

ISSN: 2219-0562

Vol. II, Issue II,
September 2010



Water Shortage
in Pakistan

Global Climate Change
Impact on Pakistan's
Political Economy

A Crisis around
the Corner

Strategic Communication



Peace Talks Between Pakistan and India

Operation Rah-E-Rasat

ISSRA PAPERS

Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis

NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN

بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
عَلَّمَ الْإِنْسَانَ مَا لَمْ يَعْلَم
TAUGHT MAN THAT WHICH HE KNEW NOT

ISSRA PAPERS

Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis
National Defence University, Islamabad

Editorial Board

| | |
|---------------------------------------|----------|
| Lieutenant General Muhammad Yousaf | Chairman |
| Major General Azhar Ali Shah | Member |
| Rear Admiral Khan Hasham Bin Saddique | Member |
| Major General Naweed Zaman | Member |
| Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema | Member |
| Lieutenant Colonel Dr Saif ur Rehman | Member |

| | | |
|-------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| Editor | : | Lieutenant Colonel Dr Saif ur Rehman |
| Assistant Editor | : | Mr. Abdul Rauf Iqbal |
| Composer | : | Mr. Muhammad Anees |

ISSRA Papers is sponsored and edited by the Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis, National Defence University, Sector E-9, Islamabad, Pakistan.

Statement of fact or opinion appearing in ISSRA Papers are solely those of the authors and do not imply endorsement by the editors or publishers.

Telephone: 051-2008125285
Fax: 051-9260663
Email: disp@ndu.edu.pk
Website: <http://www.ndu.edu.pk>
ISSRA PAPERS



NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY

**Vol. II, Issue II
August 2010**

ISSRA PAPERS



**Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis
National Defence University
Islamabad, Pakistan**

ISSRA PAPERS VOL II, 2010

CONTENTS

| | <i>Page</i> |
|--|-------------|
| • Water Shortage in Pakistan – A Crisis around the Corner <i>Abdul Rauf Iqbal</i> | 1 |
| • Strategic Communication in Counter Insurgency Operation (COIN) <i>Afifa Kiran</i> | 14 |
| • Global Climate Change: Impact on Pakistan’s Political Economy <i>Saeed ur Rahman</i> | 24 |
| • Central Asia Security: Issues and Implications for the US Interests <i>Uzma Akhtar</i> | 37 |
| • Impact of Public Opinion Policy – A Case Study of Swat Operation (Operation Rah-e-Raast) <i>Mubarak Ahmad & Zaira Irfan Cheema</i> | 64 |
| • Role of Media in Resumption of Peace Talks between Pakistan and India <i>Muhammad Akram</i> | 84 |

WATER SHORTAGE IN PAKISTAN – A CRISIS AROUND THE CORNER

Abdul Rauf Iqbal

Abstract

Water issues between Pakistan and India were settled through Indus Water Treaty – often regarded as a remarkable example of conflict resolution. But the recent Indian intentions of building “chain of dams” on Pakistani (western) rivers have once again posed a serious challenge for Pakistan. Further, UN reports are suggesting that Pakistan is going to become a water scarce country in near future. Forgoing in view, this essay highlights the reasons of water shortage in Pakistan, its implications and a proposed way out. After discussing the availability of water and its emerging challenges, the paper narrates the Indian role in water crisis and its implications for Pakistan.

Introduction

Pakistan, one of the world’s most arid countries, with an average rainfall of under 240 mm a year,¹ is heavily dependent on an annual influx into the Indus River system. About 180 billion cubic meters² of water of the system emanates from the neighboring country and is mostly derived from snow-melt in the Himalayas. This hydraulic economy of Pakistan faced massive challenges right from the independence of country in 1947. The first challenge arose at the time of partition of the Indo-Pak subcontinent which detached the irrigated heartland of Punjab from the life-giving waters of the

Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej rivers which had become part of India. The situation became worst when India stopped the water flow of Pakistan in April 1948. Then, water diplomacy started and both states under the mediation of the World Bank negotiated the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960, giving Pakistan rights in perpetuity to the waters of the three western rivers; Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers. While the three eastern rivers (Beas, Sutluj and Ravi) came under total jurisdiction of India. This arrangement resulted in a new challenge that was of a mismatch between the location of Pakistan's water (in the western rivers) and the major irrigated area in the east. Again Pakistan's water engineers were up to the task, building the world's largest earth fill dam, the Tarbela on the Indus, and link canals, which ran for hundreds of miles and carried flows ten times the flow of the river.

Water problems was settled and IWT was regarded as a remarkable example of conflict resolution yet the recent Indian intentions of building "chain of dams" on Pakistani (western) rivers have once again posed a serious challenge for Pakistan. Further, UN reports are suggesting that Pakistan is going to become a water scarce country in near future. In this premise, this essay intends to highlight the reasons of water shortage in Pakistan, its implications and a proposed way out. The paper will first highlight the availability of water and emerging challenges and then evaluate the Indian role in water crisis and its implications for Pakistan.

Availability of Water in Pakistan

According to the World Bank, Pakistan became a water-stressed country (1,700 cubic meters per capita per year) around the year 2000.³ According to a government source, Pakistan reached 1,700 m³ in 1992 and became a water-short country, and then declined further to 1,500 m³ in 2002.⁴ Water scarcity (1,000 m³ per capita per year of renewable supply) is expected in about 2035.⁵ However, a United Nations Development Programme source gives Pakistan's current water availability as 1,090 m³ per capita per year.⁶ This is because the terms “water shortage” and “water scarcity” are often used interchangeably— while both use the 1,000 m³ per capita measurement as a benchmark, “shortage” is an absolute term and scarcity is a relative concept.

Major Challenges for Pakistan

Now a days, major challenges emanating from the availability of water in Pakistan are:-

- **Water Scarcity.** Pakistan is one of the most water-stressed countries in the world. The situation is going towards the worst water scarcity due to Indian obstruction of western rivers water.
- **A high risk water environment.**⁷ Pakistan is dependent on a single river basin i.e. Indus River. This dependence on a single river system means it has little of the strength that most countries enjoy by virtue of having a multiplicity of river basins and diversity of water resources.

Indus Basin – A Source of Livelihood

The northwestern part of the subcontinent is dominated by the Indus Basin. The Indus River originates near Mount Kailash Range in Tibet and thereafter it flows to the West, eventually running into Arabian Sea⁸. The total area of Indus basin, the area draining the Himalayan water into the Arabian Sea, is about 365,000 square miles which is more than the total area of Pakistan⁹.

Indus basin involves two countries- Pakistan and India. In Pakistan, the alluvial plains of the Indus basin cover approximately 25 percent of the land area of Pakistan, with Punjab and Sind the most agriculturally important provinces¹⁰. In India, the basin includes only 9.8 percent of the total geographical area of the country. On the Indian side, the upper part of basin involves Jammu & Kashmir and Himachal Pradesh, while the lower part covers the area of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan¹¹.

Given the importance of this basin, it is unsurprising that divide of this basin has become a source of significant controversy. The dispute over Indus waters started in the form of inter-state differences before the partition. But after the independence in 1947, the dispute became an international issue between Pakistan and India. In this sense, the region's defining event was 'hasty, unimaginative and surgical partition' of British India¹². After the partition, political boundary between two states was drawn right across the Indus Basin. It left Pakistan as the lower riparian while making India as an upper riparian. Adding insult to injury most of the headwaters went to Indian side and thus leaving Pakistan as

more vulnerable state. India was therefore given the physical capacity to cut off vital irrigation water from large and valuable tracts of agriculture land in Pakistan¹³.

Pakistan – India Water Crisis: A Historical background

The water dispute between the newly born states surfaced in April 1948, when India closed the canals on the eastern rivers of Ravi and Sutlej, only agreeing to reopen them after the Inter Dominion Agreement of May 1948, where it claimed the entire water of eastern rivers¹⁴. This was only a provisional agreement and the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) was finally negotiated between India and Pakistan in 1960 under the mediation of World Bank. This gave Pakistan the western rivers (Chenab, Jhelum and Indus) and India, the eastern rivers (Beas, Sutlej and Ravi). Some restrictions were also imposed on Indian capacity to modify the flow of western rivers as she was the upper riparian for even these rivers.

Indus Water Treaty

The signing of Indus Water Treaty (IWT) in 1960 was no doubt a ‘remarkable achievement’¹⁵. It brought to an end the long standing dispute between India and Pakistan. This treaty was culminated through a long period of negotiation under the mediation of World Bank. The primary objective of IWT was to fix and delimit the rights and obligations of each country’s use of waters in relation to other.¹⁶ The water sharing under this treaty (ignoring the details given in the Annexes and Appendices) was quite simple:-

- The three western rivers (Chenab, Jhelum and Indus) were allocated to Pakistan, and the three eastern rivers (Beas, Sutlej and Ravi) were allocated to India.
- India was not allowed to build storages on the western rivers except to a very limited extent.
- Restrictions were also imposed on the extension of irrigation development in India.
- There were also provisions regarding the exchange of data on project operation, extent of irrigated agriculture, and so on.


The treaty further mandated certain institutional arrangements:-

- There was to be a permanent Indus Commission consisting of a commissioner each for Pakistan and for India, and there were to be periodical meetings and exchanges of visits.
- Provisions were included for the resolution of the differences that might arise¹⁷.
- The treaty also included the provision of international financial assistance to Pakistan for the development of irrigation works for utilizing the waters of western rivers.

Recent Stress & Strain in Observance of IWT

IWT survived in the midst of wars and border clashes. But at present Pakistan is very much concerned with the Indian projects on western rivers which would enable India either to reduce water flows to Pakistan or to release store waters and cause floods.

Therefore, Pakistani objections are water and security related but Indian position is different to that of Pakistan. Further, recent stress and strain in the observance of IWT have had many analysts believe that water sharing will take a politically charged dynamic in the relations of two nuclear rival states¹⁸.



Source: John Briscoe, *Water and Security in South Asia*, Regional Network of Strategic Studies Network, New Delhi, November 2009.

Indian Violations of IWT

India is building chains of dams on Pakistani rivers in clear violation of the treaty and her exploitation of western rivers is creating water shortage in the country. The recent projects provide India the leverage to hold Pakistani waters which can seriously affect water inflow at Marala Head Works/ Mangla Dam causing acute shortage of water for winter crops. This, besides causing electricity shortage, can greatly affect wheat crop in Punjab. Low inflow at Marala Head Works can greatly undermine the defence

value of BRB Link Canal during campaigning season. Some of Indian violations of the treaty are as below:-

- India started almost every project without informing Pakistan which is in violation of IWT.
- There is a restriction of aggregate storage allowed to India over western rives via Annexure E of the treaty. India, however, is manipulating this provision by building a series of storages on western rivers, increasing storage and water regulation capabilities manifold.
- India has recently awarded a tender for construction of 330 MW Kshanganga hydro-electric project (HEP), which will be built on Indian tributary (Kishanganga) of Jhelum River. Pakistan has announced a similar project on Pakistani side of River Jhelum. According to IWT, the country that completes the project first will win the rights to the river. Hence, despite costing 68% more than estimated, India is endeavouring to finish the project first.
- India has plans to construct 62 dams and hydro-electric units on Rivers Chenab and Jhelum thus enabling it to render these rivers dry by 2014.¹⁹

Implications for Pakistan

- India's future energy and water demands, which are enormous, can compel her to undertake projects in violation of IWT. Certain quarters in India are already

saying that IWT is more of a binding for India and should therefore be abrogated.

- Though India does not have the capability to divert water from the western rivers at present, however, possibility of a project similar to China's Great South-North Water Transfer Project can not be ruled out.
- Any reduction in water inflow to Pakistan at this stage will cause shortage of water for irrigation and if supplemented by adverse climatic conditions and other internal water mismanagement issues, can trigger inter-provincial water conflicts of serious magnitude. If India is found violating IWT at that point in time, then it will spark serious differences between India and Pakistan and might become prelude to a major conflict.
- Most recently, water flows in Chenab has declined by 40 per cent to about 6,000 cusecs from a 10 year average of about 10,000 cusecs, mainly because of construction by India of over a dozen hydropower projects upstream, reduction in rainfall and diversion of river waters.²⁰ In case India resorts to stoppage of water as per her capability, 406 Canals and 1125 Distributaries will become dry rendering 0.35 million acres of cultivated land barren and eventually ruining a total of 7.0 million acres of fertile land.²¹ India's decision to go ahead with Kishanganga HEP and four other dams in India

administered Kashmir is geared not so much towards meeting its own needs as impoverishing Pakistan.

- To fill Baglihar Dam, India had consistently obstructed Chenab's flow; resultantly Pakistan received only 19,351 cusecs on 9 October 2009 and 10,739 cusecs on 11 October 2009, when it should be receiving a minimum of 55,000 cusecs per day.²² Total loss was approximately 321,000 MAF of water.²³
- Agriculture is Pakistan's backbone and water flowing in the channels is its blood line. It contributes 21% to the GDP and employs 45% of labour force.²⁴ Adverse effects of water shortage on agriculture would have a spiraling effect on the prevailing level of poverty leading to economic and social problems.
- India has gained a water holding capacity on western rivers which can seriously affect water inflow at Marala HWs / Mangla Dam causing acute shortage of water for winter crop. Though, presently India is not capable of diverting water, possibility of a project similar to China's Great North-South Water Transfer Project cannot be ruled out.
- The growth rate of Pakistan's agriculture is already decreasing due to water shortages. In order to achieve the required growth targets in agriculture, Pakistan needs an estimated 149 MAF of water in 2000, 215 MAF in 2013 and 277 MAF in 2025.²⁵

- The shortage of surface water will result in drought and more dependency on ground water for irrigation, hence water table will go down causing water constraints to the population.

Conclusion

Pakistan is heading towards “water stress” country and has already reached to the limit of 1000 cubic meters per person per year, below which serious economic and social consequences are likely. Indian’s violations of IWT are not only a security and economic concern for Pakistan but also can pose serious implications on the region’s overall security as the both states possess nuclear arms. Even if the direct violence is avoided, inability to resolve river resource issues will undoubtedly limit the ability of both countries to manage and utilize water resources in the most efficient manner. In this backdrop, following way out is suggested:-

- Pakistan should highlight the importance of the issue on various international forums. Merely passing the political statements will not resolve the problem.
- Indian intentions and needs should be distinguished on quantitative terms to highlight the real face of India among international community.
- The treaty does not provide so many important issues like availability of water, effects of climate change and proportional increase or decrease of water in quantitative terms. Pakistan should look for proper strategic forum for

deliberative discussion and policy options for these issues.

- At present, renegotiating the treaty seems impossible and Pakistan has to relook its water policy in the given limits of treaty. Therefore, effective role of Indus Water Commissioners is the need of hour.
- Interstate conflict can be managed through internal strength and same is the case with water conflicts. Pakistani policy makers should understand the concept of conflict resolution and initiatives must be taken on capacity building as no one can compel any sovereign state (India or Pakistan) to act on morality.
- There is serious need to work on water management as the available water is being wasted and the groundwater table is going below and below.

Notes

¹ John Briscoe and Usman Qamar, *Pakistan's Water Economy: Running Dry* (Oxford: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2006), executive summary.

² Ibid.

³ John Briscoe and Usman Qamar, *Pakistan's Water Economy: Running Dry* (Oxford: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2006).

