

ISSRA PAPERS VOL I, 2009

CONTENTS

	Page
• Soviet Legacy in Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian Region: A Future Perspective <i>Saeed-ur-Rehman</i>	1
• Indian Quest for Strategic Ingress in Afghanistan and its Implications for Pakistan <i>Afiya Kiran</i>	12
• Contemporary Models of Conflict Resolution: Re-Visiting the Prospects of Unknotting the Kashmir Dispute <i>Yusra Mushtaq</i>	30
• The Dilemma of National Integration in Pakistan: Challenges and Prospects <i>Ijaz Hussain</i>	43
• Social Mobilization Theory and Balochistan Crisis <i>Abdul Rauf Iqbal</i>	61
• Energy Crisis in Pakistan: A Threat to National Security <i>Mehvish Nigar Qureshi</i>	72

FOREWORD

ISSRA Papers is a new endeavor of Institute for Strategic Studies; Research and Analysis (ISSRA). It would be a six monthly publication of National Defence University based on the research essays written by the Research Associates of ISSRA. The papers provide a forum for discussion and debate on the current issues impacting the national security of Pakistan. The essays of this edition deal with global, regional and internal issues written by the young researchers in these fields.

The first article of Mr. Saeed-ur-Rahman “Soviet Legacy in Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian Region: A Future Perspective” undertakes an in-depth analysis of Soviet legacy in the region. The author covers its evolutionary process, highlights its geopolitical trends and the future prospects.

In the paper titled “Indian Quest for Strategic Ingress in Afghanistan and Its Implications for Pakistan”, Ms. Afifa Kiran has analysed and discussed the growing Indian quest in Afghanistan for strategic ingression. In the backdrop of this scenario, author has analyzed the implications for Pakistan.

“Contemporary Models of Conflict Resolution: Re-Visiting the Prospects of Unknotting the Kashmir Dispute” by Ms. Yusra Mushtaq analyzes the prospects of the resolution of Kashmir dispute in the light of contemporary models of conflict resolution. It further offers some parameters with a different perspective for the settlement of the issue.

“The Dilemma of National Integration in Pakistan: Challenges and Prospects” by Mr. Ijaz Hussain highlights the issues which have potentials to either strengthen or deteriorate the process of national integration in Pakistan.

Mr. Abdul Rauf Iqbal in his article, “Balochistan Crisis: Unveiling Internal and External Factors” has explored the major internal and external factors which are directly or indirectly surfacing violence in Balochistan along with suggesting some

suitable policy measures.

Ms. Mehvish Nigar Qureshi's article on "Energy Crisis in Pakistan: A Threat to National Security" gives an account of energy deficit in Pakistan. The author has discussed the challenges facing Pakistan's energy sector. The article argues that these crises are a threat to national security of Pakistan.

While providing an overview of the various topics selected for the "ISSRA Papers 2009" I also avail this opportunity to inform our readers that all articles published in the Journal are peer reviewed by the senior faculty of ISSRA. We look forward to receive valuable comments and suggestions for further improving our publications.

Major General Azhar Ali Shah
Director General
Institute for Strategic Studies; Research & Analysis

SOVIET LEGACY IN CENTRAL ASIAN AND TRANS-CAUCASIAN REGION: A FUTURE PERSPECTIVE

Saeed-ur-Rahman

Introduction

Soviet Union was not a colonial power in the traditional sense, but had many characteristics of the imperialists and dominated the Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian region for about seventy years. With the disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991, fifteen Republics declared their independence. Soon after independence the region, which in cultural terms is an area of Turko-Persian civilization, hub of different world orders¹ and rich in natural resources, attracted the major world players. The intervention of these powers supported reviving the oppressed Islamic, Turkic and anti communist sentiments of the people.

The paper aims to highlight the roles of various powers-Iran and Turkey, active in establishing their influences by using religious and nationalistic slogans, which had been suppressed during the long term Soviet rule.

In the Soviet era the socialist bearings were imposed with full thrust in all spheres of life and oppressive methods for the introduction of atheism were used. Castigatory campaigns were launched against all the religious forces, and Islam especially was beleaguered because it was thought, to be the more reactionary and conservative of all the religions. They viewed Islam as a Mullah force and suspected it to be supported and financed by the British Imperialists to counter socialism. In this socialist repression, mosques were closed and women were forbidden to dress up according to the Islamic traditions but Islam survived itself in “Muhallahs” smaller communities rather than in populous areas.

Similarly Soviet pursued a policy of territorialization and systematic ethnicization of the population which often led to ethnic and clan conflicts. Soviet’s policy of divide and rule” was “national in form, socialist in content and in accordance with the objectives of

the Soviet leadership to undermine the supra national Islamic and pan-Turkic sentiments of the people². The leadership considered the Marxist ideology, to be the more progressive than any other ideology and their policy used to impose an ethnic representation by the republic, supervised by a high culture in the form of Sovietism.

With the independence, the leaders of these republics who had come from Soviet “Nomenclatura” became the teachers and preachers of nationalism. They had a hostile towards Russia and open to the West. This achievement of independence was sudden but not necessarily unwanted, as historically there had not been any such movements of nationalism in the region except for Georgia and Armenia. The drawn out Soviet dominancy did not cause any identity crisis to the people as, soon after independence the pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic sentiments of the people started to revive.

Moreover the different legacies left by Soviet Union including the Soviet minorities which in some states is greater than the titular nationals³ posed various problems like bilingualism, dual nationality issues, cross border infiltration and core periphery relations etc. Russia for a few years just after the independence was silent, but in Putin era, the Russian involvement in the region became prominent. Russian interest in the region is motivated by, firstly Russia considers this area as its sphere of influence and secondly the area is rich in natural resources. Efforts are underway by these various actors to increase their influence over the area and thereby get control over its vast reservoirs of oil and gas, which is likely to pose challenges to the Russian interests.

Soviet legacies

The concept of nationality was unknown in Central Asia before the coming of Soviet rule. Ethnic groups were not identified with a particular territory but lived interspersed and intermixed. States based their legitimacy on dynastic and religious factors rather than on ethnic solidarity. It was the Soviet Union, who created the nations of Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Kazakh and Azeri, and were completely artificial.⁴ Soviet policy was strategic and manipulative, designed to divide and rule the region by preventing its inhabitants from uniting in a single pan-Turkish or pan-Islamist

entity. All the Soviet institutions in Central Asia gave rise to genuine national consciousness by creating administrative culture and political habitus of nationhood⁵. Central Asian elites and population appreciated the practices of nationalism introduced by the Soviets and inflicted them with their own culture and social norms.

Similarly the Soviet's imperialistic characteristics made it a core country while the republics worked as periphery. These peripheries not only used to provide raw material for the core country but also market for the Russian goods. The whole administrative processes, resources and budget were determined by the Moscow.⁶ Different states were given a specific production task a specific quota and no attention to develop their regional economy. Most of the Central Asian republics relied on agriculture for their economic growth. In the Soviet era, the pattern of agricultural development was determined by the consumption and export needs of the centre rather than by those individual republics, leading to over reliance on a single crop as the mainstay of the economy.⁷

In Soviet era, all the skilled workers and industrial managers were Russians, after Soviet withdrawal, inadequate untrained workforce remained in these republics. It caused many social and political effects like a dualistic society made up of better non indigenous population and the poor unskilled indigenous people, and a type of dependency on the non- indigenous population. Similarly Soviet economic system was self contained,⁸ and left inadequate trade links among Central Asian republics and with neighboring countries.

Soviet era was characterized by a colonial attitude, secularization, Russification and the establishment of ethnic borders that left ethnic groups divided. Russian minorities since independence have very little mixed with ethnic people. Titular nationals were divided among lingual and regional lines. Russians in these republics, support dual nationalities, two state languages and often foment separatist movements.

Seeds of Pan-Turkic Revival

The term “pan-Turkism” is used to describe the idea of political, cultural and ethnic unity of all the Turkic speaking people. The disintegration of Soviet Union resulted in the creation of new Muslim Turkic speaking states in Central Asia and Trans-Caucasia, as well as an increased activism of Muslim population within the Russian federation. In all there were fifty four million Muslims in the former Soviet Union, more than ninety percent of whom were Turkish and organized in different sub ethnic groups like Volga, Tatars, Crimea Tatars, Kazakhs, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Azeri.⁹

At the time of independence of CARs, Turkey’s relations with these republics were less harmonious, despite the linguistic and cultural similarities between them. These newly independent republics did not want to import a new ideology, but rather to develop the broadest cultural and economic infrastructural ties with the world at large. The independence move in CARs raised hopes for Turkey, the Turkish politician who were only vaguely aware of the existence of the other Turks in the Soviet Union, rediscovered the world of about one hundred and twenty million Turkish people.¹⁰ Turkey at the time was trying to extend its model as a secular state in the Islamic world, and strengthen its economic position as a bridgehead between the East and the West. It was also making its efforts to get a leading role in the region, extending from the Adriatic Sea to China, including the Central Asian republics, the Caucasus region, the Black Sea and the Balkans.¹¹

Turkey’s long borders with Soviet Union, neighbor of Iran and Syria-enemies of Israel, important position in the Gulf War, gave it a strategic and reliable position in the western camp. During the independence years of the Central Asian Republics, the Turkish economy was heading for crisis, therefore it did not provide the economic aid in the desired quantity. However in the cultural sphere, when Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel visited Central Asia, he announced to support a program of expanded cultural contacts, including satellite T.V broadcasts and scholarships for Central Asian and Caucasian students to study in Turkey. The Turko-Soviet successor states regarded Turkey as one of the best economic partners. From the very start Azerbaijan had intense

relations with Turkey to get technical and cultural assistance to counter Russia.¹²

A meeting in Antalya-Turkey was held in which the deputy Parliamentary Speakers of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkey signed a protocol to create an inter-parliamentary assembly of the Turkish speaking people. Moreover Turkish cabinet of ministers decided to lift visa requirements for post Soviet states.¹³ Ankara's decision to lift visa requirements aims to pursue its expansive intentions¹⁴ and gather all the Turkic speaking people on one platform.

The present day Russia has significant Russian minorities within its borders and an upsurge in pan-Turkism could lead certain regions like Tataristan, Baskirdistan and Yakuistan to seek independence.¹⁵ Russia was angered by the pro-Turkish stance, which the Azeri government adopted in its policy following independence. Russia provided encouragement and finances to ethnic communities inside Azerbaijan to resist the government's policy of Turkification and pursue its policy of "divide and conquer."

Turkey, working in close collaboration with the European Union and a long outstanding ally of the United States, makes efforts to create a natural gas pipeline running from Central Asia across the Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan and Turkey into the Mediterranean and reduce the EU's dependence on Russian energy pipelines.¹⁶ In response, Russian government devised plans with the governments of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to construct a pipeline that will pump gas from Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan to Russia, which will not only increase Russia's control over Turkmen gas reserves but Russia would also export its gas to Europe more profitably. In the region as a whole but particularly in the Caucasus, Russia, Iran and Turkey use ethnic tensions as a mean to impede their competitor's ability to gain a solid handle on energy resources.¹⁷

Islamic Renaissance vs. Secular Approaches

Historically speaking, in Soviet era when Stalin was in power, restrictions against religious practices had been a central aspect of government policies. Stalin disbanded the Islamic revolutionists to suppress any unrest in the region.¹⁸ Many Islamists fled to Afghanistan along with their followers and Stalin re-drew the borders to divide the region into many socialist republics. This demarcation of borders was not in accordance with the geographical or ethnic consideration of the people but “to consolidate the Russian rule and suppress any kind of opposition in the region.”¹⁹

The Sovietization of the region involved a massive assault on Islam. Religious properties were confiscated: mosques and Madrassas were closed and destroyed, the Ulema were persecuted²⁰ and the Soviet Muslims were isolated from contacts with the rest of the Muslim world. The years around the breaking of the Soviet Union are characterized by a sense among the Muslims that seventy years of Soviet rule and repression of religion had made them forget, what it means to be a Muslim.²¹

Perestroika and Glasnost, in which the liberalization of social and political policies took place, allowed the Muslims to reestablish their organizational framework. This trend intensified with the collapse of Soviet Union, and resulted in a huge number of Madrassas across Central Asia. In Afghan Soviet war, those Central Asian people, who had been recruited in the Red Army to fight for their communist masters against their co-religionists,²² were taken as war prisoners in Afghanistan. Those prisoners of war were indoctrinated and got impressed with Mujahideen ideology. Soon after disintegration of the Soviet, the elites in the newly independent states were looking towards the Russian model while the dissatisfied youth having conservative and aggressive nature towards the un-Islamic practices looked at the Muslim states as model. They strengthened the ethnic and anti Russian sentiments in the region. Similarly some external factors like the long border with the war ravaged Afghanistan helped the insurgents move freely across the borders. Opposition within the state or in exile used Islam as a “campaign winning slogan” to get popular support. Moreover Iran

and Turkey are also likely to use religion for expanding their influence in the region.

After independence of these CARs and TCRs, religious schools were opened, religious literature became available, programs on religion Islam broadcasted on Radio and Television, republics recognized Islam as one of the foundations of the national culture and laws on religious associations were passed. Hizb-ul-Tahrir- an international organization, having the vision of establishing the caliphate system and unifying the whole Muslim Ummah became active. Similarly Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is a militant organization and having close links with Taliban and Al-Qaeda started insurgencies and hostages. Similarly, in Tajikistan the Islamic Renaissance Party contributed in the outbreak of civil war and opposed the continuation of the former communist regimes. Other militant groups also got influence and power in the region, who wanted to overthrow all the secular regimes.

The Iranian support of Shia community in Azerbaijan raised the Islamists there. Dozens of Iranian preachers and organizations actively engaged in various religious activities. Dozens of mosques and Madrassas were opened. This growing militancy in the region poses serious threats to the interests of the secular regimes. On the one hand the communist minded ruling elites of Central Asia and Transcaucasia can best serve the Russian interests but on the other hand the growing radical Islamism is totally antagonistic to the Russian secular appraisal. The Islamists not only try to contain the Russian interests but also struggle to overthrow the secular regimes in the region. The American intervention in Afghanistan further escalated the insurgent movements across the Central Asian borders, which is a serious security threat to Russia or any power in the region.

Central Asia's Openness to the West and Russia Centric Compulsions

For Russia, relations with the Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian Republics is not a part of the new Great Game, as this region has been under Soviet dominancy for about seventy years.

The decade of 1990,s was an era of lack of influence of Russia and especially after the U.S intervention in Afghanistan attracted the other powers to intervene in the region. In the mid 1990's, Russian policy started taking a greater stance, and in 2000 when Putin came into power he focused his policy objectives towards his neighbors. The clear policy objectives were never defined but Russia called it near abroad and the area was a top priority of Moscow.

Russia constructed its policy on two bases that is “security and economy.”²³ Both these policy objectives could be pursued by geographical, cultural, social and economical heritages, left by the Soviet Union. Central Asian and Trans-Caucasian republics have authoritarian leadership, which often receive criticism from the west for their lack of democratic credentials. And the Russian policy “not to criticize the leaders”²⁴ get grooming to pursue its goals. Similarly Russian policy of youth education, Russian language channels and buying up Central Asian companies further raise its profile. These are some resources which the other intervening actors lack.

The EU is a new actor with growing interests in the region. It seeks stability in the area out of fear of overspill effects of war in Afghanistan and an access to the oil and gas reserves. The EU's strategy for Central Asia is welcomed in the region, where countries look for alternatives to Russia's economic and security dominance. Its interests are less likely to collide in Central Asia but in Caucasia there are some policy implications for EU. It is because its access to Central Asia is geographically and economically blocked by Russia. In security realm, Central Asia works as a buffer zone for Russia. The Kremlin is of the view that stability can be obtained by supportive, healthy and non critical relations with Central Asia and by making a variety of regional organization like CSTO and SCO.

NATO is another competitor of Russia in Central Asia. NATO needs these republics for access to Afghanistan. The NATO forces in Afghanistan if become unable to control the situation, it would have bad consequences for Russian security. Because the militants movements, which already have roots in these republics can expand to CARs and TCRs, and would affect the Russian security interests in the region. Russia signaled an interest in

discussing Afghanistan in NATO-Russian Council (NRC), but this move suspended when Russia invaded NATO partner Georgia for its tilt towards the European Union. The Russian aggression on Georgia revealed the fact that any intervention by the external actor for its influence building in the Russian sphere of influence would never be tolerated.²⁵

A three sided diplomatic scrum is intensifying in Central Asia. U.S.A, Russian and Chinese officials are stepping up their efforts to make energy export deals with the regional leaders. Russia seems to be the most aggressive diplomatic actor, engaged in efforts to maintain its influence, while Washington is interested to maintain its position in Caspian Basin and China is quietly, but persistently making economic inroads in Central Asia with the main aim of securing the energy, the country needs to keep its economy growing.

The Uzbekistan's move to evict the U.S troops from its base is a proof of how the Russian influence nourishes in the region. After that the Kyrgyz government declared to evacuate the Manas airbase from the U.S forces. Soon after this declaration a meeting was held in Moscow in which the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev promised an aid package to Kyrgyzstan worth 2 billion dollars.²⁶ The decision to close the Manas base is driven by Moscow's opposition to the U.S military presence in a region that it has for centuries regarded at its sphere of influence. The Russian ruling elites clearly see the reestablishment of Moscow's influence in the former Soviet republics and if the Central Asian leaders draw their hand of co-operation, it can increase Washington's dependency on Moscow.

Conclusion

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent states in Central Asia and Caucasia provided an opportunity for the new powers to intervene in the region. Turkey and Iran are trying to avail this opportunity and explore new political and economic roles in the region. Turkey shares ethnic and linguistic ties with the Turkic states of Central Asia while Iran shares a common language with Tajikistan and the same religion Islam with

all the Central Asian Republics. Both Turkey and Iran are making efforts to pursue their interests by raising the slogans of pan-Turkism and Islamism. Islam and nationalism, which had been suppressed during the Soviet era, started reviving. The Central Asian states borders with the war ravaged Afghanistan, allow movements of Islamists across the borders. Similarly Islam is used as a campaign winning slogan by opposition within and outside the country. This growing militant Islam not only produces instability in the region but also poses serious threats to the Russian interests in the region. Similarly most of these republics have a Turkic speaking origin, which is used by Turkey as a slogan of nationalism to gather the people of these republics under Turkish nationalism.

Central Asia is a hub of different world orders and many world players struggle to build their influence in the region. China, U.S.A, E.U, Russia and NATO, all are stepping up their efforts to get an access to the energy reserves of these republics. Both Russia and U.S.A are the most aggressive diplomatic actors while China is quietly, but persistently making its economic inroads in the region. The Central Asian leaders wish an outreach to the West, and the Russia which perceives the growing influence of these external players as a threat to its interests, makes efforts to rebuild its influence by its legacies, left in the region. The Iranian and Turkish intervention in the region could easily be facilitated by their slogans of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. On the other hand the Russian influence in the region would also try to survive and its future prospects would depend on, how much Russia tries to curtail influence building of external powers in these republics.

Notes

-
- ¹ Tahir Amin, "World Orders in Central Asia" A research paper pp-1
 - ² Mehwish Hassan, Sara. "Resurgence of Islam in Central Asia: A case study of Uzbekistan." http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2006_files/no_2/article/a7.htm
 - ³ Shireen T. Hunter, *Central Asia since Independence* (Washington: The Centre for Strategic and International studies Publisher, 1996), pp.3-4.
 - ⁴ Oliver Roy, "The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations," London (2000) xvii.
 - ⁵ Ibid.
 - ⁶ Shireen T. Hunter, *Central Asia since Independence* (Washington: The Centre for Strategic and International studies Publisher, 1996), p.66.

