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**NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY
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**BENEFITS OF REGIONALISM AND THE
POTENTIALS OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION
ORGANIZATION (ECO)**

Mr. Muhammad Umer Abbasi

Abstract

The benefits of globalized economy are unbalanced in the favor of developed countries. Weak economies of developing countries, having lack of capital and technology, can not compete in international competitive markets. Economic cooperation via regionalism is an effective way for safeguarding the interests of developing countries of global South.

Introduction

Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) is one of the regional economic blocks of the developing countries of West, Central, and South Asia. Being ideally situated in geographic terms and consisting of not only resource rich countries in its north but also those that can provide them easiest outlet to the world energy markets, ECO has the potential of becoming hub of economic activities linking Europe to Asia and also Central Asia to South Asia. In this connection, the geographic position of Pakistan is very ideal, a bridge between Central and South Asia. It is in this context that the research is undertaken to explore the possibilities of making ECO a vibrant economic hub between Europe, Central Asia, and South Asia. If the ideal were attained, it would help billions of people of the region to benefit from the mutual gains of the organization.

The member countries of ECO do not address political and security matters in their agendas, therefore, no significant progress has been made even in the implemented projects. Unless political stability is attained in the region, neither there could be favorable environment for business activity nor the decided projects could be materialized. Therefore, without securitization of the agenda, ECO cannot become a strong and viable economic block.

Overview of Contemporary Global Economy and the Importance of Regionalism:

Later half of the 20th century witnessed an unprecedented development of science and technology. Nation states came closer due to the progress of communication. Increased interaction between diverse cultures awakened the consciousness of humanity and people realized the futility of wars. Economic factor in international politics gained prominence and the concept of international political economy became mainstay of international policies. United States of America (USA), the undisputed power of the west, along with her allies strengthened the capitalist economic system to pursue their national interests by employing economic statecraft.

Post World War-II period has been characterized by the West initiated political economy. Unprecedented levels of multinational production, cross border financial flows and trade liberalization have created a contradiction between increasing economic integration and concentration of wealth

in few countries of global North. The international regimes like International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and World Trade Organization (WTO) are under the influence of USA and the West. The policies of strong economic growth, modernization and investment of Multi National Corporations (MNCs) in developing countries have marginalized the developing South. After cold war a multilateral economic order based upon joint leadership of Europe, Japan, and USA have emerged.¹

The subsequent victory of the USA and the West in cold war further encouraged them to advance their ideology of liberalism. The dawn of 21st century saw the world divided into two economically divergent blocks. The pursuit of free trade economy made the countries of global North highly rich and developed with all the amenities of luxurious life. On the other hand, the third world countries of South became highly poor and impoverished. In the current state of world economy, fifteen percent of the world population living in the global North is in possession of more than eighty five percent of global wealth whereas the rest of humanity shares the remaining.² Globalization has brought unprecedented dividends to the developed world but the developing countries are still struggling to cope with its challenges.

Over all view of the contemporary global economy portrays a picture where the powerful countries are still exploiting the resources of developing countries in new form of colonialism. Physically, the countries of South claim to be independent but

in economic terms, the global policies are not only formulated by global North but are also executed by the global regimes, which are controlled by powerful states. Although the phenomenon of globalization has produced dividends for some developing countries like newly industrialized countries of South East Asia but as a whole the concept of free trade of globalization puts weak economies of developing countries at stake.

This state of world affairs is best elaborated by *structuralism*, a cluster of theories whose aim was to give an account of the political and economic subordination of South to the North.³ Core-Periphery is one of the theories of structuralism, according to which the North and the South are structurally divided into two parts; the capitalist countries form the core and the poor Southern countries are at the periphery. Raul Prebisch, an Argentinean economist, was one of the promoters of this theory who identified the mechanism by which the capitalist states held back the periphery. According to him, it was due to the pattern of specialization that so called free trade became established in world economy. This pattern involved South in the production of primary products which are exchanged for the manufactured goods of the North. He further explained that in the long term that pattern of trade was detrimental to the interests of the South because the value of primary products remains the same but that of manufactured goods increased with the development of technology.⁴

The crux of the matter is that those countries which have control over power of manufacturing always remain dominant on those whose economies can not produce manufactured goods. In order to control their dominance the countries of global North favor the hegemonic liberal theory, according to which USA, the uni polar super power is a liberal hegemony which has created conditions of liberal economic activity to further absolute gains. These countries have maintained unity under “Washington consensus”, an economic model of interaction under which free trade is implemented and regulated via American sponsored global regimes. Since, these countries have control over capital and technology, therefore, the gains earned from these policies go to their favor at the detriment of global South.

The positive effects of liberalization can be gained under specific conditions. Cultural affinity along with standard of education, level of economic conditions of the states and the geographic factor are important determinants of the success of liberal trade. Since, at global level, there is great cultural diversity and a huge gap between the educational standard of the countries of South and North, therefore, free economic interaction at international level creates disequilibrium among different economies of the world.

Secondly, the level of economies of the countries of North and South is poles apart; the former have vast economies created via control over capital and technology and the small economies of latter are dependent on the capital and

manufactured production of the former. Under conditions of free trade at global level, free market access to every competitor is offered and under unequal standards of economy, the benefits of liberalism are bound to go to the countries of the North while economies of the South will always remain in the disadvantageous position.

Geographic contiguity is also a crucial factor for harvesting the fruits of liberalization. Sheila Page is of the view that political or social sympathy may be greater among those who are near than among those who are at more distance, as when the distance and size increases and economic contact decreases, there will be a decline in benefits of liberalization. Therefore, in global liberalization more industries are affected at home and more political interests have to be reconciled abroad.⁵ This factor illustrates the significance of regionalism. Economic interaction at regional level creates ideal conditions for liberal trade. At regional level, chances of convergence of political interests are stronger, making way for economic integration. Similarly, at regional level, the standard of economies is almost the same, therefore, absolute benefits of liberalization are shared almost equally.

Another advantage of regionalism is that “Regional groupings offer the benefits of providing a stronger platform for operating and negotiating in the global economy. Regional organizations also offer potentially congenial ways of arranging economic relations between dominant local economic powers.”⁶ It means when smaller economies are

grouped into regional blocks then in global interaction their accumulated strength is much greater as compared to their individual status. Secondly, unlike individually, the weaker economies of regional block with combined strength can compete with the dominant economic power in their neighborhood. In this connection, the example of South East Asian nations is worth mentioning. In the presence of Strong Chinese economy, their economic-political value was insignificant but when these countries grouped themselves into ASEAN, not only their combined strength saved their vulnerable economies but their political importance was also enhanced and China was no longer able to dictate her terms to them.

It suggests that benefits of regionalism are not limited to economic realm but have far reaching political effects. According to John Ravenhill, economic cooperation in regions is sought for political as well as economic ends. The political ends include restoring confidence among member states, enhancing security against common threats and addressing non-traditional security threats like environmental damage, illegal migration terrorism etc. So far as economic objectives are concerned, regionalism provides continued protection of those sectors that could not survive in global competition. Regional blocks also create a greater market, which attracts foreign direct investment. Another economic advantage is that it provides opportunity for deeper integration involving issues

like domestic competition, intellectual property rights, or labor standards etc.⁷

So far the political ends related to common threats are concerned, the formation of European community is worth considering. Threat of communism converged the interests of all European nations and they pooled their individual economic strengths together to gain political unity. European regionalism provided a strong bulwark against USSR and also avoided conflict among them. One of the promoter of European Unity, Robert Schuman advocated that, “West Germany and French coal and steel industries should be put under a single authority. The solidarity between two countries established by joint production would show that war between both became not only unthinkable but materially impossible.”⁸ The idea suggests that due to common economic interests the political tussles and rivalries are minimized gradually making way for political reconciliation.

This is again evident in the gradual political integration of European countries. According to John T. Rourke, for about thirty years, European integration focused on economics. Economic barriers were eliminated, which committed the European community to become a fully integrated economic union. Then, came a point where economic integration could not continue without taking steps towards political integration. As people were united economically, it was easier to think of becoming one politically.⁹

Yet another discussion on regionalism has highlighted the preference of political factor over economic one in this way. Karl Dutsch's analysis on integration claims that, "regionalism can only takes place by political will of the communities. If due to political will the hard decisions on matters such as defense and foreign policy issues that are central to the security of states are tackled first, it makes the integration of less sensitive areas even easier. Success of prospective community can only be measured once it securitizes the agenda of high politics and applies it to low politics."¹⁰

Analyzing on the basis of both view points it is discerned that success of regionalism is a three stage process. Political will among member states is the first essential of all regional block formations. The political will for regionalism in Europe was created due to the common threat of USSR. In case of ASEAN, it was the Chinese factor that provided the political impetus for regional block formation. Second stage of regionalism is the economic interaction for supporting the weaker economies against tough foreign competition. Trade among member countries of the regional group is free but in relation to external countries, protection is offered to the vulnerable economic sectors of the members. Importance of regionalism in the view of Horst Siebert is that in regional cooperation, trade among member countries increases due to abolishing tariffs, as compared to non-members because their competitive value decreases when they face tariff barriers.¹¹ Regionalism provides continued protection of sectors that

would not survive in global competition. Regional manufacturers believe that domestic producers will be successful in competition with regional partners and will benefit from larger protected market that regional schemes create but they would not survive a competition with producers located outside the region.¹²In this context the rise of ASEAN countries as a united block manifests the importance of regionalism in providing protection to their individual weak economies against competitive global economy.

The third and final stage of regionalism is political integration that is achieved in its advanced stage when the economic integration has been successfully sustained. But the development of that stage requires increase cultural homogeneity and common security perceptions. The only successful example of that stage is evident in the formation of European Union.

Potentials of Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and its Performance

ECO is a successor of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) that came into being in 1964. Iran, Pakistan and Turkey were its members. The organization aimed at economic development of the region through increased cooperation by promoting intra-regional trade. Practically, no major economic development took place in the region. There was neither improved intra-regional trade nor there was harmonization of economic policies. In late 70's,

major political changes took place in Iran and Pakistan. The monarchy of shah of Iran was overthrown via Islamic revolution and in Pakistan martial law was proclaimed. The new governments had different priorities and policies; therefore, in 1979, RCD became a practically defunct organization.

In 1985, the organization was revived with a new name ECO. It came about as preferential trade agreement between Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey.¹³ In 1987, the member countries signed Izmir Treaty and gave ECO a formal organizational foundation.

After the collapse of USSR in 1991, six Muslim republics became independent. Owing to the strong historical, cultural and religious ties with these republics, all of them along with Afghanistan were incorporated into the fold of ECO. Therefore, at present ECO is a regional grouping of ten Muslim countries namely, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

Total population of ECO region is about 380 million (approx). It is about 6 percent of the total world population and occupies 8 million square km of area which is about twice the size of EU (most successful regional grouping of the world).¹⁴ Its countries are located in different but linked geographical regions. Whole of Central Asia with its five countries along with a trans-Caspian country Azerbaijan are its members. Pakistan from South Asia and Iran and

Afghanistan from West Asia belong to ECO and lastly Turkey a land of Asia and Europe is also its part.