⁴ "Population Stabilization, a Priority for Development," United Nations Population Fund/Ministry of Population Welfare, Government of Pakistan, undated.

⁵ *Pakistan's Water Economy: Running Dry*.

⁶ *Economic Survey of Pakistan, 2007-2008*, and *Global Human Development Report 2007*, quoted on UNDP website, www.undp.org.pk.

⁷ For Example India might be able to muddle through because it has many rivers and if something goes wrong in one place the effect is cushioned by opportunities in other places, this is a luxury which Pakistan does not have.

- ⁸ Douglas Hill, "The Politics of Water in South Asia", *Transforming Cultures e Journal*, Vol. 1 No. 2, June 2006
- ⁹ Syed Zain ul-Arifeen Shah, "The Indus Water Dispute", available at www.chup.com accessed on 14 May 2010.
- ¹⁰ Executive Summary, World Commission on Dams, *Pakistan: The Tarbela Dam and Indus River Basin*, November 2000, available at www.dams.org/kbase/studies/pk/pk-exec.htm accessed on 26 May 2010.
- ¹¹ Douglas Hill, "The Politics of Water in South Asia", June 2006.
- ¹² Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Pak-India Water Disputes", *The Post*, 26 February 2006.
- ¹³ Chaudhri Muhammad Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967) pp. 318-319
- ¹⁴ H. Gazdar, "Baglihar and Politics of Water", *Economic and Political Weekly*, 26 February 2005
- ¹⁵ Salman M.A. Salman and Kishor Uperty, *Conflict and Cooperation on South Asia's International Rivers: A legal Perspective*, (World Bank, January 2003), p. 37
- ¹⁶ *Ibid* p. 48
- ¹⁷ Questions, if any arose, were to be resolved within the commission; if agreement could not be reached at the commission level, the matter was to be referred to the two governments; if they too failed to reach an agreement, the 'question' would become a 'difference' to be referred to a Neutral Expert (NE). The NE's findings on the differences referred to him would be final and binding. If the NE decided that the matter was in fact a 'dispute', it would have to go to a Court of Arbitration.
- ¹⁸ Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Pak-India Water Disputes", *The Post*, 26 February 2006
- ¹⁹ "India's illegal dams on Pakistani rivers: Kishanganga to be completed in 2016", *The Dawn*, 19 September 2009.
- ²⁰ Khaleeq Kiani, "Drastic decline in Chenab water flows", *The Dawn*, 21 January 2010.
- ²¹ Majid Nizami, "The water bomb", *The Nation*, 27 May 2008.
- ²² Khalid Hussain, "Indus water treaty under threat", *The News*, 30 April 2010.
- ²³ Haroon Mirani, "Race to the death over Kashmir waters", *Asia Times online*, 13 January 2009.
- ²⁴ Ministry of Finance, *Economic Survey of Pakistan 2009-10*, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan) pp. 13.
- ²⁵ Dr. Muhammad Saffar Mirjat and Abdul Samad Chandio, "Water resources of Pakistan", *The Economist*, 14- 20 May, 2001.

STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN COUNTER INSURGENCY OPERATIONS (COIN)

Afifa Kiran

Abstract

The concept of strategic communication evolved in the West to understand/engage foreign audiences and influence the targeted population for the support of their overseas military operations. It is regarded as an instrument of statecraft to facilitate the governments in order to influence the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of stakeholders, non-state groups, neutrals, in support of national security policies. In this premise, this paper discusses the role of strategic communication in counter insurgency operations.

Introduction

During the cold war era, power blocks were involved in direct confrontation with each other. Both the United States and other Western powers (Britain, most notably) developed a robust infrastructure for waging a “war of ideas” against the communist ideology being promulgated by the Soviet Union and its allies.¹ But 21st century conflicts are very different from 20th century conflicts. Counterinsurgency (COIN), terrorism and counterterrorism (CT), foreign internal defense (FID), psychological operations (PSYOP), civil military operations (CMO), strategic communication, information operations (IO), intelligence and counterintelligence activities have become key elements in formulation the policies, strategies, and operations of present-day governments confronting

the irregular adversaries which demand hardheaded approaches to deal with.

21st century conflicts/wars are moving into fourth generation warfare, which cannot be won with high tech weapons alone. In the past also, this form of war has defeated the French in Vietnam and Algeria, and USSR in Afghanistan². It continues to bleed Russia in Chechnya and United States in Iraq, Afghanistan, and in other countries against Al-Qaeda network.³ These wars are against the enemies/insurgents who seek to change the social order by manipulating people and reallocate power within the country while enjoying the support of local population. To win these insurgencies, unfortunately COIN approaches, which have been evolved over the years against these insurgents, are generally confined to successful deployment of hard power and giving less importance to the fact that influence and management of perceptions of population within the conflict zone is key for successful COIN operations. Although, there is a growing realization at all levels that local population's support to the insurgents or militants has to be cut off by placing strategic communication, public diplomacy, at the centre of pre and post conflict reconstruction process but at grounds, it lacks clarity.

Few years back, the concept of strategic communication evolved in the West to understand/engage foreign audiences and influence the targeted population for the support of their overseas military operations. It is regarded as an instrument of statecraft to facilitate the governments involved in COIN to influence the perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of stakeholders, non-

state groups, neutrals, in support of national security policies. In simpler term, it refers to the reestablishing the government writ/control and institutionalizing reforms during and after an armed operation by the state.

Defining Strategic Communication (SC)

To understand the concept of SC, one has to see it as an instrument of national power beside others elements: diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) to achieve the national objectives in post conflict/insurgency scenario.

Definition

According to the Defense Science Board (DSB) of US, SC is an interactive process and coherent set of activities which include;-

- **Understanding** identities, attitudes, behaviors and cultures; media trends and information flows; social and influence networks; political, social, economic and religious motivations.
- **Advising** policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders on public opinion implications of policy choices.
- **Engaging** in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions through programs that support the national interest,
- **Influencing** attitudes and behavior through communication strategies supported by a broad range of government and civil society activities.
- **Measuring** the impact of activities.

Evolution of Term SC

The need for this concept emerged when it was felt that traditional dividing lines between public affairs, public diplomacy, and military information operations are blurred in operational environment because of immediate access to information. The current information revolution in military affairs, is part of a broader revolution with political, economic and social dimensions. SC is being shaped by profound changes in technology, perhaps most notably in the area of information technology. However, to deal with future complex social communication systems, SC is still in the process and under intense debate among policy makers. Some military analysts argue that although, the phrase “Strategic Communication” has gotten very popular lately but there has also been writing about strategic communication in government for years, though not by that exact name. A 1957 book by Dyer is, titled, *Political Communication as an Instrument of State*. In 1964 social science luminaries Morton Deutsch, John C. Harsanyi, Harold H. Kelley, Anatol Rapoport, and Thomas Schelling edited a volume called *Strategic Interaction and Conflict: Original Papers and Discussion*.⁴. Basing on this discussion carried out in preceding para, we can sum up the evolution of SC concepts over the years as under:-

- Enemy or combat propaganda (WW1)
- Political Warfare (UK)
- Psychological Warfare (US, WW2)
- Psychological Operations (1950s onwards)

- Information Warfare (1991-6)
- Information Operations (1996 to present)
- Perception Management (post 9/11)
- Strategic Communication (SC) (2004-).

Components of Strategic Communication.

To comprehend and develop further clarity on the subject and its role in post conflict or armed operation, it is important to differentiate SC from other similar concepts of communication strategies and psychological operations in warfare. Most scholars merge this term with Public diplomacy and see it in the prism of information operations. There are five primary supporting capabilities for SC⁵:-

- Public Affairs (PA)
- Information Operations (IO)
- PSYOP;
- Visual Information (VI),
- Military Diplomacy (MD)
- Defense support to Public Diplomacy.

The military uses *SC* as an integrating term for above-mentioned capabilities. These capabilities are distinguished from information operations capabilities that include electronic warfare, computer network operations, covert psychological operations, military deception, and operational security. Information operations (IO) is a term to include Computer Network Operations (Computer Network Attack and Defense), Electronic Warfare, Operational Security, Military Deception, and PSYOP Strategic

In Information Operations (IO), those capabilities are often non-kinetic, sometimes non-lethal, and often aimed at processes within systems that is, behavioral effects aimed at cognitive processes. Often networked globally, SC both informs and influences, synchronizing and deconflicting PA and IO themes and messages⁶. In the other words, strategic communication focuses on the cognitive dimension of the information environment⁷. Communication, which is both message and action, provides the means to harness the elements of national power in an effective manner. It involves all elements of national power: diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME). Strategic communication processes and supporting capabilities must be included in “all aspects of the federal government’s activities and synchronized vertically and horizontally.”⁸

Strategic Communication Process.

Effective application of SC does not simply involve a source transmitting to an audience, but rather active engagement between parties. This engagement modes are derived from the policy, strategic vision, campaign plan and operational design. Strategic Communication as a process is continuous.⁹ This involves research, planning, execution, monitoring and assessing the effects on targeted population and involves coordination at two ends:-

- **Horizontal coordination.** Among Government agencies
- **Vertical coordination** (up and down the chain of command).

This process ensures the following:-

- Policy planning, while keeping in view the cultural, informational, and communication considerations.
- The potential communication impacts of both kinetic and non-kinetic actions - their
- likely "perception effects" - are assessed and planned for *before* the actions are taken;
- "Soft power" options and capabilities are given equal priority and considered in coordination with hard power alternatives.

Targeted population/ audience include friendly elements, stakeholders, non-state groups, neutrals, competitors, and adversaries. In sum, Strategic communication process involves actors including army, Government communication agencies, local media, and Law enforcement agencies at all levels, from the operational level of war to the policy making level. This will enhance targeted population support for major military operations, shape the environment to prevent conflict through influencing the minds of neutrals, stake holders, locals, and to some extent miscreants and during the armed operation , SC will ensure favorable environment for the realization of national security interests of the state.

Does Pakistan Need SC policy?

In last few years, Pakistan has developed comprehensive counter terrorism/insurgency polices aimed at “clear, control and build to deal with terrorists/extremists within the country. Since then, armed forces are conducting successful armed operations

against the militants. However, Pakistan is far behind in handling the post-armed operations situation effectively. Use of force against militancy within the country is a difficult task particularly when it has some ideological basis. Such operations have always some risk of locals' support to extremist's ideology against the govt besides other social-economic reasons. For Pakistan, SC can be used to mobilize publics in support of major policy initiatives and to support objectives before, during, and after a conflict.

Strategic Communication Plan for Pakistan.

Strategic communication is a vital tool in the 21st century information environment. As Pakistan is facing many violent situations in many part of the country and using force to curb the menace. In such unpredictable environment, it is necessary to maintain popular support and insurgent-population isolation. SC is prerequisites for any successful counterinsurgency. Therefore, it should be the top priority of the Pakistani government to achieve its objectives in such undesired situations. An effective strategic communication plan requires continued population support for the government in its armed operations against the militants and isolate themselves from the insurgents' cause and activities. The nine "fundamental tenets" for Pakistan's SC plan should be based on principles identified by Naval War Collage USA in 2008,

- **Leadership-driven:** leaders must decisively engage and drive SC processes
- **Credible:** perception of truthfulness and respect between all parties

- **Dialogue:** multi-faceted exchange of ideas to promote understanding and build relationships
- **Unity of Effort:** integrated and coordinated, vertically and horizontally
- **Responsive:** right audience, right message, right time, and right place
- **Understanding:** deep comprehension of attitudes, cultures, identities, behavior, history, perspectives and social systems. What we say, do, or show may not be what others hear or see
- **Pervasive:** every action, image, and word sends a message
- **Results-Based:** actions to achieve specific outcomes in pursuit of a well-articulated end-state.
- **Continuous:** diligent ongoing research, analysis, planning, execution, and assessment that feeds planning and action.

Conclusion

Strategic communication is not the silver bullet, but it does present the possibility for a more tightly focused informational contribution to the strength of the other instruments of national power to achieve national strategies.¹⁰ Today, Pakistan is facing intensified conflict within the country and increasingly complex regional security situation. It is safe to say that in the war against violent extremism, SC is all about engaging the enemy in the battle of ideas. Our government and military efforts are marred by a lack

of resources, interagency cooperation, and coordinated strategy. Pakistan public diplomacy is much weaker in identifying the mission and the strategy, and it fails to address the crucial function of public diplomacy in armed conflict. In Pakistan's case, Strategic Communication is more than disseminating of information but the active solicitation of stakeholders' perspectives. By making SC centre of future strategies against militancy would facilitate the government and military to address human factors such as sociology, psychology, culture, behavior, and politics, and help building consensus and partnerships for national policy.

Notes

¹ J. Vaughn, "'Cloak without Dagger': How the Information Research Department Fought Britain's Cold War in the Middle East, 1948–1956," *Cold War History* 4:3 (April 2004):P. 56–84.

² Colonel Thomas X. Hammes USMC, "The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century" 2006-07 , P.3

³ *ibid*

⁴ *Steven R. Corman*, Strategic Communication by Any Other Name,(COMOPS journal 2010 , [Consortium for Strategic Communication](#), USA)

⁵ US Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), Execution Roadmap for Strategic Communication,(U.S. Department of Defense, September 2006)

⁶ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, Joint Publication 3-13, , 13 February 2006, pp. ix, xii

⁷ Dennis M. Murphy, *Talking the Talk: Why Warfighters Don't Understand Information Operations*, (Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, May 2009)

⁸ Charles S. Gramaglia, Lieutenant Commander, Strategic Communication: Distortion and White Noise, (US Army Iosphere Papers, Winter 2008, available at http://www.au.af.mil/info-ops/iosphere/08winter/iosphere_win08_gramaglia.pdf

⁹ Robert L. Perry, *Principles of Strategic Communication for a New Global Commons*, (US Naval War College Newport, RI, June 2008)

¹⁰ Robinson, Linda, *The Propaganda War*, (US News & World Report, 29 May 2006)

GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: IMPACT ON PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL ECONOMY

Saeed ur Rahman

Abstract

The South Asian region, being home of the 23% world population and one of the poorest regions would be hit hard by climate change. Endemic morbidity, increased deaths, diseases due to heat waves, floods, storms, fires and droughts would be witnessed. Crop yields would be declining and thus affecting the poor class of the society. The paper aims to highlight various areas in Pakistani economy that would be severely affected by climate change.

Introduction

“Don't blow it - good planets are hard to find”.

Global warming is a rapidly unfolding phenomenon that would effect the developed and underdeveloped, rich and poor alike. It is the increase in the average temperature of Earth's near-surface, air and oceans because of the increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases resulting from human activity such as fossil fuel burning and deforestation. Experts on environment believe the global temperature started increasing rapidly since the middle of the 20th century and adversely affecting human activities.

An increase in global temperature will cause sea levels to rise and will change the amount and pattern of precipitation,

probably including expansion of subtropical deserts. Warming is expected to be strongest in the Arctic and would be associated with continuing retreat of glaciers, permafrost and sea ice. Other likely effects include changes in the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, species extinctions, and changes in agricultural yields. Warming and related changes will vary from region to region around the globe, though the nature of these regional variations is uncertain.