-
- ⁷ Ibid. p.67
- ⁸ Ibid. p.70
- ⁹ John C.K.Daly, “ Pan-Turkism takes step forward in Eurasia, Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume:5 Issue: 39.
- ⁷ Freddy De. Pauw, “Turkey’s policies in Transcaucasia” available on, www.poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/ch0801.htm, retrieved on 15th April 2009.
- ⁸ Gordon, Feller “ Turkey’s new government looking again to the Caucasus and Central asia” Oct.2005.
- ¹² John C.K.Daly, “ The Rebirth of Pan-Turkism” Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC. Jan, 2008.
- ¹⁰ Gulnoza, Saidazimova, “Central Asia: Turkey lifts visa requirements for post Soviet states” Huliq News. July 31, 2007.
- ¹⁴ Freddy De. Pauw, “Turkey’s policies in Transcaucasia” available on, www.poli.vub.ac.be/publi/ContBorders/eng/ch0801.htm, retrieved on 15th April 2009
- ¹¹ John C.K.Daly, “ Pan-Turkism takes step forward in Eurasia, Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume:5 Issue: 39
- ¹² Jos Boonstra, “Russia and Central Asia: From Disinterest to Eager Leadership,” EUCAM Project. Madrid
- ¹⁷ “The Great Game”,available on <http://homepage.ntlworld.com>. Retrieved on, 20th April 2009.
- ¹⁸ Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.36
- ¹⁵ Mehwish Hassan, Sara. “Resurgence of Islam in Central Asia: A case study of Uzbekistan.” http://www.issi.org.pk/journal/2006_files/no_2/article/a7.htm
- ²⁰ Ibid.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.78.
- ¹⁹ Jos Boonstra, “Russia and Central Asia: From Disinterest to Eager Leadership,” EUCAM Project. Madrid
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ Ibid.
- ²⁶ Taiwan News, “Russia makes its move, U.S loses Kyrgyzstan Airbase.” 9 February 2009.

INDIAN QUEST FOR STRATEGIC INGRESS IN AFGHANISTAN AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN

Afifa Kiran

Introduction

Indian foreign policy interests in her immediate neighborhood, particularly in Afghanistan have been analyzed in conventional paradigm or mostly from Indian perspective. While studying Indian foreign policy postures in last eight years, it is evident that from exercising covert and overt use of hard power, she has adopted the use of soft power as a foreign policy means to expand her area of influence in the regional politics. For India, Afghanistan's geo-strategic importance is manifold in terms of political, strategic and economic gains in the presence of major players in the country. Indian policy makers know that strategic presence and foothold in country like Afghanistan would give impetus to the Indian strategic objectives and affix a stamp over Indian claim of being a major global power.

Historically, India and Afghanistan have maintained close and cordial relations except for the Taliban era. India had totally backed Afghanistan to continue propaganda against Pakistan to serve her own interests. At the time of Russian invasion of Afghanistan, India and her intelligence agencies provided full support to the USSR against the Taliban. Again 9/11 provided an opportunity to India to make inroads in Afghanistan particularly after the Bonn Agreement 2001. Since then, India has followed a policy of high-level engagement with Afghanistan.

Presently, India is one of the primary donors towards Afghanistan's reconstruction. Apart from providing aircraft to Afghan Ariana Airlines, India has been active in building roads, schools, hospitals, power and communication networks, besides training Afghan military and police. Here, the question arises whether Pakistan should also accept these developments as India projects? Apparently, India is pursuing such power projection tools for becoming a great power, and has been or is developing all the

tools for achieving that status but the focus of these developments directly or indirectly is to outflank Pakistan at domestic, regional and eventually at international levels. India's such foreign policy postures pose serious challenges to Pakistan's security, which cannot be ignored while dealing with the perilous situation against the militants within the country.

Why Afghanistan is Important for India?

Before analyzing Indian foreign policy tools for power projection, it is important to understand Indian quest to get foothold in Afghanistan. Ostensibly, India claims that her increased involvement in Afghanistan is aimed at bringing stability in the country; however, the real drives behind her strategic pursuits are yet to be known to the world. On the contrary, Dr Subhash Kapila argued that Afghanistan is not the exclusive strategic preserve of the Pakistan Army and Pakistan. Besides, India's strategic stakes in Afghanistan's stability, similar strategic stakes emanate from Iran, Russia, and Central Asian Republics.¹ The following factors clearly draw the outline of the vested economic interests of India in Afghanistan:-

- **Economic Interests**
 - For India, Afghanistan is a potential route for access to Central Asian energy.
 - India is looking Afghanistan as a base to counter China's growing influence in Central Asian economic and energy sectors.
 - India is building a port in Chabahar in Iran, which could connect to the Iranian hinterland, and thereby transport Indian goods to Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan completely.
 - Afghanistan is potential market for Indian goods and business. Bilateral trade between India and Afghanistan has been on the rise, reaching \$216 million for the fiscal year of April 2006 to March 2007.

- Ensure her presence and influence in any oil/gas pipeline project, which runs through Afghanistan's territory to Pakistan.
- **Indian Economic Policy in Afghanistan.** India has reinforced her economic interests in Afghanistan through adopting following means:-
 - Use of political levers to capture market in Afghanistan.
 - Creation of economic dependency through control of capital and investments.
 - Participation in agriculture/water power plants projects jointly and exclusively.
 - Building resilience through calibrated engagement in Afghan politics.
 - Proactively defending her interests through providing full support to Indian business community to invest in small and mega projects.
- **Strategic Interests.** Sitting right at the defining moment of Central and South Asia, called 'Afghanistan', India's objective is clear: to control and influence Afghan nation with a view to winning friendship, investment and political support against Pakistan. Strategic interests can be enumerated as under:-
 - Deny Pakistan any political/strategic, or economic influence in Afghanistan.
 - Maintain maximum presence of Indians in all sectors of Afghanistan, particularly in security and economic establishments.
 - Have pro India Afghan govt.
 - Establish a counter front against China's economic and political ingress in CARs .
 - Provide alternate land route against Gawader/ Karachi sea port to CARs and Afghanistan.

Indian Foreign Policy Tools for Power Projection in South Asia. India with sizeable hard power assets has so far been able to exert limited regional influence; therefore, she has adopted means of soft power to effectively project her power in regional politics during the recent years.

Indian Soft Power Image - Sphere of Influence.

Soft power, as described by Joseph Nye, “is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced”.² Going by with this definition, India is astutely expanding her area of influence in South/Central Asia. Indian Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru once remarked about Indian relations with Afghanistan:

‘Ever since India’s independence, we have grown closer to each other, for a variety of reasons. The long memory of our past was there, and the moment it was possible to renew them, we renewed them. And then came mutual interest, (our common hostility towards Pakistan) which is a powerful factor.’

The smart illustration of India's efforts to use soft power as a tool of foreign policy came recently in Afghanistan. With the end of Taliban era in Afghanistan, India has been active on more fronts than Pakistan, partly owing to its closer ties with the former Northern Alliance members of Karzai’s government³. Indian development projects and humanitarian aid has changed the public perception regarding Indian nefarious designs in Afghanistan. Through such investments, viz building of some cultural, educational, and scientific institutions, she is making the people of Afghanistan culturally more close to India. Major development projects, having direct or indirect implications for Pakistan, carried out by Indians are as follows:-

- India's most prominent investment is building of road network from the town of Delaram in Herat province on the Kandahar–Herat highway to Zaranj town on the Afghanistan–Iran border.
- Hydel project, the Salma Dam, on the Hari Rud river at Chisht-e-Sharif. (This is in Herat province in western Afghanistan.)
- Infrastructure project in Northern Afghanistan for building transmission lines and sub-stations, to bring Uzbek electricity to Kabul and intermediate cities.
- Built the 220 KV line over the Salang pass, over 4,000 metres high,
- Cold storage facility in Kandahar, Southern Afghanistan (Kandahar is a huge fruits production centre. It produces over 35,000 tons of pomegranates of which India is the major importer.
- Since January 2009, India has begun construction of the Afghan parliament building.
- 500 Afghan students go to India every year on ICCR (*Indian Council for Cultural Relations*) scholarships for undergraduate and graduate studies.
- India also trains 500 Afghan public servants each year in India (Both the scholarships and training slots are being expanded significantly in 2009).
- Air links between Afghanistan and India have been established.

Capacity-building of Afghan Armed Forces. India has offered security assistance and provided training for the Afghan national army. India has been regularly training Afghan officers and other ranks at her military training institutions, ranging from the National Defence Academy at Khadakwasla to the School of Artillery at Devlali. India has also posted some army officers in Afghanistan to teach basic military fieldcraft and English skills to the Afghan army, apart from sending several military doctors to help at hospitals in Kandahar.

Indian Paramilitary troops in Afghanistan. India has sent a company of paramilitary troops to protect the engineers working on

the road construction projects. This placement of Indian troops is close to the western frontier of Pakistan. India is increasing the number of its military personnel in Afghanistan on the pretext of providing security to the Border Roads Organization, indicating that the strength of Indian troops had reached almost a company size.⁴

Indian Tools for Power Projection in Afghanistan

- **The Indian Lobby.** Indian diaspora in Afghanistan has enabled two countries to work together and changed Afghan foreign policy in favour of Indian interests in the region. The political partnership in general, and the huge investment in specific, between the two countries is the culmination of many years of efforts by the India lobby. Currently, Indian diplomats have been penetrated deep into Afghan politics and exert considerable influence in Afghan decision-making process.
- **Indian Cultural Diplomacy.** India supports the Afghan government through economic aid, public diplomacy and non-military assistance. It has established various cultural centers in Kabul, which provides vocational trainings to the Afghans.
- **Developmental Aid.** India has committed aid to Afghanistan in the 2002-09 period amounting to \$750 million, making it the fifth largest bilateral donor after the United States, Britain, Japan and Germany. Pakistan in turn has committed \$200 million in the same period and is still hosting over 2 million Afghan refugees.
- **Indian Embassy/ Consulates.**
 - There are approximately 3,000-4,000 Indian nationals working on several such projects across Afghanistan. India has two consulates in the south near Pakistan's two provinces:
 - Balochistan
 - NWFP/ Tribal belt.
 - One Indian consulate is located in Kandahar. The other one is located close to the airport in Lashkar Gah, capital of the Helmand

province. Besides its embassy in Kabul and consulate in Mazare- Sharif (both in Northern Afghanistan), India has reopened its consulates in cities of Kandahar (Southern Afghanistan), Herat, (Western Afghanistan) and Jalalabad (Eastern Afghanistan).⁵ (Map Attached)

- **Indian Media.** Soft power is “India's greatest asset” in Afghanistan, writes Shashi Tharoor, former Under-Secretary-General at the United Nations. The local as well as international media has vocally supported the India’s growing role and presence in Afghanistan. On the other hand, Pakistan’s media has an embittered view of its involvement, saying that its aid is wasted on an ungrateful Afghanistan, which has become the root of Pakistan’s national security problems.⁶
- **RAW in Afghanistan.** During the Soviet war in Afghanistan, Pakistan became a front-line state in thwarting the Soviet invasion. At that time, India aided the Soviets through RAW and provided full assistance to KGB and Afghan spy agency Khad against Pakistan through sabotage, sedition, subversion and acts of terrorism. The seeds of rebellion were sown in Balochistan, the fires of which are now again being stoked by Indian spy agency RAW⁷. Sarobi is the nerve centre headed by an Indian General officer, who also commands the Border Road Organisation (BRO). Dissidents from Pakistan are trained at Sarobi for missions inside NWFP. Kandahar has its forward bases at Lashkargah and Nawah Their target area is our province of Balochistan. The dissidents from Balochistan are trained at Lashkargah for undertaking missions in Balochistan as well as in support of the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).⁸ Approximately 600 *ferraris*, or Baluchi tribal dissidents, are getting specialized training to handle explosives, engineer bomb blasts, and use sophisticated weapons in these camps.⁹

The Foreign Policy magazine has also recently confirmed that the Indians were neck deep in supporting the TTP in Pakistan:

“While the U.S. media has frequently reported on Pakistani ties to jihadi elements launching attacks in Afghanistan, it has less often mentioned that India supports insurgent forces attacking Pakistan. “The Indians are up to their necks in supporting the Taliban against the Pakistani government in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” a former intelligence official who served in both countries said. “The same anti-Pakistani forces in Afghanistan also shooting at American soldiers are getting support from India. India should close its diplomatic establishments in Afghanistan and get the Christ out of there.”¹⁰

Afghan officials have also confirmed that India is using Afghanistan to stir trouble in Pakistan. Afghan Government’s Advisor, Ehsanullah Aryanazai said on the sidelines of Pak-Afghan Parliamentary Jirga at a Pakistani hotel on April 2, 2009 that:-

“India is using Afghan soil to destabilize Pakistan and Afghan security agencies are unable to stop Indian intervention due to absence of centralized government mechanism.”

Working with Power Players in Afghanistan

US. Post 9/11 American game plans in Afghanistan brought pro Indian forces in Kabul with unparalleled accumulation of power in the hands of Northern Alliance.¹¹ Afghan Govt’s support to India for using its soil as a base of operations against Pakistan clearly reflects that the US is aware of the cooperation and the input of substantial quantity of direct and indirect weapons and financial support to the jihad, criminal and terrorist movements operating inside Pakistan.

Convergence of Indo-US Interests in Afghanistan. US and India are working closely for protecting their interests in Afghanistan beside collaboration on range of regional and global issues. It includes following:- .

- Monitor Pakistan's activities regarding its strategic assets including nuclear deterrence capabilities.
- To control Afghanistan for access to the Central Asian oil and gas reserves.
- To counter China's growing political and economic ingress in Central Asia through maintaining and increasing their military presence in Afghanistan.
- Have friendly Afghan Government to support their common interests in the region.
- Deny Pakistan any strategic depth in Afghanistan through supporting Northern Alliance.
- Use Afghanistan as a base to control any oil/gas and energy projects initiated in the region through controlling power politics in Afghanistan.
- Closely influence Pakistan's internal issues according to their own interest like FATA, Balochistan, Water issue, etc.
- India though subversive activities wants China to abandon the huge development projects inside the Pakistani province of Balochistan.

Despite Pakistan's serious demur against Indian growing involvement in Afghanistan, United States has in turn encouraged Indian trade, investment, and assistance to the Central Asian States and Afghanistan. Afghanistan's entry into SAARC and signing of Indo-Afghan free trade area are clear reflection of this support. Although some US officials have realized as State Department adviser Lisa Curtis urged that it is in India's interest to ensure that its involvement in Afghanistan is transparent to Pakistan, and the US has a role to play in ensuring this.¹² Such statements become relevant in context to the announcements made by the Obama Administration, which call for "regional diplomacy" with key players in order to solve the Afghanistan issue. As Richard Holbrooke, in a press conference (April 8, 2009) in New Delhi,

pointed out that India, Pakistan, and the US face a common challenge and that India's full involvement in "settling issues like Afghanistan" is indispensable. T.C.A. Raghavan, a senior Indian diplomat overseeing the Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran division in the External Affairs Ministry, recently welcomed the 'Af-Pak' approach of developing a "coordinated policy" on Afghanistan and Pakistan. "We have always seen [the region] as a single issue," he said during a seminar on March 18 2009, organized by the Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad Institute for Asian Studies.

Iran. Iran enjoys considerable influence in Afghan politics. Since long, India has been exploiting anti-Taliban approach of Iran to forge closer relations with Afghanistan and secure her economic interests. Currently, India and Iran are facing cold relations due to India's support to IAEA and providing Iran specific satellite for Israel. However, Iran, India, and Afghanistan had signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in January 2003, to improve Afghanistan's access to the coast. Under this agreement, Iran is building a new transit route to connect Milak in the southeast of the country to Zaranj in Afghanistan, and has already completed an important bridge over the Helmand River.¹³

Russia. Russia also share its due interest in building Zarang-Dilaram route as this would link Afghanistan's Garland Road under India- Iran –Russia, north-south trade corridor. In this context, both the countries are working closely to deny the re-emergence of the Taliban to protect the trade route between India, Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Consequently, as past, both India and Russia would keep the Northern Alliance strengthen through providing support militarily and politically.

Pakistan's Apprehensions towards Indians Expanding Role

Some Indian analysts mistakenly contend that India should commit itself militarily to Afghanistan and see Indian's contribution as essential for the security and stability of the region. Recently, US President, Obama in his new policy towards Afghanistan and Pakistan, released in March 2009, has named India for greater role in Afghanistan. In response to all these developments, Pakistan has

openly expressed her apprehensions that India is using Afghanistan as a base to create unrest in Balochistan and Waziristan.

India spends around \$1.2 billion plus in Afghanistan. India itself is a poor country. Is it worth it? Such huge investment by India clearly indicates her ambitious goals in the region and beyond. On the other hand, India has successfully managed to acquire a facility in Farkhor, Tajikistan, which may house MI-17 helicopter gunships. Till date, air base follows up on a hospital and logistics depot constructed by the Indians. Sushant K Singh, in his article titled, 'Indian presence essential in Afghanistan' comments that Pakistani state will be denied the strategic depth it seeks by installing a favorable dispensation in Afghanistan. The Pakistani establishment will be compelled to divert its energies from their eastern to their northern borders. Loud protests can be anticipated from Pakistan against India's active military involvement in the region, but the involvement of the United States will restrict Pakistani antipathy to voluble complaints."¹⁴

Implications for Pakistan. The flow of massive aid under the guise of humanitarian relief, building of infrastructure, training of public sector human resources by the Indians, are the serious indicators of the future prospects for large scale economic, political and military cooperation aiming at marginalizing Pakistan's future role in Afghanistan¹⁵. Such scenario presents following economic and security implications for Pakistan:-

➤ **Economic**

- Through establishing road links to Iranian port of Chahbhar, India is attempting to undermine strategic importance of Gawader port for Afghanistan and CARs. Although, Indian participation in the construction of Chabahar and a road linking it to Afghanistan is more of a propaganda than a real strategic deal. The only feasible and shortest trade route for Indian trade with Central Asian countries is the land route that passes through Pakistan. Chabahar route is an impossible

dream for Indian trade due to its length, increased taxation and duties, and sea/land switch-overs.

- Pakistani goods/ and business is directly affected when it comes in direct comparison of Indian goods and would have a long- term impact on Pakistan economy.

➤ **Security**

- It is said that India-Afghanistan relations have been a classical case of Kautilyan's theory, that is an 'enemy's enemy is (a) friend'. India, in case of a war between Pakistan and Afghanistan, would be able to open the second front against Pakistan on the North-West Frontier.
- India has financed the construction of a road in Afghans' Nimroz province linked to the Iranian border, which has its own long-term implications due to following reasons :-
 - Firstly, demographically the province is dominated by the Baloch and the Pushtuns.
 - Secondly, it is the only border province that shares a border with both Pakistan and Iran.
 - Thirdly, the project was expected to provide a major impetus to trade links with Afghanistan and extend it to Central Asia as it would not only shorten the trade route, via the port of Chabahar (Iran) and then by road into Afghanistan, by over 1400 kms, but it would also free Indo-Afghan trade from being constrained by Pakistan.
- Indian arms/weapons are being flooded through Afghanistan to Pakistan's security prone areas.
- Through active participation and collaboration with other power players in


Afghanistan, India is becoming successful to eradicate Pakistani influence in major sector of the country.

- Pakistan's internal security is under threat particularly, security of FATA and Balochistan.