Geographically, it is the only regional grouping of the world that is lying at the cross roads of five very important regions or countries of the world. Russia is located in its North, China is in North East, South Asia is in the Southern part, Middle East touches it in the South West, and Europe is situated to its West. This ideal location makes ECO geographically a very significant organization.

The energy laden countries of Central Asia and Caspian region are its members. The fact that all these countries are landlocked brings into prominence the importance of those countries, which can provide them an outlet e.g. Pakistan and Iran. The peculiarity of ECO is that it is comprised upon not only the resource rich states but also those that are geographically very important. Secondly, the region of ECO connects Asia with Europe & Central Asia with South Asia. If it becomes a united block then the whole of trade between these continents would be undertaken through it.

So far as the energy and agriculture sources of the region are concerned, there is a presence of hydrocarbons in CARs and a strong agriculture base in Southern countries of the region. CARs contain 150 billion barrels of crude oil and 1234 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves.¹⁵ Kazakhstan & Azerbaijan have extensive reservoirs of oil and Iran, Turkmenistan, & Uzbekistan have huge amounts of natural gas. The countries of Tajikistan & Kyrgyzstan have potential

hydroelectric energy capacity. Apart from Kazakhstan, all countries are cotton exporters with Uzbekistan being the world's fifth largest producer and second largest exporter.¹⁶ Pakistan & Turkey are known for their textile industry. ECO region contains 11.62 percent of the total crude oil of the world and 20.15 percent of the world's natural gas.¹⁷ The presence of significant amount of world's economy fuel has attracted the attention of world powers in the region and the Central Asian region of ECO has become the battle ground for new great game of oil politics.

Central Asian countries are blessed with huge amount of natural resources. Since, they are landlocked therefore they depend upon other countries for gaining the world markets for the transportation of their oil and gas. Presently, majority of their transportation takes place via Russia. This northern transit route is not only lengthy and expensive but it also makes them dependent upon Russia-their old ruler. Russia enjoys the monopoly of their resource trade by manipulating transit fees. There are also other alternative routes favored by different powers. For instance, westward route to Europe is favored by USA and eastward route by China. The most cheap and ideal route for these countries is in the South via Pakistan and Iran, both ECO member states. Therefore, for central Asian countries ECO region route will be the most effective in terms of cost and dependability. This is a great incentive of ECO for the landlocked countries of Central Asia.

If location of Pakistan is considered on the map, it acts like a bridge linking Central Asia with South Asia. Central Asia is a resource rich region looking for markets and South Asia, being energy hungry, affords a ready market for its resources.¹⁸ Secondly, if dependence on Russia for energy transportation to Europe ended and westward route via Turkey is used than Central Asian countries would be dealing with the markets of Europe directly.

ECO is suitable to CAR's as compared to other regional organizations like SCO, CIS, or CSTO, because there is no dominating power in it, and the economies of countries are not significantly different. In all the other parallel organization of Central Asian countries, either Russia or China is present. Both of these are powerful countries and their economies are far stronger than Central Asian countries. Therefore, in case of economic interaction these powerful countries would take the lion's share and weak economies of Central Asian countries would not be added to get the relative advantage effect. Secondly, these organizations do not have the advantage of ideal location as the ECO region has.

Given her more diverse and strong economy, ECO is more productive for Turkey. It can play a more dominant role in ECO than in EU. If the pipelines take Turkey's route then she would act like a bridge between Europe and Central Asia. This would enhance its role and importance within ECO.

Due to her nuclear program, Iran is subjected to sanctions and restrictions. If ECO becomes a united economic &

political block then Iran can overcome her isolation. Secondly, if Iranian region is used for resource transportation of Central Asia then Iran's economic problems can be overcome, even it offers the cheapest transit rates. As compared to SAARC, ECO is more beneficial to Pakistan, due to the absence of a hegemonic country like India- that has halted any progress of SAARC, and secondly, it can also offer the easiest route to pipelines coming from Central Asia.

After looking into the potential of ECO region, the picture is obvious. The region is not only located at the cross roads of the most important regions of the world but also contains the fuels of global economy in abundance. The value of energy attracts the regional and global powers into central Asia. The importance of Pakistan, Turkey, and Iran is also significant as they provide pipeline routes to landlocked CARs.

The above debate also manifests the fact that for all member countries, ECO is more beneficial as compared to other regional groupings. The fact that all these countries have almost similar level of economies; rich historical, cultural and religious commonalities and above all, none of them is a hegemonic power demonstrates the ideal position of ECO for the member countries. Now the question arises how the potential advantages of ECO can be exploited in the best interests of member countries.

The last part of this paper tries to find the answer of the above mentioned question. In the next part various

suggestions have been made for making ECO a viable economic organization.

Since the main objectives of ECO are based upon economic development, therefore, the priority areas for this organization have been trade and infrastructure development. For promotion of trade, the development of transport and communication infrastructure is vital; therefore this sector of economy has always been given primary importance in the agendas of ECO's summits. In this regard, following progress has been made in infrastructure development.

Quetta plan of action was adopted in 1993 that contained key objectives in the field of transport & communication.¹⁹In 1997, that plan was further elaborated in Almaty Outline Plan by suggesting interconnection of road & railway networks of CAR's with the roads & railways of Pakistan, Iran, & Turkey. It also aimed at construction of missing links of roads and railway lines. One of its major objectives was to open international road transportation among ECO countries.²⁰From 1998 to 2007, ECO decade of transport and communication was celebrated, which contained plans and actions to eliminate non-physical barriers on main transit-transport routes of the region. It aimed at developing physical infrastructure of East-West & North-South transport corridors. It was also decided that during that decade, telecommunication & postal links in the ECO region would be developed.²¹

In 2009, ECO container train service was launched between Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. The train's route was Islamabad-Tehran-Istanbul. It aimed at connecting Pakistan to Europe via Turkey. The railway line can link whole of ECO region to Europe. But at present there are some missing links that need up-gradation e.g. Quetta-Taftan track & Kerman-Zahidan track.²²For facilitation of road transport in the region ECO-IRU Silk road Truck CARAVAN Project was launched in 2010. The caravan started from Islamabad in April 2010 and terminated at Istanbul in October 2010, after completing its 11,000 km journey. It passed through seven ECO countries bypassing turbulent region of Afghanistan. Its purpose was to collect data to facilitate road transport in the region.²³

The second area of interest in the ECO member countries has been intra-regional trade. For the promotion of trade following measures have been planned.

In 2003, ECO Trade Agreement (ECOTA) was signed for establishing free trade area in the region by 2015. It was decided that tariffs on 80 percent of the goods traded will be reduced to 15 percent. The agreement has still not been ratified by Iran due to her differences with Turkey over tariff issues.²⁴In 2007, ECO Trade and Development Bank (ECOTDB) was established. Its purpose was to mobilize resources for initiating, promoting, and providing financial facilities to expand intra-regional trade and to provide expert advice to the member states in financial matters. Although,

the bank is functional in Istanbul, yet it has not undertaken any concrete project.²⁵

The above mentioned projects and plans clearly indicate that ECO is basically an economic organization. Even the new comer nations of Central Asia have only economic interests in the organization. Sawaran Singh has described the reasons for Central Asian Republics' joining the ECO in these words "As regarding CAR's, the main attraction for them lay in the ECO's concrete plans for economic development, particularly in communications and other infrastructure building".²⁶ According to Najeeb Ur Rahman Manalai, the diverse potential and its uneven distribution in the ECO region make it necessary for the countries to have economic collaboration. For example Kazakhstan has vast wealth of oil and gas while Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have abundance of natural gas. This asymmetry of energy resources calls for an economic cooperation for gaining mutual benefits and also for transporting this potential to outside world.²⁷

The agenda of ECO does not address political or security issues. Some critics have stated that regional formations of the Muslim world are least effective due to the lack of securitization of their regional agendas.²⁸ Since the member countries do not address political and security matters in their agendas therefore no significant progress has been made even in the implemented projects. Unless political stability is attained in the region, there could neither be favorable environment for business activity nor could the decided

projects be materialized. The political turmoil in Afghanistan and security related problems of terrorism, ethnic disputes, drug and weapon trafficking need united security and political approach and that is missing in the agenda of ECO. Therefore without securitization of the agenda, ECO cannot become a strong and viable economic block.

Impediments in the Way of ECO

There are many factors that hinder the trade cooperation among ECO countries. The first is related to the historical legacy of colonial rule. The patterns of trade developed by the colonial rulers (Britain and Russia) are still existent in the ECO countries. The CAR's were bound by former USSR in the intra-republics trade. The southern states of ECO being under the influence of Britain had no connection with the northern states of Central Asia due to the Great Game's curtain. Southern states got independence much earlier but the states of Central Asia remained under USSR control. Since the latter states' economy was closed under socialist system of former Russia, therefore no trade connection could be developed between the two tiers of ECO region.

The intra-regional trade of ECO is based upon preferential treatment instead of free trade area of the entire region. Preferential treatment has never been successful. Domestic interests who benefit from protection, invariably prove sufficiently strong to keep their product off the offer list, so that the list remain short and often consists only of items for which intra-regional trade is likely to be small.²⁹

The development of intra-regional trade is the lifeline of regional cooperation. Strong business activity is the key to mutual interaction among regional member states. In the case of ECO, the state of intra-regional trade is dismal. The northern states of the organization depend upon Russia and the West for their trade. Turkey's trading partners are EU and USA, whereas the trade of Central Asian states is linked to Russia. For trade, Southern states are also dependent on external players. Pakistan's major trading partners are USA, Britain, Saudi Arabia, and Germany. Iran mostly trades with Japan, Germany, France and China. Afghanistan continues to survive on minimal foreign aid. None of the ECO members is each other's major trading partners, which raises doubts on the efficacy of ECO's progress in relation to economic development.³⁰

The second important issue regarding trade is the narrow growth base of export competitiveness, concentrated on primary products, textile or hydrocarbons. The exports of Iran and Turkmenistan are dominated by oil and natural gas, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan rest heavily on exploitation of their large oil reserves. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have minerals which may be commercially exploited. Cotton is the biggest primary export of Pakistan, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. The economies are too similar in their dependence on a limited range of primary products to offer great gains from intra-ECO trade.³¹ State of macroeconomic performance of the member states, structural

impediments: especially non-tariff barriers (e.g. quantitative restrictions, delays in custom clearances, payment settlements difficulties, high transit fees and charges), and infrastructural deficiencies (both physical and non-physical) concerning land and railway transportation are the other obstacles in the way of intra-regional trade of ECO countries.³²

For the realization of promising trade, infrastructure development is a must. In the case of ECO countries, there are two logistical impediments in their trade. One is linked to the inability of their infrastructures to develop airline and shipping companies. The second factor is due to the lack of railroads and motorways.³³ The development of transit routes for the trade of the landlocked members of ECO is very important. The main rail and road links of the CAR's lead north through Russia and Caucasus.³⁴ This factor keeps CAR's away from other ECO members not only in terms of trade but also in terms of people to people contact. Secondly, the infrastructure development of southern states like Pakistan and Iran is in dilapidated condition. The Quetta-Taftan railway track of 700 km still needs \$500 million to meet International standards. Similarly 540 km rail track between Kerman and Zahidan (inside Iran) is also under construction.³⁵

Political stability is the backbone of economic development. In case of ECO region, the political instability in Afghanistan has marred all prospects for economic progress. The central location of Afghanistan makes it a bridge linking

majority of ECO countries. Civil war and war on terror has kept all the roads of interaction closed. The menace of terrorism, drug trafficking and criminal activities in Afghanistan has spill-over effect and the security of all the neighboring countries is threatened.