Political and public debate continues regarding global warming, its causes and what actions to take in response. The available options are mitigation to reduce further emissions; adaptation to reduce the damage caused by warming; and, more speculatively, geo-engineering to reverse global warming.

The South Asian region, being home of the 23% world population and one of the poorest regions would be hit hard by climate change. Endemic morbidity, increased deaths, diseases due to heat waves, floods, storms, fires and droughts would be witnessed. “Crop yields would decrease by 30% upto 2050”¹, and thus effecting the poor class of the society. The paper aims to highlight various areas in Pakistani economy that would be severely affected by climate change.

Climate Change Mechanism

The greenhouse effect is a warming process that balances Earth's cooling processes. During this process, sunlight passes through Earth's atmosphere as short-wave radiation. Some of the radiation is absorbed by the planet's surface. As Earth's surface is

heated, it emits long wave radiation toward the atmosphere. In the atmosphere, some of the long wave radiation is absorbed by certain gases called greenhouse gases. "Greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide (CO₂), Chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's), methane (CH₄), nitrous oxide (N₂O), tropospheric ozone (O₃), and water vapors"². Each molecule of greenhouse gas becomes energized by the long wave radiation. The energized molecules of gas then emit heat energy in all directions. By emitting heat energy toward Earth, greenhouse gases increase Earth's temperature.

The greenhouse effect is a natural occurrence that maintains Earth's average temperature at approximately 60 degrees Fahrenheit. The greenhouse effect is a necessary phenomenon that keeps all Earth's heat from escaping to the outer atmosphere. Without the greenhouse effect, temperatures on Earth would be much lower than they are now, and the existence of life on this planet would not be possible. However, too many greenhouse gases in Earth's atmosphere could increase the greenhouse effect. This could result in an increase in mean global temperatures as well as changes in precipitation patterns.

The key concept in climate change is time. Natural changes in climate usually occur over; that is to say they occur over such long periods of time that they are often not noticed within several human lifetimes. This gradual nature of the changes in climate enables the plants, animals, and microorganisms on earth to evolve and adapt to the new temperatures, precipitation patterns, *etc.*

The real threat of climate change lies in how rapidly the change occurs. For example, “over the past 130 years, the mean global temperature appears to have risen 0.6 to 1.2 degrees Fahrenheit (0.3 to 0.7 degrees Celsius)”³. Changes in mean global temperature have occurred at greater rates over time. Further evidence suggests that “future increases in mean global temperature may occur at a rate of 0.4 degrees Fahrenheit (0.2 degrees Celsius) each decade. Temperatures are predicted to rise by 3 degrees by 2040 and up to 5-6 degrees by the end of the century”⁴. Monsoon rains will be drastically reduced but have a much higher intensity. Droughts and floods are predicted for the whole of South Asia.

The geological record--the physical evidence of the results of processes that have occurred on Earth since it was formed--provides evidence of climate changes. This means during the history of the earth, there have been changes in global temperatures similar in size to these changes. However, the past changes occurred at much slower rates, and thus they were spread out over long periods of time. The slow rate of change allowed most species enough time to adapt to the new climate. The current and predicted rates of temperature change, on the other hand, may be harmful to ecosystems. This is because these rates of temperature change are much faster than those of Earth's past. Many species of plants, animals, and microorganisms may not have enough time to adapt to the new climate. These organisms may become extinct.

Impacts of Climate Change: A Pakistani Scenario

Environmental degradation is fundamentally linked to poverty in Pakistan. Approximately less than one-fourth of the country's population, like in most developing countries, is poor and directly dependent on natural resources for their livelihoods—whether agriculture, hunting, forestry, fisheries, etc. By far, the economic sector most affected by global warming will be the agricultural sector. This is because global warming is projected to cause serious disruptions in the weather, which will have a domino effect on other factors. More specifically, it is predicted that global warming will seriously affect the number of rainfall that certain agricultural regions receive yearly.

Pakistan is an agriculture-dependent country, with over 47% of its population earning their livelihood from agriculture. “This sector contributes 24% to GDP. Pakistan earns 70% of its foreign exchange from agriculture alone”⁵. Pakistan is an agriculture supplier that feeds vast populations of its own and of neighboring countries like Afghanistan, as well as the Middle East and several Central Asian Republics. Recent ranking by Maplecroft of the UK places “Pakistan at 28th amongst those that will be most severely affected”⁶. Unless it maintains stable growth rates, its economy will suffer immensely. Unless Climate Change trends are reversed and things return to normal, agriculture will be the most seriously impacted sector. Without a clear-cut adaptation strategy and the requisite resources and capacity building the medium to long-term prognosis is far from good!

Pakistan especially in its agricultural domain, will receive these cross currents.

- Reduced water availability, which is altering the crop rotation and cropping patterns.
- Drastic reduction in cereal production, e.g. wheat and rice, as well as in cotton and sugarcane.
- In southern Pakistan yields of major cereals predicted to decline by 15-20% by Regional Climate Change Models
- In the northern area minor improvements in yield due to increased duration of growing period
- Livestock production predicted to decline by 20-30%, creating crises in milk, meat and poultry supplies and pushing prices beyond reach of the average Pakistani
- Rangelands will be over-stressed from prolonged droughts and shifting human and livestock populations around riverine areas and in mountainous regions. This will reduce tree and shrub cover. Pakistan is already amongst the most forest/tree resource-poor countries in the world with a meager 5.2% forest cover, and even that sparsely stocked.
- Inland fisheries predicted to be reduced due to decreased water availability and changing river flows
- Plant diseases, weeds and insect attacks will increase considerably, resulting in major crop losses

- Fruits, vegetables and horticultural products are high-value exports for Pakistan. A predicted reduction in these will severely impact our balance of payments.
- The livelihood of farm communities will be affected, and marginalized groups like women, children and the elderly will be negatively impacted through widespread malnutrition.

Despite Pakistan's contribution to the greenhouse gas emissions being far below global average, climate change is significantly affecting crop output in the country, increasing poverty levels and adversely affecting people's lifestyle.

The Indus Valley, which is the cradle of Pakistan's agriculture, is presently threatened by the vagaries of Climate Change, largely induced through anthropogenic interventions that result in global warming. The agriculture in the whole of the Indus Valley is under threat. Climate change having direct and indirect impacts on agriculture can cost billions of dollars of loss to Pakistan. This threat translates into "direct impacts to over 100 million people and indirect impacts to the entire burgeoning population of 180 million, which is projected to increase to 240 million by 2035"⁷. Producing high delta water-consuming crops like sugarcane under a Climate Change scenario may no longer be feasible. Sugar prices have more than doubled over the past year, creating social unrest and political embarrassment. Same would be the case with wheat, cotton and many vegetables.

Almost all of Pakistan's water resources originate from glacial melt-off of Himalayan glaciers. Increases in global temperatures resulting from climate change are expected to affect the rate of glacial melt: At first there will be widespread flooding and then, as the glaciers melt away, there will be no water resource. This is evident what occurs in the Attabad Lake in the Hunza Valley in northern Pakistan. In the last four months, the water level raised in the lake due to glacial melting, “swelling it to 18.5 kilometres long and 107 metres deep”⁸. It is linked to climate change, because the whole water balance and ecology of the Himalayan region is changing- causing instability and posing serious threats, one of which is catastrophic flooding to the Hindu Kush-Himalayan region.

Glaciers in Karakoram, Rakaphoshi and Nangaparbat are Pakistan’s primary source of water and some scholars predict that global warming could consume the glaciers in as little as 40 years. “Of the 5,000 glaciers in the region, 90% are in various degrees of melting, putting a question mark on the future of water resources in an already stressed situation”⁹, In Pakistan, the most dangerous aspect of glacial melting is the large lakes left behind, potential sources of destructive flooding. “Scientists have identified 2,420 glacial lakes as Glacial Lakes Outburst Floods (GLOFs) in Gilgit Baltistan. Of those, 52 are potentially dangerous to the populations living below”¹⁰.

The current Attabad lake issue and the resultant displacement can be a case study of global warming. Last month’s glacial melt led to the “evacuation of more than 12,000 people living

downstream of the landslide-formed Attaabad Lake in northern Pakistan. An additional 1300 people have already lost a total of 120 houses to flooding”¹¹ as the waters have risen and if the seasonal rains start, according to BBC reports the natural team would be breached and “about 25,000 people in 36 villages would be displaced downstream”¹².

Climate change has caused Pakistan “a loss of around \$3.57 billion over the past 18 years”¹³. The report warns of disasters in five main areas: rise in sea level, glacial retreat, floods, higher average temperatures, and high frequency of droughts. “Around 23% of the country’s land and nearly 50% of the entire population”¹⁴ is vulnerable to the damage resulting from these potential disasters. “In 2009, the rainfall was greatly reduced and highly erratic¹⁵”, The summer and the winter rains decreased by 30% each. The water supply to dams was also slashed, badly hurting hydroelectricity production and reducing power supply to many parts of the country, leading to urban riots”.

Poverty combined with a rapidly increasing population and growing urbanization, is leading to intense pressures on the environment. In Pakistan, the deterioration of environment continues to affect livelihoods and health thus increasing the vulnerability of the poor to disasters and environment-related conflicts. Biodiversity in Pakistan is also under serious threat due to excessive depletion of natural resources. The latest red-list of endangered species in Pakistan, includes “the Blue Whale, Fin Whale, Hotson's Mouse-like Hamster etc.”¹⁶

Recommendations

- There is an urgent need to come up with a national plan to avoid the consequences of climate change, as it will alter the temporal and spatial patterns of precipitation and trigger droughts, mudslides, typhoons, cyclones, and floods in the country.
- Pledge unequivocal support to help address the agricultural challenges arising from Climate Change in Pakistan.
- To stop an increase in harmful carbon emissions that contribute to climatic disasters, Pakistan and other South Asian countries need to formulate and implement clean technology policies.
- Although Pakistan produces minimal chlorofluorocarbons and a little sulphur dioxide emissions, thus making a negligible contribution to ozone depletion and acid rain, it will suffer disproportionately from climate change and other global environmental problems. Health of millions would also be affected with diarrhoeal diseases associated with floods and drought becoming more prevalent. Intensifying rural poverty is likely to increase internal migration as well as migration to other countries. Given the enormity of the impact, adaptation and mitigation measures are critically important.

- When it comes to climate change population does matter, particularly for countries like Pakistan with an annual growth rate of 2.69 percent, will be the sixth most populous country. As poor families struggle to survive, environmental degradation is going to be more pervasive. Increased use of wood for fuel, abusive use of land and water resources, in the form of overgrazing, over fishing, depletion of fresh water and desertification- are common in rural areas of Pakistan. Both at government and public level, measures should be taken to control population explosion.
- Technology transfer in the area of renewable energy at farm level and green technologies to save the environment from the vagaries of Climate Change.
- Massive investment in forest and tree cover across the board with due attention paid to special ecologies, e.g. the coastal belt, where mangroves are the most suitable.
- Lastly, a major focus on the youth and children to prepare them to face the consequences of Climate Change. Their education and involvement are a vital part of any sensible strategy!

Conclusion

The adverse impact of the rising global warming on human and other forms of life is becoming clearer day by day, which is adding to man kinds' fear for the future. Industrial states of the world are being accused of atmospheric pollution that spurs global

warming. It is a rapidly unfolding challenge of catastrophic global, regional and national proportions. Pakistan will be affected by the impacts far more seriously than is generally perceived. It is an agricultural country and floods, droughts, alteration in raining days and rotation in crops duration are some of the many issues that arise of global climate change. Pakistan. Although contributes very little in global warming but the repercussions are far greater. Offensive measures need to be taken to tackle the issue; otherwise the economy of the country would deteriorate.

Notes

1 Karim, Khan, "Climate Change Cost Pakistan 3.5 Billion Dollars in 18 Years" Dec 09, 2009 Available on <http://freebird.instablogs.com/entry/climate-change-cost-pakistan-35-billion-in-18-years/#ixzz0qnHzBhRM>

2 "Global Warming" Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia" Available on http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_warming

3 "Global climate Change: Overview" HTML code by Chris Kreger, Last updated- November 10, 2004. Available on <http://www.cotf.edu/ete/modules/climate/GCclimate1.html>

4 Ibid.

5 "Global warming: The Economic Effects" 2007, Available on <http://globalwarming.solveyourproblem.com/global-warming-economic-effects.shtml>

6 Jamal, Shahid, "Climate Change effects to hit Pakistan hard: IPCC Chief" Dawn, January 14, 2009.

7 Reporter, "Pakistan Most Vulnerable to Climate Change" the Daily Dawn, 05 February, 2010.

8 Report, "Climate Change and Vulnerabilities Challenges in Pakistan" IUCN, Ministry of Environment-Government of Pakistan

9 Amber Masood of the UN Development Programme-glacier project.

10 Assessment report, "Community Based Survey for Assessment of Glacial Lake Outburst Flood Hazards (GLOFs) in Hunza River Basin" Water Resource Research Institute and UNDP, November 2008

11 "Glacial Melt Could Cause Tidal Wave in Pakistan" Circle of Blue WaterNews, June 07, 2010 Available on <http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/2010/world/glacial-melt-could-cause-tidal-wave-in-pakistan/>

12 Ibid

13 Karim, Khan, "Climate Change Cost Pakistan 3.5 Billion Dollars in 18 Years" Dec 09, 2009 Available on <http://freebird.instablogs.com/entry/climate-change-cost-pakistan-35-billion-in-18-years/#ixzz0qnHzBhRM>

14 World Bank report. The report, released on Tuesday (December 08, 2009),

15 Jamal, Shahid, "Climate Change effects to hit Pakistan hard: IPCC Chief" Dawn, January 14, 2009.

16 Pakistan: Strategic Country Environment Assessment by WB (Sep, 2007)

CENTRAL ASIA SECURITY: ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR US INTERESTS

Uzma Akhtar

Abstract

Independence has brought a host of new problems to the Central Asian States, as well as exaggerating the number of former ones. At the same time statehood has meant that the leaders of these former Soviet republics have new tools at their disposal to try and address these issues, but international assistance and the instruments of statehood are often used unwisely, or not to their fullest possible extent. This paper discusses the internal and external security concerns of the Central Asian states and its implication for U.S interests.

The Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) face common security challenges from crime, corruption, terrorism, and commitments to economic and democratic reforms. However, cooperation among them remains halting, so security in the region is likely in the near term to vary by country. Internal political developments in several bordering or close-by states may have a large impact on Central Asian security. These developments include a more authoritarian and globalist Russia, an economically growing China, instability in Iran and the South Caucasus region, and re-surfing drug production and Islamic extremism in Afghanistan. Now how U.S uses these security issues of Central Asia for its interest is the focus of this

paper. U.S interest in Central Asia can be summed up by three words: security, democracy and energy.

Introduction

According to DER SPIEGEL:

“Never before in modern history has a country dominated the earth so totally as the United States does today...America is the Schwarzenegger of international politics: showing off muscles, obtrusive, intimidating....The Americans, in the absence of limits put to them by anybody or any thing, act as if they own a kind of blank check in their MacWorld”¹

Schwarzenegger was a famous body builder, actor and governor of California. He has a very sound physique. The newly independent states of Central Asia are passing through a transitional phase of nation building. The Central-Asian –Caspian region is one of the richest in the world in its energy resources. Many countries compete for the right to develop its oil and gas reserves, jockeying for a share of a potentially very lucrative market.² Because of rich natural resources, lack of capital and expertise, weak armed forces and landlocked position, Central Asia region is in the utter need of good relationship with the neighbors and other powers of the world.