Recommendations

- Pakistan should deepen its engagement in reform and capacity building of Afghanistan's social sector through organizing training programmes and sharing expertise in various fields.
- Pakistan's diplomatic diaspora should engage in back channel dialogue with reconcilable elements in the Afghan politics, if Pakistan is to retain and build upon its hard won influence in the country. In this way, supporting pro Pakistan elements in the political mainstream could have a moderating effect in future Afghan-Pak relations.
- Pakistan must have an active contribution in any policy initiative or strategy on countering terror or addressing the issue of narco trafficking and support to existing programmes run by international collaboration in Afghanistan.
- Pakistan also needs to work on her government policy tools for countering Indian influence in Afghan politics through public diplomacy as defined by Nye, "Public diplomacy includes, daily communications, which involves explaining the context of domestic and foreign policy decisions...strategic communications, in which a set of simple themes is developed, much like what occurs in a political or advertising campaign...the development of lasting relationships with key individuals over many years through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences, and access to media channels".¹⁶

- Pakistani government should exploit public-to-public contact through common language and culture., especially in the realms of increased educational exchanges.
- Deployment of Pakistani doctors, teachers, technicians and social workers can have deep effects on Afghan society. Government should encourage such deployment in all sectors of the country.
- India is attempting robustly to isolate Pakistan in her own neighborhood, therefore Pakistan needs to closely monitor and engage with regional and extra regional actors jointly especially US, Iran, China and CARs in Afghanistan.
- Pakistan must build its strategic communication in Afghanistan to increase its visibility in Afghanistan based on following:-



- In this way, Pakistan would be able to achieve the following:-
 - **Long term.** Establishment and maintenance of credibility and mutual trust through cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries.
 - **Short term.** Ingress in Afghan society through credible information dissemination having all available media on board.
 - **Counter Psychological Operations.** Public Affairs and media operations for domestic audiences prepared by India through her cultural centres can be countered by


- formulating psychological operational strategy.
- Media's role in protecting Pakistan's interests within and outside has been ruled out since long. Nevertheless, comprehensive media policy backed by proactive foreign policy towards Afghanistan would change the local and regional approaches/public opinion in favour of Pakistan dramatically.
 - Pakistan should proactively pursue the proposed project, called the "Trans-Afghan Pipeline," going from the Daulatabad gas fields in Turkmenistan to Multan/Gwadar, through Afghanistan.
 - Afghanistan's population is heavily dependent upon Pakistan for the import of wheat, rice, grains; Pakistan must exploit such economic levers against Indians in Afghanistan through regulating these imports under sustainable government policy.

Conclusion

Many Afghans say that India and Pakistan are fighting a proxy war in their war-ravaged country. However, Afghanistan is facilitating India towards her expansionist designs and she is utilizing a two-pronged policy: Hard Power and diplomatic cum soft power tools. The former entails military cohesion, economic interaction and aid packages etc. The latter calls for cultural exports, public relations campaigns and cinema to make Indian culture/society more tempting and appealing. Moreover, these developments are fully supported by other regional players like US, Russia, Iran and to some extent Central Asian Republics. However, it is said that India's greater participation in Afghanistan depends on to what extent the Americans are willing to accommodate India's strategic interests. At this stage, Pakistan should make Western scholars and many important players of President Barack Obama's administration understand our concerns, vis-à-vis India, if they want Pakistan to fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. But at the same time, while looking into Pakistan's counter policy against Indian growing influence in Afghanistan, the result can be drawn that measures taken by Intelligence services or Pakistani Army are not enough.

Pakistan needs comprehensive and proactive counter policy backed by our political elites against Indians strategic quest in Afghanistan. Our foreign policy makers should have a vision to view these developments, which are taking place dramatically in regional politics, affecting Pakistan's national security interests within and without quite adversely.

In view of the foregoing, it has become evident that Indian interests revolve around her desire for political and military hegemony, obsessive drive for control of natural resources and expansion of military bases, encircling Pakistan. There is no reason to doubt that Indian strategic quest in Afghanistan is motivated by her self-interest and not to stabilize Afghanistan as they project. There is also convincing evidence that geo political and geo strategic location of Afghanistan is an important motivational factor for India to gain pro Afghan govt through huge investment in the country. It is not wrong to assume that if prevailing Indian imperialistic designs are allowed to continue, then Pakistan should be ready to see Indian presence on both of its eastern and western borders.



Notes

-
- ¹ Dr. Subhash Kapila, “Afghanistan: India Has Legitimate Strategic Interests In Its Stability”, South Asian Analysis Group, 15-Apr-2009, available online at <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers32%5Cpaper3149.html>.
- ² Joseph Nye, “Springing Tiger” India Today (September 25, 2006). Available online at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/ksgnews/Features/opeds/092506_nye.htm.
- ³ Jehangir Pocha, “The Rising Soft Power of India and China, New Perspectives” Quarterly, volume 20#1, Winter 2003, Available online at http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive/2003_winter/pocha.html
- ⁴ Furzana Shaheen, “Kabul’s fake friend” Daily News, 21 Feb 2008 Available online at <http://dailymailnews.com>
- ⁵ Ahmed Quraishi, “Indian Army Major-General Runs Terrorist Camps Inside Afghanistan”, 26 July 2009, Available online at www.defence.pk/.../30627-indian-army-major-general-runs-terrorist-camps-inside-afghanistan.html
- ⁶ Raja Karthikeya Gundu and Teresita C. Schaffer, “India and Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sports” South Asia Monitor, Center for Strategic and International Studies. April 3 2008.
- ⁷ General Mirza Aslam Baig, “This Is How Afghanistan Is Used Against Pakistan And China”, Pakistan Think Tank, 2 Nov 2007, Available online at http://www.ahmedquraishi.com/article_detail.php?id=135
- ⁸ Ibid
- ⁹ ibid
- ¹⁰ Laura Rozen, “India Playing With Fire by Supporting TTP”, May 23, 2009, Available online at <http://pakistanakhudahafiz.wordpress.com/2009/05/23/india-playing-with-fire-by-supporting-ttp/May%2023%202009>
- ¹¹ Qadar Bakhsh Baloch, Abdul Hafeez Khan Niazi, “Indian Encroachment in Afghanistan: A New Imperialism in the Making”, available online at [www.qurtuba.edu.pk/.../02 Indian%20Encroachment %20in%20Afghanistan.pdf](http://www.qurtuba.edu.pk/.../02%20Indian%20Encroachment%20in%20Afghanistan.pdf)
- ¹² Lisa Curtis, Address to the House of Representatives, National security and Foreign Sub Committee, April 1, 2009.
- ¹³ Kanchan Lakshman, “Fault lines” Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant Editor, Conflict & Resolution, South Asia Terrorism Portal, 19 April 2009
- ¹⁴ Sushant K Singh, “Indian presence essential in Afghanistan”, International Relations and Security Network (ISN), 06 Aug 2008, <http://www.defence.pk/forums/india-defence/13287-indian-presence-essential-afghanistan.html>
- ¹⁵ Ibid
- ¹⁶ Joshua Kurlantzick's, “Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World”, 2007

“CONTEMPORARY MODELS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: RE-VISITING THE PROSPECTS OF UNKNOTTING THE KASHMIR DISPUTE”

Yusra Mushtaq

Introduction

The Kashmir conflict has multiple dimensions and is defined by a complex intersection of an international dispute with sources of conflict, internal to the disputed territory and its Indian and Pakistan – controlled parts. Any approach to resolving this multi-layered conflict must necessarily involve multiple, but connected and mutually reinforcing, tracks or axes of engagement and dialogue.¹

The Kashmir conflict is the outcome of a process of neglect, discrimination, suppression of Kashmiri identity. It directly affects peace and stability of the South Asian subcontinent. The region contains a large segment of human race. The dispute reaped three wars and the possibility of a fourth war- - probably a nuclear holocaust is looming large. The major contenders of the dispute are Pakistan, India and Kashmiris. For Pakistan, without the resolution of the Kashmir conflict, there cannot be peace and stability in Islamabad-New Delhi relations. Whereas for India, Kashmir may be a major issue negatively affecting Indo-Pakistan relations, but is certainly not the core issue as repeatedly stated by Pakistan. The hard line positions taken by India and Pakistan on the Kashmir conflict resulted into stalemate in their relations, heavy defence expenditures and ineffectiveness of regional cooperation in South Asia. On the contrary, Indo-Pak tension over Kashmir reached new levels after the outbreak of an uprising in the Indian controlled Valley of Kashmir in the late 1980s.² Conceiving a plausible solution of the Kashmir conflict within the parameters of maintaining the state structures, order, fairness and justice is an uphill task.

The essay aims to explore and analyze the prospects of the resolution of Kashmir dispute in the light of contemporary models

of conflict resolution. It further offers some parameters with a different perspective for the settlement of the issue.

Dimensions of the Kashmir Dispute

‘Kashmir is situated in the extreme north of the Indo-Pak subcontinent and at the southern point of Central Asia. With an area of 86,000 square miles and a population currently estimated at around 17 million³, it is surrounded by four countries: China, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, with the narrow Wakhan strip in Afghanistan separating it from Tajikistan and Krygstan (as shown in the map). Its rivers and traditional highways have been towards Pakistan with whom it shares the larger part of its border. In its middle is the Vale of Kashmir. Compared to the existing 191 sovereign states in the world, taken individually, Kashmir is larger than 95 and more populous than 121’.⁴

The cease-fire line between the forces of India and Pakistan has currently divided Kashmir into two parts. One is under Indian occupation that comprises 63 percent of the whole territory, and other includes Azad (free) Kashmir, which is under indirect Pakistani control, and the northern region of Gilgit and Baltistan, which is directly administered by Islamabad.⁵

Geo-Strategic Significance of Kashmir

South-Asia is not dangerous region only because India and Pakistan are nuclear but it is also dangerous for the geo-strategic location of Kashmir. Kashmir lies not adjacent to both India and Pakistan only but also a key frontier region that gives access to Central Asia. The strategic importance of Jammu and Kashmir has not diminished after the end of the cold war. It has in fact raised some new developments in the region which have attracted more intensely attention of India and Pakistan. The state on one side, is flanked by highly volatile Afghanistan and on the other side, it is flanked by China. Many Indian strategists are apprehensive about China's role in the region in coming future.⁶

Kashmir on its journey to Pakistan .Kashmir contains the

headwaters of the rivers running into West Punjab, Pakistan's main agricultural province, which is greatly dependent on irrigation for its prosperity. The water issues are in fact one of the major cause of this ongoing stalemate, particularly from the perspective of Pakistan.⁷



Source: <http://www.wisdomquarterly.blogspot.com/2008>

Kashmir's Water Potentials

The territorial dispute for strategic resources upon which both countries absolutely depend for their stability and survival is centered in Jammu Kashmir. Geographically, three of the five key tributaries and the Indus River pass through

A 2005 report by the Strategic Foresight Group found that the Indus Basin Water Treaty only offers a frail defense against heightened conflict over river resources between Pakistan and India, and that it is only a matter of time before water war becomes a virtually unavoidable feature of the region’s political environment. Every proposal made by Pakistan through track-II diplomatic channels since 1999 has referred to water as a pivotal concern.⁸

Pakistan views India’s dams and upper riparian status as potential means to economically squeeze or starve Pakistan, or alternatively to flood it, conceivably for military purposes. However, Indians hold this view that Pakistan is making virtually impossible to exploit effectively the non-consumptive uses, especially hydropower production.⁹ The opportunity to tap the Jhelum and the Chenab rivers would provide windfall gains not only to India’s side of the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir, but also to its three states of Punjab, Rajasthan and Haryana.¹⁰

The Kashmiris

The Kashmiris are people of a large territory which is not part of any existing sovereign state. They have been assured by the entire international community represented by the United Nations that they would have complete freedom to decide their future by a free vote. But Pakistan, India and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) have failed to resolve the dispute. They are the major factor in resolving the conflict as no solution is acceptable without their acceptance. The Kashmiris have suffered constantly but are unable to get relief. They have been suffering from injustice, insecurity, violence, terrorism and identity crisis. This is further fortifying by a longer term threat to their survival because of an uncertain future in the South Asian region. The arbitrary bifurcation of Kashmir has divided thousands of Kashmir families into different parts of the world because of the intense volatility of the Kashmir conflict.

With the passage of time, the Kashmir conflict tend to put the people of Kashmir in a very crucial situation because of two main reasons. First, if their leadership fails to play the cards well,

they can again be cheated and get a raw deal. Second, if an element of conflict fatigue is prevailing over India and Pakistan, then it will become easier to think in terms of providing a just and fair settlement of the Kashmir conflict. What is predictable in view of the futility of resolution efforts is management of the Kashmir conflict.¹¹

Therefore, to a large extent, “Kashmiris simply wanted basic democratic rights, including representative, accountable government and a voice in determining the destiny of their homeland. But, the Indian State appeared to interpret popular opposition to Pakistan as further license to continue trampling on those very rights.”¹²

Relevancy of the Contemporary Models of Conflict Resolution with the Kashmir Dispute

There are number of models of contemporary conflict resolution which are viewed as instrumental in the process of resolving the territorial disputes. However, there are three models which have much relevance with the curves and corners of the Kashmir dispute. These are as follows:-

The Irish Model

It is also called as “The Good Friday Agreement”. It premised on two interrelated principles: first, it recognizes the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of the people of the Northern Ireland concerning its status. Second, the agreement reaffirms commitment to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organizations.

The Northern Ireland model offers the following aspects that should be considered in the conflict resolution process of Kashmir dispute:-

- Recognition of the legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by the people.
- Commitment to a process of eventual disarmament of all paramilitary organizations

- Provides a context of the right of self-determination as opposed to territorial control. There must be sustained and structured dialogue. Hence, a multi-track dialogue process in addition to the ongoing India/Pakistan dialogue is needed at three main levels: intra-Kashmiri dialogue with participants from both sides of the LoC and involving militant groups; Pakistani/Kashmiri dialogue; India /Kashmiri dialogue
- The militants need to be involved in the process as soon as possible.
- There should be trilateral dialogue as opposed to bilateral dialogue
- The role of the Diaspora is critical
- Civil society groups should take the lead to foster peace movements.
- The role of an outside/internal facilitator is critical and essential to the process.¹³

The Conflict Transformation Model

Conflict transformation is the process by which conflicts are transformed into peaceful outcomes. It differs from conflict resolution and conflict management approaches in that it recognises "that contemporary conflicts require more than the reframing of positions and the identification of win-win outcomes. The very structure of parties and relationships may be embedded in a pattern of conflictual relationships that extend beyond the particular site of conflict. Conflict transformation is therefore a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict".¹⁴

The following aspects can be considered in the process of Kashmir resolution:-

- A commitment by all parties to a peaceful resolution of the conflict

- Utilizing an elicitive, rights-based approach that draws from the Kashmiris their solutions to the Kashmir dispute.¹⁵

Faith-Based Reconciliation model

Faith-based reconciliation model is based on eight principles or core values; pluralism, inclusion, peacemaking, justice, forgiveness, healing deep wounds, sovereignty and atonement. This model has five basic elements; imparting moral vision, building bridges between estranged groups, establishing a lasting peace, social justice, promoting political forgiveness and healing the wounds of history. The focus is on reconciliation in place of the traditional conflict resolution model and a form of socio-political healing is followed. It has three basic objectives; resolution of the conflict, restoration of the political order that has suffered from war and injustice, and the reconciliation of people groups.¹⁶ The model offers the following aspects that can be considered in the conflict resolution of the Kashmir dispute:-

- The need to restore the historic moral vision in Kashmir based on reconciliation as foundation for a future Kashmir and as a basis for restoring their Kashmiri identity and harmonious relationships throughout the region.
- The need to build bridges among the different identity-based groups in the region so as to create understanding, and overcome stereotypes.
- The need to demolish walls of hostility that currently exist between members of identity based groups and toward India or Pakistan.
- The need to address issues of human rights and the sharing of power and privilege as a basis for establishing the common good and a just basis for Kashmiri society and its relationship with India and Pakistan.
- The need to heal the torn fabric of society by fostering both individual and political forgiveness.

- To encourage leaders to consider spiritual and moral values in governance and policy making.
- Encouraging the development of a problem solving approach by reframing the conflict as a joint problem to be solved by all parties.¹⁷

Towards a Resolution

The Kashmir dispute has come across with number of proposals for its resolution since its inception. At start of the decade, many scores of more or less serious proposals (with greater or lesser involvements of official governments) had already been produced either by Indians, Pakistanis or the international community. By now, these proposals present rather extensive, not to say bewildering array of possibilities¹⁸. The proposed options are “Plebiscite, UN Trusteeship, Partition, Independence, Irish model and Musharraf’s four points.”

The UN promised to hold a plebiscite at the very onset of the dispute which was acceptable to all the three parties. But today, this option seems to be not taken its final shape in the scenario of current environment. The dispute has already undergone with three wars and option of the fourth war is not at all unthinkable because now both countries are the nuclear powers. The partition of the disputed territory is not acceptable to the Kashmiris because they take themselves as an organic body. The actual solution lies in accepting the sovereignty of the Kashmiris and viewed the regions of Kashmir as an organic body.

There is no short cut to the resolution of Kashmir conflict. All ways headed towards the resolution can be blocked if the basic principle of fairness and justice is not taken into account. The stark reality of the Kashmir conflict is its asymmetrical nature. Kashmiris being a weaker party is conscious of their disadvantaged position vis-à-vis India.¹⁹ There is also a sharp imbalance in the power configuration of India and Pakistan. But both of the countries are the nuclear powers and nuclearization unfolds high stakes between the two rivals. It remains a question that how India and Pakistan find a path for the resolution of Kashmir conflict.

The architecture for peace and conflict resolution in Kashmir dispute, which has existed till now, ignored two fundamental realities: first, the participation of the people of Kashmir in the process of peace and conflict resolution and second, adopting a flexible position which is acceptable for the three contenders, on issues which have created a stalemate towards reaching a solution for a long time.²⁰ This basic fact needs to be considered that political will, commitment and seriousness exercised on the parts of Pakistan and India could have made things better, not only for the people of the disputed land but also the inhabitants of the whole region.

For more than half of a century, the people of this disputed territory are bearing extreme hardships and particularly the violation of their rights. The real reconciliation of the dispute lies in the quest of the acknowledgment of existence and identity of Kashmiris with that of security and economic interests of India and Pakistan. It is a need for the contenders to accept some critical realities about the dispute. There are assumptions which are actually those proposed options which are usually considered but not applied due to unwillingness either by one or all the three parties.

Following assumptions have the potentials to pave a way of the viable model for settlement of Kashmir dispute:-

- Demilitarization
- Self-Governance
- Organic unity
- Council of Common Interests

Demilitarization

The Security Forces should vacate all civilian areas which have occupied land and civilian infrastructure in the State. This should be vacated and the Security forces should be confined to areas along the LoC.

Demilitarization must be viewed in its widest sense. It should include

- The withdrawal of military as well as paramilitary forces from Kashmir region , not merely from heavily populated areas.
- The repeal of draconian laws, including the Special Powers Act and the Disturbed Areas Act, which authorize the security forces to kill Kashmiri people with impunity. Currently there are 700,000 Indian Security Forces (ISF) stationed in Kashmir. Draconian Laws give immense power to the ISF and should be repealed.

India should respond positively to the demilitarization proposal from Pakistan for creating confidence among the Kashmiri people. This would also result in a reduction in the security expenditure of India as well as of Pakistan. There can be a phased demilitarization leading to ultimate demilitarization and then a mechanism for maintaining law and order in the State could be chalked out. It should lead to a reduction of human rights violations.²¹ The framework of demilitarization from the Pakistani side must be mentioned on obvious lines to India because it facilitates the Indian government to follow the pursuit. The proposal of demilitarization must be equally applicable to both of the forces of India and Pakistan respectively.

Self-Governance

Self-Governance means total political, administrative and economic control by the Kashmiris without the interference of India and Pakistan. This can all be done by establishing an elected parliament of Kashmir. The concept of Self-Governance is being misinterpreted in Kashmir. For example, People’s Democratic Party (PDP) or National Conference (NC) have their own definitions. This aspect needs to be cleared in full spectrum. For Self-Governance, subjects must be identified where Kashmiris would have sovereignty and where parental States Pakistan and India would have sovereignty.²² The issues to be dealt with self governance include trade and commerce, waterways, cross border transport, environmental protection and preservation, agriculture, cultural matters and tourism.²³

Organic Unit

There is a need to accept the organic unity of the regions of the Kashmir dispute despite of considering them as five fragmented parts of the disputed territory. Kashmir must be addressed as one unit as it existed at the time of the partition of the British India. Kashmir is not viewed as an organic body and primarily putting a side totally the aspirations of the Kashmiris. A solution of the Kashmir problem cannot be found on regional or cultural basis. The Chief of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) clearly declared the Kashmiri standing that “Kashmir be addressed as one unit as it existed at the time of the partition of British India.”²⁴

Council of Common Interests

This assumption lies on the joint management between the two parties namely Pakistan and India, which is commonly known as “condominium”. This will lead to the reconciliation on which both parties would freeze their positions within their respective parameters. It is supposed to secure the potential interests as well as threats of both parties respectively. Formulation of the Council of Common Interests would deal with the issues of defence, currency and foreign policies. This council would have the membership with the ratio of 51% Kashmiris, 49% Indian and Pakistani. This joint management has to be studied very carefully and its mechanism must be formulated according to the interests of the parties. There is a divergence in how Pakistan and India view the concept of joint management. India is looking for a consultative mechanism while Pakistan is interested in executive power.²⁵ However, any agreement on Kashmir must be accepted by the participants of India, Pakistan, and Kashmiris respectively.