Instead of joining together for the solution of Afghan problem and forging unity for a joint strategy for addressing their common security dilemma, the ECO member countries depend on external mechanisms for their security. Central Asian states look towards Russia and have joined her sponsored regional security organizations like CSTO, CIS or SCO. Turkey depends upon NATO and Pakistan inclines towards USA for her security. Iran follows neither East nor West policy and Afghanistan depends upon ISAF for security. These independent, divergent and outward looking security approaches keep ECO countries away from one another. So far the agenda of ECO is concerned, it is economic based and lacks securitization of agenda.

Some countries face inter-state ethnic problems. Afghanistan and Tajikistan remained involved in ethnic disputes for many years. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have also similar issues. Recently, Kyrgyzstan has faced ethnic turmoil between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Pakistan and Iran are also suffering from ethnic problems. The root cause of these ethnic problems has colonial flavor because the boundaries of almost all these countries have been demarcated without taking into consideration the ethnic homogeneity.

The most attractive factor of ECO countries is the presence of hydrocarbons in Central Asian region. The importance of oil and gas in the world of economy attracts the world energy hungry powers to Central Asian countries. The fact that all these countries are landlocked further enhances the importance of those countries that can provide transit facilities to pipeline routes. Therefore, a sort of new great game is on between powerful countries to get access of the energy resources of the region. The main actors of the Great Game are Russia, China, Iran and the USA.

At present, majority of the hydrocarbons are being transported via Northern routes that are controlled by Russia. The oil and gas to Europe goes through Russia, which not only manipulates the transit charges to her own advantage but also exploits the politics of Central Asian countries. Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) takes oil from Kazakhstan to Russia. Baku- Novorossiysk brings oil from Azerbaijan to Russia. Similarly, gas of Turkmenistan is being transported to Europe via Russia, who is planning to establish a regional organization like OPEC by including the Central Asian countries into its orbit. She wants complete monopoly over the transit routes and opposes any other possible routes.³⁶ China has also jumped into the battle ground of new great game and wants hydrocarbons to run through her territory. Kazakhstan-China pipeline (KCP) is partially operational for bringing oil to China.³⁷ She is also looking for bringing gas via this route.

The third big outside contender in this race is USA who favors those routes that neither pass through Russia nor through Iran. It tries to establish Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) that is supposed to bring oil or gas to Europe from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, bypassing Russia and Iran.³⁸ (See Annex 2) She also favors Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline (TAPI) that is also halted due to political turmoil in Afghanistan. (See Annex 3) Iran is the only ECO country involved in this game. She not only offers her territory for transit facilities but also offers the cheapest rates. Two of her favored routes are Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey gas pipeline (TIT) and Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran oil pipeline (KTI). But the problem for Iran is that neither she has extensive pipeline infrastructure nor Central Asian countries want these routes since these are objected by USA.³⁹

A cursory glance at the story of this Great Game reveals the fact that the involvement of big powers for their interests halts any close interaction by the ECO countries. All powers pull these countries towards their sphere of influence as they are handicapped due to their weak position and lack of unity among them. One of the major reasons for US presence in Afghanistan is to manipulate the oil politics in her favor. And that seems to be the reason for prolonging her physical stay in the region by 2014.

From the above discussion, it has become clear that the economic reasons for the failure of ECO are preferential treatment inside the region, lack of export diversification and

poor infrastructure that does not connect countries of the region. Another reason for lack of development of trade in ECO region is the absence of common custom union. The importance of custom union in regional cooperation has been highlighted in these words, “When a custom union is formed, trade is both created and diverted. Internally, potential member states expect the combination of economies of scale and lowered trade barriers to facilitate trade. Within such a regional trading arrangement, countries also achieve gains to trade through the reciprocal exchange of concessions on trade barriers and greater market access. Externally, the privileges to states within the union are not shared with those on the outside giving a de facto advantage to union members.⁴⁰ Therefore, the formation of ECO custom union is the primary requirement for developing trade inside and across the region.

In political terms, the political and security problems have to be addressed by forming a joint security policy. The foreign interests relating to pipeline routes have to be addressed by considering those options where the interests of ECO countries are served in the best way that needs a political will based upon thinking in terms of common gains.

Future Prospects and Way Forward

For the promotion of trade, there is a need of establishing free trade area within ECO region by across the board elimination of tariffs.⁴¹ So for as external trade is concerned, instead of liberalization, it is logical to have a corporatist strategy of protectionism under preferential trade

agreements.⁴² For this to accomplish, ECO countries must form a custom union for enjoying the benefits of free trade internally and protecting their industries from imported products. Secondly, for trade facilitation there should be free movements of goods, capital, people & services along with simplification of visa requirements and abolishment of non tariff barriers. Thirdly, there is a need of investment in labor intensive manufacturing. Combination of unskilled labor with the capital and experience of Asian private entrepreneurs could be profitable.⁴³

For improvement of export diversification, the countries should start trading in those products that could bring relative advantage effect. For example there is no trade between Kazakhstan and Pakistan. Kazakhstan imported prepared foodstuffs of \$1,082.6 million from abroad. Pakistan can provide foodstuffs to Kazakhstan.⁴⁴ Similarly there is no trade between Kyrgyzstan and Pakistan. Kyrgyzstan imports vegetable products and foodstuffs for \$ 62.6 millions, beverages and tobacco for \$ 141.6 million, and textile and fabrics for \$ 51 millions from abroad. Pakistan and Turkey can provide these items.⁴⁵ Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan can provide oil and Iran and Turkmenistan can provide gas to Pakistan and Turkey. Pakistan and Turkey can help these countries in textile industry.

For the realization of a viable regional organization, joint ventures among the member countries are essential. The example of EU is a model where in the beginning, the member

countries pooled their resources of coal and steel and got fruitful results. Joint ventures make the interests of the countries similar and also save a lot of capital by combination of production. Secondly, these ventures create big markets that compete in the international economy.

In case of ECO, almost all countries produce cotton but majority of it is exported in raw form. If this commodity is manufactured jointly by making it value added (in the form of cotton yarn, fiber or textile) then cotton industry has the potential of becoming one of the world's largest market. It would give ECO countries' monopoly in this export item. But for joint qualitative production, industrial development has to be given prime importance. In developing countries, industry as an academic subject is not given preference. On the other hand, if we take the example of USA, 65 percent of Ph.D scholars of industries are practically engaged in industrial research. ECO countries are lacking industrial development, technology and education. Therefore, there is a need for a joint industrial research centre. It would increase potential of industries and increase the quality of products.

For transfer of technology, ECO needs establishment of research oriented ECO University of international standard where expert international scholars in the fields of Industry, Agriculture, Science & technology, Information technology, Atomic energy etc. should be hired. Promising students should be sent to developed countries for higher education on

scholarships. And after their return, they should be compensated as per international standards.

For the promotion of trade, infrastructure development is the basic requirement. ECO countries need establishment of airline and shipping company along with the development of road and rail lines infrastructure. Since, the road and rail lines of CARs are in northward direction therefore, there is a need of linking these countries to the South. In this regard, investment from China can be beneficial. China is interested in trade with this region. It has borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Pakistan. If road infrastructure is developed from above mentioned CARs to China and from there it is linked to Karakorum highway in Pakistan then it would eventually link all these countries along with China to Karachi or Gwadar. Since China has developed Gwadar port for access to CARs therefore she would definitely show interest in this project. As far as the railway links are concerned, the missing links in the region should be bridged like up gradation of Quetta-Taftan track & Kerman-Zahidan track so that a network of railway tracks could be laid in the whole region for easy transportation of goods and people.

The presence of oil and gas is the strength of ECO region. As mentioned earlier many foreign players are active in the control of pipeline routes to get access to these precious natural resources. ECO countries should favor those routes through which not only they benefit the most but also get rid of external dependence. At present, the routes via Iran and

Pakistan seem to benefit the ECO region. The Iran proposed routes like Turkmenistan-Iran-Turkey (TIT) gas pipeline route and Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran (KTI) oil pipeline routes which are favorable to her because she offers the cheapest rates and there would be no foreign involvement. But these could be made practicable when the existing pipeline structure of Iran is made extensive which needs joint investment of all ECO members in this project.

Recently, Iran and Pakistan have successfully concluded an agreement for the transfer of gas from Iran to Pakistan i.e. Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline (IP project).⁴⁶ If this route is connected to already operational Kurpezhe-Kurt Kui (KKK) gas pipeline; that brings gas from Turkmenistan to Iran, then the TAPI route which is impracticable due to situation in Afghanistan can be bypassed. The third proposed project of pipelines route could be thought of if the narrow strip of Wakhan that connects Tajikistan and Pakistan, is taken into consideration. Although, the Wakhan corridor is wedged in rough and tough Pamir Mountains yet it could be used for pipeline routes if joint heavy investment is made by ECO countries. The most attractive aspect in this route is the shortest distance. The following comparison table shows that distance between Dushanbe (capital of Tajikistan) and Karachi is shortest as compared to other possible routes. This fact enhances the position of Pakistan as the most important energy transit corridor.

Dushanbe-Karachi----- 2720 km

Dushanbe-Bandar Abbas (Iran) ----- 3400 km

Dushanbe-Vladivostok (Russia) ----- 9500 km⁴⁷

End Notes

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- ²⁹ Richard Pomfret, "The Economic Cooperation Organization: Current Status and Future Prospects" in *Europe-Asia studies* p.663.
- ²⁹ Ejaz Akram, Op cit., p.136.
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Another notable route that can be feasible for ECO countries is the Trans-Caspian pipeline (TCP) route. That proposed route would bring oil/gas from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan. From there it could be linked to Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline. (See Annexure 4) Although the route is favored by USA but majority of the transit countries are ECO members. This fact can end dependence on Russia. Political stability is essential requirement for economic development. As mentioned earlier ECO's economic progress has been marred by political instability. Neither intra-regional trade nor pipeline routes can be developed in the presence of political turmoil, ethnicity conflicts and the problems of terrorism and drug trafficking.

The first step in solving political problems is the securitization of ECO agenda. Without addressing the security related problems the member countries cannot proceed forward. After including security problems in their agenda the leaders of ECO countries must take a united front against all these hurdles. Terrorism and drug trafficking have spill over affect and need harmonization of policies. It would be effective to establish an Inter-Pol like organization within ECO region along with opening its regional branches in every member country. In this way not only information regarding these activities would be shared but it would also be helpful in formulating a unified policy.

The situation of Afghanistan is affecting the whole region and her stability is very important for ECO region. Therefore all heads of governments must get united for finding a durable peace in Afghanistan.


All member countries must devise ways for eliminating the involvement of external actors and helping the country in her efforts of rebuilding.

Ethnic problems of ECO region can be solved by taking all the ethnic minorities on board and by addressing their concerns. If they are given due share by raising their standard of living then their grievances would be redressed. Establishment of free trade area along with free movement of people would be helpful in eliminating the misunderstandings of the people and would cause interaction of ethnic brothers across the borders. It would definitely decrease the sense of deprivation of ethnic minorities.