All these features of the region provide a good reason for the involvement of outsiders. Various nations of smaller, medium and big stature are quite eager to engage in the new Central Asian republics, especially for exploitation of vast energy resources. In this context, the huge reserves of oil and gas are most attractive features of the region as a whole. For this purpose, a kind of diplomatic

struggle is going on among different countries, which see their stakes in this region.³

The U.S is also one of these countries and wants to have a say in the affairs of the region. To achieve this target, it is making its own diplomatic efforts. The United States has varied and at times competing interests in Central Asia. The region, which includes the five post-Soviet states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, as well as Afghanistan and the Caspian basin, plays an important part in U.S. global strategy in view of its proximity to Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Iran, and other key regional actors. No less important are its ethno-religious composition and vast deposits of oil, gas, coal, and uranium. The United States has provided assistance for these efforts and boosted such aids and involvement after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, but questions remain about what should be the appropriate level and scope of U.S. interest and presence in the region.

In the past five years real and present dangers to U.S. national security, especially Islamist terrorism and threats to the energy supply, have affected U.S. policy in Central Asia. The region has great energy potential and is strategically important, but it is land-locked, which complicates U.S. access and involvement there.

Types of Insecurities in Central Asia: Internal and External

We can divide these insecurities threats of Central Asia in three broad categories. 1) Chronic threats which were inherited from the past, 2) new insecurities that have appeared during the transition

period, and 3) threats that have resulted from geo-political changes in the region and in the world. Ultimately, all of these have one commonality: They are manifestations of difficulties in the management of new processes.

Inherited Common Insecurities

These types of insecurities are related to what the countries of Central Asia inherited from their history, a combination of spatial distribution, the nature of the rural and traditional societies and the transformation processes which the republics underwent as part of the Soviet Union. These include Nation-state formation, geography, infrastructure, ecology and environment, traditional society and reliance on all-providing system.⁴ Human security continues to be seen through the responsibility of top-down measures, instead of bottom-up solutions.

Human Insecurities acquired during the Transition Period

The past decade of transition in Central Asia has been marked by a sharp increase in a variety of human insecurities, as a direct result of 1) sudden and multi-dimensional structural changes in society, the economy and the political system, 2) ill-conceived policies or reactions to these,⁵ and 3) the changing nature of the roles and responsibilities of the state. Transition offered an opportunity of change, but was also seen as a time of crisis for many individuals and households. Although the *causes* of these insecurities need to be further analyzed, their *manifestations* are the following, with varying degrees between the different countries. These includes economic insecurity, poverty, decline in level of

human resource development, education, healthcare, social welfare, political change, changing social structure, gender, young people, drugs, crime, globalization.⁶

Human Insecurities as a Result of Changing Regional Contexts

These types of threats were identified as a result of changing dynamics within Central Asia and from conflicts from outside the region, and call for a common regional platform to ensure regional stability. There are two sub category of this type of insecurities.

Inter-Regional conflicts and Threats

These includes fall-out from open conflicts and poor management of common resources. The former further creates escalation of instability in other countries, large scale displacements, armed insurgencies and threats of terrorism and extremism and destabilization of trade and economic security for markets in the region.

Extra-Regional Conflicts and Threats:

These threats come from two sources: Instability in Afghanistan as well as the changing global context, and demonstrated once again the need for regional stability to ensure human security.

Security Threats to Central Asia

The problems of authoritarian regimes, crime, corruption, terrorism, and ethnic and civil tensions jeopardize the security of all the new states of Central Asia, Kazakhstan has faced the potential of separatism in northern Kazakhstan Tajikistan faces threats from economic Mismanagement and the possibility of separatism,

particularly by its northern Soghd. In Kyrgyzstan, northern and southern regional interests vie for influence over decision-making in Central politics. Turkmenistan faces clan and provincial tensions and poverty that could contribute to instability. Uzbekistan faces escalating civil discontent and violence from those whom President Islam Karimov labels as Islamic extremists from a large ethnic Tajik population, and from an impoverished citizenry. Ethnic Uzbeks and Kyrgyz clashed in 1990 in the Fergana Valley. This fertile valley is divided between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and contains about one-fifth of Central Asia's population. All these states are harmed by drug and human trafficking and associated corruption and health problems.⁷

Islamic Extremism and Terrorism

The practice of Islam is still state-regulated in Central Asia, and Central Asian leaders have not taken pains to distinguish between religious activists, religious extremist, and Islamic terrorist. Effectively, anyone who advocates the primacy of religious values over secular norms is understood to be “an enemy of the state”, whether or not this primacy is to be achieved through persuasion or through force.⁸

After the Basmachi Revolt was suppressed and liquidated by the Soviet forces, no organized terrorist or militant activity could take place due to a strong vigilance by the Soviet law enforcement authorities and the government. But after independence, the situation changed totally and the Pandora's Box of militancy and

terrorism opened up once again, taking advantage of the political confusion and uncertainty that engulf the region initially.⁹

There are several phases in rise of terrorism in Central Asia. CARs regimes have recently taken to labeling Hizb-ut-Tahrir al Islami (HT, Party of Islamic Liberation) and the militant Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and civil war in Tajikistan as the main source of terrorism in central Asia. Different factors determining how these two groups have been able to effectively operate in the region will be addressed including: current CARs regime policies towards Islamist, especially in Uzbekistan, and the effects these policies have had on the population; the depressed economic situation, and the viability of fundamentalism as an alternate in the region; notwithstanding outside influences, such as international financial assistance and ideological teachings leading to the rise of radical Islam after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dynamics around surrounding the creation of the newly independent CARs. Uzbekistan, Kyrgstan and Tajikistan are the victims of terrorism¹⁰

Narcotics and Drug Trade

The security of Central Asia can no longer be understood in separation from drug trade. Most processing of opium into heroin now occurs inside Afghanistan, and the largest increases in production are taking place in the country's northern parts, making large quantities available in the vicinity of the Central Asian states. Known heroin laboratories in Kunduz province and elsewhere in the

north, as well as increased seizures of heroin coupled with decreasing opium seizures, indicate that the main volume of drugs Moving into Central Asia is in the form of heroin.

By the early 2000s, the number of drug users in Central Asia had skyrocketed. Central Asia has so far not seen an addiction epidemic as Russia has, but heroin-addiction levels are rising rapidly.⁹⁰ Societal consequences are emerging, including a rapid rise in HIV cases and drug-related crime.⁹¹ Concomitantly, the economic and political impact of the drug trade in these states has also been significant, especially in the region's weakest states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. In the absence of a strong licit economy—especially in the case of Tajikistan, still suffering the ravages of war—the large turnover and profit margins of drug trafficking have a serious impact on state and society. This has created a severe corruption problem across the region at all levels, especially among low-paid government officials in law enforcement. High-level government officials have also been involved in the trafficking of drugs, raising the question of whether systematic criminal infiltration into state agencies is taking place. Meanwhile, the Islamic insurgencies in the region have been tied intimately to the drug trade.¹¹

Border Tensions

While border tensions have been a salient feature of Central Asian politics for the past decade due to the undemocratic and often undetermined drawing of their borders at independence, the area has seen considerable progress. By 2005, most of the boundary disputes

between Central Asian states and between them and China were resolved. The process was often difficult and produced political crises, especially in Kyrgyzstan, but it nevertheless testifies to a certain maturity of the political leadership.¹²

The problem of delineating their 4,200 mile border has been an important source of concern to Russia and Kazakhstan. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have agreed on the delimitation of about one-half of their 579 mile shared border and pledged in September 2007 to peacefully settle contentious disputes involving borders in the Fergana Valley. Uzbekistan's unilateral efforts to delineate and fortify its borders with Kazakhstan in the late 1990s led to tensions. In September 2002, however, the Kazakh and Uzbek presidents announced that delineation of their 1,400 mile border was complete, and some people in previously disputed border villages began to relocate if they felt that the new borders cut them off from their "homeland".¹³

Crime and Corruption

The collapse of legal economies in conflict-torn and transition countries has created a severe corruption problem across the region at all levels. Low-paid government officials in law enforcement are routinely bribed to look the other way as smugglers take a shipment through, and are otherwise involved in protecting the local transport and distribution of drugs. One leading Central Asian specialist estimated the average proportion of corrupt officials in the law enforcement agencies of the region at 70 percent. The interior ministries across the post- Soviet space remain the most

unreformed sectors of the state, and have attracted little foreign interest, with the exception of some activity on the part of the OSCE. This has helped to sustain high levels of corruption among these entities.¹⁴

Domestic and Transnational Issues

While the region's political environment is unstable, the states of the region need to deal with a host of domestic problems in their quest for stability and development. Foremost among these is the development of the political systems of the region. The five post-Soviet Central Asian states have so far failed to make significant progress in building of, participatory transparent and accountable government institutions. While some progress was noted in the mid-1990s, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, a certain backtracking in political reforms was widely noted from the late 1990s onwards.¹⁵

Current WMD Proliferation Threats

The continued presence of fissile and radioactive material in the countries of Central Asia poses a persistent proliferation risk. Obtaining fissile material such as highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium is one of the most important steps separating terrorists from a nuclear device of very destructive power, while acquiring certain types of radioactive material is the principal hurdle to creating a radiation dispersal device (RDD) or "dirty bomb". Central Asia is a potential source for both types of material. HEU remains at several sites in Central Asia. Another potential proliferation threat in Central Asia is the significant number of "orphan" radiation sources.

These are sources abandoned by medical, scientific and industrial users who are either unable or unwilling to dispose of them properly, leaving them vulnerable to theft. Some of these sources could be used in unsophisticated radiological devices.¹⁶

Energy and Water Issues

Energy issues have been more complicated, mainly because of the unbalance between water and hydrocarbon resources in the region. Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan dominate its oil and gas resources, whereas 90 percent of water resources are concentrated in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. These resources were bartered in Soviet times, a process that effectively collapsed in the 1990s as gas producers demanded payment but refused to pay for water, a dynamic known from the Middle East and other areas.¹⁷

Economic and Defence Security Threats

The Central Asian states have worked to bolster their economic and defense capabilities by seeking assistance from individual Western donors such as the United States, by trying to cooperate with each other, and by joining myriad international organizations. Regional cooperation has faced challenges from differential economic development and hence divergent interests among the states, and from more nationalistic postures. Cooperation also is undermined by what the states view as Uzbekistan's overbearing impulses. Regional cooperation problems are potentially magnified by the formation of extra-regional cooperation groups such as the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the Shanghai

Cooperation Organization (SCO). Each group reflects the diverging interests of Russia, the United States, and China, although the fact that each group stresses anti-terrorism would seem to provide motivation for cooperation. All of the Central Asian states have been faced with creating adequate military and border forces the capabilities of the military, border, and other security forces are limited, compared to those of neighboring states such as Russia, China, or Iran. Military forces range in manpower from about 16,300 in Tajikistan (excluding Russians) to 87,000 in Uzbekistan.¹⁸

The global economic downturn that began in 2008 contributed to halting or even reversing the growth of per capita income in the Central Asian states in 2008-2009, the first such lack of growth in several years. Reductions in remittances from migrant workers and rising food and fuel costs account for some of the decline. Regional currencies depreciated against the dollar, contributing to plummeting imports, and fluctuating world commodity prices contributed to declining exports. The banking sectors were severely stressed by a jump in non-performing loans, and banks cut back private sector lending. These economic stresses threaten government spending on health, education, and other social programs.¹⁹

Implication for US Interest

United States and the West in general find themselves increasingly dependent on the continued stability and development of the Central Eurasian region. The United States is heavily invested in Afghanistan, and its engagement there and in Central Asian states

is a long-time endeavor. The future of this region has considerable bearing on the development of the Global War on Terrorism and in general on U.S. security interests in Eurasia: the maintenance of access to airspace and territory in the heart of Asia, the development of alternative sources of energy, and the furthering of freedom and democratic development. The Eurasian drug trade is a threat to all of these ambitions.²⁰ After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the former Bush Administration stated that U.S. policy toward Central Asia focused on three inter-related activities: the promotion of security, domestic reforms, and energy developments.²¹

Although then-U.S. Caspian emissary Elizabeth Jones in April 2001 carefully elucidated that the United States would not intervene militarily to halt incursions by Islamic terrorists into Central Asia, this stance was effectively reversed after September 11, 2001. U.S.-led counter-terrorism efforts were undertaken in Afghanistan.²² In October 2003, then-Assistant Secretary Jones in testimony stressed that “our big strategic interests [in Central Asia] are not temporary” and that the United States and its international partners have no alternative but to “be a force for change in the region.”

Participating with Members on November 18, 2009 in launching the Congressional Caucus on Central Asia, Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake, Jr. stated that the Obama Administration “has placed a high priority on building partnerships and enhancing our political engagement in Central Asia.” Signs of

this enhanced engagement include the establishment of high-level annual bilateral consultations with each of the regional states on counter-narcotics, counter- terrorism, democratic reform, rule of law, human rights, relations with NGOs, trade and investment, health, and education²³

Reactions to U.S.-Led Coalition Actions in Iraq

U.S. ties to the Central Asian states appeared generally sound in the immediate wake of U.S.-led coalition operations in Iraq in March-April 2003 to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Initial responses in the region ranged from support by Uzbekistan to some expressions of concern by Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan that diplomacy had not been given enough of a chance. Alleged incidents where civilians have been killed during U.S. operations have been criticized by some Islamic groups and others in Central Asia.

Designations of Terrorist Organizations

The U.S. government has moved to classify various groups in the region as terrorist organizations, making them subject to various sanctions. In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU, led by Yuldash, as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, stating that the IMU resorts to terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. Among other terrorist groups, then-CIA Director Porter Goss testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 17, 2005, that the IJG/IJU “has become a more virulent threat to U.S. interests and

local governments.” On the other hand, the United States has not yet classified Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) as a terrorist group.²⁴

Military Cooperation:

U.S. security accords were concluded with several Central Asian states after September 11, 2001. These include a U.S.-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership signed on March 12, 2002, that included a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States affirmed that “it would regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan’s security and would consult with Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis” regarding a response. Kazakh accords were signed in 2002 on the emergency use of Kazakhstan’s Almaty airport and on military-to-military relations. Turkmenistan, which has sought to remain neutral, allowed the use of its bases for refueling and humanitarian trans-shipments. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan have sent several military liaison officers to USCENTCOM.²⁵

Closure of Kurshi-Khanabad

Uzbekistan on July 29 demanded that the United States vacate K2 within six months. On November 21, 2005, the United States officially ceased operations to support Afghanistan at K2. Many K2 activities shifted to the Manas airbase in Kyrgyzstan. Some observers viewed the closure of K2 and souring U.S.-Uzbek relations as setbacks to U.S. influence in the region and as gains for Russian and Chinese influence. Others suggested that U.S. ties with other regional states provided continuing influence and that U.S.

criticism of human rights abuses might pay future dividends among regional populations²⁶

Emphasizes on Kazakhstan as Strategic Partner

With the closure of K2 and the cooling of U.S.-Uzbek relations, the United States appeared to shift more of its regional emphasis to Kazakhstan. In a joint statement issued at the close of Nazarbayev's September 2006 U.S. visit, the two countries hailed progress in "advancing our strategic partnership."