These assumptions can play an active role in viewing the resolution of the dispute with new sense of accepting the fundamental right of self-determination of Kashmiris and also open new horizons of thought in finding resolution of the century old dispute. A new model can be build up on the pillars of these four assumptions. The need of the time is fairness and loyalty to resolve the issue by putting besides own interests.

Conclusion

The resolution of the Kashmir dispute directs towards peace and stability of the region. The two main contenders India and Pakistan are the nuclear powers and fear of nuclear exchange always endangers the situation. The resolution is equally beneficial for India and Pakistan. India claims to be the secular state and resolution is fruitful for its claim as well as significant for its desire to have the permanent seat in the UNSC being emerging power in south Asia. The reconciliation lies in securing the economic and security intentions of the two countries along with the declared acceptance of the Kashmiris identity and rights. This formulation gives a win-win situation for the two parties of the dispute. The contemporary environment unfolds various mechanism of conflict resolution but the complexity of Kashmir dispute raises number of questions.

The Kashmir conflict had evolved around number of proposals, peace accords and declarations. It is said that Pakistan, India and the international community are very loyal and eager to resolve the issue. In this respect, it is astonishing that why it takes so much time to resolve and now it's passing more than six decades. The sufferings of the Kashmiris are increasing day by day and in innumerable forms. The real antidote is the active involvement of those very people which have to suffer the consequences of any kind of a resolution. Many theories have come forward with their different names but all are agreed on this very fact that without trust and willingness, no dispute can meet its resolution. The willingness of prime contenders is the key in the process of negotiations. As long as there is stubbornness and conditions attached in order to be able to start negotiations, the prospects for a plausible resolution of any conflict are remote. Building of trust is another key requirement in order to secure benefits of peace and cooperation. There is a need to learn the lesson from the dynamics of conflict, failures and successes. Otherwise it becomes difficult to stabilize political, economic and security relations among parties who are in the process of resolving the conflict and cementing peace in the post conflict environment.

Notes

- ¹ Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003)
- ² Moonis Ahmar, "Kashmir and the Process of Conflict Resolution," *Pakistan Security Research Unit(PSRU)*, brief no.16 (2007) <http://spaces.brad.ac.uk> retrieved on 30th June, 2009
- ³ Census of 2005
- ⁴ Ghulam Nabi Fai, "Kashmir: Past, Present and Future," <http://www.saag.org> retrieved on 21st June, 2009.
- ⁵ Ibid
- ⁶ Z.G.Muhammad, "Looking for a Solution," <http://www.kashmirwatch.com> retrieved on 15th July, 2009.
- ⁷ S. Waslekar, "The Final Settlement: Restructuring India- Pakistan Relations," (Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group, 2005)
- ⁸ ibid
- ⁹ B.G. Verghese, "Fuss Over Indus-I: India's Rights Are Set Out in the Treaty," *The Tribune* (Chandigarh), 25 May 2005.
- ¹⁰ Indian Group foresees Pak-Kashmir water war", *The News International*, 23 March 2005. <http://jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2005>
- ¹¹ Moonis Ahmar, "Kashmir and the Process of Conflict Resolution," *Pakistan Security Research Unit(PSRU)*, brief no.16 (2007) <http://spaces.brad.ac.uk> retrieved on 30th June, 2009.
- ¹² Sumantra Bose, *The Challenge in Kashmir* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997).
- ¹³ Shireen M. Mazari, "Learning from the Models of Conflict Resolution and Peace Process," (paper presented at International Kashmir Conference Jammu and Kashmir Dispute: Models for Resolution. Islamabad, Pakistan, March 16-17, 2007)
- ¹⁴ Hugh Miall, "[Conflict Transformation: A Multi-Dimensional Task](http://www.berghof-handbook.net)," <http://www.berghof-handbook.net> retrieved on 8th July, 2009.
- ¹⁵ Shireen M. Mazari, "Learning from the Models of Conflict Resolution."
- ¹⁶ Brian Coax, " Kashmir Project: Faith Based Reconciliation," <http://www.icrd.org> retrieved on 25th June, 2009.
- ¹⁷ Shireen M. Mazari, "Learning from the Models of Conflict Resolution."
- ¹⁸ Raju C. Thomas, "Reflections on the Kashmir Problem," in *Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia*. ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992).
- ¹⁹ Moonis Ahmar, "Kashmir and the Process of Conflict Resolution".
- ²⁰ Ibid
- ²¹ Inam ul Haque, "Step-by- Step Approach to Self-Determination: Identification of the Area; Demilitarization; Self-Governance; Joint Management," (paper presented at International Kashmir Conference Jammu and Kashmir Dispute: Models for Resolution. Islamabad, Pakistan, March 16-17, 2007)
- ²² Inam ul Haque, "Step-by- Step Approach to Self-Determination".
- ²³ Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003)
- ²⁴ "APHC rejects division of Kashmir," *Dawn* (Karachi), April 5, 2006.
- ²⁵ Inam ul Haque, "Step-by- Step Approach to Self-Determination."

THE DILEMMA OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN PAKISTAN: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

Ijaz Hussain

Introduction

Integration literally means the fitting together of parts to make one whole. Parts, of course, cannot be fitted together unless they are compatible. This is the first prerequisite of integration. A country, if it is to survive, must have national unity, cohesion and integration. National integration is a process of achieving national cohesion, stability, prosperity, strength and feelings of being united as a nation.¹ Pakistan has faced varying degrees of religious, ethnic, linguistic, economic and political problems that are often in conflict with our national interests. To guard against all challenges to the solidarity and security of Pakistan, a well knitted and integrated nation is a must. Having inherited a complex nature of multi-ethnic and multi-linguistic population in its national entity, with different socio-cultural backgrounds, the danger of regional fragmentation is always there. In these ways, the achievement of national integration in Pakistan presents its own set of dilemma. So national integration in Pakistan can only mean establishing a common citizenry, common political and social structures, a common state, and a common sense of identity. It means building a common national community on top of the existing diversity.

The paper, however, intends to highlight the issues which either have potentials to strengthen or deteriorate the process of national integration in Pakistan. The references of historical dynamics including the tragedy of East Pakistan provide the benchmark for the paper. It also accentuates the likely inclinations in the future followed by certain recommendations to maintain unity among the nation.

DIVERGENCES

Political Factors

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in his Presidential address to the first

Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, on 11 August 1947, expressed that;

“I sincerely hope that with your support and co-operation we shall make this Constituent Assembly an example to the world. The Assembly has got two main functions to perform. The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing the future constitution of Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan.”²

Unfortunately, neither of these two functions could be met by the Assembly and Pakistan, slowly and gradually, got itself on the track of wrong precedents. Delay in constitution making reduced the space for the development of political system in the country, and as a result the first Constituent Assembly was dissolved by 1954. This was a severe blow to the democracy and federation of Pakistan, two prerequisites for national integration. In these ways, the desire for autonomy by the provinces remained a mere dream and dissatisfaction started arising among them. This, however, intensely disturbed the smooth running of the country because Federal system of government is considered to be indispensable for Pakistan due to her large heterogeneous population and provinces.

Pakistan is the first ideological based country which appeared on the map of the world. It was established on the basis of ‘two-nation theory’ which is then embodied in the constitutional structure of Pakistan, through the famous ‘Objectives Resolution’. This resolution of 1940 is said to be the backbone of our constitutional composition and provided the yardstick for the constitutional development of Pakistan. Notwithstanding, the unremitting and unnecessary delay in the making of constitution could result in failure to establish a viable democratic system, a prerequisite for the Federal system. The concept of autonomy was automatically suppressed by such unhealthy developments which created misunderstanding among the provinces.

Although, the Constitutions of 1956 and 1962 subsequently

recommended the Federal system of Government with maximum autonomy to the provinces, yet those remain confined to only promises. Besides, certain discretionary powers entrusted to the President were also resented by the units. Suspension of constitution and imposition of martial laws further added fuel to the fire. At this point in time was also witnessed a gigantic governance crisis in the country and at the same time the leadership deficit.

Autonomy always emanates from federation and a true federation flourishes only with the stabilization of democracy, so these three terms are interdependent. The 1973 constitution, however, gave certain measures to ensure provincial autonomy. It established the bicameral legislature – to safeguard the interests of smaller provinces, extended the President’s Electoral College to the provincial assemblies in Eighth Amendment and authorized the provinces to elect Provincial Governments.³ It formulates National Economic Council to regulate Centre-Provinces policies regarding trade, commerce and economics. Council of Common Interests (CCI) ensures solution of any dispute between centre and provinces regarding division of water, electricity, revenue etc. National Finance Commission (NFC) settles issue like distribution of revenue between centre and provinces. Although the constitution ensures maximum autonomy to the provinces, yet several flaws have been witnessed in its implementations since 1973 to date. Lack of will and dedication on the part of political leaders and frequent interruption in the political system resulted in delays, which created resentment in the provinces. The Federal Government held the ‘Concurrent list’ with itself, along with the Federal list, and kept the units away from the right to exercise their authority. In these ways, crisis of confidence could find the space to emerge among provinces and still the political scene is shadowed by a trust deficit between the centre and provinces. Unsatisfied federating units are the product of over-centralization, which alienated the smaller provinces and generated sentiments of separatism, violence and distrust. The recent situation in Balochistan can exactly be considered as a sound example. Hence it goes without saying that a Central Government with absolute power can neither run the administration effectively nor can solve the problems of the people having different socio-economic problems.

In Pakistan's political history, the political process has been interrupted four times by non-democratic forces and the country has remained under military rule for almost three decades. As a result, the political culture has never had the space to evolve and instability shadowed the political scene of the country. The political entities, on the other hand, exercised immature political attitudes like extending support to military rulers, propensity to misuse authority, personalization of politics and revenge under garb of accountability.⁴ Lack of political consciousness to evolve viable democratic culture, lack of supremacy and degradation of institutions, absolute government and political control of a special feudal class all witnessed in an instable political process. Even today the same faces with feudal background are appearing in the parliament. As our political scene has been shadowed by qualms and doubts it becomes difficult to keep the nation intact. The authorities have failed to deliver the people their inalienable rights and resulted in dissatisfaction, doubts, violence, chaos and uncertainties, which created hurdles in the way of national integration. These did not exactly make the population, especially in the smaller provinces, interested in the future of a united Pakistan. Nevertheless, regional based political parties can't be a comfortable trend for the political integration of the country. The ethnically oriented result of 18 February general election in 2008 validates the said argument and indicates that the propensity still continues.

Economic Factors

“To make this great State of Pakistan happy and prosperous, we should wholly and solely concentrate on the well-being of the people, and especially of the masses and the poor. If you will work in cooperation in a spirit that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one state with equal rights, privileges, and obligations, there will be no end to the progress you will make.”⁵(Muhammad Ali Jinnah)

The vision of the founder was shaped in nothing by the successors, rather poor governance, mismanagement and political instability continuously contributed weakening the economic system

since very beginning. Inequality, unfairness, corruption and nepotism instead of equality, impartiality, fairplay and justice were roughly exercised throughout history. Theoretical assumptions and promises could not transform into practical form. Provincial autonomy was being promised in all the three Constitutions but it is yet to be delivered. So the Federating units remained absent from exercising authority over their own resources. On the other hand the Federal Government held everything in hand despite its continuous failure to maintain even economic developments in all the provinces. This proved a major factor which created mistrust among provinces. Also, it could not provide them with sufficient exploration mechanism. The ratio of revenue generation capabilities by provinces were ignored by the Federal Government and remained reluctant to pay the royalty they deserve. Unequal distribution of resources, employment opportunity, infrastructural development and industrial growth provided a space for the uneven socio-economic development in provinces. This created disparity in economic well being of people living in different provinces and boosted up poverty. In these ways, provinces like Balochistan and Sindh lacked behind in every sphere of life. These along with frequent failure of CCI and NFC, disputed water distribution and energy resources and the right to royalty endangered the prosperity and integrity of the country. In addition, the current economic system has further widened the already existing gap between the riches and the poor.

The equitable distribution of resources is the only solution to the confronting socio-economic problems and development of the provinces. A simple example of the existing NFC criteria is that 'province of Sindh was contributing 65 percent but getting 23.71 percent of revenue share from the Federal Government that has weakened the financial position of the province. Previously the provinces had been getting 80 percent share from the NFC Award but in 1996 the then caretaker government reversed the formula of NFC Award and the share of the provinces was reduced from 80 percent to 37.5 percent'⁶. Same is the case with N.W.F.P and Balochistan. Nevertheless, this criterion seemed to be an unjustified one and intensely needed a revision. Quite recently, the Centre and the provinces realized this fact in the 7th NFC Award and have agreed on a formula based on multiple factors rather than population

factor alone. At this point in time, it becomes quite relevant to say that the much taunted single factor formula of NFC Award has been replaced by multiple factors, which is considered to be a landmark consensus. To achieve this, not only the Centre sacrificed its share under the vertical arrangement in an endeavour to give additional financial incentives to the provinces but also the Punjab showed flexibility on contentious issues under the horizontal inter-provincial sharing of resources. The provincial share of the divisible pool would increase from the present 47.5 per cent to 56 per cent in the first year of NFC (2010-2011) and 57.5 per cent in the remaining years of the award under the vertical distribution of resources.⁷ This share would virtually be over 60 per cent. The Centre has also agreed to cut tax collection charges from five percent to one percent and this amount would also be added to the divisible pool. The NFC recognised sales tax on services as a provincial subject and it might be collected by the respective provinces.

About the horizontal distribution among the provinces, Punjab would now get 51.74 percent, Sindh's share will be 24.55 percent, the NWFP will receive 14.62 percent share while Balochistan will get 9.09 percent. Besides, the break-up of unprecedented multiple indicators and their weightages under 7th NFC Award are following:-

- Population - 82.0%
- Poverty and Backwardness - 10.3%
- Revenue Collection / Generation - 5.0%
- Inverse Population Density - 2.7%.⁸

The federation and the provinces agreed to provide Balochistan Rs 83 billion of the provincial pool in the first year of the Award, and to give one percent of the total divisible pool to NWFP as an additional resource. In this way, Sindh would receive an additional transfer of Rs 6 billion from the federal government, which is equivalent to 0.66 percent of the provincial pool.

This development will immensely enhance financial autonomy to the provinces and the federation will become stronger if the provinces achieve the financial autonomy and become more

powerful.

Ethno-Religious Dimensions

Demographically, Pakistani society is composed of 48.2% Punjabis, 13.1% Pushtoons, 11.8% Sindhis, 9.8% Siraikis, 7.6% Urdu speaking (Muhajirs), 4.2% Baloch-Brauhis, 2.4% Hindko speaking and several small ethno-linguistic groups.⁹ Pakistan has been beset with so many conflicts of ethnic nature in its history. Also, there is no denying the fact that the wide varieties of ethnic and linguistic groups operating inside the country have very little in common besides being Muslims. So there should be no dispute regarding the legitimacy of diverse ethnic grievances and competition in society. In Pakistan, ethnicity along with provincialism has also been a source of manipulation by the political leaders to give a cover to their mismanagement.¹⁰

Soon after the tragedy of 1971, another separatist movement emerged in Baluchistan, which was forcibly suppressed with the assistance of 80,000 troops.¹¹ Then, Zia did more to aggravate the ethnic tensions in Pakistan than to alleviate them. His military operation in Sindh gave birth to a Sindhi nationalist movement, which was responded to by the Muhajirs and they too launched a movement. This led to the worst ethnic rioting in Sindh and civil war in Karachi. Islamisation thus failed to reduce ethnic tensions in Pakistan because Zia's interpretation of Islam denied the legitimacy of ethnicity and their grievances. Pakistani nationalism failed to develop not as a result of the incompatibility of Islam and nationalism, but because successive Pakistani leaders have been unable to offer a convincing rationale for why ethnic nationalism should be discarded in favour of Pakistani nationalism.

Though Islam is most often cited as the main basis of Pakistani nationhood, its validity as an integrating force remained limited. While Islam is a potential force for unity but emphasis on it alone provided no sure guarantee to hold the state together, as it could not in 1971, because the political, economic and social forces were ignored. Moreover, too much stress on Islam could aggravate sectarian conflicts in history, and further it can inhibit the process of

modernization by strengthening the hands of fundamentalist parties. The ongoing uncertainties as a result of chaos and disorder in the country expose the validity of the said argument. Analysis shows that it should have been clear to the leaders of Pakistan that they could not over-rely on religion alone to unite a society characterized by diverse factors. They should have firmly considered the importance of political and socio-economic factors as well. However, more than religion would have been needed to integrate the fragmented polity of Pakistan.

With the introduction of religious parties and the exploitation of religion by various governments, throughout history, to legitimize and stabilize their respective regimes created hell on this land of the pure. The roots of sectarianism can be traced back to 1980s following the curse of Afghan war, when Iran started supporting 'Shia' madrassahs in Pakistan in a response to Saudia Arabia supporting 'Sunni' madrassahs.¹² The period, however, led the credit for boosting such inclination as never before. Nevertheless, some self serving clerics from different sects remained engage in alienating the simpleton Muslims from the true spirit of Islam and are weakening the Muslim brotherhood, which is the real basis of Pakistan.¹³ The society remained divided religiously into different factions, which always resulted in social stratification. The tendency, however, remained intensifying up to date and still has the capacity to create hurdles in the way of national integration, if steps are not taken to sincerely tackle the issue. After 9 September 2001, the Muslim society in general and Pakistani society in particular, has been divided between Enlightened and Conservative Muslims. This trend further created a division but with new fashion to the already polarized society on sectarian lines. The situation although apparently shadowed the later nature of division by the former one, yet the ground realities expose that both these inclinations exist in parallel. The state of war has however prevailed in the country against the extremist elements, who support the terrorists, and on this basis the society has further fragmented. This trend would, no doubt, poses a serious threat to the integrity of Pakistan. There is also the possibility that the internal dissensions by the extremist elements may have gained patronage from external forces as well.

Trans-National Interference

The decade of 1980s witnessed a huge influx of refugees into our country, which to a larger extent reshaped the composition of our society. Pakistan has been suffering from multi-directional ramifications owing to such an alien demographic penetration of Afghans and other refugees. They brought with them Kalashnikov culture, black marketing, smuggling and human trafficking as well. Such an alien interference in our society gave birth to extremism, sectarianism and terrorism, which continues since 1980s to date. The current menace of terrorism by Al-Qaeda and other Non-State Actors has the roots in the same social trend. So it can safely be assumed that the militancy in Pakistan is the product of such a trans-national penetration and is likely to continue unless the Afghan refugees are systematically forced to leave the country. Furthermore, the foreign intelligence agencies might have exploited the inclination to get inside the country to meet their professional designs. As a result, the traditional structure of Pakistani society has been fragmenting rapidly in dual directions, modernization and fundamentalism.

The situation has the capacity to create schism among different sections of population and different regions of the country, leading Pakistani society to instability and social disintegration. In such a situation, frustration and sense of deprivation gives rise to separatist tendencies which sometimes assume the shape of political agitations. Unless social, psychological and economic problems are understood and solved at early stage, they may become unmanageable and result in widespread social maladjustment and political instability. Pakistan presents an admixture of various races and caste. These racial differences along with regionalism create social differences in country, which may have serious political repercussions. This would also dominate the natural forces of integration such as brotherhood and nationhood and thereby affect the national unity and solidarity of the country. In addition, social ills like intolerance and excessive corruption also mars the process of social and political integration of the country.