In a nutshell it is narrated that given the potentials of ECO, the right choice for her member countries is to devote their energies in making this organization viable. The present century would be remembered for the value of energy and since ECO region is rich in hydrocarbons therefore the member countries must exploit their strategic and economic position by forming unity.

Along with establishing free trade area, diversification of exports and infrastructure development, the countries should also form joint policies for industrial development and transfer of technology and human resource development. All these economic gains would be materialized if and only if political and security problems are solved. That needs political will and inward looking policies. External dependence on powerful countries can be reduced if ECO leaders depend on the potentials of their rich region.

Annexure 1 Truck Caravan Route



Source: <http://www.silkroadcaravan.org>.

Annexure 2 TRANSCASPIAN PIPELINE



Source: http://www.sras.org/geopolitics_of_oil_pipelines_in_central_asia.

Annexure 3 TAPI Pipeline



Source:http://www.sras.org/geopolitics_of_oil_pipelines_in_central_asia.

Annexure 4 BTC Pipeline



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**STABLE AFGHANISTAN: SUGGESTED
GOVERNMENT MODELS FOR AFGHANISTAN IN
POST AFGHAN WAR SCENARIO**

Ms. Afshan Sajid

Introduction

Traditionally, Afghan society is the collection of several ethnic groups. These entities are based on self-governed tradition. People of these groups or tribes select their leader known as Begs or Khans.¹ Historically, the central body had very loose grip on these tribal groups and provinces, most of which govern them on nearly all matters. Previously, Afghanistan has been the part of various empires based in India and Central Asia. The British, for a long time, used enormous influence in the affairs of Afghanistan. During the Najibullah regime, Kabul tried to exercise its authority on these tribal entities which led to armed resistance in the country.²

Struggle for power continued inside Afghanistan between the British Empire and the tribes and later between various ethnic factions to gain control of Kabul until the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979. After the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, the different ethnic groups which were previously fighting against the Soviets now started fighting against each other which caused eruption of a civil war in the country.³ Then came the Taliban regime in 1994 which was, initially, welcomed by war sickened Afghans in the hope of peace and stability. Though, soon after gaining the power, Taliban not

only imposed very strict Sharia laws but also became the notorious violators of women rights and they also allowed Al-Qaeda network to operate in Afghanistan unaccountably.⁴

After the Taliban ouster from power, prominent Afghan leaders met under UN auspices in Bonn, Germany. The Bonn Agreement of December 22, 2001 was anticipated as a first step towards the establishment of a broad-based, gender-sensitive, multi-ethnic and fully representative government. In result of that Agreement an Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), comprised of 30 members and headed by a chairman, was constituted, followed by two years transitional Authority.⁵ An Emergency “loya jirga” (traditional Afghan Assembly) held in June 2002 replaced the AIA with a Transitional Authority (TA). The TA brought together a broad transitional administration to lead the country. Thereafter, first ever general elections were held in Afghanistan (presidential elections in October 2004 and parliamentary and provincial elections in September 2005).⁶

The aim of this study is to highlight the present situation of Afghanistan and in light of this scenario, suggest suitable government models which will lead to the stability and prosperity of the country and will be in favor of region and other stakeholders within and outside Afghanistan.

Contemporary Scenario

Presently, the Afghans are learning the modern way of administration. Although, the prevailing system is under the shadow of various challenges, including fragmented

administrative structure and weak economy. Fragile economy and low earnings mean that few people with significant administrative and management skills are available to run the state machinery. Decades' old armed conflict has destroyed the institutions of higher education, consequently, few people with required skills and educational background are available to run the country. Though, government tried to establish merit-based recruitment procedures, the present system is too slow to bring any vibrant change in the country.

Country's revenue system is also not well geared. In comparison to the state's annual expenditure, current revenues cover less than half of the total expenses. Therefore, the government is heavily dependent on foreign aid. The government not only relies on financial support from donor countries but also gets the assistance in developing the administrative capacity, assessing and collecting taxes throughout the country.

The current debate on success in Afghanistan is limited to how to defeat al-Qaeda and end Taliban insurgency. The Taliban are not the only source of conflict in Afghanistan, rather, they are many and often local. Increasing conflicts in communities far removed from Kabul need a fresh look at current state-building strategies.⁷

Suitable Model of Government

After the long history of armed conflict and instability, the Afghans are in desperate search of way to govern their country. Many political observers are advocating for

strengthening community's self-governance and building local capacities for sustainable development. Majority of Afghans and scholars argue that a decentralized model of governance, based on consensus, devolution of power to village, district, and provincial levels, and a significant degree of local autonomy is the most suitable model of governance which can keep the Afghan nation together.⁸

Instead of attempting to impose a 'one size fits all' model of the centralized nation-state, Afghanistan needs a public debate to bring forward fresh approaches to governance... It is time that we looked for models of political organization, social control, and economic development that are flexible enough to accommodate the diverse needs of Afghanistan's rural communities.⁹

Lasting peace in the war torn country could only be achieved if moderate Taliban members are allowed to participate in the development of Afghanistan's political structure.

Option One – Model of De-centralization

For the stable Afghanistan, a model of de-centralization would be a viable option. In this model major responsibilities of central government can be marginalized, e.g. to draft and ratify budget, centralize justice systems for various crimes by using traditional customs, to appoint important officials, enforce local laws and regulations, collect local revenues, etc. It increasing the autonomy of local entities would make it easier to win the trust and support of Afghans and would

provide the opportunity to enhance the relations between center and local communities.

However, certain responsibilities like formulating foreign policy and internal security must remain under the authority of central government. This will prevent the local entities, after gaining the autonomy, from hosting the insurgents and radical elements. It will help in preventing the use of Afghan soil for destabilizing its country or planning terrorist acts against other regional countries. Although, this model has no guarantees of ultimate success in Afghanistan but it sounds results in other countries¹⁰ and country's similar natural power sharing pattern suggest that it would provide a rational balancing of power, interests and would help in arbitrating conflicts within Afghanistan.¹¹

However, the model of de-centralization would face the challenges of three kinds. First, Taliban who oppose democracy are likely to resist the approach of vibrant center-local relations (de-centralization). Second, a state with weak administrative system and insufficient number of qualified and competent bureaucrats would not work well in de-centralization setup of power distribution among. Last, the tribal warlords and radical elements would be unlikely accept this type of government because it would threaten their status and authority.

It would not be easy to combat high-level corruption or to improve administrative capacity. A transparent system of governance in which locals make most decisions would allow

Afghanistan's ethnic societies' leaders to regulate the use of power, corruption and public funds.¹²

Option Two – Model of Good Governance

After more than two decades of armed conflict, Afghanistan has faced a large number of political, social and economic challenges to bring lasting peace and stability back to the country. According to the former UN secretary, Kofi Annan, good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.¹³

Theoretically, good governance has eight major elements: participation; orientation; accountability; transparency; responsiveness; effectiveness and efficiency equity and inclusiveness and rule of law.¹⁴ The starting point of stabilizing a country would be the identification of core districts or centers of gravity where concentration assistance would be needed. These centers of gravity would serve as launching pads for government to spread peace and stability across the country. A team based on local police and citizens would be designed and each center would be assigned to them. The regional team would have the authority to make decision regarding their respective centers.

These regional teams would also establish local councils (Shura) to engage the local community in dialogue process on the issues of security, development and governance. The locals know better about the ways to find solution of their problems. The aim of the Shura would be to resolve communal disputes. They would act as a mediator in existing conflict and initiate a

process of reconciliation. A monitoring body would be created in order to track the activities, development and achievements of the Shuras.¹⁵ The model of good governance would be beneficial only, if the characteristic of the model must be implemented fully. This would require constant and dedicated efforts by the government.

Option Three – Mix Bag of Efforts

Another proposed model of government would be mix efforts of government, local bodies and international community for the stability of Afghanistan. In order to bring peace and stability in the country a future government and international community would unite. Together they would agree on common agendas with the dedication to fulfill their commitments. For the people of Afghanistan both government and international community are untrustworthy and unreliable. They don't have high expectation with them. For them, government and international community are the two side of a same coin. In order to win the support and trust of Afghans, both need to work in close collaboration and coordination, and the success of both would depend on each other.

In case of collaboration between government and locals, this model would not only take many powers that belong to center and hand over to the provincial or district level, but also would go one step further and would grant local authorities the additional power to rule their own as long as they did not cross the redlines imposed by the center. These

redlines would be, first, local authorities would be forbidden to allow their sphere of power to be used in a way that would violate the foreign policy of the country. Second, local administration would be prohibited from infringing on the rights of neighboring provinces or districts, e.g. seizing assets or diverting natural resources. Last, officials would not engage in narcotic or human trafficking and would not exploit the country's natural resources for their own benefits.¹⁶

Option Four – Regional Integration

A sustainable peace in Afghanistan is assumed to be in the interests of Afghans, the region and international community. For the stable Afghanistan, a regional approach would also be in favor of Afghanistan. A friendly and cooperative government in Afghanistan would be equally beneficial for Afghanistan and the region. By creating interests of regional stakeholders – China, Pakistan, Iran, India, Russia, The US and the Central Asia - in the country, a government would prevent instability in the country. The need of regional integration would result into improved regional trade.

One area where the potential gains of regional economic co-operation are particularly high for Afghanistan is energy and energy transportation. Afghanistan would become an important transit and receiver country of cheap gas and hydropower, if the proposed Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India gas pipeline (TAPI) materialized and also Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan expanded their export of hydropower resources southwards.¹⁷

A joint India–Pakistan gas pipeline would also help to lessen tensions between these two countries. However, these stakeholders need to keep in mind that insecurities associated with Afghanistan as a transit country and the sheer size of the investments of these transport projects will be stalled progress. Trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan has grown rapidly in the last few years. Afghanistan has become an important destination for Pakistan’s exports over the years. Bilateral trade increased from \$192 million in 2001–2002 to \$1.5 billion in 2005–2006.¹⁸ The strengthening of economic ties would have positive impact on their political relationship.

India, Iran, Russia, Pakistan, China and the Central Asian states and other regional players have the fear that if Afghanistan falls back into disorder, their own security interests will be threatened by the spread of Islamist political movements at their doorstep. Therefore, the stability and peace of their states is greatly dependent on stability in Afghanistan. This would lead to the strong regional cooperation approach which would never allow any armed dispute threatening the integrity and peace of Afghanistan.

The reason of pursuing a regional approach in Afghanistan is doubtless in its outcomes. If Afghanistan’s neighbors (direct or indirect) would collaborate with Afghanistan and other regional countries in regard to counterterrorism, reconstruction, and state-building. The prospects of peace and stability in the region will increase the regional integration

immeasurably, if only government in Afghanistan believes in this approach and formulate a friendly foreign policy.

Recommendations

Stability and peace in Afghanistan requires that its people accept government authority as legitimate and trust in its institutions. This will happen only if the central government addresses the people's primary necessities - security, protection, justice, and economic development - through good governance. In this regard some recommendations are suggested:

- Improve the appointment process for senior officials, especially provincial governors, so that the corrupt and unqualified person do not get important offices and undeserving incumbents can be removed for cause.¹⁹
- Commit to build a capable and competent Afghan National Security Force to provide security to its citizen without depending on foreign troops.
- In order to win the support of ethnic entities, the government should include some of tribal laws within the formal justice system.
- Future efforts to build stability in Afghanistan should be addressed in a regional context.
- The Afghans themselves will need to step forward, take initiative, and bring an end to the culture of aid dependency. The international community cannot do this for them for good.