The Manas Airbase in Kyrgyzstan

In early 2006, Kyrgyz President Bakiyev reportedly requested that lease payments for use of the Manas airbase be increased to more than \$200 million per year and at the same time re-affirmed Russia's free use of its nearby base. After reportedly drawn-out negotiations, the United States and Kyrgyzstan issued a joint statement on July 14, 2006, that they had resolved the issue of the continued U.S. use of airbase facilities at Manas.²⁷

The "Transit Center" Agreement

The Defense Department announced on June 24, 2009, that an agreement of "mutual benefit" had been concluded with the Kyrgyz government "to continue to work, with them, to supply our troops in Afghanistan, so that we can help with the overall security situation in the region. The agreement was approved by the legislature and signed into law by President Bakiyev, to take effect on July 14, 2009.

The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) of Afghanistan

Because U.S.-coalition and NATO supplies transiting Pakistan to Afghanistan frequently were subject to attacks, the Central Asian region has become an important alternative transit route. Gen. David Petraeus, the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, visited Kazakhstan and Tajikistan in late January 2009 to negotiate alternative air, rail, road, and water routes for the commercial shipping of supplies to support NATO and U.S. operations in Afghanistan. To encourage a positive response, the U.S. embassies in the region announced that the United States planned to purchase many non-military goods locally to transport to the troops in Afghanistan.

US Security Assistance

In FY2008, peace and security assistance was boosted further to \$213 million, with increases in Defense and Energy Department funding for Global Threat Reduction in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, Defense Department Sec. 1206 funding for Caspian Sea security training and equipping in Kazakhstan, Defense Department Sec. 1206 funding for counter-terrorism training and equipping in Kyrgyzstan, and Defense Department Sec. 1207 funding for stabilization operations and security sector reform in Tajikistan. In percentage terms, peace and security assistance has become an increasingly prominent aid sector. Budgeted peace and security aid to Central Asia in FY2002 was 34% of all aid to the region. Budgeted peace and security assistance increased to 78% of all aid to the region in FY2007, and was 66% in FY2008.²⁸

Non-Proliferation

The breakup of the Soviet Union, U.S. fears of nuclear proliferation were focused on Nuclear-armed Kazakhstan, and it has received the bulk of regional CTR and Department of Energy (DOE) aid for de-Nuclearization, enhancing the “chain of custody,” and demilitarization. Some CTR and DOE aid also has gone to Uzbekistan. On May 19, 2009, the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration announced that CTR funds had been used to remove 162.5 lb. of highly enriched uranium “spent” fuel from Kazakhstan. The material originally had been provided by Russia to Kazakhstan, and was returned to Russia by rail for storage in a series of four shipments between December 2008 and May 2009.

Counter Narcotics Aid

There is rising U.S. concern, since Latin American and other international organized groups have become involved in the Central Asian drug trade, and European governments have begun to focus on combating drug trafficking through this new route. U.S. policy also emphasizes the threat of rising terrorism, crime, corruption, and instability posed by illegal narcotics production, use, and trafficking in Central Asia.²⁹

Military Assistance

The principal components of U.S. military assistance to Central Asia are Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), the Regional Defense Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), the Regional

Centers for Security Studies (RCSS), and transfers of Excess Defense Articles (EDA).

Safety of US Citizens and Investments

The U.S. State Department advises U.S. citizens and firms that there are dangers of terrorism in the region, including from ETIM, IMU, and Al Qaeda. Groups such as Hizb ul Tahrir (HT) also foment anti-Americanism. The Peace Corps pulled personnel out of Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan after September 11, 2001, but in a policy aimed at fostering pro-U.S. views among Islamic peoples, personnel were re-deployed by mid-2002 (Uzbekistan declined Peace Corps services in 2005). U.S. military personnel in the region mostly stay on base, and travel in groups off base to maximize their safety.³⁰

Embassy Security

Immediately after September 11, 2001, U.S. embassies in the region were placed on heightened alert because of the danger of terrorism. They have remained on alert because of the ongoing threat of terrorism in the region. The IMU explained that the suicide bombing of the U.S. embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in July 2004 was motivated by U.S. support for Karimov and U.S. opposition to Islam. No embassy personnel were injured. Embassy personnel also may have faced greater danger to their personal safety after Uzbek officials accused the embassy of orchestrating and financing the May 2005 uprising in Andijon.³¹

Analyses

American policy makers took advantage of conditions created by the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington to shake up the strategic balance in Central Asia. The biggest complication, though, has been US advocacy of a “freedom agenda”, which was designed in large part to justify the ongoing human and financial costs of the war. Moscow, competing for energy stakes, has made substantial investments in Uzbekistan’s oil and gas industry. The Russian have also promised Turkmenistan that they will finance construction of new pipeline along the Caspian coast as alternative to a plan supported by the United States and the European for an undersea pipeline across the Caspian.

Bush administration has begun to group the Central Asian states with India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in various policy-making activities of the US government. The priority of US policy in the region has been energy security. Washington has pressed for multiple pipelines as the key to protecting the independence and economic security of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which border the energy-rich Caspian Sea.

US policy makers did hope that these states would make steady progress towards becoming democracies with market-driven economies. U.S Kazakh security cooperation has increased; there is no possibility of the United States gaining basing rights in Kazakhstan. Similarly US interest in Turkmenistan has increased subsequently. US access to Turkmenistan facilities was increased after Washington fell out with Tashkent.

Despite official statements to the contrary, the Central Asian states are less important to Washington, in and themselves, than they are as facilitators of US policies towards other countries, or in the pursuit of American double standard, which they believe many European states adhere to as well. Because of this perceived double standard, many Central Asia prefer dealing with Russia and China and with Asian states generally.

Central Asian leaders frequently feel caught in a struggle between great powers. So United States should find new ways to advance its security interests in the Caspian region providing opportunities for local elites and leaders to broaden their options by closer engagements with Washington, in ways that do not antagonize either Russia or China.

Conclusion

The U.S. is not unlikely to become a single dominant power in Central Asia, nor is there any reason why it should attempt to achieve such a status. Realistic goals—energy security; proximity to the main theaters of operation in the war on terrorism, Afghanistan and Pakistan; combating the traffic in drugs, weapons, and weapons of mass destruction technology; and encouraging participatory and transparent social and economic development—require a sustainable engagement. This is especially the case as the U.S. focuses its resources and attention elsewhere, primarily in the Middle East. The strategic location of the region and the intense global competition over its energy reserves will, to a certain extent, keep the U.S. involved. U.S. engagement is particularly constricted by uneasy

relations with current Central Asian regimes, whose authoritarian tendencies are of no consequence to Russia, China, Iran, and even India. Even if the U.S. had the capacity to limit the presence of other large powers in the region, to do so would be unwise. First of all, the primary U.S. goals in the region are energy security and proximity to terrorist threats, not outright control. The U.S. and other great powers share the goals of stability, economic development, and preventing religious radicalization and terrorism. Rather than openly antagonizing China, Russia, or India over their involvement in Central Asia, the U.S. should pursue the benefits to be derived from regional cooperation.

It is vital that the U.S. maintain and expand a multifaceted presence in Central Asia. The benefits of U.S. involvement accrue to both sides: The U.S. can protect its security, military and geopolitical interests and its energy access while helping to promote the development of democracy and civil society in Central Asia. The developing nations of Eurasia can gain access to much-needed U.S. investment, security assistance, and global integration above and beyond what they are offered by Russia, China, India, and Iran.

Recommendations

There are two recommendations for Central Asian security in international action plan perspective. One is An OSCE-led Central Asia security initiatives and other is that the international community should develop a new approach to assistance to Central Asian states in the spheres of economy and security. U.S. and Central Asian political, economic, and security interests are not

mutually exclusive and may be better achieved through cooperation than through confrontation. Development and security of supply and transit is one such common interest that needs to be cultivated.

Seeing eye-to-eye on every issue should not prevent states from working together to attain shared goals. Even if relations between the U.S. and Central Asian states or Russia are at a post-Soviet low point, common interests such as energy development, fighting terrorism, and limiting nuclear non-proliferation should be pursued and cultivated.

To achieve these goals, the National Security Council should coordinate activities by the U.S. State Department, Department of Defense, Department of Energy, and other departments to pursue the following policies:

- Continue to encourage the governments of India, China, and Pakistan to create alternatives to the Russian energy transit monopoly by establishing new energy transit routes (pipelines, shipping lines, and railroads) that head west and, in some cases, east and south.
- Encourage multinational corporations to diversify energy transit routes to mitigate risk. This is a common interest of the U.S., members of the EU, and China
- Develop closer ties to Central Asian states by stressing mutual gains from Western investment, military presence, and security cooperation. Specifically.
- Assist economic and legislative reform in order to attract and protect foreign investors and spur economic growth.

- Coordinate reform activities with international financial institutions and programs administered by the members of the EU, such as the British Know-How Funds.
- Strengthen military-to-military, intelligence, anti-terrorism, and law enforcement relationships
- Enhance democratic and civil society institutions through programs administered by the National Endowment of Democracy and non-governmental organizations.
- Emphasize common security interests, especially fighting Islamist terrorism, and pursue military-to-military cooperation when it is in U.S. interests
- Adopt a nuanced approach to states whose leaders are not amenable to cooperation with the U.S., specifically Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Specifically:
- Assist economic and legislative reform in order to attract and protect foreign investors and spur economic growth.
- Coordinate reform activities with international financial institutions and programs administered by the members of the EU, such as the British Know-How Fund
- Strengthen military-to-military, intelligence, anti-terrorism, and law enforcement relationships; and
- Enhance democratic and civil society institutions through programs administered by the National Endowment of Democracy and non-governmental organizations.

- Adopt a nuanced approach to states whose leaders are not amenable to cooperation with the U.S., specifically Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Specifically:
- Emphasize common security interests, especially fighting Islamist terrorism, and pursue military-to-military cooperation when it is in U.S. interests;
- Facilitate energy cooperation, including private-sector investment projects and transit (pipeline) projects that enhance hydrocarbon supply to global markets;
- Support secular or moderate Islamic democratic opposition parties or figures (who necessarily must be opposed to any jihads or terrorist–extremist sponsor states or organizations) without openly pursuing regime change;
- Examine and encourage possibilities for stability-enhancing dialogue between existing regimes and democratic and moderate Islamic opposition groups to facilitate the opening of the political system;
- Engage, where necessary, in public information campaigns to criticize existing leaderships and expose their abuses; and
- Guard against Islamist backlash by supporting recognition and dialogue between existing regimes and secular opposition groups and other legitimate, non-destabilizing political actors.

U.S. involvement and assistance contribute to the economic, political, social, and security development of the states of Central Asia. The United States should remain as engaged as possible in the region. Given recent tensions concerning values, preferred economic models, and political systems, such engagement will be complex. Continuous dialogue with regional actors, as well as with Russia, China, the European Union and its key members, Japan, and India, is required to coordinate policies and prevent crises.

Notes

¹ Der Spiegel, *Rogue State: A Guide to the World's Only Superpower* (London: Zed Books Ltd., 2002), 60.

² Mikhail A. Molchanov, "The Political Economy of Energy Sector in the Central Asian-Caspian Sea Region" (Department of Political Science, St. Thomas University, Canada, 1995), 8.

³ Yuri Yevdokimov, "The Politics of Energy and Gas in the Central Asia" (Department of Civil Engineering and Economics, University of New Brunswick, Canada, 2000), 15.

⁴ Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh "Transition and Human Security in Central Asia" *Proceedings of the Round Table Conference in Ashgabad, Turkmenistan, 22-24 April 2002*.

⁵ Olivier Roy, "The New Central Asia: Creation of New Nation" (London: Oxford Press, 2000), 46.

⁶ Roy Alison, ed, "Central Asia Security: The New International Context" (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2001), 78.

⁷ Jim Nichol, *Central Asia' Security: Issues and implications for U.S interest* (USA: Congressional Research Service, 2010).3.

⁸ Martha Brill Olcott, "Central Asia: Terrorism, Religious Extremism, Regional Security" *Carnegie for International Peace*, October, 2003, 2.

⁹ Jatin Kumar Mohanty, "Terrorism and Militancy in Central Asia" (Delhi: Kalplaz Publishers, 2006), 53.

¹⁰ Thomas H. Johnson and Colin Lober, "Central Asia Terrorism: A Problem in Search of Definition and Policy" (Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 2005), 187.

¹¹ Svante E. Cornell and Niklas L.P Swanstrom, "The Eurasian Drug Trade A Challenge to Regional Security", (Department of Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University, Sweden, 2006), 19.

-
- ¹² Open Source Center. *Europe: Daily Report* (hereafter *EDR*), June 5, 2009.
- ¹³ Martha Brill Olcott, "Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia", *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, July 2007:32.
- ¹⁴ Lena Jonson and Roy Alison, Ed, "Central Asian Security: Internal and External dynamics" (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), 10.
- ¹⁵ Niklas L. P. Swanstrom. "The Prospects for Multilateral Conflict Prevention and Regional Cooperation in Central Asia", *Central Asia Survey*23, no. 1(March 2004): 41.
- ¹⁶ Tog Zhan Kassenova, "Central Asia: Regional Security and WMD Proliferation Threats" *Central Asia at the Crossroads*, March 2007.
- ¹⁷ Philip Macklin, "Managing Water in Central Asia" (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 2000), 187.
- ¹⁸ Farkhed Tolipov, "Central Asia" *Caucasus Analyst* December 1 2004.
- ¹⁹ CAREC .Report of Senior Officials to the 8th Ministerial Conference on Central Asia Regional Cooperation, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, October 16, 2009.
- ²⁰ Swant E Cornel, "Finding Balance: The Foreign Policies of Central Asia's States" *Strategic Asia* 2007, 65.
- ²¹ U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia. Hearing: U.S. Policy in Central Asia. *Testimony by Richard A. Boucher, Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asian Affairs*, April 26, 2006.
- ²² Christopher M. Blanchard. "Afghanistan: Narcotics and US policy" *CRS Report*, February 27, 2009.
- ²³ US house of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, Submission on the Middle East and Central Asia, Assessing Energy and Security Issues in Central Asia *Testimony of Steven Mann Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asia Affairs.*, July 25,2006.
- ²⁴ *Washington Post*, December 27, 2004, p. A4.
- ²⁵ The State Department. Fact Sheet November 27, 2002; Supporting Air and Space Expeditionary Forces, RAND, 2005.
- ²⁶ *US Fed News*, July10, 2008.A7.
- ²⁷ *Associated Press*, July24, 2006.
- ²⁸ US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relation, Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs" Hearing on Re-evaluating U.S Policy in Central Asia, December 15, 2009.
- ²⁹ Svante Cornell, "Narcotics and Conflict: Tracing the Link and Its Implications" Working Paper(Uppsala University, Department of East European Studies, February 2005), 38.
- ³⁰ Barbara Harries, ed, "Globalization and Insecurities, and Responses: An Introduction Essay,"(New York: Pal grave, 2002), 42.
- ³¹ A. Brownfield, "Al-Qaeda's Drug Running Network," *Jane's Terrorism and Security Monitor* (February 1 2004),67.