East Pakistan Debacle

After the inception the most formidable problem of nation-building in Pakistan was the integration of the geographically and culturally distinct Bengali sub-nation. The problem was urgent because Bengalis were the largest ethno-cultural subgroup in Pakistan constituting a majority of 54 percent of the country's total population.¹⁴ Bengalis were hardly represented in the administrative and power structures. As a result, the Punjabis and the muhajirs, who modernized early, became the national elite of Pakistan from the outset. Ayub' regime promised that the domination of East Pakistan by the West Pakistan would cease.¹⁵ However, his policies created an imbalance in the development, which inevitably intensified Bengali demands and created disequilibrium in the national system.¹⁶ Ayub's policies gradually transformed the Bengali agitation from a lingo-cultural phenomenon into a much broader politico-economic one. The nature of Bengali political demands also changed, from participation in the national political system to demands for a totally autonomous system. Consequently, the negligent policies strengthened ethnic identity as a political factor and by 1971 a civil cum external war separated the two wings. The major causes in this regard were:-

- Geographically, East and West Pakistan was separated from each other by 1600km.¹⁷ Thus the logic of geography dictated that there been a dual economic and administrative apparatus. Also, the disparity in geographical location created different strategic interests.
- Both parts also exhibited sharp differences in demography. East Pakistan's population density was nearly seven times more than that of West Pakistan.¹⁸
- The linguistic differences between the two wings were very great and none of the languages had general acceptance in both wings. The Bengalis were intensely proud of their language and often revealed a sense of linguistic nationalism. They strongly resented the attempt to make 'Urdu' the only national

- language and demanded the same status for the ‘Bengali’.
- There also existed some basic disparities in the society and culture of both wings. Both societies were much more segmented from each other. The differences in social stratification led to differences in political sectors, which could prove detrimental to national integration.
 - Bengalis were reluctant to put too much emphasis on Islam because they had a large percentage of Hindus too, and they did not want to alienate them. Moreover, emphasis on Islam was perceived as no sure guarantee for uniting all the Muslims.
 - Over-centralization of administrative and political system always resulted in the disparity of socio-economic developments between the two wings, which created sense of deprivation among the masses of East Pakistan. So the overemphasis on state-building rather than nation-building led to the alienation of the Bengalis and proved conducive towards the disintegration of the country.

Convergences

“I shall always be guided by the principles of justice, fairplay and complete impartiality, and I am sure that with your support and co-operation, I can look forward to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest nations of the world”.¹⁹(Muhammad Ali Jinnah)

Had the people and leaders of Pakistan followed the principles of justice, fairplay and impartiality since very inception, as Mr. Jinnah had wished, they would surely have emerged as the greatest nation of the world. But unfortunately we could not. However, despite surface tensions and confrontations, there is an unmistakable trend of greater inter-dependence among ethnic communities and society as a whole, which can contribute to national integration. There are certain economic, demographic, political, and cultural developments taking place in the country

which tend to affect such relationships.²⁰

Firstly; two kinds of historical approaches to national integration in Pakistan have relevance even today. One is that all Governments since 1947 have tried national integration by emphasizing India as an external threat. So they heavily relied on pointing across the border to promote national unity. Hostility towards India and the struggle for Kashmir has been important tools to stress Pakistan's unity.²¹ Using an external enemy for strengthening internal unity had gained credibility and three Indo-Pakistan wars also provided a base to the argument that internal unity was inevitable for survival. This notion of common enemy, India, is still alive among the whole nation. Besides India, the other most important tool to establish unity instead of fragmentation has been the common religion, "Islam". Again, all governments have utilized religion as a unifying force but in very different forms. Although this factor alone could not avoid the unfortunate tragedy of 1971 and hence proved not a sole reliable integrating force, yet it still has the relevance in contemporary society, along with the political and socio-economic factors.

Secondly; despite having the diverse nature of society there still remains a ray of hope among the nation that after all they are united by the feeling of having a common national identity. They have strong ideological attachments as well. So there must be a confidence without any confusion in sustaining Pakistan as its people do share a common political identity and represent a 'unity in cultural diversity'. People do also share a common political base and believe in the supremacy of national interest, thus the main characteristics remain the strong sense of common identity and unity.

Thirdly; after the unforgettable incident of 1971, the whole population, unlike past, lives within the same common territory. Hence it makes communication more easy and there are prospects of greater mobility of population and resources. So there remains no logic of geographical dictations to socio-economic developments in different parts of the country.

Fourthly; given the literacy rate going up, there seems to be a growing awareness among the general masses inside the country. People became more conscious about their political and socio-economic rights and are able to differentiate between rights and wrongs. This would, no doubt, be helpful to understand the national problems and the importance of national unity. Media, both electronic and print, can play a vital role in this regard while providing the public with sound knowledge of happenings around them and particularly of the political system prevailing in Pakistan. This will help establishing a democratic tradition in the country while utilizing the public awareness in the wake of free media and education.

Lastly; all the stakeholders seem to be pursuing the agenda of national reconciliation both at tactical and strategic levels. This will no doubt help consolidate national unity, built national consensus, improve national image in the international arena and provide a comfortable playing ground to all nationalistic entities to do the best for the integrity of the country under the prevailing critical environment.

Future Perspectives

Despite sixty-two years of its existence the present state of nation-building phenomenon in Pakistan is fragile, however it has not failed. Keeping in view the unfortunate debacle of East Pakistan in 1971, the danger of the rest of Pakistan disintegrating cannot be ruled out at all.²² The future of Pakistan thus, to some extent, hangs in the balance. A combination of over-centralization, ethnic resentments, social alienation and religious extremism today characterize Pakistan. The government looked to be either constrained or confused on policy framework to counter the internal menaces. As a result, people tend to become cynical and alienated from politics and the state. Continuous failure of the law enforcing agencies, crisis of management and huge economic pressure are likely to create uncertainties among people. And the increasing internal competition for meager resources can reinforce fragmentation.

Though the nature of insurgencies in Pakistan is not absolutely ethnic, yet at the same time the fragmentation of political system has increased considerably and has grown more provincial in character than national. The social fabric of the country is also weakening. Separatist movements along with a triple crises of political, economic and militancy are likely to get momentum in the foreseeable future. These along with continuous weakening of state structures can easily lead to destabilize the country. This would simply imply weakening of national integration, and strengthening of ethnic, tribal and religious forms of political identities.

The country definitely has great potentials to overcome the political and economic shortcomings, but again the will is absent. However, the economic prospects are dim at the moment and that the most likely scenario for Pakistan is a very pessimistic one, in case the current government failed to address the most pressing problems of the country. The combination of paralysis, fragmentation and the weakening of the social fabric can easily lead to a highly unstable political situation, without a functioning integrative mechanism. This combination can overturn the democratic system in the long run and strengthen the Islamic movements.

At present, the country is vulnerable to suicide attacks and bomb blasts. Regrettably, most of our leaders failed to understand the intensity and the sensitivity of the strategic environment. The ongoing adverse circumstances have enveloped the country from all sides, and are creating a rift between the public, politicians and the security forces. Besides this, acute differences on the basis of regional and provincial interests at the cost of national one have threatened the very unity among various ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the country is in a mess in wake of the present multiple crises and it looks as if there is a “war of all against all”.²³ At this critical juncture, the situation demands sacrifices of self interests from every citizen in favour of national interests.

With the survival of the existing multiple crises, an unstable equilibrium may go on for a long time in the foreseeable future, and the next few years will have immense importance for Pakistan to

make the situation compatible and to resolve the internal menaces mentioned above. Until now we have put a little effort to keep the nation integrated, but the question still remains whether the country make use of the chances it has, or concede defeat.

The Way Forward

- To establish a viable political system for the uninterrupted growth of the political process, a strong democratic culture is a must. Political entities must ensure supremacy of institutions through a carefully conceived strategic planning with consensus among various pillars of the state. None of the political parties should extend their support to the absolute and despotic governments. All the stakeholders should work for nation-building and ensure their respect for the constitution, and should jointly address the problems faced by the nation. This will keep the nation satisfied, which is one of the prerequisites for integration.
- Federal system of government is indispensable for Pakistan, as entrusted in the 1973 constitution. For it reconciles the national unity and will help keep the units satisfied, narrowing the gap of trust deficit, increase inter-provinces and center-province relations and reduce separatist tendencies. So, decentralization and deliverance of provincial autonomy is a concrete step to satisfy the nation.
- We have to extend our support to national institutions and national political parties while discouraging the regional ones. Unlike history, we have to ensure the political participation of every citizen so that no one felt excluded and the common national identity could develop.
- Media can play an effective role in resolving the issues pressing the nation at the moment. It has to be utilized for regaining the lost image of the nation in the international arena, and the government should consider it a convenient tool to win the hearts and

minds of the people, necessary for the integrity and unity of the nation. Through it one can easily narrow the differences among different factions of society and various political parties through open debates and patriot Intellectuals' writings.

- We should try to remove all social ills hindering the social and political integration of the country. These include intolerance, corruption, social injustices, ethnic discrimination, illiteracy, poverty, frustration, tribalism etc.
- To promote equity and harmony, necessary for national unity and integrity, we should treat equally all ethnic groups, and ensure the protection and promotion of their languages and cultures. Just economic developments in all the provinces need to be ensured. So far we have achieved nothing through violence, thus we have to adopt diplomatic approach to meet national agendas.
- We have to redress the situation in FATA sincerely in a planned, systematic and scientific manner instead of the perfunctory and ad-hoc approaches. The government should follow the multi-pronged strategy of political, military and socio-economic development to counter the militancy in FATA. The issue is so serious that if we fail to tackle it soon, it may spread out to other parts of the country, which would be detrimental to the integrity the country.
- We have to seek national consensus on every issue of strategic importance to form a unifying front. Political parties need to rise above purely party interest and look for the best interest of the nation. This will help resolving the problems in a much smooth and convenient manner thereby injecting mutual confidence and find combined solutions to the common problems. It is not the time to outwit all the others but it is time to use wits of all to outwit the enemies of state and to counter their designs by finding true solutions to our problems.

Conclusion

The incompatible factors to national unity and integration in Pakistan remained geographical differences, economic disparity, mal-administration, social injustices, distance between the ruler and the ruled in civil administration, lack of patriotism, failure to develop national character and morale, lack of spirit of sacrifice and a sense of responsibility towards the nation. These combined with other diversities pose a problem for the Pakistani society to create and develop social harmony. We have to generate the feelings of patriotism and nationalism instead of regionalism and provincialism, within ourselves, and have to dedicate to the cause of national integration consciously. It is the duty of every individual to play their due part in nation building. The prevailing situation demands from the nation a sense of sacrifice and responsibility towards state and society unanimously. At state level, the institutions working for national reconstruction are inadequate to deal with the deep-rooted problems of regionalism, sectarianism and militancy. People from all walks of life should extend their cooperation to arrest the onslaught of alien ideologies and cultures. It is, however, concluded that only one factor can not keep the whole nation integrated so we have to consider multiple factors, which in combination can sustain the national integration. Over-reliance on any single factor while ignoring the others would result in non achievement of national integration.

Notes

- ¹ Mirza Muhammad Saleem, "National Integration", published in 'Advance Contemporary Affairs' by Imtiaz Shahid, Book. 58, 6th Issue (2008), p424
- ² Dawn (Islamabad), Independence Day Supplement, 14 August 1999. Available online at:
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html (Accessed on: 15 May 2009)
- ³ Muhammad Asif Malik, Ideology and Dynamics of Politics in Pakistan (Lahore 2001), 443-444.
- ⁴ Alauddin Masood, "Strengthening Fragile Political System", The Pulse (26 March 2009)
- ⁵ Dawn (Islamabad), 14 August 1999.
- ⁶ The Financial Daily (International), 9 May 2009. Available online at:-
www.thefinancialdaily.com (Accessed on: 10 June 2009)
- ⁷ The News (Islamabad), 12 December 2009.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ *Feroz Ahmed, "Pakistan: Ethnic Fragmentation or National Integration?", Pakistan Development Review (Winter 1996), available online at:*
findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_6788/is_4_35/ai_n28682505/pg_14?tag=content:coll (Accessed on 28 March 2009)
- ¹⁰ B. Kofi Kukubor, "Ethnicity, Discrimination and National Integration", Ghana (11 November 2006), available online at:
www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/artikel.php?ID=113717 (Accessed on 2 April 2009)
- ¹¹ Walker Connor, "Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?", World Politics, Vol. 24, No. 3 (April 1972), 319-355
- ¹² Sadia Nasir, "Rise of Extremism in South Asia", IPRI Paper 7, published by Asian printers Islamabad (Oct 2004)
- ¹³ Mirza Muhammad Saleem, Op.cit
- ¹⁴ Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York and London, 1972), 6-7
- ¹⁵ Dawn (Karachi), 22 October 1958.
- ¹⁶ Ibid.
- ¹⁷ Rounaq Jahan, Op.cit
- ¹⁸ Muhammad Asif Malik, Op.cit
- ¹⁹ Dawn (Islamabad), 14 August 1999.
- ²⁰ *Feroz Ahmed, Op.cit.*
- ²¹ Jochen Hippler, "Problems of Culture, Democracy and Nation-Building in Pakistan", Silk Road Journal, Vol. 1, No. 4 (April 1998), pp. 6-15, available online at:
www.jochen-hippler.de/Aufsatz/Nation-Building_in_Pakistan/nation-building_in_pakistan.html
- ²² Ibid.
- ²³ Memona Firdous, "National Unity" Pakistan Observer (Islamabad), 26 November 2008.

SOCIAL MOBILIZATION THEORY AND BALOCHISTAN CRISIS

Abdul Rauf Iqbal

Introduction

Four times since independence of Pakistan, Balochistan has undergone insurgency, demanding greater autonomy or even an independent state, to reunite the Baloch population of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan under one flag¹. Violent protests in the form of bomb blasts, target killings and acts of sabotage have become routine matter. Situation in the province has reached to a level where now Pakistani flags are being taken down, schools are being threatened against singing the national anthem and non Baloch residents are scared for their lives. Grievances relate to self rule, ownership of resources, political participation and control over the economy.²

Scholars interpret current violent protest mobilization by applying different academic explanations. Alok Bansal considers the Baloch movement as a result of perceived Punjabi hegemony.³ Adeel Khan argues that Baloch nationalism results from the struggle for power between the Pakistani state and the Baloch people.⁴ Robert G. Wirsing concludes the context of today's Baloch insurgency in terms of energy resource developments.⁵ Frederic Grare relates the uprising to revival of nationalistic sentiments whereas Mir Ghaus Bizenjo attributes the current violent outburst as an out come of military operations of 1973.⁶ Feyyaz defines the insurgency as greed phenomena⁷ while Surendra discusses it in terms of opportunity based motives.⁸ Notwithstanding significance of other scholarly explanations, this paper essentially examines the efficacy of social mobilization explanation offered by Surendra for the ongoing insurgency.

Surendra's Social Mobilization Explanation

In essence, Surendra's hypothesis envisages social mobilization in Pakistan by amalgamation of particular opportunities

encouraging rebellion. Notion of opportunity refers to political climate, and not a materialistic form. She posits that mobilization is the result of an intricate combination of circumstances that foster lucrative opportunities and these factors facilitate the expression of grievances and transform them into action. Mobilization-supporting opportunities can be divided into two broad categories: economic viability and organizational advantage. After evaluating these variables Surendra concludes that opportunity for mobilization in Balochistan has encouraged contentious behavior and unsatisfactory institutions provide a further grievance to fuel the Baloch antistate ideals.

Within this broad theoretical framework, the paper first provides an overview of the present crisis in Balochistan. That is followed by empirical analysis of opportunity-based variables as explained by Surendra. Also, the paper analyzes the ground facts which have been ignored by Surendra while discussing the current insurgency. Theoretically speaking, the paper discards the social mobilization theory as a best explanation of insurgency in Balochistan.

Balochistan-A Historical Background

Balochistan is the largest province of Pakistan with the smallest number of people. With area of 347190 kilometers, the province covers 43.6 per cent of the total area of Pakistan. Its population was 6.51 million, according to 1998 census, but now, the estimated population is 7.914 million with 76.1 per cent rural population⁹.

Strategically important Balochistan covers nearly the country's entire coast – 470 miles of Arabian Sea. But the same time, it is the most impoverished province of Pakistan, with the lowest per capita income compared with the other three provinces. It is a tribal land that was ruled autocratically by its Nawabs. Although these tribal areas are under Pakistani rule, real power resides in the hands of local tribal leaders, who most often have their own laws, armies, and jails. Therefore, one can blame central government for marginalizing Balochistan, but equal responsibility lies with the

Sardars who enjoy immense powers in their tribes, and in central and provincial governments. Ethnically and linguistically, it is the most diverse province of Pakistan. Baloch are the largest ethnic group in their province but do not constitute majority. Their number is closely followed by Pakhtoons. The third largest ethnic group is Brahui, followed by a substantial number of non Baloch residents. Interestingly, the majority of Baloch live outside Balochistan, mostly in Sind and Punjab.

Rich in mineral resources such as coal, iron ore, marble and sulphur, Balochistan is the driest province of Pakistan. Therefore, there is very little irrigation and farming. Because of severe weather and scarcity of fertile land, the social mode of Balochistan has predominantly been nomadic complemented by patches of settled agriculture. Around these patches a tribal life was organized. The livelihood of the people has been dependent on a numerous economic activities such as growing crops on small pieces of land, tending pasture land, cattle breeding, especially sheep and goats, trade and work in mines. The social organization of the province continues to be based on tribalism until this day.¹⁰

Resurgence of Current Uprising

The current wave of violence has been manifested after an interval of almost three decades. Balochistan is the largest but also the least developed province of the country. Fueled by a long list of grievances, it has long faced acute discrimination and neglect at the hands of the central government. Among the grievances is the perceived exploitation of gas and mineral resources by the central government, development of mega projects and military presence within the province.

The political and economic marginalization has given rise to four insurgencies in the province. The present upsurge in Balochistan started due to the government's efforts to develop the area by undertaking a series of mega projects, most importantly the Gwadar port. In the wake of these developments, chief of Bugti tribe, Nawab Akbar Bugti along with other tribesmen led an insurgent movement against central government. Nawab Akbar, ex

Chief Minister and ex Governor of Balochistan, was killed on 26 August 2006 in a military operation. Afterward, Nawabzada Balach Marri, leader of the banned Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), killed in an ambush while crossing Afghanistan to Pakistan.

Balochistan crises took a new shape in early 2009 when UNHCR representative, John Solecki was abducted from Quetta. Soon after, three Baloch nationalist leaders were found brutally murdered in Turbat. Afterward, a new wave of violence touched urban areas of province. The insurgents started attacking developmental activities and hatred against non Baloch residents of province took the shape of target killings. This violent situation is still in practice and target killing has taken lives of more than 200 civilians in the last six months¹¹. Academicians are also being targeted and so far six academicians have become victims of target killings during the last couple of months. Besides of targeting non Baloch population, some religious extremists are also spreading sectarian violence through target killing. The former Capital City Police Officer (CCPO) of Quetta has alleged Lashkir-i-Jhangvi for sectarian target killings.¹²

Empirical Analysis of Social Mobilization Theory

Mobilization is regarded as a result of complex combination of circumstances that encourage beneficial opportunities. These factors assist the notion of grievances and transform them into action. Mobilization-supporting opportunities can be divided into two broad categories; economic viability and organizational advantage. Economic viability further includes financial gains from the exploitation of natural resources, foreign support, access to conflict-specific capital and low costs of involvement. On the other hand, organizational advantages involve favorable terrain that physically supports rebellion and social cohesion through which mobilization gains legitimacy.

Economic Viability

- **Financial Gains from the Exploitation of Natural Resources.** Collier is of the view that it is

common for rebels to exploit the rich natural resources of area and use the funds to support their movement. Hence, natural resources encourage the conflict. In addition, when people assert ownership over natural resources, it gives them a further incentive to establish sovereign states.¹³ The likelihood of resource based movement becomes higher when the economic value of the resource is more difficult to estimate as is the case of natural gas.