- Creating the opportunities for returning refugees from Iran to participate in Afghanistan's reconstruction needs to be given higher priority.
- International actors should develop a coordinated plan for development that ties the whole region together economically.²⁰
- The government of Afghanistan and the international community should focus on basic infrastructure development, including power and water development and delivery, and the construction of national and regional road and rail corridors.²¹

Conclusion

After the long history of conflicts, building the Afghanistan's institutions be a daunting task for any future government. Research has the fact that majority proved of Afghans are in favor of better political system which ensure the peace and stability in the country. In order to bring lasting peace and stability in the region, government of Afghanistan must win the popular support of its citizens. Afghanistan is not ungovernable. There are feasible options for Afghanistan which will lead it on the path of stability. For this, government of Afghanistan needs to create various power sharing blocs within Afghanistan.

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US DRONE ATTACKS ON PAKISTAN – A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

Ms. Beenish Sultan

Abstract

In the words of Clausewitz: war is a depiction of a policy of achieving political objectives and limited aims; however it comes with long term consequences. The term ‘Global War on Terror’ may be given up by the President Obama’s administration but the massive blows in terms of internal and external threats it brought for Pakistan cannot be ignored. In addition to physical and psychological grievances it paved technological outburst in the western areas of Pakistan. Year 2004 brought Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) in the Pakistani domain with an intention to target militants accurately but also confused the policy followed by the Pakistani government in this regard. Using such lethal technology in a state where its consent itself is vague brings about serious reservations in the international law community. Probing into this aspect is vital for international humanitarian and human rights law along with protecting the sovereignty of states like Pakistan.

Introduction

Tragedy of 9/11 marked a fundamental transformation in the entire world order. Where the US centered its resources in the objective of finding Al-Qaeda targets either to capture or kill¹. It also used Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS)²-Drones as a vital part of the strategy. These Aerial attacks ‘that once

seemed impossibly futuristic are now so routine that they rarely attract public attention unless a high-ranking al-Qaeda figure is killed³.

Drone- ‘an unmanned aircraft or ship guided by a remote control’⁴ performs variety of functions, i.e. Transportation, Oil Gas Mineral Exploration⁵, remote sensing, commercial aerial surveillance⁶, scientific research, and conducting search and rescue operations. However, the US pushed these Aerial attacks by choice⁷ in Pakistan's tribal regions usually armed with Hellfire missiles. These predators targeted the militants in western Pakistan⁸, partly to stem cross-border attacks against U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan⁹. Consequently, this activity raises many questions related to public international law. Certainly, to probe in to the US policy of the drone attacks in Pakistan, and exploring the legal basis of the logic is very critical¹⁰.

This study is significant as it objectively analyzes the inability of the United Nations charter, International Human Rights Law, International Law of Armed conflict and the international legal community in coming up with tangible provisions that declare the usage of such lethal technology as illegal. Furthermore, the study argues that the US rationale of these strikes is not logically satisfactory.

It envisages a five-fold focus: firstly, on the issue of breach of sovereignty by usage of such technology. Secondly, view of the US rationale for these strikes. Thirdly, review of the stance and response of Pakistan from all fronts. Fourthly,

implications of these strikes for the locals residing in the targeted areas and finally, presenting some recommendations for Pakistan in the pursuit of bringing the illegalities of these strikes in the limelight. The concluding premise is that the usage of drones should be abandoned because it entails Pakistan's sovereignty and is in direct clash with the fundamental human rights principles of the citizens of Pakistan.

Drones – A Legal Minefield

Drones are remotely operated by CIA Headquarters from Langley, West Virginia, USA or from its bases in Khost, Afghanistan and Pakistan¹¹. Theoretically, airborne attacks of such capacity, 'as a military weapon, can only be used lawfully on the battlefield. As in traditional law enforcement the use of lethal force is limited to the situations of absolute necessity'¹². Hence, in legal terms assortment to drones must be attuned with the law of *jus ad bellum* (law on resort to force) and *jus in bello* (law governing the conduct of hostilities). The classical rationale of *jus in bello* is to limit the consequences of armed conflicts on non-combatants (including vulnerable groups such as the wounded, women and children), property and the environment. Accordingly, *jus in bello* provides only a fraction of principles governing the process of conflict termination, including capitulations and armistices¹³. Furthermore, traditionally, law of *jus ad bellum* was justified by the purpose of thwarting security threats. This dualist conception was declared to be distinct in nature as it declared

that all conflicts shall be fought humanely, irrespective of the cause of armed violence¹⁴. In short both the theories pave way for the provisions of international humanitarian law and human rights law in this particular case.

Usage of drones naturally concerns the propagators of the basic fundamental rights of humanity. Thus, there is a growing consensus among the jurists that killing an individual without providing him a chance to defend himself in the court of law would construe “target killing” or “extra judicial Killing” which is a violation of International Humanitarian Law.¹⁵ Extra-judicial killings: are prohibited under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)¹⁶. Moreover, it commits violations of Article 11 (1) and Article 1 (3) of UN human rights declaration as well¹⁷.

In this context, on September 20-21, 2010, the ICJ (International Court of Justice) Global Security and Rule of Law Initiative convened an informal expert consultation on the issue of drone and targeted killings. This meeting emphasized on paving a prompt response to the increased usage of drones in genuine armed conflicts. It also illustrated the frequent disregard of international human rights law and a lack of transparency in targeted killings. However, with the lack of tangible conclusions such exercises are vague.

On the other hand, the UN Charter also lacks a strict affirmative in imposing the human rights obligations on the UN member states. This makes it easier for them to exploit the gap and structural ambiguities in the laws of an armed

conflict. Consequently, for this purposes the criteria of considering a conflict as an 'armed conflict' in international law is to be specifically examined. Imminent from customary international law and treaties, a conflict to be declared as an armed conflict should satisfy three main principles: Military necessity (stringently limited to legitimate military objectives), Distinction and Proportionality. The use of force in the form of drones in this case lacks all three.

Consequently, the 'use of force' against a state is also subject to certain legal obligations. The international legal system considers the idea of it in certain situations i.e. that in the exercise of 'self-defence'. This right primarily accepted by the traditional international law also gained sophistication under the UN Charter.¹⁸ As, it is recognized in accordance to the terms of maintaining international peace and stability (Article 2) and also by the Article 51 chapter VII of the Charter which states that: 'if an armed attack occurs against a member, it can exercise its right of self-defence.'¹⁹

However, assuming that force is only legal as a response to an armed attack, questions may arise as to the duration of the response. Whether a state having been attacked is authorized only to repulse the attack? Or whether the state is entitled also to use retaliatory force as a deterrent to future attacks coming from the same source? The UN charter and law is silent about these ambiguities. The only relevant provision found in the charter is the Article 51 (affirming the right of self-defence in case of an armed attack). Some hold that this

article along with its complicit is applicable only to the member states. While others are of the view that along with the effect of Article 2, Non-member states become a negligible minority but are bound to act in accordance for maintaining international peace and security.²⁰

Nevertheless, it is to be kept in mind that ‘self-defence’ can be exercised by a state, against a state and to defend a state. This raises technical challenges when the attack is conducted by an entity other than a state i.e. a non-state actor. A way out suggests that the attacked state in order to respond against the non-state actor which is operating in another state, must first justify the ensuing violation of its own sovereignty and second during the process not violate the solidarity of the other state. Various authors have proposed different standards in this case, but three scenarios generally seem possible: (a) the territorial state was complicit or was actively supporting the non-state actor in its armed attack; (b) the territorial state failed to exercise due diligence, i.e. it did not do all that it could reasonably have done to prevent the non-state actor from using its territory to mount an armed attack against another state, or is not doing all it can to prevent further attacks; (c) the territorial state may have exercised due diligence, but it was nonetheless unable to prevent the attack, or to prevent further attacks. The US post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan is considered to be quite comfortably justified under these standards.²¹

However, considerably it is a matter that requires precise precaution in actually justifying counter actions on the basis of these arguments. Who will decide the amount of diligence required? And are there any alternative measures to seek clarification from the territorial state? The international legal principles are quiet in this regard and further make the situation vague. Thus, the fact remains that whatever the case may be and in the absence of transparent legislations the responding state fails to comply with the aforementioned requirements completely and may continuously violate the norms of certain international set standards. In addition while posing drone attacks in the Pakistani domain what legal justifications does the US propose in a legal vacuum? Americans make believe that by handing over ground bases within its domain and not protesting adequately Pakistan has consented for these strikes.

But is mere consent of the aggrieved state a legal justification for the usage of drones? A valid consent, According to Article 20 of International Law Commission draft on responsibility of state for international wrong, is when a state can give consent for an act which was wrong without consent. It states that 'valid consent by a state to the Commission of an act by another state precludes the wrongfulness of the act in relation to the former state to the extent that the act remains within the limits of that consent'.²²

Thus, if these limits are crossed it becomes the infringement of the sovereignty of the state that consented.

Although a realist perspective proposes that no state enjoys absolute sovereignty in the world today. The question here arises that, can sovereignty of a state be put at stake on the basis of ‘Mutual Interest’? The answer yet simple can get more ambiguous than one can imagine. Theoretically sovereignty is a state’s unavoidable basic right but practically certain states tend to breach it in order to protect their own national interests in situations of intimate cooperation as well. When there is a breach of this right then there is agitation and frustration. However, interestingly the sovereignty issue in this regard has not been highlighted by most of the theorists. This study will further examine this breach in the latter portions, thus firstly it is important to put forward the US rationale of these strikes in Pakistan.

US Rationale of the Strikes

Primarily, US rationale of the drone strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas is attributed to its claim of ‘self defence’. Along with the invention of doctrine of ‘pre-emptive strike’ to seek legitimacy for the use of force in accordance with this right²³. This approach which significantly evolved following the 9/11 attacks, was affirmed immediately by the resolutions 1368 and 1373 of the Security Council.²⁴ In addition, the NATO and its alliance countries also affirmed this right of using force against the non-state actors involved in the land mark attack. Following which the coalition forces posed an armed attack in Afghanistan against Al-Qaeda.

Notably there can be no US right of self defence; as in the Nicaragua case 1986, it was held that ‘right of self defence arises of direct attack’. Thus, any use of force not in relation to this is a clear violation of Art 2(4) of UN Charter (which declares the threat of use of force to be against the territorial integrity of a state). So, if any entity from Pakistan didn’t wage a direct attack on the US, how is the use of force in the Pakistani domain justified?

Secondly, following this pursuit it is generally agreed that operations may be launched into the territory of another state with its consent. But it is legally problematic when the cross border operation is conducted without the territorial state’s consent or by secret consent. The US drones in the tribal areas of Pakistan is a problem of such nature. The US places its stance on the duration when former president of Pakistan Gen. Pervez Musharraf allowed the drone strikes from 2004 to 2007.²⁵ However, the choices of the targets were done unilaterally by the US usually based on faulty intelligence and killed large number of civilians rather than Al-Qaeda leaders.²⁶ Going unilateral and exercising excessive force (where there are no set standards for quantifying the level of consent) is to be considered as a clear violation of the sovereignty of the state that consented as mentioned in the earlier portion.