**IMPACT OF PUBLIC OPINION ON PUBLIC POLICY
A CASE STUDY OF SWAT OPERATION
(OPERATION RAH-E-RASAT)**

Mubarak Ahmad & Zaira Irfan Cheema

Abstract

Public Opinion' is a phenomenon that took its toll in 18th century against the idea of an absolutist state, strengthening further the democracy ideals. Public opinion 'dikes' the process of public policy and account for its success or failure. The 'Elite theorists' stressed that elite class decides policy, the 'Group theorists' contends that pressure groups control it, whereas 'Liberal Democratic Model' argues that individual decides the fate of policy. Public opinion change over a policy issue is studied by Larry N Gerston in the model 'Internal Triggering Mechanism' that is suggestive of the fact that, 'scope, intensity, timing and resources explain the impact over opinion change. This paper contends that though public opinion is a very weak channel of input, however it is most effective on visible and highly emotional issues.

Terrorism and resultant counterterrorism policy converges on population centers. Reluctant and confused civilian minds are the battleground for the belligerents. Therefore, with regards to counterterrorism operations, the influence of public opinion on policy outcome is very significant. The paper observed the covariational congruence among the two variables i-e public opinion and success in Swat Operation (Operation Rah-e-Haq). Lack of clarity on the technical aspect of identification of "policy problem"

resulted in confused policy. The public opinion fluctuated and was not favorable for a military operation in Swat till early 2009, but then multiple variables contributed to the sympathetic perception. An International Research Institute (IRI) survey conducted in July 2009 noticed 69 percent support for the military operation. Quantified graphical and survey data suggests that military success in Swat followed the trajectory of public opinion. Hence proving the fact that public opinion plays vital role in counterterrorism operations at all the three stages of policy process i-e. Policy formulation (Planning), policy execution and policy outcome. This paper recommends that a Public Opinion Phase (POP) with empirically verifiable benchmarks should precede all major counterterrorism operations.

Introduction

The relationship of Public opinion and Public policy is a complex phenomenon that has both external and internal variables to its effect. As a mechanism public opinion ‘dikes’ public policy or changes its channels but except in revolutionary cases the policies are not initiated by it. *“The force of Public opinion is partisan, spasmodic, simple minded and external”*.¹ David Easton equated political action with a system where demands and support reinforced by the feedback act as inputs and produce public policies in the shape of outputs². Although being a primitive and mechanical model—acknowledged by David Easton himself³, yet, rational actor theory substantiates the argument that in a representative system the public policy, in principal, should respond to the public opinion. “The responsiveness of political institutions to the citizens’ preferences is

central to democratic theory and practice”⁴. However, it is the manipulative potential of the political and ruling elites, which divides the researchers on actual impact of public opinion on public policy.

This paper explores the covariational congruence (if both move in same direction) of public opinion and public policy. We will measure the trajectory of public opinion leading to operation Rah-e-Rast and assess the hypothesis that public opinion plays vital role in counterterrorism operations at all the three stages of policy process i.e. Policy formulation (Planning), policy execution and policy outcome. In fact, as far as counterterrorism operations are concerned it is emphasized that “public opinion is an important leitmotif of policymaking”⁵.

Public Option

The public opinion holds its importance from the times of Romans and Greeks, Plato was no democrat and according to him ‘doxa’(opinion) is a dubious and changing phenomenon, so the political control should rely with ‘episteme’(knowledge) which means experts should be in charge of political decisions not the general public. Aristotle gave opinion a favor, he added ‘phronesis’(wisdom) suggesting that political deliberation should be on informed guesswork, and judgement.⁶ The term ‘public opinion’ was derived from a French word ‘opinion publique’ and its an 18th century invention .The response on a particular matter is called as opinion and “Opinion is an indication of attentiveness”⁷, of public towards a related issue.

In fact, during the 18th century “publicity was a ‘battle cry’ against the Absolutist State, its aim was to expose secrecy and hence subject them to public criticism”⁸. Public opinion has been a bone of contention among Greek / Roman philosophers and contemporary social scientists. “Opinion, a villain of philosophy, became public opinion - a hero of politics”⁹. The famous scholar of public opinion Ole R. Holsti stated that “public opinion is a tenet of democratic theory”. The most common modern tools for measuring the opinion on specific issues are through ‘opinion polls’.

Public Policy

Public Policy is what “governments choose to do or not to do (Thomas Dye 1992: 2). Such a definition covers government action, inaction, decisions and non-decisions as it implies a very deliberate choice between alternatives (see Hall and Jenkins 1995). The ‘Elite theorists’ suggests that there’s an elite class that makes decisions, ‘Group theorists’ contends that “public policy is and should be controlled by pressure groups”¹⁰, whereas the ‘Liberal Democratic Model’ stressed ‘individual rationality in the arena of public choice’. In these models of Public Policy process the elite theorists leave no room for public opinion but the group theorists created an organized body of it and liberals let individuals to have freedom of expression.

Linkage between Public Opinion and Public Policy

Norman Luttbeg outlines the theoretical models of the political linkages between the public and policy-makers in two broad groups: coercive models and non coercive models (Luttbeg, 1981). In coercive models, the public applies pressure, either real or potential

electoral pressure, to force lawmakers to enact the desired policies.¹¹ The Normative Democratic theory asserts public opinion to be the final verdict and through ‘procedural democracy’ theory it establishes the fact that “the control that voters exert through reward and punishment in elections- provides public opinion with the means to constrain what governments do”.¹²

Walter Lippman criticized and said “no where the idyllic theory of democracy realized”¹³ whereas the Oxford Handbook of Public Policy refers that “Policy, is not a black box from which the analyst can understand the outputs and outcomes, nor is a simple extension of culture or public opinion”¹⁴. Lippman simplifies the impact of Public Opinion on public policy through use of the term of ‘direct action’...with power to say yes or no’ to a policy option. Whereas V.O Keys rejects the presumption that opinion exerts direct influence on a policy decision and argues that it is a system of dikes that channel public action. In his final analysis ‘public opinion constrains rather than determines the decisions governments make’.¹⁵

Theoretical Explanations for Public Opinion Change

Majority of researchers concede that public opinion is an agency of change, but another debate highlights a very relevant issue; how a change is noticed by the agency or what characteristics make a subject salient enough to interest ‘The Public’. Public opinion responded to the brutal operationalization by the militants about their concepts of authority and its enforcement in Swat. Centuries ago Plato noticed that change in public opinion “is forced when they

occur under the violence of some pain and grief¹⁶. It was the realization by the public that militant groups are hurting their basic beliefs and life style which prompted them to voice their opinion and resultant support for the operation Sawat. The change in opinion was brought through specific positive appeals and by using Robert Owen's famous tactic; to change Public Opinion, "never argue, repeat your assertion". Larry N Gerston constructed a model of Public opinion change over any policy issue. He explaining 'Internal Triggering Mechanism' he asserts that it is the linkage between the perception of a 'problem' and the demand for political action that specifies the impact of opinion. "Scope, intensity, timing and resources explain the impact of triggering mechanism on the public policy"¹⁷, and if these factors become more pronounced the influence of the triggering event becomes more important in formulation of issues for public agenda. Another important factor that is evident in relation to public opinion change in Swat is that the ideological basis can not be changed through policy. The situations do attract positive or negative opinion, depending upon how 'The Problem' is formulated but the ideological principles are never compromised by the general public, irrespective of the efficacy of the policy. E.H Paget said "as a rule people oppose situations not principles. Sudden shifts in opinion may occur if the situation is modified"

The theoretical basis of this paper is that "For policy impact, public opinion is a very weak channel of input; however it is most effective on visible and highly emotional issues"¹⁸. Being highly emotional, the results of counterterrorism operations in Swat were

very sensitive to the public opinion. Policy outcome or the success of the operation followed the trajectory of public opinion.

Swat Operation (Operation Rah-e-Rast) and Public Option

The terrorist activities in Pakistan remained confined to Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA). However during 2007 the Taliban started asserting themselves in the settled areas of Swat (100 km from Islamabad). The development, forced the Pakistan to launch its first of the series of counterterrorism operations code named Rah-e-Rast (the true path) on October 25, 2007. The counterterrorism policy was not supported by the public opinion. Majority of the population perceived the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as American war¹⁹. No major political party owned the military operation in swat. In the face of highly divided public opinion the terrorism policy and resultant military operation remained supple on the insurgents and lacked clear direction. A confused counterterrorism policy provided an opportunity to the Taliban to readjust, regroup and bolster their support. Where as, the government was oblivious to the public opinion, Taliban very intelligently manipulated the public perception in their favor. They claimed their legitimacy through appeal to the popular demand of Islamic sharia.

It was lack of effort on the part of government to win over the public opinion which allowed the Taliban to retain their legitimacy and challenge the established order. The failure of two subsequent operations June 2007 and Jan 2009 allowed the Taliban

to operationalize their concept of Sharia law. The hitherto vague concept of Sharia Law started affecting the life of common citizens as well as their perceptions towards GWOT. The Taliban handed down summary punishments in the shape of beheadings and public lashings to the violators.

In Feb 2009, the provincial government signed a peace deal with Sufi Muhammad of Tehreek-e-Nifaz-a-shariat-e-Mohamadi (The Movement for Enforcement of Mohammedan Law) of Swat. This was a clever move on the part of the government and was aimed at de-legitimizing of the cause of the Taliban and affect the public opinion. Now Sufi Muhammad was supposed to ask the Taliban to disarm as their main demand had been met. The move allowed the public to see Taliban in their true colors and make their own opinion. The public opinion clearly had two distinct phases. In first phase (2002 – 2008) the public perceptions about military operations and role of Taliban were divided and confused. In second phase (2009 onwards), public opinion showed a distinct shift in favor of military operations the role of Taliban. In succeeding paras, we will trace back the public opinion which was captured through the available data on public opinion polls and newspapers.

Public Opinion Prior to 2009/Operation Swat

Ever since 2002, Pakistan's military operations against terrorists along north western borders had been unpopular with the masses. The sentiment had been reinforced by indiscriminate use of force like the October 2006 missile strike on a madrassa in the Bajaur. The attack resulted in the death of 80 people housed in the

seminary and the media as a major propaganda news tool played its role by transmitting live images of the dead bodies. Propaganda is “a communicator with the intention of changing attitudes, opinions and behaviors of others.....and the audience is often called in the terminology of public opinion studies, the ‘target’.²⁰Notwithstanding that whether those killed were terrorists they were viewed as victims of an unnecessary war and the opinion of the ‘target’ fell to favor terrorists. As expected, the attack was widely condemned through street protests, by cross sections of political divide²¹, led by religious parties. Similarly a massive military operation centered on the South Waziristan city of Wana in March 2004, was forcefully rebuked by a cross section of opposition political parties, including former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League and Pakistan Peoples Party, that are now in government²². The Mutahidda Majlis-i-Amal, a coalition of the most powerful mainstream religious parties that contest parliamentary elections, condemned²³ the Wana attacks as “state terrorism”, and similar sentiments were echoed in fiery sermons delivered in neighbourhood mosques in all of the country’s major cities²⁴. Government did not make any attempt to influence the public opinion before commencement of first Swat operation, which was widely condemned²⁵.

As late as early 2009, the dominant sentiment among the general public was that it is not Pakistan’s war rather an American war. Few politicians like Imran Khan²⁶ and Jamiat-e-Islami leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed²⁷ influenced the public opinion by floating the argument that tribal response is ethical as the Government forces

have encroached upon centuries old tribal traditions. In summery, the probable variables which influenced the public opinion against the military action prior to 2009 are enlisted below:-

- Lack of regime legitimacy and political ownership.
- Concentration of executive and legislative powers in COAS, General Pervaiz musharref.
- Public knowledge of the American coercion.
- Long history of public legitimacy of Afghan jihad.
- Effective support of the religious parties, especially MMA's Provincial Government in NWFP.
- Governments confused Anti terror policy, and resultant lack of resolve.
- Taliban's ability to disguise political ambitions, in the popular demand of 'Sharia Law'.
- Lack of precise Intelligence.
- 'Red Mosque' operation²⁸

A Swing of Public Opinion – 2009 onwards

Prior to Operation Swat, two military operations followed by political peace deals emboldened the Taliban. During the early half of 2009, Taliban fully operationalised their concepts of 'sharia law'. The period witnessed summery executions and vast human rights violations. Taliban publicly owned the suicide attacks on civilian targets and exposed their political plans for territorial gains. The period witnessed a critical shift in the public perception about the whole process and focused on the public policy 'problem'. The media and government efforts managed to present 'establishment of

the writ of the state' as the 'Problem'. Ordinary citizen exceedingly understood that Taliban wants to overthrow the established order through violence. This helped the public to focus their opinion.

Contrary to previous military operations (Jan 2009 & Jun 2007), Swat Operation (Operation Rah-e- Rast) launched on 3 May 2010 had overwhelmingly public and parliamentary support. Military managed a spectacular success and evicted the Taliban from the area. The operation involved the evacuation and rehabilitation of around 30 million of civilian population. Despite all the hardships and collateral damage public viewed the operation favorably. The probable variables, which helped in the shift of the public opinion, are:-


- Transition to popular democracy i-e restoration of relative regime legitimacy.
- Military resolve and a focused Swat counterterrorism policy.
- Operationalization of Taliban's abstract sharia concepts.
- Effective media campaign.
- Focus on the 'Policy Problem'.

Public Opinion Trends – Pakistan's War on Terror


Over the years, different opinion poll organizations have captured public perceptions on Pakistan's military operations and the role of Taliban through opinion surveys. Relevant trends are reproduced here. At occasions, available data is short of desired level, nevertheless, it gives measurable trends which clearly support

our line that the success of military's operations in swat and public opinion has a congruence of co variability.

Agree or Disagree? The Taliban and Al Qaeda Operating in Pakistan is a Serious Threat



Do You Think that Pakistan Should Cooperate with the United States on its War Against Terror?




SOURCE IRI

*Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy A Case Study Swat Operation
(Operation Rah-e-Rast)*

Although Pakistan's major offensive against Taliban insurgents has displaced more than half a million Pakistanis, Gallup data suggest the government may have some popular support for its actions. A Gallup Poll conducted in December, well before the current military operation, found nearly half of Pakistanis (47%) believed the Taliban's presence in some areas of the country has a negative influence; 14% said it has a positive influence and 39% had no opinion.²⁹

Do you think the presence of the Taliban in some areas of your country has a positive or negative influence on that region?

Asked of Pakistanis



December 2008

GALLUP POLL

A different survey undertaken by the U.S. polling firm Gallup around the same time, which covered all of Pakistan, found only 41 percent supporting the operation. The Gallup poll also found a higher number—43 percent—favoring political resolution through dialogue.


According to a Gallup Pakistan poll conducted in the last week of October 2009 51% of the public supported the military operations, only 13% opposed it while a large proportion, 36%, were unsure.³ On May 18, 2009 an „All Parties Committee“ comprising all major political parties represented in federal parliament signed a resolution endorsing Operation Rah-e-Rast in the northwestern Malakand Division which includes the Swat valley. The resolution emphasised the need to protect the “writ of the state.”⁴ Public support for Operation Rah-e-Rast and the subsequent operation in South Waziristan was also evident.

On dialogue vs military action

Question: In your view, should the Pakistani government have a dialogue with the Taliban of Swat, or carry out military action?