- Balochistan is the major supplier of Pakistan's natural gas. The compensation for the Sui gas reserve went partially to Nawab Bugti and partly to Balochistan province. It is alleged that Bugti used this money to fund local insurgents. One can question the validity of the statement but fact remains that the Dera Bugti region of Balochistan has been at the heart of current insurgency.
- **Foreign Involvement.** Subventions from hostile governments are the second mean for rebel groups to gain necessary funds.¹⁴ Foreign elements can support the movement in the form of military and economic assistance. Therefore external involvement can raise both the morale and the capability of the rebel group.¹⁵ The geo-strategic importance of the area increases the likelihood for external support for Baloch insurgency.
- Pakistani media has time and again reported of foreign involvement in the insurgency. Many of the Pakistani media reports have suspected India and Iran for the violence on the fact that the two do not want Gwadar to emerge as a rival to Chabahar port, which the Indians are developing in Iran. However, Indians deny it, and argue that Iran with a substantial Baloch population is unlikely to stroke Baloch nationalism and India does not have a rationale to support an insurgency in Balochistan as such a support would undermine India's interest in the gas pipeline project from Iran to India. Contrary to it, they overemphasize on US as the 'only country with a capability and

reach to influence local politics'¹⁶. One can question the share of India, Iran, Afghanistan, the US and Russia but, the fact is that all these foreign actors are behind the ongoing violence in Balochistan.

- **Conflict Specific Capital.** Conflict-specific capital is another economic necessity for turning a social movement into a rebellion. Collier argues that the opportunity for rebellion comes when such capital is unusually cheap or available.¹⁷ Access to arms, training, and resources further supports the armed conflict and the facts shows that the Baloch have no shortage of conflict-specific capital as it is alleged that foreign actors are providing them weapons. Hence it becomes obvious that the conflict-specific capital is present in Balochistan.
- **Low Cast of Involvement.** Cost of involvement to the individual is the final economic factor that may persuade a social movement. Collier argues that when the alternatives to rebellion are attractive, the risk of conflict is greater to the individual. Participation in a rebellious movement needs that an individual gives up his earnings and if his earning is low, the cost of rebellion is likewise low. Contrary to it, if earning is high, the individual is not likely to participate in the rebellion. Balochistan is the poorest province from rest of three provinces as well as the region is very low in literacy rate. These factors make the Baloch little to lose in agitating against the government. This statement may be true for lower class but confusion arise when one discusses about the middle class and elite tribal leaders. According to theoretical understanding, they should not involve in insurgency but as a matter of fact, a fraction of middle class along with tribal elders are part of current armed struggle.

Organizational Advantages

- **Favorable Terrain.** Organizational advantages for the insurgents also encourage contentious behavior. Methods of communications and access to facilities are affected by the physical and the social environment of the region. Further, the favorable terrain for rebels becomes a disadvantage for government forces.
- This is evident in the case of Balochistan where low dense population and low urbanization encourages mobilization of rebel groups. Balochistan is an area of widespread harsh mountains and severe desert. Nomadic life of local population gives them an advantage over the state machinery. Hence, low population density coupled with its huge size, challenging terrain, and lack of development becomes a breeding ground for contention. Insurgents use different tactics like target killings for urban areas as the city centers are not favorable for insurgents. It is also noteworthy that the Pakthoon dominated northern part of province consists of same terrain but no trace of insurgency is found there. Hence one comes to know that favorable terrain is not present in the whole province.
- **Social Cohesion.** Another source of insurgency is social cohesion which can be reduced by ethnic and religious diversity.¹⁸ Balochistan has a legacy of autocratically ruled by its Nawabs. Ethnically and linguistically, it is the most diverse province of Pakistan. Baloch are the largest ethnic group in their province but do not constitute majority. Their number is closely followed by Pakhtoons. The third largest ethnic group is Brahui, followed by a substantial number of non Baloch residents. Interestingly, the majority of Baloch live outside Balochistan, mostly in Sind and Punjab.
- It is to be noted that the present upsurge is only found in the Baloch dominated area which shows a certain

level of cohesion in the Baloch population. The structure of tribal networks within the Baloch further encourages the formation of rebel groups since their social cohesion allow clearer communication among insurgents. Moreover, tribal leaders' support for the current movement also fuels the fire as they play important role in mobilizing their people. Contrary to it, non-tribal societies of Pakhtoons and Brahui populations make rebellion more difficult because the required level of social cohesion is missing.

Conclusion

This investigation shows that social mobilization in Balochistan is not best explained by the amalgamation of particular opportunities encouraging rebellion in the provinces. It denies Surendra's findings and one comes to know that partially social mobilization theory applies in the case of Balochistan. Long list of grievances exist in province but equal responsibility lies with the provincial government. If the Lasbella district of ex Chief Minister remains underdeveloped then it is the fault of Jam Muhammad Yousaf who remained chief minister but was unable to develop his own area. Natural resources are being exploited by Bugti tribe but question arises that who is funding Marri and Mengals. The fact shows that the external actors are supporting the insurgency in Balochistan due to the strategic importance of the region. Foreign elements are also responsible for providing conflict-specific capital to the Baloch insurgents. As the tribesmen bear low cost of involvement, therefore, one can see that the present insurgency is only found in the tribal areas of Baloch population whom earnings and lives are sole responsibility of tribal leader. This is the reason that only three tribal leaders are waging armed struggle against Islamabad and rest of the province remains quite peaceful.

Examining the organizational advantages for insurgents, one comes to know that there exists a favorable terrain for insurgents in the rural areas and urban areas become difficult for insurgents to target. Therefore, the rural and undeveloped areas of province are hub of the insurgency whereas urban centers are quite reluctant to

accept rebel like social mobilization. Social cohesion may exist in the Baloch tribesmen while it is difficult to find the so called cohesion among the non tribal region of the province as the fact shows that there is no insurgency in Pakhtoon and Brahvi population.

Surendra has used all the variables in “Yes” and “No” form and she has not left any space for “to some extent”. While the empirical analysis of the theory shows that all these variables are true to some extent, therefore, she has wrongly concluded that social mobilization theory can be best explained in Balochistan. The paper concludes that the present crises are not because of opportunity based mobilization. Rather, the ethnic Baloch of three tribes (Mari, Bugti and Mengal) are suffering some major grievances by the hands of their tribal elders and the governmental authorities. These grievances must be addressed by the central government and the present can be settled through dialogue based an open mind and heart. There must be a surety that the policy measures will be enforced honestly and completely so that lack of distrust may be removed.

- Negotiation and Reconciliation can be used as guiding principles for resolving the crisis. So, there must be an encouraging environment for reconciliation and after creating an enabling environment, efforts should be made to restore the confidence of the people.
- Mega projects are important but the central government should also accommodate the provincial demands. Whatever step is taken, it must be strictly in accordance with the wishes and priorities of the local people that are ultimate prospective beneficiaries.
- The matter of gas royalty is an old Baloch grievance and it should be reviewed after a debate on the matter.
- Successive government used to deviate from their mandate and instead of imparting the civil rights; they brutally use force to curb the Baloch demands.

Hence, there is a need for partnership between the civil society and the media to grow pressure on rulers not to depart from their mandate and also to act as counter pressure to those external forces who try to influence the government policies.

- Majority of the feudal chiefs of Pakistan have damaged the interests of Pakistan. Generally, they have shown little commitment or sense of nationalism with their homeland. For the said reason, Pakistan needs to immediately abolish the Sardari System in the province.
- All federal departments may be directed to provide acute representation to Baloch youth immediately
- Total reliance on mega projects is not the solution. Instead of it, due attention must be paid to resolving day to day concerns of people such as their need for employment, a decent wage, facilities of safe movement, satisfaction of basic needs and guarantees of security of life and due protection of law.
- The province is now facing intensive law and order situations as well as sectarian violence. Its causes may be located and very effective system may be adopted to improve this grave situation.
- The very important areas of Sibi and Naseerabad Divisions, which are abode of famous Baloch tribes Marri and Bugti, and are at present the hub of tribalism, have no college and university. This area is breeding violence against the federal government and only education can stop the youth of these area to not to go to violence. Therefore, it is need of time to establish there cadet colleges, degree colleges and a university.
- The foreign elements are undoubtedly functioning against Pakistan's vital security and economic interests in the region. Islamabad should demand from the U.S. to cease the usage of Afghan soil to destabilize Pakistan.
- Media should also act as a pressure tactic to those external forces that are influencing the present crises.

Media men should portray the true picture of external powers.

Notes

¹ Wikipedia, "Balochistan Liberation Army", available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balochistan_Liberation_Army, accessed on 17 June 2009.

² Sanaullah Baloch, "A Lesson to be Learnt", *Dawn*, August 05, 2008.

³ Alok Bansal, "Balochistan: Continuing Violence and Its Implications", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 30, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2006, pp. 264.

⁴ Adeel Khan, "Baloch Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan: From Guerilla War to Nowhere?" *Asian Ethnicity* 2, 2003.

⁵ Robert G. Wirsing, "Baloch nationalism and the geopolitics of energy resources: the changing context of separatism in Pakistan", *Strategic Studies Institute*, April 2008, pp. 41.

⁶ Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, *In Search of Solutions*, ed. B.M. Kutty, (Karachi: Pakistan Labour Trust and University of Karachi's Pakistan Study Centre, 2009).

⁷ Feyyaz M. Pasha, "If Greed Theory has Visited Nuclear South Asia", unpublished, National Defence University Islamabad.

⁸ Shanna Dietz Surendra, "Explaining Social Mobilization in Pakistan: A Comparative Case Study of Baluchistan and Azad Kashmir", *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2009.

⁹ Population Welfare Department, Demographic Profile of Balochistan, available at http://apnabalochistan.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=category§ionid=4&id=42&Itemid=486, accessed on July 22, 2009.

¹⁰ Nadeem Qasir, *Pakistan Studies: An Investigation into the Political Economy 1948-1988* (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1991), pp. 26.

¹¹ Muhammad Sabir, "Target Killing: 200 Persons Die in Six Months", *Jung Sunday Magazine*, 19 July 2009.

¹² Rafi Ahmed Pervaiz Bhatti, "Balochistan Insurgency: An Insider Speaks", Letters to the Editor, *Dawn*, 6 July 2009.

¹³ James Buchanan and Roger L. Faith, "Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit," *American Economic Review* 77, 1987, pp. 1024.

¹⁴ Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, 2004.

¹⁵ Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, "External Interventions and the Duration of Civil War" (manuscript, World Bank, DECRG [Development Economics Research Group], 2000).

¹⁶ Alok Bansal, "Balochistan: Continuing Violence and Its Implications", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 30, No. 1, Jan-Mar 2006, pp. 54.

¹⁷ Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance".

¹⁸ Ibid.

ENERGY CRISIS IN PAKISTAN: A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY

Mehvish Nigar Qureshi

Introduction

Energy lies at the heart of economic security, as energy is the pre-requisite to generate any economic activity. In this way energy is a big determinant of development and growth of an economy especially in case of developing countries. In the modern global economy, the concept of “natural security” has emerged as a main component of security of nations. It means sufficient, reliable, affordable and sustainable supplies of natural resources for the modern global economy.¹ The proponents of natural security refer to energy as the most important ingredient of natural security because of its finite supplies, especially in case of fossil fuels e.g. oil, gas and coal. Energy production of any country is the measure of its economy. Energy is essential to build a strong economic base in order to compete in today’s global economy. A study conducted by United States Agency for International Development (USAID), describes the strong relationship between the provision of energy services and global, economic, and political development.²

An energy crisis is a great shortfall (or price rise) in the supply of energy resources to an economy. Global economy suffers from the fear of final energy crisis in the world, as world’s primary energy demand will continue to rise at about 1.7 percent annually, over the next twenty years, driven by economic growth.³ It is estimated that the developing countries of South Asia will account for the largest share of the growth in the world energy demand. In case of Pakistan, it is unfortunate to know that the concept of “energy security” has been ignored for decades till it took an atrocious shape and emerged in the form of acute shortages of electricity and power cuts (load shedding). The present energy crisis in the country has its roots in the structural inadequacies present in the policies of energy sector.

Due to lack of cohesion among various departments and ministries of the government managing energy sector, the energy

needs of the country have never been studied from one focal point so as to formulate an integrated energy policy with consultations from all energy sub-sectors. Each sub-sector has been pursuing its independent policies to meet the energy requirements which resulted in a disproportionate energy mix with huge imports and lack of energy diversity. Despite immense hydroelectric potential, the country relies on oil imports for power generation.⁴ In the same way, natural gas reserves are being rapidly consumed and depleted instead of increasing the consumption of coal in the energy mix. It shows lack of cohesion among Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources, Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and National Coal Authority (NCA). There has been a delay and ignorance factor constantly involved, which has led to short-term solutions to control periodic energy deficiencies, rather than long-term and coherent initiatives to address the issue on pragmatic lines. There is a long history of lack of research capabilities and budget allocations to develop alternative energy resources to meet the growing energy demands. There are two main sources of energy; non-renewable or conventional sources (oil and natural gas, coal and coal products) and renewable or non-conventional sources of energy, (waste, geothermal, wind and tidal wave, photovoltaic, solar and geo-thermal energy). In Pakistan, there has been more focus on non-renewable sources of energy which has resulted in country's increased reliance on foreign imports to satisfy the energy demands.

The essay is an exploratory study of the evolution of concept of energy security in Pakistan through tracing the evidences in the official data available. It explores links between energy security and national security implicitly through explaining the multi-dimensional nature of energy security and its connection to political stability. While analyzing the loopholes in the energy security policy of Pakistan, it traces the factors which have been operating for decades and have resulted in the present energy crisis in the country. Through a detailed study of the structural inadequacies and policy dilemma, it proceeds towards the options and choices available for averting energy crisis. The recommendations focus on exploitation of indigenous energy resources i.e. coal and hydro electricity, keeping in view the consequences of consumption of various resources.

It is not a scientific study of economic factors and statistical data has been analyzed in terms of its political and economic implications. In the essay, energy crisis is independent variable and economic development and national security are dependent variables. It draws a theoretical connection between energy and economic development and its impacts on national security. The pessimistic school of thought may seem to be dominant throughout the writing because there was a fear of ill-assessment of facts in the optimistic approach towards the issue.

Energy Security: Applying Energy Security Indicators to Pakistan

In the age of globalization and new economic order, the concept of Energy Security has four main dimensions. An analysis of the four dimensions indicates the energy security state of any country. These are:

- Energy Intensity
- Energy Diversity
- Energy Import Dependency
- Energy Transportation.

Energy Intensity

Energy intensity is a function of policy choices, made by policy makers of an economy. A country that uses energy more efficiently is going to have more energy reserves in the longer run. Energy intensity is measured in Tons of Oil Equivalent (TOE) per unit of Gross Domestic Productivity (GDP). Consequently there are wide disparities in the energy intensity of different economies.⁵


In Pakistan, National Energy Conservation Center (ENERCON), an attached department of the Ministry of Environment is the focal national agency for coordinating a national program on energy management. But it seems to be ineffective in devising techniques to control the transmission and distribution losses and conservation of energy. The system-wide transmission and distribution losses are 24.8 percent (29 billion units / year) in

Pakistan⁶. Pakistan is ranked among moderately energy efficient countries. It is also lacking on energy conservation techniques. The only way of reducing the 'energy gap' (supply and demand) is a nationally planned program of energy conservation.

Energy Diversity

Energy diversity indicator assesses the distribution of energy sources in the energy mix of a county or region. Energy diversity indicator declines when there is a growing dependence on one source, thus undermining energy security. Pakistan relies heavily on natural gas, constituting 47% of energy supply, with oil 31%, hydroelectricity 11%. On the other hand, the use of coal, Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) and nuclear energy is 9%, 1% and 1% respectively as shown in Fig I.⁷ The increased reliance on natural gas and oil limits the energy supplies to only two main sources. It depicts the vulnerability of economy because any disruption in supply of oil and gas will directly affect the economic output. Unfortunately, renewable sources of energy have been ignored in the energy mix, despite their huge potentials.

Fig I: Pakistan's total Primary Energy supply, 2007-08.




Source: Asian Development Bank: Clean Energy Development in Pakistan.

Energy Import Dependency

It means reliance on foreign sources of energy to fulfill the energy requirement of the country. Energy import dependency increases when “annual primary energy production” is growing at a lower rate than the rate of growth in the “primary energy demand”. The reliance on foreign energy resources for economic development and prosperity increase the dependence: a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces (international market rates). In case of Pakistan, the fluctuating rate of oil in the international market and domestic market and the difficulties faced by government in determining the suitable consumer prices have affected the economic growth of the country and the industrial output directly and the national security indirectly. It arouses public anger also.

Pakistan relies heavily on imported energy. Only 18% of the oil demand is met through indigenous oil. It shows country’s economic vulnerability in case of any supply disruptions because oil constitutes 31% of the energy mix of Pakistan. During 2007-08, Pakistan’s energy imports were 34%, with 66% indigenous production, as shown in the Figure II.⁸ A country’s over reliance on energy imports can be justified on basis of scarcity of indigenous resources. But in case of Pakistan with huge potentials of coal and renewable energy, 34% of energy imports are not a feasible choice. This excessive reliance on energy imports to fulfill the energy requirements undermines the energy security of the country

Figure II: Total Energy Availability: Indigenous Production and Imports, 2007-08.



Source: Asian Development Bank: Clean Energy Development in Pakistan.

Energy Transportation

It means appropriate and timely delivery of energy from different sources. It is an important component of energy security because supply disruption adversely affects energy security of a country. The natural gas and oil resources of Pakistan are concentrated in Balochistan and Sindh. But the unequal distribution of revenue generated from resources in Balochistan has added to the grievances of Baloch people and justified their resort to force and destruction of gas pipelines.⁹ The targeting of supply pipelines in Balochistan resulted in periodic disruptions in transportation of gas in the country. Attacks by terrorists or militia on important infrastructure are a possible problem in future as well for domestic energy consumers.

Moreover, it has also affected the international gas pipeline project: Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline. According to the original design, the Iran–Pakistan–India (IPI) gas pipeline was to be 2,775 kilometers (1,724 miles) starting from Iran's South Pars gas field in the Persian Gulf through the Pakistani city of Khuzdar in Balochistan, with one branch going on to Karachi and a second branch extending to Multan (898 kilometers) and then on to India (740 kilometers).¹⁰ Recently, the project has been finalized between Iran and Pakistan only, because security assurance of the transporting pipeline in the Pakistani territory (Balochistan) has been an irritant for government of India thus hindering finalization of the IPI gas pipeline deal. Some of the energy security thinkers believe that the security of transporting pipeline in Balochistan territory is one of the reasons for India's not signing the pipeline project with Iran and Pakistan. However, the pipeline project has been signed between Iran and Pakistan, keeping in view the energy demands of the country.

According to the official report prepared by the Petroleum Ministry and Inter State Gas Systems (ISGS), the gas purchased will be used for power generation and it would enable Pakistan to generate 5,000 MW power. The report says that power generation and usage of imported gas by the industrial sector will contribute \$1 billion to the annual savings.¹¹ This will help to replace the costly

fuel used in thermal powerhouses and save over 1 billion dollar for national kitty if the crude oil price stands even at just \$70 per barrel.¹²

Pakistan is fortunate in regard to its geo-political location as it can pursue projects of import of gas and oil independently, as compared to India. But unfortunately, there is a lack of concern towards the issue, and most of such projects face long delays thus dragging the country to an energy crisis. In case of Iran-Pakistan pipeline project also, the work on the project will start by mid 2010 and the estimated time period is five years.

Nature of Energy Crisis in Pakistan

The main objectives of Pakistan's energy sector as stated by Mukhtar Ahmed (Former Advisor to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Energy) are: to ensure adequate and affordable energy supply to meet the needs of an expanding economy, maintain a balanced energy mix through maximum indigenous resource utilization with a focus on renewable sources of energy, exploiting the potential for cross border energy transactions and to create a conducive environment to mobilize private sector investment.¹³ In its organizational mechanism, it is to strive for appropriate distribution of responsibilities (policy formulation, regulation, administration), a rational industry structure (Government's 'strategic' presence, public-private partnership, exclusive private ownership), and sustainable pricing regime (cost-of-service, transparent and targeted subsidies).¹⁴ But a study of various energy sub-sectors (discussed below) reveals that the facts are contradictory to these objectives. The shortcomings in the policy planning and implementation mechanisms in the energy sector have resulted in negative effects on the economic growth of the country.

An overview of energy sector (institutions and resources) is necessary to understand the nature of energy crisis in Pakistan. Potential of various resources, their exploration and contribution in the energy mix of the country is discussed in detail. The limitations of related institutions and organizations have been highlighted to understand the factors behind present energy deficit of the country.