Thirdly, according to the US the secret consent of the then president of Pakistan augured well to the coincidence of the policy of eliminating terrorists. But who is to maintain record

of the extra-judicial killings. Furthermore, is mere consent of a state enough for violation of human and humanitarian rights provisions which are ascertained by the UN Charter? Considerably, these are all violations of the dignity and self esteem of the Pakistani state.

Fourthly, the US claims that these strikes in Pakistan are done under the doctrine of the hot pursuit laws. Simply, 'Hot pursuit' means continuous pursuit of suspects from one jurisdiction to another. However, that authorization is relevant for U.S. domestic law purposes only. It has no relevance for the law governing international legal matters it is relevant only over sea in international matters.²⁷

Thus, in relation to these arguments, the U.S. may use significant armed force in Pakistan only under three conditions: One, if Pakistan is responsible for an armed attack on the U.S. Second, if Pakistan is a failed state [a state with no central government or one where that government is so ineffective that it has little control over much of its territory]. Third, if Pakistan's government has requested help in waging a civil war. The U.S. does not claim that Pakistan attacked it or that it is a failed state. Pakistan is not engaged in a civil war, nor has it ever requested for their help. The U.S. may have Pakistan's tacit consent to attack an area, but this is a weak basis for lethal conduct, made even weaker by the lack of Afghanistan's consent to launch drones from its territory.²⁸

But despite of these findings, why are these attacks so routine and still consistently prevalent in the Pakistani

domain? Does Pakistan have an international agreement over these strikes with the US? And has it been inserted in the domestic law? For this the stance of Pakistan from all fronts is to be examined.

Pakistani Stance and Response

Firstly, the stance of the Pakistani Government Pakistan's public position is to demand the US to stop the drone attacks due to two reasons: it amounts to a violation of Pakistan's sovereignty; and secondly it is counter-productive.²⁹ Reportedly, in 2008 the strikes were concentrated on those who opposed attacks on Pakistan.³⁰ Thus, in response to these reservations, the Pakistan Foreign Office former spokeswoman Tehmina Janjua and Mustafa Nawaz Khokhar advisor of Human rights to Pakistan's Prime Minister, both claimed that the CIA drones covertly attacking Pakistanis are intolerable, despite these being President Barack Obama's "weapon of choice," and the heavy CIA presence is making citizens angry.³¹ In addition the attacks are a breach of Pakistan's sovereignty and the killings are extra judicial.

Secondly, stance of the Military leadership: Some Wiki leaks cables reveal the cause of confusion in Pakistan regarding the stance of the Pakistani military.³² However, what had to be a bilateral affair turned out to be mayhem, when the US initiated the strikes unilaterally. Now there is a demand of equal say in the drone attacks by the military. Primarily, because of the US unilateralism and secondly,

because of the belief that it carries serious risks for Pakistan in its combat against the Pakistani Taliban.

Thirdly, with regard to the Intelligence agencies: It is evident that Pakistan officially condemns drone strikes on its territory however it is also widely believed to share intelligence with the US for at least some of the attacks, especially those that target Pakistani Taliban militants blamed for numerous attacks in the country.³³ The ties of the ISI and the CIA have been aligned and considered as historical ones.³⁴ They might work together on this issue but the CIA is known for its betrayal. Thus, ISI Chief Lt Gen Ahmed Shuja Pasha is reported to have asked the US to stop its drone strikes in Pakistan in a meeting between CIA deputy director Michael Morrell and senior ISI officials held in Islamabad.

Fourthly, stance of the media, civil society and intelligentsia: In Pakistan, none of the issue is more controversial other than American drone attacks. Anti American sentiments are fueled as the drone war continues. American officials may praise the precision of the drone attacks, nevertheless Pakistani news media heavily accounts for the innocent civilian casualties which are widely believed. There is no channel, intellectual gathering and forum which does not discuss the continuance of these strikes in the Pakistani domain.

It is high time that the implications of these strikes on the natives of the targeted areas and the sovereignty of Pakistan

are kept in mind and a practical action strategy is planned urgently.

Implications of These Strikes: The drone attacks in Pakistan started in 2004 further from which they have increased in numbers dramatically. The table below illustrates the frequency of the attacks and the estimates of the fatalities as a result of the attacks:

Drone Attacks Year by Year


Period/ Year	No. of Drone Attack	Fatalities
2004-2007	9	109
2008	34	296
2009	53	709
2010	132	938
2011 (until 31 st July)	60	493
Total	288	2545

Source: Conflict Monitoring Center Islamabad report '2011.

It is imperative to note that the continuation of these strikes have adverse implications for the locals residing in the targeted areas. These strikes alienated communities, killed the innocent civilians and driven by the sentiments of vengeance created more terrorists and raised the number of suicide bombings within Pakistan. Reported targeted attacks on funerals and peaceful Jirga's have been unpopular in the media but they send negative psychological vibes within the area³⁵. Brooking Institution reports revealed the fact that

mostly civilians die in drone attacks as compared to terrorists. It is a violation of article 51 (2) of Additional protocol I of Geneva Convention which prohibits the civilian population from being the object of attacks under any circumstances.

On the other hand, this sentiment is also exploited by the terrorists. A Jordanian Suicide bomber trained by TTP blew him up in a CIA base in Khost province of Afghanistan on the ultimate day of 2009. The CIA lost seven of its officer in the attack. It was the worst ever attack since 1983 when the agency lost 8 of its agents in Beirut, Lebanon. TTP claimed responsibility of the attack and said the attack was meant to avenge death of Baitullah Mehsud, the head of TTP.³⁶ This sentiment is prevalent in the Pakistani domain as well, as evident from the table below:



Hike in Drone attacks create a Hike in Suicide bombings as well. (<http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php>) accessed on: 7th Nov' 2011

Some Pakistani politicians and western counterinsurgency analysts declare the drone strikes as counterproductive

because they stoke anger against the US among the Pakistani public, potentially adding to the pool of militant recruits³⁷.

Secondly, as a result of these strikes, the people residing in the targeted areas are forced to move from their homes creating a diverse situation of internally displaced persons. The vulnerable economic infrastructure of the country faces serious implications when the displaced demand refuge and shelter from the government.

Recommended Action Strategy

Keeping in view the aforementioned scenario, a tangible strategy from all fronts of the country is required, a few steps in this regard are firstly, the Government stance should be made clear. The US rationale is that the Pakistani government has consented to the strikes. However, the Pakistani government regularly denies it. Thus, a legal defence on consent is meaningless if the party who is supposed to have given consent denies it publically. The competence of giving such consent is another debate altogether. But, what is clear is that neither of the US defence has sufficient credibility to make these actions indisputably legal.³⁸

Secondly, another strategy would be to get hold of the drone technology itself. By acquiring it we may be in a position to justify any drone attack from our own front minimizing the chance of reservations in the citizens of Pakistan.

Thirdly, involving the legal community is suggested both at the domestic and international level. Firstly, at the national

level, the local legal community needs to take steps towards formulating and codifying local laws which clearly declare such violation of the sovereignty of the state as illegal. Secondly, they need to approach the UN and make vocal the US violations of many treaties to which it is a signatory. For example, the extra-judicial killings amount to violation of the Human rights treaties and also amount to violation of treaties ratified for the rights of women and children and innocent civilians.

Finally, the government and the military should remain firm in pursuance to the national interests. Steps should be taken to take up full responsibility of the area, after all in any form of cooperation the sovereignty of the country should not be put at stake. In addition the informants should not be trusted entirely in such an area where human intelligence fails due to geographical difficulties³⁹.

Conclusion

In the pursuit of Counter terrorism the US drones have "recklessly trampled on Pakistan's sovereignty, security and territorial integrity", and caused casualties of Pakistani civilians as well as soldiers⁴⁰. Ironically, the count exceeds the total number of deaths witnessed in the 9/11 attacks. Thus, if the rule of law is to be defended then the tactics used against terrorists must not undermine the democratically mandated law. International law, however weak, provides Pakistan a realm in which to safeguard its sovereignty and protest against the killings of hundreds of its citizens being

unthinkingly targeted. The current wrangling over the legality of drone attacks marks the beginning of the development of the legal regimes that will govern warfare in a new era. In standing up for the sovereignty of smaller nations, Pakistan can ensure that the existence of borders is not a unessential exercise noted by superpowers only when convenient, and disregarded when strategic interests dictate otherwise. It is high time that the US realizes this and stops the drone attacks in Pakistan and also adheres to the principles prescribed in the public international law.

End Notes

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THE NON-TRADITIONAL SECURITY THREATS TO CENTRAL ASIA

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Abstract

The Cold War ending with the collapse of Soviet Empire disintegrated into three parts i.e., Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus region. The scars of disintegration could not be erased till yet as the Central Asian States (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) are still facing a dilemma of security. The region is overwhelmed by the non-traditional security threats such as drug and human trafficking, insurgency, terrorism, organised crime, financial corruption, waste and mismanagement by ruling elite, illegal migration, communicable diseases such as HIV and AIDS which are cumulatively undermining the CAR's quest towards stability and prosperity. These societal hazards are also causing environmental degeneration at an alarming pace on land, water and resource pollution which is threatening survival in downstream region as it carries transnational implications. The fractured security in the region needs to be addressed by strengthening the infra-politico-economic structures and by sincere joint international cooperation to eradicate the termites corroding non-traditional security. Unless addressed, these threats could pose dire consequences for the region thus creating shockwaves of instability in its neighbourhood.

Key words: *Central Asian Republics, Non-traditional security threats, Drug & human trafficking, Terrorism & Organised crimes, Illegal migration, Communicable diseases, Environmental degeneration*

Introduction

The Central Asian region carries historical significance as it has been a 'Cradle of Civilization'. The region is particularly important because its history embraces extremes of historical phases starting from pre-Islamic to Islamic era to the Russia Empire and the former Soviet Union. With the disintegration of USSR and emergence of essentially five Central Asian Republics, security concerns naturally appear on the show. The region being nascent and backward is subjected to different challenges of economic growth, development and stability which hampered the security and thus decelerated the phenomenon of development in the region. With the developmental activities being unable to cope up with technological advancement and increased criminal activities, the inept traditional security i.e., domestic, economic and military security is further threatened by the emerging burden from non-traditional security threats, where narcotics and human trafficking, illegal labour immigration, organised crime, insurgency, financial corruption along with health and environmental hazards such as communicable diseases as HIV/AIDS and environmental pollution and degradation¹ took roots thus posing a dire threat.

Traditional and non-traditional security concerns are intricately interlinked and security cannot be maintained unless both are addressed. Conventional security cannot be achieved unless non-traditional security is guaranteed. Consequently, any misbalance in conventional security opens gateways for non-traditional security threats. The region unfortunate in development despite being a resource hub is already facing conventional security threats but the mounting non-traditional security threats leave no stone unturned in aggravating the agony of the region. With all these exertion, the region is subjected to serious threats that have transnational implications. Narcotics trade, terrorism, insurgency, health and environmental hazards are now expanding beyond borders which are an alarming stage. Non-traditional security threats are corroding the basis of growth and development and undermine any further efforts on account of its aggravated and ever-increasing effects. In order to maintain a strategic balance and security in the region, the origin of these threats need to be identified and addressed unless the threat escalates thus endangering global security.