Some people support dialogue, others support military action. What is your view?

| | |
|-----------------|-------------|
| Military Action | 41% |
| Dialogue | 43% |
| Don't Know | 16% |
| Total | 100% |



A survey conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in July 2009, which excluded the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP)—the regions directly affected by war—found 69 percent of respondents supporting the military operation in Swat.

Recommendations

Failure, followed by success in the same theatre has numerous lessons. Few recommendations, mainly from the perspective of public opinion and public policy, are enlisted:-

Public Opinion Management should precede Counterterrorism Operations

Contrast in Public opinion before and after 2009 explains the story of the failure of two previous military operations and success of the third one. It would be naïve, not to give due credit to other variables like military resolve, etc, but the public opinion served as grundnorm for their effectiveness. As the counterterrorism operations are fought amidst the population, leverage over public perception, advantage the opposing forces for control of time and space. A comprehensive public opinion management plan should precede operational plan. The Public Opinion Plan (POP) must have empirically verifiable benchmark. In counterterrorism operations, operational plan should only be executed if and when the POP indicators are positive. POP should be formulated and executed at the highest possible interagency level. The department of

Government and Public Policy (GPP) at faculty of contemporary studies should be tasked to prepare a comprehensive and empirically verifiable POP, for major counterterrorism operations. ISPR, in coordination with field formations should execute the POP in clearly distinctive, pre operation period – may be named as POP Phase.

Exploit Deviation from ‘the Ideology’

Practical world is quite different from the ideological positions. As said by E.H Paget, “people do not change their ideology but react to situations”. Taliban’s actions should be confronted with their ideological positions. During the early phases, Taliban managed to extract legitimacy for their cause due to appeal to the popular ideology. The people should be informed about the grey areas in their practice and stated positions.

Identification and Communication of Right ‘Policy Problem’

A given situation, from the public policy perspective, presents many problems. Our capacity to understand the correct ‘Problem’ will dictate policy response. A mistake on part of the policy planners, at the problem identification stage, has the potential to jeopardize the policy outcome. Therefore, before any policy planning the ‘problem’ should be clearly identified and precisely stated. This will focus the effort and save precious resources.

To win the public support it is equally important that people clearly know the ‘Problem’. Many public opinion polls show that there is lot of confusion in public mind as to what is the ‘Problem’. This single variable has largely contributed to the divided public opinion and involuntary support to the militants. Repeated efforts

should be made to inform the public – after identification, of the correct ‘Problem’. To convey the message to the public mind follow Robert Owen’s saying, once again, “never argue, repeat your assertion”.

Regime Legitimacy

Any public policy draws its strength from the legitimacy of its authors. Peoples’ consent to the regime translates their consent to the policy. A regime, who is struggling for its own legitimacy, is not in a position to rally the public opinion for an unpleasant action. In our case as well, return to popular electoral democracy attracted some of the public opinion away from the militants. Constitution is a document of social consent. A legitimate regime should be as close to this social contract as possible for favorable public opinion resultant support for its counterterrorism policies.

Political Ownership

Political ownership of the operation by central and KP provincial governments contributed considerably in the success of Swat operations. Political authority and executive authority should be distinctively separate in counterterrorism operations. The strategic decision to launch the counterterrorism operation in a population center should be visibly with the legislature / political authority. Military wing of the strategy should at no occasion be seen as dictating the decision. This measure will ensure public sympathy for the dutiful and honest servants of the state, who are laying their lives for the public mandate.

In a democratic state the voice of public is like the order by Kings, and it might be over-rated but it should not be under-rated in any sense. The major representative bodies should not only be taken into confidence but also to be directed to voice their support over the military operations that will strengthen the effect over public. The leaders are not less than symbolic statures of wisdom and virtue so their support to a military cause will ultimately shape the opinion in favor of the institutional efforts to curb terror.

Media Impact – Emotional Visuals

Few Screams of ‘Flogging Girl’, matched the years of pious sermons of ‘Moulana Radio’ those visuals created a stream of pricking conscience from the echo chambers of public opinion holocaust. So the propagand’s famous tool should be well handled by expertise of opinion management to not only mould but to checker if any source is going against the mainstream planned line of action.

A famous quote suggests “ God is not on the side of big battalions, but on the side of those who shoot the best”. A Planned line of action, a careful drawn strategy, measured steps to further and intelligent target shot by bulls eye darts to take Public opinion as a part of war strategic theme will be effective measure.

Notes

- ¹ Walter Lippman ,The Phantom Public, (New Brunswick, Mac-Millan Company ,4th edition,2004) , 141
- ² Political thought on david easton
- ³ ibid, p -
- ⁴ Jeff Manza, Fay Lomax Cook, Benjamin I. Page, Navigating public opinion: polls, policy, and the future of American democracy
- ⁵ Yehezkel Dror , Public Policymaking Reexamined (Chandler Publishing Company ,fifth printing ,2003), 288
- ⁶ - Theodore Lewis Glasser, Public Opinion and the Communication of Consent(Guilford Pres ,1995), 4
- ⁷ Matthew Baum,Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in The New Media Age, pg 15
- ⁸ Glasser, 26
- ⁹ Glasser 27
- ¹⁰ Peter Woll, Public Policy (Winthrop publishers, 1983) , 9
- ¹¹ Luttbeg, N. R. ,*Public Opinion and Public Policy: Models of Political Linkage* (3rd ed.).(Itasca, Ill.:F.E. Peacock Publishers, 1981).
- ¹² Brigitte Lebens Nacos, Robert Y Shapiro, Decision making in a glass house: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, (Rowman and little field publishers,2000), 224.
- ¹³ Walter Lippman ,Public Opinion , 213
- ¹⁴ Michael Moron, Martin Rain, Robert E. Goodin, The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, (Oxford Publishers, 2008), 172.
- ¹⁵ Christopher Page ,The Role Of Public Opinion Research in Canadian Govt, (University of Toronto Press, 2006) , 104
- ¹⁶ William Albig, Public Opinion, (McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY,2007) ,217
- ¹⁷ Larry N. Gerston, Public Policy Making Process and principles, (M.E Sharpe Publications, 2004), 29.
- ¹⁸ Jhon J. Harrigan. Adison Wesley Longman, Politics and policy in states and communities (1998) , 115.
- ¹⁹ from opinion polls
- ²⁰ K.J Holsti , International Politics: A Framework For Analysis,(London,Prentice Hall International, 1983) ,196
- ²¹ “NWFP Assembly condemns Bajaur Operation” Dawn newspaper October 31, 2006.
- ²²“ANP chief condemns Wana operation” Dawn newspaper March 24, 2004.
- ²³ Hassan, Ahmed “MMA condemns Fata operations” March 12, 2006.
- ²⁴Khan, Anwarullah “Govt asked to stop operation in Wana” Dawn newspaper March 23, 2004.
- ²⁵ “Eyebrows raised over Swat action in NA” Dawn newspaper.
- ²⁶ Khan, Imran “How to clear up this mess?” Pakpoint April 24, 2009
- ²⁷ “Qazi Hussain Ahmad demands the government to immediately revoke expected military operation

in tribal areas.” Pakistan Press International September 7, 2003.

²⁸ Note that the rate of suicide and other bombings by non-state actors within Pakistan dramatically

increased following the siege of Islamabad's Red Mosque on July 10, 2007. See Meyer, Bill “Suicide attacks soar in Pakistan since 2007” Cleveland.com September 28, 2009. Available at: http://www.cleveland.com/world/index.ssf/2008/09/suicide_attacks_soar_in_pakistan.html.

²⁹ Julie Ray- Pakistanis generally see Talibans Influence As Negative.- research paper

ROLE OF MEDIA IN RESUMPTION OF PEACE TALKS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND INDIA

Muhammad Akram

Abstract

Pakistan and India have been adversaries to each other since their independence. Besides having shared borders, both the countries have a number of things common to share; like religion, culture, language and holy places in either country. Media has become a driving force in opinion making and shaping of perceptions. It plays an important role in conveying information, forming opinions and setting of trends. It even affects social behaviour. Media's role in influencing national and international public opinion through round the clock coverage of worldwide events has grown immensely in today's ever more connected world. This phenomenon has led the media practitioners to play even greater role in influencing high-level international decision making. It can also help curbing social evils prevailing in the society. Media is greatly promoting trade, business and cultural activities across the globe. Similarly, it can also help harmonize relations between Pakistan and India. South Asian Free Media Association and Jang Group of Pakistan and Times of India are the media organizations working for the promotion of understanding between India and Pakistan to maintain durable peace and tranquility in South Asia. This paper will focus as to how can media bring harmony and pacify

the relations between Pakistan and India by highlighting commonalities among both the countries.

Introduction

In the present day world, media has become a driving force in opinion making and shaping of perceptions. First, we shall have to understand media and its impact. The word media denotes, “the main means of communication with large number of people, especially television, radio and newspapers: the mass media.” Film, stage, music, publishing, advertising news agencies, coins, stamps, graffiti, posters, public meetings, lectures, exhibition, and now internet are the some of the means that can send messages to a large number of people. Even teachers, religious leaders and social workers can be used to spread information to the public.

Media is known as the fourth pillar of the state. Its reach, scope and ever-present nature make it an important factor in any nation as well as in the international politics. It plays an important role in conveying information, forming opinions and setting of trends. It even affects social behaviour of the people. Outwardly, it has appeared that many countries, organizations, people and commercial enterprises not only know to use media to present their viewpoint effectively but can also mold it to meet their objectives.

Characteristics of Media

Media has some common traits, which are as under:-

- Problems in a society get more media attention as compared to good news; overemphasis on drama or the

bad news at the expense of substance and context¹.

However, media does not provide workable solutions.

- Media can influence people's opinion, way of life and their prejudices.
- Media creates stereotypes.
- Media pressures can undercut policymakers' caution². (US aborted rescue of its embassy hostages in Iran).
- Media coverage has greater impact when policy is ill defined or unrealistic. In such cases, people are likely to rely more heavily on media versions of the events³. (Kargil conflict, attack on the Indian Parliament and the Mumbai attacks).

Importance of Media

Mass media has four basic functions; to inform, to entertain, to educate and to influence. What we receive through media becomes perception through our knowledge, experience and psychological surroundings. The power of media lies in its abilities to transform perceptions into convictions. Media creates cognitive (knowledge), attitudinal, emotional, psychological and behavioural effects. The expansion of various media channels such as radio, television, print media, satellite broadcasting, internet etc have brought the media to the living rooms of most of the people. It is the media that has made the world a global village in the real sense. Media's role in influencing national and international public opinion through round the clock coverage of worldwide events has grown immensely in today's ever more connected world. Present world has

become the world of infotainments. For instance, movies, dramas or sitcoms etc. being staged, aired or played have been enlightening the people besides entertaining them. This phenomenon has led the media practitioners to play even greater role in influencing high-level international decision making. It can also help curbing social evils prevailing in the society. Manipulation of media can create deliberate and desired effects for specific objectives. Governments, commercial organizations and social groups use media for their own motives and priorities. War frenzy media can deteriorate relations among nations. However, my prime focus will remain on optimistic aspect of the media. These days, media determines the ultimate winner in the contemporary arena of the international politics. It plays an important role in shaping strategy, as it provides necessary inputs about the changing international scene, the likely response to international initiatives and highlighting the interdependence of various international issues. Media biases simply cannot be forgiven when said media have the tools to record and deliver the objective reality of any given event so political affiliations must be cast aside⁴. The world has turned into a global village with the advent of modern means of interaction and communication. Media is greatly promoting trade, business and cultural activities across the globe. Similarly, it can also help harmonize relations between Pakistan and India.

Media and Regional Integration

Social scientists are grappling with the role of media in social cohesion and national and regional integration for a long time.

The proponents of the limited effect-models may not agree, but many critics share the view that media can help free the people of a country or region from mutual hostility and help achieving national and regional integration. Needless to say that such cooperation removes insecurity from neighbouring states and acts as a barrier towards arms race or any type of conflict between and among them. In South Asia, such supporting role of the media has always been coveted various multilateral fora. The first SAARC information ministers' meeting held in Dhaka in April 1998 emphasized the need for greater flow of information among member states to promote peace and harmony in the region⁵.

Peace Process between Pakistan and India

Composite dialogue between Pakistan and India, generally known as the peace process, started in January 2004 after a meeting of Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in Islamabad⁶. Earlier, an eight-point agenda was laid down in 1997, as a result of which the unanimity found between the two leaders that was further discussed by the respective foreign secretaries in February 2004. The eight-point composite dialogue encompasses issues including CBMs, Jammu and Kashmir, Siachen, Sir Creek, Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project, Terrorism and Drug Trafficking, Economic and Commercial Cooperation and Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in Various Fields⁷. A brief review of the peace process suggests that both countries remain unable to seek out practical and sellable solutions to the unresolved issues. Even the less intractable problems, such as

the Siachen and Sir Creek issues, are far from being settled⁸. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), an organization of South Asian nations was established in 1985 and provides platform of official and unofficial communication between the governments and the people of the member countries including Pakistan and India⁹. Similarly, South Asian Free Media Association is also lending its cooperation and efforts to promote peace and harmony in the South Asian region. For this purpose, a conference was held in Islamabad on August, 2003 for confidence building and conflict resolution¹⁰.

South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA)

An association of SAARC countries' media persons was established in the year 2000 as a result of South Asian Free Media Conference in Islamabad under the slogan of "Towards Free and Vibrant Media". SAFMA has so far got national chapters in India, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. In the 2nd South Asia Free Media Conference (SAFMC) held in Kathmandu in January 2002, the country delegates agreed on 'Declaration of Intent: Media and peace'. Also SAFMA's media agenda was put into action plan in this conference. Its role in peace and confidence building is of a catalyst and a facilitator. SAFMA's most important capital is its credibility. SAFMA is widely respected as politically and ideologically unbiased; committed to peace, understanding and press freedom. It has no hidden agenda beyond these objectives. As the organization has a record for succeeding in bringing even high level Indian and Pakistani politicians together for dialogue, SAFMA is

facing expectations in order to provide bridges in a number of sectors. SAFMA's impact in easing the tension between India and Pakistan is difficult to measure in exact terms. Even if impact in peace and confidence building is more a matter of quality than of quantity, SAFMA has a potential to improve its monitoring mechanisms. Today, there is still a mission mood prevailing, where every SAFMA conference or initiative is labeled as «highly successful», without parameters sufficient for assessing the real effects¹¹.

SAFMA objectives

SAFMA objectives, agreed at the second SAFMC, which became part of its Memorandum of Association (Constitution), include:

- Promote tolerance, understanding, confidence building, management and resolution of conflicts, peace, nuclear stabilization, disarmament, economic and cultural cooperation and people to people contact in the region.
- Support full enforcement of universally recognized human rights, including women rights, social rights of the people and equal rights of the minorities and the indigenous people.
- Struggle for freedom of media, freed and easy access to information, including the removal of all barriers in the way of free flow of information and unhindered movement of media persons and media products across the region.

- Develop high professional standards, professional collaboration and independence of a South Asian media free of all biases and prejudices while monitoring all violations of freedom of and access to information.
- Benefit the people and the region with the fruits of information revolution by promoting interactive and collaborative media products including web-sites and magazines.
- Uphold public interests and civil society in each country and overall interests of the people of this region.
- Respect decency, privacy and dignity of all citizens and be accountable readers/viewers autonomous and self-regulatory¹².