Electric Power Sector

Electricity is the major mode of Power expression as different sources of energy are harnessed in the form of electricity. Pakistan has two integrated public sector power utilities, the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) and the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC). WAPDA supplies power to the whole of Pakistan except the metropolitan city of Karachi, which is supplied by KESC. With the development of nuclear energy, Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission was established in order to use nuclear energy for power generation however the Independent Power Producers (IPPs) represent the private power sector in Pakistan. National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) regulates the distribution companies¹⁵. The installed capacities owned by various agencies operating in the country are:

- Water & Power Development Authority (WAPDA): Total installed capacity of WAPDA stood at 11,454 Mega Watt (MW) during July-March 2008-09 of which, hydel accounts for 57.2 percent or 6,555 MW, thermal accounts for 42.8 percent or 4,899 MW
- Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC): 1,884 MW.¹⁶
- Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC): 462 MW
- Independent Power Producers (IPPs): 5,954 MW.¹⁷

The country has a total installed generating capacity of about 19522 MW. The current production is 11,000 MW, while current demand is 15,000 MW.¹⁸ It means that only 55% of the total installed capacity of power generation is being utilized. According to the Water and Power Minister, the present government has inherited a 3,500 megawatts shortfall, but it succeeded in generating 1,500 MW by upgrading the system but despite government's initiatives, the demand for electricity is rising rapidly and it has shot up to 16,000 MW per day.¹⁹ There are allegations of concealing the exact figures of energy shortfall from public which fosters public anger. Figure III, shows electricity demand projection and energy supplies in future. It shows that the demand is gradually rising.

Figure III: Electricity Demand and Firm Supply Position.



Source: Private Power Infrastructure Board

Developments in power production sector remained stagnant and it is seen that electricity consumption by different sectors has merely increased by 0.7 percent during July-March 2008-09, due to shortages in electricity supply despite increase in demand.²⁰ (See Table I) This trend of moving towards negative growth and the reduction in the consumption of electricity is coupled with higher cost due to gradual phasing out of a subsidy on electricity which has fostered public anger and protests in major cities.

Table I: Sector-wise Electricity consumption.

Fiscal Year	Petroleum Products		Gas		Electricity		Coal	
	Tones (000)	Change (%)	(mmcf)	Change (%)	(Gwh)	Change (%)	M.T* (000)	Change (%)
1998-99	16,647		635,891		43,296		3,461.40	
1999-00	17,768	6.7	712,101	12.0	45,586	5.3	3,167.90	-8.5
2000-01	17,648	-0.7	768,068	7.9	48,584	6.6	4,044.70	27.7
2001-02	16,960	-3.9	824,604	7.4	50,622	4.2	4,408.60	9.0
2002-03	16,452	-3.0	872,264	5.8	52,656	4.0	4,889.90	10.9
2003-04	13,421	-18.4	1,051,418	20.5	57,491	9.2	6,064.50	24.0
2004-05	14,671	9.3	1,161,043	10.4	61,327	6.7	7,893.80	30.2
2005-06	14,627	-0.3	1,223,385	5.4	67,603	10.2	7,714.00	-2.3
2006-07	16,847	15.2	1,221,994	-0.1	72,712	7.6	7,894.10	2.3
2007-08	18,080	7.3	1,275,212	4.4	73,400	0.9	10,110.60	28.1
Avg. 10 years		1.4		8.2		6.1		13.5
July-March								
2007-08	13,342		955,625		55,208		6,559	
2008-09 (e)	12,892	-3.4	931,700	-2.5	55,614	0.7	4,822	-26.5

Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09.

Since beginning (1947-1955), Pakistan's power sector focused on construction of small thermal plants and small canal fall hydel stations to achieve quick results. It started with two small hydroelectric power stations with a total installed capacity of 10.7 MW.²¹ In 1955, Pakistan's installed generating capacity of 342.4 MW comprised of four hydroelectric power plants and about 90 thermal stations.²² This shows the shortsightedness of the policy planners as these small thermal plants with quick results were of little benefit in the longer run. Moreover, the focus on thermal plants left the hydroelectric potential of the country unexploited. Conventional thermal plants using oil (28.7%) natural gas (35.7%), and coal (0.3%) account for about 66 percent of Pakistan's capacity, with hydroelectricity making up 33% percent and nuclear (2.3%) percent.²³ Despite huge hydropower potentials, country relies on imported oil for electricity generation.

WAPDA operates the majority of thermal power plants in Pakistan, with over 5,000 MW of installed capacity in its control. These thermal plants are run by imported oil, thus the cost of electricity generated by them is higher than hydroelectric power plants.

“The production cost of furnace oil electricity is Rs 16 per unit, add to it the transmission, distribution cost (including losses), the total cost of such electricity works out to approximately Rs 22 per KWh. It is estimated that the country consumes at least 25 billion units of electricity produced annually through furnace oil, which amounts to the total deficit of Rs 425 Billion. Government does not have enough resources to pay such a huge subsidy to WAPDA and increase in tariff can not solve the problem alone.”²⁴

As a result most of the thermal power plants of WAPDA are working at 50-60 percent of their dependable capacities.²⁵ (See Table II). This has led to the current power outages in the country, thus affecting industrial output and discomfort for the domestic consumers. WAPDA is also delaying payments to the oil companies and IPPs. So the IPPs are not producing electricity to their full

capacities. Under these circumstances, country's total installed capacity is not being fully utilized.

Table II: Installed Generation Capacities, Dependable Capacities and Power Generation.

<u>Thermal Power Station</u>	<u>Installed Capacity (MW)</u>	<u>Dependable Capacity (MW)</u>	<u>Power Generator (MW)</u>
Jamshoro TPS	850	700	415
Kotri TPS	174	140	118
Lakhara TPS	150	-	Non- Functional
Guddu TPS	1655	1155	873
Muzaffargarh TPS	195	60	38
GTPS F/ABAD	244	210	58
KAPCO (IPP)	1638	1386	1272
F/ABAD TPS	132	100	70
Malakand-III TPS	81	81	44

Source: The News International, "4 IPPs, 2 Rental plants closure add 950 MW to shortfall", by: Omer Bhatti, Thursday, August 13th, 2009.

Moreover, due to reliance on imported oil to meet the energy demands, country's own hydroelectric potential remained unexplored. WAPDA controls the country's major hydroelectric plants; with the largest being the Tabela plant at 3,046 megawatts (MW) installed capacity. Additional hydroelectric plants in operation include Mangla (1,000 MW), Warsak (240 MW), and Chashma (184 MW).²⁶ Apart from large dam projects, the canal network has immense potential. The hydropower potential of canal system in Pakistan ranges from 1 MW to more than 10 MW. However, the total hydro potential of the country is estimated at about 50,000 MW.²⁷ The proposed sites for hydropower generation from canal network are given in Table III.

Table III: Proposed Sites and their Discharge, Fall and Power Potential

<u>Name of Channel</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Discharge in Feet/second</u>	<u>Fall in Feet</u>	<u>Power Potential (MW)</u>
Baloki-Sulamanki Link-1	RD106250	12500	10.64	10.00
Baloki-Sulamanki Link-2	RD33430	9000	17.86	10.72
Chanab-Jhehlum Link (Tail)	RD316622	13527	41.70	40.00
Upper Chanab	RD0	16500	8.83	9.70
TP Link Canal (DG Khan)	RD183000	12000	3.00	12.28

Source: Nayyer Alam Zaigham, Zeeshan Alam Nayyer, "Prospects of Renewable Energy Sources in Pakistan", COMSATS Conference on Renewable Energy Technologies and Sustainable Development, 2005.

Despite a small number of water reservoirs, the construction of new dams as well as small canal power projects has been ignored by successive regimes. It is very unfortunate to know that Pakistan has developed only about 4,800 MW of its total power potential in sixty years. The construction of Kalabagh dam has been delayed for decades. Kalabagh dam project will have an installed capacity of 3600 MW, which will be 20% of the peak demand. It will generate on average 11,400 million KWH annually. Moreover, the conjunctive operation of Kalabagh and Tarbela will enable to generate 336 million KWH of electricity in addition to its existing power production, with an average power benefits estimated as Rs. 35.94 billion per annum.²⁸ But the project has long been delayed due to provincial divergences. Consequently, the country is facing acute energy crisis.

"If Kalabagh was in position today, there would have been no load-shedding in Pakistan."²⁹

In recent years, growth in Pakistan's thermal power generation has come primarily from new Independent Power Producers (IPPs), some of which have been funded by foreign investors. At present there are 16 private power projects with a capacity of above 5500 MW which are in operation. This is roughly one-third of the total power generation capacity of Pakistan.³⁰ It shows that WAPDA has not been successful in pursuit of its core objectives. It is also responsible for non-functioning of IPPs. It is now opting for rental power plants to meet the energy requirements. Instead of rental power plants, there is a need to make IPPs functioning through payments by WAPDA, as country has invested in IPPs already and they have the capacity to generate electricity to suffice the demands. It is only because of the delays of payments by WAPDA, that these power stations are closed.


Oil and Gas Sector

Pakistan's Ministry of Oil and Natural Resources regulates the country's oil sector and decides taxation mechanism and royalty payments to the oil companies. Pakistan's largest national oil companies include: Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL), Pakistan Petroleum Limited (PPL), and Pakistan State Oil (PSO). However, major international oil companies in Pakistan include: British Petroleum (BP), Österreichische Mineralölverwaltung: Austrian mineral oil authority (OMV), Orient Petroleum International (OPI), Petronas and Tullow.³¹ Pakistan has five refineries, with total 270,000 bbl/d capacity. These include: National Refinery Limited (NRL), Pakistan Refinery Limited (PRL), Pak-Arab Refinery (PARCO) and Attock Group of Oil Refineries. Government policy in the oil sector always aimed at increasing the production of oil, but due to lack of capital and resources, the sector remained mainly at the mercy of international oil companies. It was in 1961, that OGDC was established, before that government was in joint ventures with the private companies, providing them negotiated risk capital in rupees.³²

Pakistan has proven crude oil reserves of 313 million barrels as of 1st January 2009.³³ But since the late 1980s, Pakistan has not experienced many new oil fields coming online. As a result, oil

production has remained fairly flat, at around 60,000 barrels per day, while consumption increased to 350,000 barrels per day. This has resulted in increase in the net imports of the country. (see Figure IV) Pakistan's strategic oil reserves are at precarious level with only 29 days stockpiling. It does not meet IEA standards of stockpiling which is a minimum of 90 days.³⁴ According to a study on Pakistan's oil production and demand, there is a forecast of decrease in Pakistan oil production of 19.1%, with crude volumes falling steadily to 55,000b/d in 2018.³⁵

Figure IV: Pakistan's Oil Production and Consumption.



On the other hand, oil consumption between 2008 and 2018 is set to increase by 23.7%, with growth slowing to an assumed 3.0% per annum towards the end of the period and the country using 481,000b/d by 2018.³⁶ These figures indicate that in future, country's import dependency will increase thus making the economy more vulnerable to oil price fluctuations in the international market. This will further undermine the energy security state of the country in near future.

In natural gas sector, Pakistan's state owned PPL and OGDCL are the main actors, which produce 30% and 25% natural gas respectively. The foreign natural gas producers include: OMV and BP.³⁷ In the recent years, due to increased use of gas, the household and industrial sector is facing shortage of gas supply especially in the cold winters. It is assumed that in the near future,

Pakistan will face a shortfall of natural gas, despite recent gas discoveries, which will be insufficient to meet the rising demand. Gas demand is set to rise from an estimated 31.2bcm in 2008 to 39.2bcm by 2013, requiring imports of at least 1.2bcm. Gas production is expected to further rise to a possible 45.0bcm by 2017/2018. With demand growth of 60.5%, this requires imports rising to 5.1bcm by the end of the forecast period.³⁸ This is the result of lack of diversity in the energy mix and increased use of gas. This over consumption of natural gas has resulted in unmanageable gas shortages in winter adding to the woes of consumers. It does not seem to be a feasible choice to move to an integrated energy policy (with maximum exploitation of coal and wind energy) after complete depletion of gas reserves of the country.

The overall share of imported energy in Pakistan has risen to 34-35 percent in the FY08 against 30 percent in FY04.³⁹ This is mainly due to higher imports of crude oil and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) for meeting the local demands of various sectors. The recent oil price hike in the international oil market caused an increase in the prices of energy in the domestic markets relative to other goods and services and adversely affected economy of the country.


On the other hand, in oil refining industry, the installed refining capacity in Pakistan remained stagnant due to acute shortage of capital required to build modern refining complex. As a result, the scale of operation of refineries in Pakistan is small and the normal refinery capacity utilization is 80%. Foreign investors in oil refining industry are reluctant due to high rate of return on investment. There is an increase in demand of natural gas and furnace oil particularly for electricity generation but Pakistan produces only 18% of the oil it consumes, rest of the requirement is fulfilled through imports resulting in financial strains.

Coal

According to 2007-08 figures, coal consumption in Pakistan has increased from 6 percent 1996-97 to 13.7 percent in 2008-09.⁴⁰ Figure V, shows a positive trend in terms of decreased oil

consumption and increasing coal consumption, but in a period of ten years, it is a relatively slow transition and needs to be accelerated.

Figure V: Coal Consumption: 1996-97 and 2007-08.



Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09.

Pakistan has immense coal reserves and Tharcoal mines are one of the biggest coal mines. Pakistan has an estimated at 185 billion tons of coal reserves, which, according to Dr. Akram Sheikh (ex-Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission) are equivalent to at least 400 billion barrels of oil, in other words equivalent to the oil reserves of Saudi Arabia and Iran combined.⁴¹ According to the vice chancellor of Punjab University, Professor Dr. Mujahid Kamran, these coal reserves equal to 618 billion barrels of crude oil. At \$50 per barrel this asset is worth up to \$30.0 trillion and equivalent to more than 187 times of Pakistan's current GDP.⁴² These are astonishing figures, and it seems unbelievable that a country with immense potential of energy resources is suffering from an energy crisis.

In 1972, after the discovery of gas, the share of coal in the total energy consumption declined from 8.3% to 5.5% in 1977-78, as coal was gradually replaced by gas and petroleum products in the absence of any comprehensive coal development plan, dealing with its production, transportation and utilization.⁴³ After creation of National Coal Authority (NCA), which aimed to promote the use of indigenous coal, there was a realization that the coal imports were made at a high cost in foreign exchange, which could be fulfilled more economically by indigenous coal⁴⁴. But the projects could not

be implemented successfully due to a lack of political will. Even recently we see that a Chinese firm that had agreed to set up a 600 MW project at the Tharcoal mines for 5.79 cent per unit quit from its project recently, when the authorities refused to offer a tariff more than 5.39 cents per unit. There is a need to focus on coal-based power generation as seen in case of other countries of South Asia. Coal is the most preferred source of energy in China and India, constituting 81 percent for china and 51 percent for India despite environmental concerns.⁴⁵

Nuclear Power

Presently, Pakistan has one nuclear power plant, Chashma-1 and nuclear energy constitutes 0.735 percent in the primary energy mix. The Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) operates the nuclear plant. Pakistan is currently working on second nuclear power plant (Chashma-2), with the help of China National Nuclear Corporation. The plant will have 325 MW of installed capacity and could be completed by end of 2009.⁴⁶ But keeping in view, the country's vast coal reserves, any investment to develop nuclear energy on immediate basis does not seem a viable option. Nuclear plants are capital intensive and have long gestation periods which make them less cost- effective as compared to coal fired plants.

Renewable Energy

Alternative Energy Development Board (AEDB) was created in 2003, keeping in view the potential of renewable energy sources.⁴⁷ It acts as a central national body on the subject of renewable energy with the main objective to facilitate, promote and encourage development of renewable energy in Pakistan. Pakistan is blessed with huge potentials of hydro-power and wind energy. But presently, alternative fuels only constitute less than one percent (it was zero percent before 2009) of energy mix of Pakistan. Wind energy is an important form of renewable energy. It has been estimated that the potential of wind energy in Pakistan is 350,000 MW.⁴⁸ Coastal areas of Sindh and Balochistan (Karachi, Thatta, Hyderabad, Jiwani and Pasni coastal areas) present an ideal location for the wind mills. In case of solar energy, Pakistan is located in the

sunny belt but currently, the use of solar energy is very limited due to the higher cost of solar plant infrastructure and lack of silicon semiconductor industry in Pakistan.

There is absence of commercialization of clean energy and market facilitation efforts. Government has long been hesitant towards development of renewable sources of energy due to the high cost of infrastructure required. There is a need to realize that cost of development of renewable sources of energy is far less than the amount paid for oil imports every year. Replacing oil imports with renewable sources of energy and indigenous crude oil will be beneficial in the longer run, keeping in mind the fluctuation in oil prices in the international oil market and the predictions about final energy crisis in the world. It is commendable to know that current energy crisis in Pakistan has raised governmental concerns for development of wind energy projects to avert the energy crisis. But there is a need to have consistency in development of renewable energy.

Analysis of Root Causes of Energy Crisis in Pakistan

- In addition to the factors discussed above, there have been structural inadequacies in the policy planning and lack of adequate economic reforms in transition phase from an agriculture based economy to an industrial based economy.
- Reluctance towards technical change which affects the energy intensiveness of consumption (see page 3, Energy Intensity). This has resulted in huge transmission and distribution losses. According to economic survey report 2008-09, the transmission and distribution losses of WAPDA alone are 19.41 percent after the up gradation of the system in the present regime. In the past, these figures were above 20 percent since 1998 when it was 25.8 percent. (See Table IV).

Table IV: WAPDA Transmission and Distribution Losses (%)

<u>Year</u>	<u>Transmission and distribution losses</u> <u>(%)</u>
1998-99	25.8
1999-00	24.6
2000-01	23.8
2001-02	23.6
2002-03	23.9
2003-04	23.5
2004-05	22.3
2005-06	21.9
2006-07	21.2
2007-08	20.92
2008-09	19.41

Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09

- There is an increase in the energy demands of the country but means of energy production have not been developed consistently. With increase in population and rapid industrialization, there is an increase in the stock of energy-consuming goods, and utilization rate which require increase in energy production. Table V, shows the projected indigenous energy supply and deficit of Pakistan. It shows that energy deficit will increase to 46 percent in the fiscal year 2015 and further to 64 percent in the fiscal year 2025, which is very alarming.⁴⁹

Table V: Projected Energy Supply and Deficit of Pakistan.

<u>Energy Resources</u>	<u>FY 06</u> <u>(MTOE)</u>	<u>FY 15</u> <u>(MTOE)</u>	<u>FY 25</u> <u>(MTOE)</u>
Oil	3	4	2
Gas	29	34	19
Coal	2	5	13
Hydel	7	13	29
Renewable and Nuclear	1	3	12
Total Indigenous Supply	41	61	75

Total Energy Req.	58	114	211
Deficit	17	53	136
Deficit as % of E. Req.	29%	46%	64%

Note: Energy imports constitute 34% of energy mix 2008-09

Source: Pakistan Energy Yearbook 2006.

- Energy consumption and productive activity: A lesser amount of energy is used for productive activities contributing to GDP growth of the country.
- Policy Dilemma: Pakistan's Energy Security Policy has been a victim of changing regimes and their agendas. An analysis of the five-year plans shows that although there have been programmatic interventions made on pragmatic lines, but those policies suffered a lack of sustainability due to changing regimes and an insufficient follow-up support provision. Some of the plans suffered a set-back due to dependency on external technical assistance, and the budgetary constraints. Most of our leaders believe that some minor alterations in the economic policy will be sufficient to prevent these problems from adversely affecting the economy. But they fail to see the long-term threats and consequently fail to do much about them, their initiatives does not go beyond their tenure in the government service. It is the duty of democratic decision-makers and parliamentary representatives, to work with conviction to take reasonable decisions with long term viability.