Origin of Instability

Afghanistan has emerged as the single largest producer of heroin in the world.² This basic reality has had a tremendous negative impact on the Greater Central Asian region. In fact, much of the traditional and non-traditional security threats can be directly derived from this unfortunate situation or has reinforced other security threats. Criminal co-option of the

state and military instability can in simple terms be calculated from the epicentre that Afghanistan has become. The greater the distance from this hub, the less instability and criminal cooption. The situation can, of course, not be only calculated by geographical proximity as the underlying factors are more complicated than this but the heroin trade has had an undeniably negative impact on the stability of the region.

The arch of instability is primarily derived from a few states in the vicinity of Afghanistan, but there is serious spill over to other neighbouring states. The weakness of the Afghan, Tajik and Kyrgyz economies and political systems make them easy targets for the criminal networks, and have emerged as three of the most corrupt states according to Transparency International. In fact, all states within the Greater Central Asian region receive a dismal score. For example, Kazakhstan (on the high end) receives the score 2.2 (of 10) which indicates rampant corruption and Afghanistan receives 1.5, which is the fifth lowest score in the world.³

As a result, security threats of different kinds have emerged in the region to an unprecedented level in the worst affected states, but the impact is felt to some degree in all regional states. Due to the fact that the states are weak and have very little impact on the security situation, there are huge domestic security problems. This is especially evident in the areas outside of the major cities that the central government has lost control of, or lost interest in, especially if minorities or opposition controls the area.⁴

Weapon Culture (The security risk: past use and threat of use of small arms)

Stockpile leakages were one of the main sources of weapons in the Tajik civil war 1992–1997. The war was fought between the United Tajik Opposition, comprised of Islamic and democratic opposition groups, and supporters of the secular regime who sought continuity with the Soviet period. The two factions fought each other largely through regionally-based militias and acquired their weapons through local community leaders. The militias supporting former Communist Party First Secretary Rakhmon Nabiyev's election to the presidency had particular access to national law enforcement structures for supplies, and also received weapons from the governments of the Russian Federation and Uzbekistan.⁵

Ten years after the end of the war in Tajikistan, leakages from government stockpiles continue in Central Asia. Thefts from stockpiles have been reported in Kyrgyzstan. For the period 1993–2002 the Military Prosecutor's Office in Kyrgyzstan assessed a total of 1,100 cases of theft, and more than 30 officers and 500 soldiers were charged with criminal offences. Between 2000 and 2002, seven incidents of large-scale firearms theft by military personnel were registered.⁶

The management of government stockpiles is a matter of concern in Kazakhstan too. According to International Alert, there has been no official inventory carried out in Kazakhstan since independence. Attempts to undertake any effort to address the issue met resistance from the military. It has been

alleged that arson has even taken place in order to cover up the loss of weapons from stockpiles.⁷

Drug Trafficking/Narcotics trade

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the security of Central Asia's new sovereign states was threatened by the danger of drug expansion.⁸ The Iron Curtain fell and the countries of Central Asia were given new opportunities to integrate with the global economy and political community. The geopolitical position of these countries is convenient for the development of trade and political ties with Europe, Southeast Asia and China. Existing communication structures inherited from the Soviet Union are well developed, while trade links southward are being recreated. In some ways, it is possible to talk of a renaissance of the Great Silk Road.⁹

During the last decade the governments of the Central Asian states have been working to determine priorities for cooperation, even as drug traffickers in the region grasped that porous regional borders, corruptible law enforcement bodies, intra-regional commodity trade, common languages, cultural affinity and ethnic diasporas created a favourable environment for the establishment and development of a "great heroin road" or "Northern route" for Afghan drugs.¹⁰ Afghan and Tajik drug clans, interested in establishing channels for heroin delivery to Europe, began to test them. They started to exploit the northern route after some disruption in traditional drug routes through Pakistan and Iran and in the midst of a rapid increase in heroin demand in Central Asia and Russia. Factors

influencing the development of the drug situation in Central Asia since the 1990s are:

- A steady growth of drug production in Afghanistan and increase in the volume of smuggling;
- Increase in demand for drugs in the CIS countries and Europe;
- The establishment of a new “Northern route” via the countries of the former USSR, the importance of which is increasing due to the strengthening of controls along the Iranian border;
- A worsening social and economic situation in the region, which has encouraged the involvement of some layers of society in the drug trade;
- Poor condition of drug abuse prevention systems and a lack of medical clinics and rehabilitation centres;
- Changes in the use of narcotic substances, which have been a crucial factor in the spread of HIV/AIDS, Hepatitis, tuberculosis and other infectious diseases;
- The emergence of new synthetic drugs (such as ecstasy), as well as an increase in the number of users of these drugs;
- Availability of raw material drug base in the form of wild-growing hemp and ephedrine,¹¹ as well as the persistence of illicit poppy cultivation in some regions.¹²

The drug problem is not a new phenomenon in the Central Asian region¹³. Nevertheless, levels of drug abuse and drug-related crime rates have been much lower than in the West.

During the last five years, the situation has worsened dramatically. Aside from being transit zones for drug trafficking, the region has also become an active consumer of the most dangerous drug of modernity – heroin. The data suggests that around one third of drugs transiting Central Asia are consumed there¹⁴. From the spill over of trafficking routes, drug addiction, especially of heroin, has skyrocketed. In 1990 there were more than 5,000 registered drug users out of 50 million people in the region. Since then, Central Asia has experienced the fastest growth in drug addiction of any region of the world. In the period up to 2002, there was an 18-fold increase, with users rising to over one percent of the population of the region. The drug business generates enormous profits and the temptation to grab a cut creates favourable conditions for corruption in law enforcement agencies.

HIV/AIDS

Drug abusers are prone to HIV. In 2000, HIV outbreaks were registered among intravenous drug users (IDU) in the cities of Temirtau (Kazakhstan), Osh (Kyrgyzstan) and Yangiul (Uzbekistan). According to statistics, 70% of HIV infections across Central Asia have been contracted through drug injection (the figure in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is ca. 82 %). Intravenous drug administration is the main cause of the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS as well as other sexually or intravenously transmittable diseases. A sudden and drastic rise in HIV has been registered in the region since 1997, before

which HIV/AIDS was a very slight problem. In the period 1990-1996, HIV/AIDS cases hovered around 0.2 cases per 100,000 people per year, before jumping to 1.4 in 1997. It is not a coincidence that it was in that same year that large volumes of heroin trafficking began – from its beginning, the spread of HIV in Central Asia was directly related to intravenous drug use, above all of heroin.¹⁵

Human Trafficking and Slavery

“These women sell their underage daughters to local policemen. The girls sniff glue and see yellow Pokémon’s. They travel to Almaty and Tashkent sometimes too... without documents they cross the border by bribing the guards.”¹⁶

Human trafficking in Central Asia has both interstate and intrastate dimensions. As in other parts of the world, organized groups trafficking humans consist of three players: recruiters, dealers and brokers. The first player is responsible for persuading potential victims to accept a job offer. Recruiters are mostly represented by potential victim’s relatives, friends or neighbours, who they are likely to trust more. Dealers transfer victims across state borders, while brokers sell victims to specific employers. Mostly young men and women aged 19-29 are usually unaware that trafficking rings exist and fall victims of human trade. In Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan almost 50% of the total population is younger than 30.

Older generations are more informed and have access to mass media, although women have the least access to TV

media, making them more vulnerable. Usually men are trafficking en masse from one village by a recruiter and they are traded either as a group or individually. Women, by contrast, are often trafficked alone or in groups of no more than five. They are traded for higher prices than male slaves; with an average price of \$300-\$400 per woman. More desirable women might fetch up to \$10,000. The age of male victims is turning younger in each sending country, with many 15-16 years olds trafficked.

Organized trafficking in human beings emerged during Tajikistan's civil war. Along with trafficking in drugs and weapons, women became easy targets for illegal traders seeking easy funds. In the absence of law-enforcement, trafficking in women was easy and cheap. Young women were sold to Afghanistan and Uzbekistan as brides during the 1990s; after the war ended women were sold for prostitution in Russia, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey and the Gulf states. During that period roughly 1,000 human beings were trafficked every year. Since the early 2000, while trafficking for prostitution remain roughly the same, more people were trafficked for slavery, mostly to Russia and Kazakhstan.

Samarkand, Bukhara, and the Ferghana Valley have the highest rates of human trafficking. The recruiters and dealers are usually from Uzbekistan with women involved in the logistics trafficking as "bosihi" (female bosses). Shelters in Bukhara and Tashkent provide psychological and medical help to over 3,000 victims registered to date. According to an IOM

representative, the largest group of trafficked women in the UAE is Uzbeks. Most of the women who depart from Osh, Kyrgyzstan, or Chimkent, Kazakhstan wind up in UAE or Turkey.

Energy and Environmental Security

Environmental hazards and disasters are a significant concern in the sub region, which includes some of the USSR's principal nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons production and testing sites, and the desiccated Aral Sea, once the planet's fourth largest lake with a thriving fishery. Most Central Asian states attained their independence with plans for environmental reforms high on their agendas, and with their citizenry highly supportive of such reforms. Yet both society and the political establishment did not anticipate the subsequent sharp economic decline which accompanied reform and which resulted in a decline in investment in urban and rural infrastructure, welfare systems, public education, and medical services. As a result, despite the wave of environmental interest and activism that initially emerged, environmental management reforms and initiatives have struggled to win support in recent years. Undoubtedly, one of the regions' major environment concerns in the Aral Sea. In prioritizing the region's shared environmental concerns, the most important are:

- **Water Degradation:** Central Asia has a substantial amount of water, however, scarcity problems stem from poor management distribution and

pollution (particularly during the Soviet era). Water supply and sanitation systems are also in poor repair in many areas. Virtually all major urban/industrial centres throughout the sub region suffer from significant water pollution with tests indicating that approximately 12.5 per cent of household water contains biological contaminants and over 3.5 per cent is chemically polluted beyond WHO standards.

- **Soil Erosion and Land Degradation:** Several factors cause land degradation in the region including: loss of vegetative cover (i.e. from over-grazing, expanding human populations, and pollution); erosion (both wind and water); depletion of soil resources (i.e. from no rotation of crops); and salinization (from poor irrigation practices).
- **Loss of Biodiversity:** Central Asia contains a well developed network of nature reserves inherited from the USSR; roughly three per cent of the region was designated under some form of conservation regime in the late Soviet era, equivalent to about 100 000 km² (Sievers et al 1995).
- **Pollution of the Caspian Sea:** The Caspian Sea, covering more than 370 000 km², is the planet's largest inland body of water. Its littoral states are Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Turkmenistan. Today, the sea is severely polluted from a concentration of the 100 or so

rivers which enter it, and the uncontrolled oil and gas extraction from it (Zonn 1999). While the Caspian still yields 90 per cent of the world's Sturgeon, the annual yield of sturgeon has fallen from tens of thousands of tonnes per year to under ten thousand tonnes.