The politicians needed someone to break the ice. SAFMA was there at the right time adjudicating the violation of the rights of the citizens. Commenting on the new approach of SAFMA, M. Ziuaddin, resident editor in Islamabad for a major daily *The Dawn* and president of the Pakistani chapter of SAFMA said: – We had a unique situation, which required new thinking. The media community had to utilize its special position as independent observers to overcome the animosity between Indian and Pakistani politicians. If not, the traditional efforts from the media organizations to dismantle barriers and improve media rights are doomed to remain fruitless, overshadowed by the Indian-Pakistani conflict. SAFMA is part of a greater cause, he says¹³.

SAFMA Parliamentary Forum

South Asian Parliament deliberated upon major policy areas of regional cooperation and addressed most pivotal issues in its eight marathon sessions. A South Asian Vision, Economic Cooperation in South Asia, Water Issues and the Energy Grid, South Asian Parliament, South Asian Human Rights Code, Cooperative Security in South Asia, Right to Know and Independence of Media and Bhurban Declaration on Evolving South Asian Fraternity. SAFMA and its Indian and Pakistani chapters have, in addition, undertaken several exercises to connect Indian and Pakistani cities and regions, notably the Mumbai-Karachi-Mumbai exchange between the commercial capitals, the Punjab-Punjab exchange, and historical initiatives in order to bring journalists together across the LoC (Line of Control) in Kashmir. The conflict in the sub-continent could be explained in terms of missed opportunities, errors of judgment and the colonial overhang in policy making – victims of a system adopted in 1947 without much thought, Indian and Pakistanis need to «break free»¹⁴. SAFMA feels that the best approach is to simultaneously tackle disputes without making regional/bi-lateral economic cooperation a hostage to the disputes. Conflict management, confidence-building and resolution of auxiliary issues will create necessary conditions to settle the major disputes among and within the states. Indo-Pak peace process will not move forward without replacing the respective nationalist ideologies of enmity with a new Paradigm of Detente that view bi-lateralism as mutually re-enforcing and equally rewarding. It is just not Indo-Pak relations

that are vital to South Asian progress towards an economic union, relations between India and other neighbors are also very crucial for regional amity. The Indian chapter of SAFMA is especially aware of India's special position in the region, bordering to all the SAARC countries, except Afghanistan. The Indian chapter is prepared to take on special assignments in order to assist media colleagues in troubled neighbouring countries.

For over four years, Pakistan and India have been engaged in a Composite Dialogue process. Discussions have been held on eight segments ranging from cooperation in bilateral trade to people to people contacts to addressing all outstanding issues including Jammu and Kashmir .The overall objective has been to construct multi-faceted good neighbourly relationship with India and build durable peace in the region. Consequently, there has been significant improvement in the atmospherics between the two countries¹⁵. Until February 1994, India and Pakistan were engaged in sporadic dialogues that always ended with zero progress. This is why both countries formally suspended dialogue in 1994. Islamabad's approach was to settle the Kashmir issue first, after which the other problems would get settled almost automatically, whereas India was interested in dilating first on other issues, such as trade and travel. Eventually, to bridge the gap between the two positions, both governments agreed to address all political and territorial issues simultaneously, including Jammu and Kashmir. Consequently, the foreign secretaries of the two countries met in Islamabad and resumed the stalled dialogue process in June 1997. They

institutionalized the process by identifying eight areas to deliberate upon and established working groups to make progress on each issue separately but simultaneously. This entire process was called off when the Kargil confrontation occurred¹⁶. Later, in 2004, India and Pakistan launched a renewed peace process aimed at resolving all their longstanding disputes.

Fate of Peace Process and Mumbai Terror Attacks

Two hundred and eighty seven people were killed and more than 100 injured in Mumbai terror attacks, on November 26, 2008. At least seven high-profile locations were hit in India's financial capital, including two luxury hotels where dozens of hostages were being held¹⁷. All the terrorists were killed except one Ajmal Kasab, who belonged to Pakistan. New Delhi blamed Islamabad for patronizing and not curbing the network of terrorists on its soil or territory under its control. Consequently, it halted the peace process with Pakistan. Keeping the stalemate situation between Pakistan and India regarding peace efforts, Jang Group of Pakistan and The Times of India, the two leading media houses of the two neighbours, have come together to develop a stronger track II in the diplomatic and the cultural relations between both nations. They have branded their peace efforts as “Aman Ki Asha: Destination Peace”¹⁸.

Aman Ki Asha

Jang Group and Times of India have launched a comprehensive drive aimed at bringing peace between the two neighbours, which is a noteworthy effort on the part of media. Both the media houses have arranged a number of programmes to

promote mutual trust between Pakistan and India in the sectors of culture, trade and commerce, education and, etc.

Peace Efforts under Aman Ki Asha

Two media giants of Pakistan and India initiated their peace and friendship campaign on January 1, 2010. The Times of India started its turn with a caption “Love Pakistan”¹⁹. It states: “Feels odd to see those two words side by side doesn't it? Terror, hatred and fanaticism somehow sit more comfortably in our minds when we think of the other side of the border. We have been fed in daily doses for the last six decades and in greater doses for the last one year. This has shut our minds to even recognize the undeniable truth that people across the border are, above all, human beings; like us. So here's the question. Is there any chance at all, that we could still raise a hand, not in anger but in greeting? Depends on who raises his hand first, some of us would say. Also how, whisper a few others. But mostly, it all boils down to one simple question. Why? Why must we do it? Why do we need them? Why don't they first say sorry for what they've done? And the answer is simple. It's easier to say Hi than to say Sorry. It's shorter too. Besides, there is no rule that says a book has to be closed before a new one is opened. Not even if it's a history book. So on the first day of this new year, we're going to make a start. Again. With Aman Ki Asha. A brave, new people-to-people initiative by the Times of India and Pakistan's Jang Group to bring the people of two fine nations closer together. Culturally, emotionally and peacefully.”

Starting with a series of cross-border cultural interactions, business seminars, music and literary festivals and citizens meet that will give the bonds of humanity a chance to survive outside the battlefields of politics, terrorism and fundamentalism. In the hope that one day, words like Pakistan, India and Love will not seem impossible in the same sentence. Similarly, on January 3, Pakistan Foreign Office Spokesperson said, while welcoming the setting up of “Amn Ki Asha” that Pakistan would support any effort that brought peace in the region. He said: “We strongly believe in having a lasting peace with India. We want our bilateral relations to be normalized so that South Asia could live in peace and prosperity²⁰. Lauding “Aman Ki Asha” programme, Chairman All Parties Hurriyat Conference Jammu and Kashmir Mirwaiz Omar Farooq said that it (Aman Ki Asha) provides a recipe for the resolution of the long-standing Kashmir conflict. Explore more avenues for the settlement of contentious issues following the launch of “Aman Ki Asha” he added. He further said that the Kashmiris may play their important role for the success of this programme because they need it the most²¹. Commenting on “Aman Ki Asha”, Jaideep Bose, a prominent Indian said that over the past few months, The Times of India have had the privilege of meeting some very fine people at the Jang Group, and they made some wonderful friends there. They look forward to deepening this relationship in the months and years to come — and spreading the goodwill beyond the confines of our newspapers and TV channels, he added. He went on to say while quoting the words of John Lennon’s peace anthem, Imagine? “You

may say I'm a dreamer/But I'm not the only one/I hope someday you'll join us..." He maintained that they'd like to believe there are many more 'dreamers' like them out there — and that their dream of India and Pakistan living in harmony will come true²². Students of St. Peter's High School, Toba Tek Singh in Pakistan, joined Aman Ki Asha to promote peace between India and Pakistan. The school organized a programme titled 'Aman Mein Mera Hissa' (my contribution to peace). Sixty students, including boys and girls, were given white handkerchiefs and they carved the messages of peace for Indian students. The students also carved various peace symbols, quotations, prayers and wishes on the handkerchiefs. The messages that attracted people from various walks of life were: 'May peace be in India', 'May peace be in Pakistan', 'Please ask your government to ensure water supply for Pakistani rivers', 'No to arms', 'Yes to progress', 'India and Pakistan should work together to end terrorism', 'Peace is like a river flowing through you and me', 'I love Pakistan and India', 'Let us make our paradise -- Kashmir -- a safe heaven', 'Let us press our governments to ease traveling between the people of two countries', 'Yes to peace' and 'No to war'²³. Similarly, Indian film industry, the Bollywood, is also stressing the need of friendship and cordial relationship between Pakistan and India through its movies like "Main Hun Naa."

Conclusion and Recommendations

Nothing stops Pakistani people from meeting Indian people like the national frontier, and nothing destroys the national frontier like free trade, people to people contact and easing of tensions

between both the countries. The time has come when both the nations would have to set aside their differences for the sake of prosperity and security of their people. No nation can think positive without having peace of mind. This can be achieved through many ways like government to government better understanding. However, this thing can take much time as there might be some reservations on both sides. But, the people living on both sides of the border can be persuaded and convinced to put pressure on their respective governments to show some sense. This objective can be achieved through massive use of media campaigns to form public opinion in this direction. There are so many things which should be highlighted through media that can bring ease among the people of South Asia. For example, Sikh community, living on other side of the border and the world over, has its most sacred places in Pakistan, which is respected both by the Muslims and the Sikhs as well. Similarly, we have a hill named Eelam in Swat where according to Hindu mythology their Prophet Ram Chandra Jee spent fourteen years of his exile. It was on Eelam where Ram Chandra Jee's wife, Seeta gave birth to three sons i.e. Peshu Roy, Kishu Roy and Lahu Roy on whose names the cities of Peshawar, Kasur and Lahore were later on, established.²⁴ The same is the case with Buddhism. The second most important personality of this religion after Buddha, Padama Sambawa was born at Gonyar village of Malakand Agency. From there he went to Lhasa, the capital of Tibet to promote this religion.²⁵ The Media should project this mutual harmony through programmes, talk-shows, films and documentaries. Similarly,

Punjabi language is widely spoken and understood on both sides of the border and can also play a pivotal role in promoting peace and harmony between the two neighbours. Here I want to quote some verses of a Punjabi poet from Indian Punjab carrying message of love and cooperation. He says:

Wahgay Diay Sarhaday Ni
Tenu Tatti Wa Na Laggay Ni
Laggan Phull Gulab De
Tery Dohaan Passay Ariay Wassan Putt Punjab De
Bumb Aidar Diggay Yaan Odhar
Honi Bari Kharabi Ni
Dohaan Passay Marnay Putt Punjabi Ni

(O border of Wahga, I wish that you may not come across any problem even the hot wind. Sons of Punjab glitter like red roses on both sides of proud Wahgah border. War will kill Punjabis living on both sides of the border.)

Media should also pay homage to common heroes of freedom like Bhagat Singh, as it is our joint legacy. Likewise, religious tourism can be promoted between Islamabad and New Delhi. Hindus also have their sacred temples in Pakistan.

Urdu and Hindi – national languages of Pakistan and India, respectively, virtually sound similar, becoming understandable for people of the two countries; though there are written differently. This can help bridge communication gap between the two nations.

The Muslim saints buried in India have great respect and honour among Muslims in Pakistan, which can also be highlighted aptly in media.

The interdependence of both the countries in terms of import and export could ease the burden upon them. Similarly due importance of international projects like Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline and India's strong desire of access to the Central Asian states via Pakistan can also help peace-process.

The recent marriage of top athletes of India and Pakistan in the positive perspective and jubilation expressed at the public at large in this regard in both electronic and print media can also press the two sides for the promotion of peace. By giving special treatment to the increased poverty, due to rising defence expenditure of Pakistan and India, in the media, peace efforts can be resumed and expedited. Furthermore, common people should be made aware through massive and positive use of that terrorist groups operating in Pakistan and India are taking advantage of the Indo-Pak rivalry and causing more and more complications and problems in the relations of the two countries.

So, if this point is projected at the international level through all means including media, these two sides could be brought to the negotiating table. It may be added here that hatred between Muslims and Hindus had been orchestrated by the imperial British. For instance, how they have been promoting Hindu-Muslim hatred is evident from the fact that incidents of wild boars or pigs in mosques and throwing the heads of cows in Hindu temples before the

partition of united India that led to widespread communal riots. At the time of partition, there are hundreds of examples in which Muslims and Hindus rescued people of each other's faith. In this way, media can prove the fact that Indo-Pak rivalry is considerably artificial. Besides, survey reports artistically projected in the electronic and the print media about Pakistan's poetry gaining popularity in terms of Indian songs and music in Pakistan could also help the peace process.

Notes

- ¹ Commodore Asif Humayon, "Media as an instrument of strategy", *NDC Journal* 2000, p.97
- ² Ibid. p.105.
- ³ Ibid.p.121.
- ⁴ Mirza Jan, "*Political Terrorism under the Flag of Media*", *South Asian Studies*, Vol. 24, (January 2009): p.45
- ⁵ Muhammad Aslam, Don Freeman, Sajida Iqbal and Shahid Mehmud, "Media-The Emerging Strategic Force" *Group Research Paper, National Defence Course*(2002-2003): p. 103
- ⁶ Ershad Mehmud, "Pak-India Peace Process: An Appraisal", *Policy Perspectives* (July 2007):Vol. 4, No.2, p.1.
- ⁷ KS Manjunath, Seema Sridhar & Beryl Anand", Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue 2004-05", *IPCS Special Report 12*, (February 2006) a profile, p.110.
- ⁸ Ibid. p.115.
- ⁹ Shahid Nadeem, "*Pakistan and India Dreams for Peace*", (Lahore: Book Home, 2004), P.105.
- ¹⁰ Ibid.p.107.
- ¹¹ Alf Skjeseth, Masood Hayat and Cyril Raphael, "*Journalists as power brokers*", *Review of the South Asian Free Media Association (SAFMA) and the Free Media Foundation (FMF)*, (August 2006), p.4.
- ¹² Ibid.p.5.
- ¹³ Ibid. p.6.
- ¹⁴ Ibid. p.8.
- ¹⁵ Pakistan-India Peace Process (2008-2009), Dr. Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, IPRI Factfile, p.46.
- ¹⁶ Ershad Mehmud, "*Pak-India Peace Process: an Appraisal*", *Policy Perspectives*, (July 2007). Vol. 4, No.2, p.9.
- ¹⁷ BBC, November 27, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7751160.stm

¹⁸ <http://rightnreal.com/aman-ki-asha-indo-pak-friendship-forum/>

¹⁹ “Love Pakistan”, *The Times of India*, 1 January 2010.

²⁰ Mariana Baabar, “FO wishes godspeed to Aman Ki Asha”, *The News*, January 4, 2010.

²¹ “Kashmir settlement to provide ‘Aman Ki Asha: Mir Waiz’”, *The News*, January 3, 2010.

²² “Peace with Pakistan: Give Tomorrow A Chance: Jaideep Bose”, *The Times of India* January 1, 2010.

²³ “Aman Mein Mera Hissa: Students inscribed peace messages on handkerchiefs”, *The News*, May 18, 2010.

²⁴ This was revealed by Lutfur Rehman (NDU Research Scholar) during a conversation.

²⁵ Ibid.