Impact of Energy Crisis on National Security

No country can achieve high economic growth without producing sufficient energy. In this way, production of energy reflects industrial and agricultural output of a country. Energy security fosters economic security of a country, which has emerged as a vital ingredient of national security. It has become a gadget in measuring the national security of a country. China is emerging as a global power due to its strong economy. It is the economic power of a country, which serves as a first line of defence as well as a threat

to the enemies. On the other hand, an economic recession can undermine the power and national security of a country. National security refers to the survival of a nation-state through the use of economic, military and political power and the exercise of diplomacy. In this regard, adequate and cost effective supply of energy is the pre-requisite for socio-economic development and economic prosperity, which ultimately contributes to national security of a country.

When energy supply of an industry is restricted, its output decreases and cost of production increases. Periodic load shedding/power cutoffs lead to a reduction in the gross domestic production and exports of the country. In this way, energy crisis adversely affects the national economy by way of industrial output, agriculture growth, business and quality of life. Consequently, the macroeconomic implications of a supply-induced energy crisis are large as energy is the resource used to exploit all other resources. Table VI, shows the relationship between economic growth and energy in case of Pakistan. An overview of the figures from 1990-2007 reveals that the gross domestic production (GDP) of Pakistan has been significantly affected by energy productions. But despite this close linkage between energy and GDP growth, the energy sector has suffered from lack of attention by the successive regimes. Pakistan's GDP growth for FY 2009-10 is forecast by Business Monitor International (BMI) at 2.5% down from 5.8% in 2008. In 2010, growth is put at 3.5%, followed by 4.3% in 2011, and 4.8% in 2012-2013 mainly due to energy shortages.⁵⁰ In the 58 years history of the country, there have been only a few golden years where the economy grew above 7 percent. This unstable economy will have adverse effects on national security. Energy crisis in Pakistan has emerged as a threat to national security because of its intensity and multidimensional nature. Industrial output is reduced and exports are declining due to long hours of power cutoff.

Table IV: Pakistan's Economic and Energy Growth (1990-2007)



Source: Pakistan Energy Yearbook 2007; Pakistan Economic Survey 2007.

As a result, country's trade deficit is increasing rapidly. Like industry, agriculture is heavily dependent upon electricity and oil. Our crop production has failed to achieve its target and this failure is leading to the creation of another crisis, which is 'Flour Crisis'. The lack of diversity of sources in the energy mix caused increase in the prices and availability of oil and natural gas which has directly affected transport. Expensive commercial transport further increases cost of a product, and decreases the 'purchasing capacity' of people, which means depreciation of national currency. Moreover, this has resulted in increase in the cost of living and it has made life difficult for the public. The power outages and long hours of load shedding apart from their economic costs also foster political instability by provoking public anger. The situation is further aggravated by the rising electricity prices.


Recommendations: Averting the Energy Crisis

The solutions can not follow any set prescription. Diversity of resource endowment, environmental, demographic, cultural, economic and political conditions force each nation to pursue a specific path. In case of Pakistan, the existing energy resources should be exploited to build a strong exploration and production base. The efforts should be directed at achieving cost effectiveness, reduction in import dependence, promotion of self reliance through accelerated exploitation of energy resources and minimum

environmental degradation. In addition, a number of far reaching measures need to be taken which include: attracting private foreign investment, creating a qualitatively improved infrastructure in oil and gas industry. The energy security policy should be grounded in national security with a strategic decision; to ensure a sustainable supply of energy resources for economic growth.

- The most important and initial step in averting energy crisis is energy conservation. An effective and full use of energy generated is more essential and effective to minimize energy shortages than materializing new projects in the field. Energy efficiency and conservation techniques should be adopted to minimize transmission costs and avoid transmission losses. There is a need to rehabilitate the transmission and distribution networks to reduce these technical and non-technical losses (i.e. electricity theft) through improving the efficiency of operations. There are trends of wasting energy instead of energy conservation among the masses. These trends need to be discouraged through energy conservation campaigns by Government.
- There is a need to pursue a policy of diversification of energy resources. Hydroelectric power generation, nuclear power generation and renewable energy share in the energy mix needs to be increased. “Invert the Prism Model” is suggested to diversify the sources of energy with a maximum utilization of indigenous resources (See Figure VI). According to this model, indigenous coal should form the base of energy mix and reliance on gas should be minimized keeping in view fast depletion of natural gas resources of the country. The model suggests an increased share of renewable sources and nuclear energy, thus minimizing the imported oil consumption, though it can not be eradicated completely due to demands of industrial sector.

Figure VI: Invert the Prism Model



Source: Author

Explanation: Invert the Prism Model has been designed, keeping in view the potential of various energy resources in Pakistan and the relative costs of harnessing energy through their exploitation, i.e. coal reserves: 185 billion tons, hydro potential : 50,000 MW, Wind energy potential: 350,000 MW in coastal areas of Sindh alone. It suggests a decrease in the use of natural gas and focuses on diversification to avoid rapid depletion of gas reserves. The percentage of nuclear energy is kept below 5% due to the high costs for its development. The percentage of oil is suggested to 1-2%, to cut short enormous oil imports. It is suggested that oil requirements should be fulfilled through indigenous oil production to avoid the negative impacts of oil price hike and of global energy crisis (as predicted) on country's economic growth and development.

Source: Author.

- In case of high cost of electricity generated by thermal plants, Inver the Prism Model will help in low cost production of electricity through construction of additional hydroelectric, nuclear and coal-fired electricity generation facilities. Moreover,


importing electricity from Iran and Tajikistan is a feasible option but it should be limited for a short time-span. Meanwhile, the indigenous electricity generation capacity of WAPDA, KESC and IPP should be enhanced.

- There is a need to revise the petroleum policy aiming at increasing the indigenous oil and gas production as well as to attract foreign investment in oil refining industry. Pakistan relies on 34 percent energy imports. There is a need to foster the process of oil exploration. According to economic survey report 2008-09, the total recoverable reserves of crude oil in Pakistan as of 1st January 2009 have been estimated at 313 million barrels. But unfortunately, there is lack of infrastructure and refining companies. So there is a need to decrease dependence on imported oil, through encouraging indigenous oil production.
- The infrastructure of oil exploration companies and refineries needs to be improved. The installation of infrastructure and machinery will reduce dependence on foreign sources. The demands of foreign investors for minimum rate of return should be considered and negotiated Rate of Return (RoR) be offered, keeping in view country's over reliance on oil imports.
- Renewable sources of energy- Clean energy: In order to reduce country's reliance on imported energy, especially oil, it is required to increase spending on alternative fuels, particularly wind and hydroelectric power, keeping in view the assessment of their potential in Pakistan. Currently, although the cost of energy generated from renewable resources is generally higher than that produced by "conventional" energy sources. However, as renewable resources become more established and the benefits of mass production take effect, the gap will reduce. Moreover, there will be positive local environmental impacts of renewable energy schemes, thus contributing towards clean environment. There is a need for political will and foreign investment

friendly policies to move these projects from laboratory or pilot project stage to full scale developmental, energy generation plants.

- Promoting coal production: Being a member of Kyoto protocol, there is a rising concern over environmental aspect of coal-use. In addition to it, Sindh Coal Authority (SCA)'s concerns over tariff have hindered the coal exploration and consumption in Pakistan. After the massive shift to natural gas in the transport sector and policy of de-dieselization, the total amount of pollutants emitted per day will remain almost the same. In addition, the LPG supplies have been increasing at an annual cumulative growth rate of 18.2 percent during last few years, which has resulted in decreasing the rate of deforestation.⁵¹ In order to minimize negative environmental impacts of coal-use, Coal gasification techniques can be applied.⁵² (See Figure VII) Moreover, the use of coal can be planned for a limited time and meanwhile renewable resources of energy (e.g. hydroelectric, wind and solar energy) can be developed.

Figure VII: Synthetic Fuel Production.




Source: Lawrence Rocks and Richard P. Runyon, "The Energy Crisis: The Imminent Crisis of Our Oil, Gas, Coal and Atomic Energy Resources and Solutions to Resolve It", Crown Publishers, 1972, New York.

- Keeping in view Pakistan's fast depleting natural gas reserves; there is a need to encourage the building of transnational pipeline grids. The IPI gas pipeline project has been finalized between government of Pakistan and Iran. The project will be completed in 5-years, and it will help to avert the electricity crisis in the country. There is a need to pursue more projects on same lines in order to diversify imported gas supplies, but the security issues in Balochistan needs to be resolved first.
- In Pakistan, there is a culture of politicization of issues of national interest. In the last three decades, the energy generating projects have remained stagnant as seen in case of Kalabagh dam. There is a need to separate development projects from the political ambitions of the leaders.
- Petroleum consumption: Although share of imported energy is increasing in the energy mix but in case of POL products, the consumption has decreased in the last decade dramatically from 17,768 tones in 1990 to 12,892 tones in 2008 due to the higher consumer prices.⁵³ There is a need to promote indigenous oil production, through exploration of oil fields of Sindh and Balochistan which will be cheaper.
- It is required to develop nuclear origin electricity generation units. But keeping in view the economic recession in the country and huge costs of developing nuclear energy, the pace of development should not be very fast.
- The role of private enterprise in the energy sector is hindered by the unstable political situation and security conditions in the country. There is a slow rate of deregulation and privatization, the political controversies and provincial disagreements over the storage-based hydroelectric power generation projects, and lack of investment friendly policies. John Hammond of the U.S. Energy Association detailed some of the barriers to U.S. investment in Pakistan's energy sector, he said:

- “Pakistan must demonstrate to the investing world that successful, unaltered private-power projects can operate without government interference.”⁵⁴
- There is a need to establish strategic oil reserves and engage in bilateral and multilateral energy cooperation. Asian countries should devise a common energy policy with the objective of creating energy security measures and addressing environmental issues. In order to enhance south Asia’s energy security, efforts must be made to create political stability in Afghanistan, as South Asia future energy routes emanate from Central Asia. Pakistan must promote its indigenous energy related organizations at national and regional levels in Asia in order to foster cooperation in the energy sector. In this regard, SAARC- Energy Centre can play a significant role.

The recommendations need to follow a systematic path for their effective implementation to avert the energy crisis in the country. Strategic steps need to be taken to acquire energy resources in future. After an analysis of the factors leading to energy crisis and Energy Security Strategy is suggested in light of recommendations made, to avert energy crisis in the country. (see Figure XII)

Figure XII: Energy Security Strategy for Pakistan



There are some positive initiatives taken by the present government. There is an increasing focus on development of wind energy projects to avert the energy crisis and some projects are in the initial phases. In case of solar energy also, Government has finalized some projects, e.g. Punjab Government has selected the Islamia University Bahawalpur for installation of a solar power plant worth \$10million, having a generation capacity of 2.5 megawatts. According to government, 17 power projects will be completed in 2010. But Government needs to communicate to public about the future power projects in order to create awareness among them. It will also help government to regain trust of public, and will pacify public anger.

Conclusion

The study shows that the energy crisis in Pakistan has not emerged over night. It is a result of long-term ignorance towards development in the energy sector. It seems to be a supply-induced crisis as there have been a short history of reforms in the energy sector and a lack of focus on diversification of energy resources and over reliance on imports. Energy plays a pivotal role in the economic growth of a country which leads to social development and political stability. For development of Pakistan's economy, it is necessary to take advantage of any source which can be harnessed, converted, transported, and used in practical and reasonably efficient ways. Those countries which discover significant deposits of oil and gas will have the least number of problems in their development.

Pakistan's energy sector has a history of short-term, temporary and urgent initiatives. Although these initiatives suppressed the issue for a short time but resulted in greater fallouts in the longer run due to lack of vision. There is a need of continuity of reforms in the energy sector instead of short term solutions to periodic energy fallouts. The demand for electricity is growing by about 9 per cent per annum but there is no positive development on Kalabagh dam or small canal power projects as yet. Moreover water distribution issues with India are not resolved which has resulted in further shortages of water supplies.

There is a need to formulate a comprehensive and well integrated energy security strategy with a focus on developing indigenous energy resources, a strong oil and gas exploration and production base to minimize dependency on imports through increasing self-reliance, energy conservation through improved infrastructure, promoting private foreign investment. Recently, Prime Minister Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani has welcomed President Obama's initiative to form a joint task force for assisting Pakistan in overcoming the present energy crisis.⁵⁵ This joint task force may help in improving the coordination among various energy sub-sectors to formulate a comprehensive energy policy. The development of renewable resources and nuclear energy will take time and it requires a continuity of policies, but once developed, it will save the country from huge national bills of oil imports. The vital relationship between energy availability and economic growth can not be denied so in order to keep pace with the developing nations of the world, it is necessary to establish a strong energy base through exploitation of indigenous resources, and coal is the most feasible choice in terms of its availability and cost effectiveness. This is the only way to transform a country with energy crisis into one with a strong energy base and to avert the ill-effects of energy crisis on national security. Being a mature nation, there is a need to strive for a coherent and comprehensive energy policy this time to tackle the issue on pragmatic lines instead of short-term solutions again.

“Fears of scarcity will also prove to be a poor guide for energy choices. Rather energy choices should be made in a comprehensive and integrated manner weighing environmental concerns, technological trends, and security considerations.”⁵⁶

Notes

¹ Sharon Burke, “Natural Security”, Centre for a New American Security, Working Paper, June 2009, USA.

² Gordon Weynand, “Energy Sector Assessment for USAID/ Pakistan”, Office of Infrastructure and Engineering: Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture, and Trade, June 2009.

³ Energy and Poverty, International Atomic Energy Agency, Available at,

www.iaea.org, Retrieved on 15th July, 2009.

⁴ The oil-fired thermal power plants cost Rs.15-22 per unit of electricity as compared to hydro-electricity which costs Rs. 0.20-0.45 per unit of electricity. The Nation, "Pakistan Electricity Crisis- A Real Perspective", By: Amjad Agha, 10th June, 2008. Available at, www.opfblog.com, Retrieved on, July 4th, 2009.

⁵ Energy efficiency of appliances and buildings, fuel economy of vehicles, better methods and patterns of transportation, capacities and utility of mass transit, energy rationing or conservation efforts, energy prices, 'off-grid' energy sources, and stochastic economic shocks such as disruptions of energy due to natural disasters, wars, massive power outages, new sources of energy, efficient uses of energy or energy subsidies may all impact overall energy intensity of a nation.

⁶ Dr. Jamil Masud, "Clean Energy Development in Pakistan" Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Energy Workshop, March 26-27, 2009. Bangkok.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ The total revenue generated from Baloch resources is Rs. 1.4 billion; however Baluchistan's royalty from federation stands at Rs. 2550 million only.

Available at, www.nation.com.pk, Retrieved on, July 25th, 2009.

¹⁰ Ali Mostashari, "The Political Economy of the Iran-Pakistan-India Gas Pipeline," *Iran Analysis Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (January-March 2007), p. 28, Available at http://isg-mit.org/IAQ-storage/IAQ_Vol.4_No1_2007.pdf, Retrieved on, 12th May, 2008.

¹¹ Dawn News, "Iran finally signs Gas-pipeline Accord" Tuesday, July 21st, 2009, Available at, www.dawnnews.com, Retrieved on, July 24th, 2009.

¹² Thaindian News, "Pakistan Preparing Sea-route Feasibility Report on Pak-Iran Gas-Pipeline Deal" July 5th, 2009. Available at, www.thaindiannews.com, Retrieved on, July 12th, 2009.

¹³ Pakistan's Energy Strategy and its Role in South Asia, Presented by Mukhtar Ahmed (Advisor to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on Energy), 19th February, 2007.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Distribution companies are: LESCO, GEPCO, FESCO, IESCO, MEPCO, PESCO, HESCO, and QESCO.

¹⁶ Pakistan: Economic Survey Report 2008-09, Government of Pakistan, Finance Division; Economic Advisor's Wing, Released on, June 2009, Islamabad.

¹⁷ Alternative Energy Development Board(AEDB), in collaboration with Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), "Power Sector Situation in Pakistan", Islamabad, September, 2005.

¹⁸ DAWN News, "Load shedding-free regime after December", Wednesday, 3rd June, 2009.

¹⁹ The News International, "4 IPPs, 2 Rental plants closure add 950 MW to shortfall", By: Omer Bhatti, Thursday, August 13th, 2009.

²⁰ The News International, "Pakistan's energy sector needs long-term sustainable policy", By: M. Osman Ghani, February 23, 2009. Available at, <http://jang.com.pk/thenews/>, Retrieved on, July 4th, 2009

²¹ Dr. Abdul Latif, "The Implementation of Energy Policy in Pakistan", Royal

Book Company, 2004, Pakistan.

²² Government of Pakistan, Planning Commission, “The *Second Five-Year Plan*, (1960-1965)”, June 1960, Karachi.

²³ Langdon D. Clough (ed), *Encyclopedia of Earth: Energy Profile of Pakistan*, Last Update: March 13, 2008, Available at, <http://www.eoearth.org>, Retrieved on, 28th June, 2009.

²⁴ The Nation, “Pakistan Electricity Crisis- A Real Perspective”, By: Amjad Agha, 10th June, 2008. Available at, www.opfblog.com, Retrieved on, 4th July, 2009.

²⁵ Pakistan Economic Survey Report: 2008-09, Government of Pakistan, Finance Division; Economic Advisor’s Wing, Released on, June 2009, Islamabad.

²⁶ Op. Cit, Latif.

²⁷ A. H. Kazi, “The Indus River; Water, Power and Environment: In the Indus River, Azra Meadows and Peter S. Meadows”, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1999.

²⁸ Water Availability Vs Population Growth; Kalabagh Dam Project, Available at, www.wapda.gov.pk, Retrieved on, June 15th, 2009.

²⁹ Shoukat Mahmood Alvi, “The Kalabagh Dam”, Available at, <http://www.contactpakistan.com>, Retrieved on, 12th June, 2009.

³⁰ www.ppib.gov.pk, Retrieved on, June 20th, 2009.

³¹ Op. Cit Weynand.

³² Shahid Ahmed, (Director: Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources), “Role of Private Sector in Petroleum Exploration and Development in Pakistan. Islamabad 1985.

³³ Op. Cit, Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09.

³⁴ Robert. A. Manning, “The Asian Energy Factor”, PALGRAVE Publishers, 2000, New York.

³⁵ Pakistan Oil and Gas Report Q4 2009, Published by Business Monitor International, 14th September, 2009.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Op. Cit, Weynand.

³⁸ Op. Cit. Business Report.

³⁹ Daily Times, “Pakistan Energy Yearbook FY 08: Dependence on Imported Energy Products Increasing”, By: Mohammad Yasir, Thursday, February 12th, 2009.

⁴⁰ Pakistan Economic Survey Report: 2008-09, Government of Pakistan, Finance Division; Economic Advisor’s Wing, Released on, June 2009, Islamabad.

⁴¹ Op. Cit. Ghani.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Op. Cit, Latif.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ “Energy in China: Transportation, Electric Power and Fuel Markets”, Published by, Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre: Institute of Economics, 2004, Japan.

⁴⁶ Op. cit, The Encyclopedia of Earth.

⁴⁷ Op. Cit, USAID.

⁴⁸ The News, “Increasing Socio-Economic Costs due to Energy Shortages in Pakistan”, By: M. Osman Ghani, 2nd June, 2009, Available at,

<http://jang.com.pk/thenews/>, Retrieved on, July 4th, 2009.

⁴⁹ Op. Cit, Ahmed.

⁵⁰ Business Monitor, "Pakistan Oil and Gas Report Q3 2009", June 2009, Available at, www.businessmonitor.com, Retrieved on, 29th June, 2009.

⁵¹ Op. Cit, Pakistan Economic Survey 2008-09.

⁵² Lawrence Rocks and Richard P. Runyon, "The Energy Crisis: The Imminent Crisis of Our Oil, Gas, Coal and Atomic Energy Resources and Solutions to Resolve It", Crown Publishers, 1972, New York.

⁵³ Op. Cit, Pakistan Economic Survey: 2008-09.

⁵⁴ "Pakistan: Meeting energy fiscal needs", Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, www.wilsoncentre.org, Retrieved on, May 12, 2009.

⁵⁵ PAKISTAN OBSERVER, "Gilani hails Pak-US energy task force," By: Sharafat Kazmi, Tuesday, 18th August, 2009.

⁵⁶ Robert. A. Manning, "The Asian Energy Factor", PALGRAVE Publishers, 2000, New York.