- **Air Pollution:** While hydropower meets an appreciable amount of the region's energy needs, reliance on coal, inefficient power plants, industrial practices, and private transport have all led to high levels of both local and trans-boundary air pollution.
- **Radiation:** Hundreds of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons tests were conducted at the Semipalatinsk (Kazakhstan) nuclear test area, the Naryn (Kazakhstan) testing area, and on Resurrection Island (Kazakhstan/Uzbekistan) in the Aral Sea. The incidence of ill-health and death which has been caused by radioactive contamination at many or all of these sites is significant, and remains a major environmental and health concern for the sub region. (Appendix-1).

Recommendations

Following recommendations are suggested to counter non-traditional security threats in Central Asian Republics:

- A joint cooperation among Central Asian states is required to collectively counter the non-traditional security threats.
- Overcoming ethnic differences are essentially important in order to bring about immediate changes and reforms.

- Settling the issues of water management between up-stream countries and down-stream countries needs to be addressed.
- Increased securitization on borders to check against drug and human trafficking.
- There is a need for planned agriculture and industrialization to protect the environment from environmental degradation.
- Increased socio-economic interdependence on regional and extra-regional cooperation level to attain regional stability and make the region even more lucrative for investment by offering skilled manpower that would open new horizons for employment and development.
- Regional cooperation for effective utilization of land as well as labour of Central Asia.

Analysis

Being subjected to different intra-regional challenges, along with the *New Great Game* going on; the region is facing threats of multi-dimensional nature which are hampering its security, stability and peace. Besides, the socio-economic structure is being pushed back towards decline on account of these mounting non-traditional security threats. Research makes it evident that instability, terrorism as well as drug culture in Afghanistan is paving way and therefore, providing fertile grounds to promote the illicit activities of drug trafficking, illegal labour immigration, human trafficking, organised crimes terrorism etc in Central Asia. Increased drug

trafficking in CA is predominantly via Afghanistan. The effect is that already frustrated youth is increasingly victimized by drug addiction and drug trafficking because due to increased unemployment, drug trafficking is the only source of earning money. HIV/AIDS is rapidly increasing in CA and a major cause of this outspread is said to be drugs usage. Around 17 to 25% of intense drug addiction is likely to be the cause of AIDS as well as a drug addict can do anything to get intoxicated. Such desperate people are further more exploited that they are forced to sell off their children for the matter of human trafficking where they are smuggled to be exploited by being targeted as child labour, women trafficking etc. This frustration is also ending up in rebel against authorities such as the arms culture in CA is gradually attaining its grip in the region where they have been quite successful in Uzbekistan where weapon culture has spread notoriously.

The inheritance of environmentally inefficient policies, including over exploitation of natural resources and lack of appropriate industrial controls, have left a severe development burden on the sub region. The sharp economic decline, poverty, and the lack of investment in infrastructure following independence also pose some serious issues, both currently and in terms of the pent-up potential in the expansion of Central Asia's industrial base.¹⁷

Energy sector is another dimension of the non-traditional security threats that is causing environmental degradation at a rapid pace which is threatening human survival. All life forms,

whether human, wild life or plants are affected by these biological and chemical hazards. The region being resource rich in minerals is having massive sites of nuclear material such as uranium deposits. Inadequate extraction of these resources, unplanned irrigation and industrialization adversely affects the environment and other seismic phenomenon which carry fatal consequences.



Appendix-1

End Notes

¹Niklas Swanstrom, "Traditional and Non-Traditional Security Threats in Central Asia: Connecting the New and the Old", *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly*, Volume 8, No. 2 (2010) pp. 35

² *World Drug Report 2009* (New York: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2009).

³ Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index: <<http://www.transparency.org/>>.

⁴ Niklas Swanström and Nicklas Norling, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Trade, and the roles of India, Pakistan and Iran," *Central Asian Survey* 26, 3 (2007): 429-444.

⁵ Torjesen, Wille and MacFarlane, 2005, op. cit., pp. 9 and 57.

⁶ MacFarlane and Torjesen, 2007, op. cit., pp. 28–29.

⁷ John Heathershaw, Emil Juraev, Michael von Tangen Page and Lada Zimina, 2004, *Small Arms Control in Central Asia*, International Alert Eurasia Series no. 4, at <www.international-alert.org/publications/getdata.php?doctype=Pdf&id=44>, p. 22.

⁸ The Central Asian region is formed of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Northward the region borders Russian Federation, in the South Iran and Afghanistan; it spans from China in the East and up to the Caspian Sea in the West. Hereafter, according to Alexander Zelichenko's definition, drug-expansion implies an intensive increase in illegal drug trafficking as well as broadening of the areas of other states where the drugs are trafficked to, often accompanied by arms trafficking on state borders. Alexander Zelitchenko, *Afghan Narcoexpansion of the 1990s and Kyrgyzstan National Security Problems*, Bishkek: Kyrgyz-Russian Slavonic University, 2003, pp. 5-6.

⁹ The so-called "silk routes" represent numerous side roads which branched off, then joined together again, skirting round mountains and deserts, and linking oases and market towns. The term "silk route" itself, however, dates only from the 19th century. Long after, therefore, the caravan trails were interrupted by the Mongolian invasions of the 13th century and the Eurasian trade route was abandoned in favour of maritime trade in the 15th century. Summary data from International conference "Drug Routes from Central Asia to Europe", Paris, 2003.

¹⁰ Opium has probably been one of the many products transported along Great Silk Route. The development of the production of and international trade in opium in Asia dates principally from the 18th century, and more particularly from the 19th century when the European colonial empires shared a large part of the Asian continent between them. However, the opium trade could not use the routes in Central Asia, apart from those in Chinese Turkistan, as Lower Central Asia was suddenly closed off after Russia took over the khanate of Khiva in 1873. The movements of illicit

opiates now using the Central Asian transport routes are thus more of a new phenomenon than history repeating itself.

¹¹ The 1998 survey found extensive growth of ephedra, which can be used to produce ephedrine (used in the form of ephedrone in the region), the main precursor for the manufacture of methamphetamine or methcathinone. Some 88,200 ha of ephedra were identified in Kazakhstan, 46,400 ha in Kyrgyzstan and 3,500 ha in Tajikistan. UNODC, *Illicit Drugs Situation in the Regions Neighbouring Afghanistan and the response of ODCCP*, October 2002, p. 3.

¹² Climatic conditions in all five Central Asian countries are, in principle, favourable for the growth of opium poppy and cannabis which are illicitly cultivated on small individual plots in villages, or in remote mountainous regions. UNODC Report *Illicit Drugs Situation in the Regions Neighbouring Afghanistan and the response of ODCCP*, October 2002, p. 3.

¹³ Kyrgyzstan, for example, cultivated opium poppy legally up to 1974, meeting 86% of the USSR pharmaceutical industry demand, which equated to 16% of world legal opium poppy cultivation. Up to the 1990s, USSR Lekarsprom association made up to 500 tons of ephedra in Kyrgyzstan. Not far away, in the city of Shymkent, Kazakhstan, there used to be a pharmaceutical plant producing narcotic and psychotropic medicines.

¹⁴ In recent years the countries of the Central Asia have been likely turning into a kind of “sump” for drug traffic. Simultaneously this affects a general increase in drug crime and addiction. In December 1999 a cache of unprecedented size was found in the village of Tuleikan, Osh province, Kyrgyzstan, which contained 831 kg of opium, 2, 6 kg of heroin.

¹⁵ *The Drug and Crime Situation in Central Asia*, ROCA UNODC, 2003.

¹⁶ A comment by a sex worker in central Bishkek, January 2009.

¹⁷<http://www.unescap.org/esd/environment/soe/2000/documents/CH20.PDF>

**RESURGENT RUSSIA:
CHALLENGES & PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH ASIA**

Ms. Rizwana Khalid

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, there have been repeated efforts by the states to develop a new standard to understand the international arrangement.¹ ‘Resurgent Russia’ is yet another phenomenon in this way and today Russia is trying to reinforce its influence around the globe. It is struggling to reinstate its traditional primacy, which had eclipsed earlier with the demise of Soviet Union. Thus, Russian urge to regain its traditional influence around the globe is central to its political, security and economic policies.

The collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia struggling to pull itself back together politically and economically. Russia set on the track of political, economic and military resurgence under the vibrant leadership of President Putin. This was largely facilitated by rising Russian oil revenues. Today, as Russia recovers its economic might, it is not surprising to see Moscow reaching once again for the reins of power in the Caucasus, because the Kremlin sees this area as its natural sphere of influence.² Russia is seeking to increase its international profile with its strategic ties with almost all major nations in East and Central Asia, and is playing a more assertive role in dealing with regional issues. This Russian endeavor to regain its influence is one challenge that the West, particularly the U.S, can surely not afford to ignore.

After the demise of Soviet Union up till now, it has been largely believed that unilateralism is an exclusive feature to US policy making behavior. Conversely, Russia is promoting the concept of multilateralism and refuse to accept the US unilateral hegemonic attitude anymore. At this instant, with the recent notions like; resurgent Russia, rising China and India, a new international paradigm is about to begin. The United States decade-old strategic global predominance is now under challenged by Russia and China.

Russia's resurgence on the international stage has its roots in its domestic politics and economics. Its resurgence is made possible by a number of economic and strategic factors that worked in favor of Russia. Strong economic policies, military and political alliances, pipeline politics, have all played a significant role in bringing about the Russian renaissance.³ Furthermore, Russia, with its flourishing economy and successful strategic policies, is all set to regain its former international supremacy and challenge the unipolar dominance of the United States in world affairs.⁴

The paper mainly examines three-fold objectives; firstly, the foremost factors which contributed in the resurgence of former Soviet Union, secondly, its gas pipeline projects to counter US influence in Europe and lastly, the implications of Russian re-emergence for South Asian region particularly in the light of its relations with India, Pakistan and its interest in Afghanistan.

Post Cold War Scenario

The Soviet Union breakdown changed the structure of international system from bi-polarity to unipolarity. The United States became the sole superpower with ability to intervene in any part of the globe. Initially, the United States endeavored to establish its influence as hegemony with emphasis on constitutionalism, legitimacy and efficacy.⁵

In the years following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Russian Federation remained compulsively focused on the domestic situation. In the first decade after the Soviet breakup, despite turbulence, turmoil and grave challenges, Russia avoided becoming internationally isolated and created a favorable international disposition by drastically reducing military spending; became a member of the major global economic institutions like International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; Russia also inculcated special politico-economic relationship with China in this decade.

The political chaos, loss of identity and prestige, and confusion caused by the sudden break up has been shocking for the Russian masses. Russia faced extreme political and economic problems which consumed a lot of efforts. Thus, Russian position in the international community was largely determined by its domestic compulsions. Consequently, Russia preferred to limit its global role in this chaotic period.⁶ The foreign policy goals set by the first Russian Federation Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev in 1992 amply indicated that “all Russian foreign policy was indeed domestic”.⁷

In the last years of Yeltsin era, Russian domestic plight was at its highest level, when Yeltsin brought in Vladimir Putin as the Prime Minister in June 1999. He became the acting president after Yeltsin's resignation in Dec 1999. In the subsequent elections held in March 2000, he was elected as the President of the Russian Federation by a majority vote. Since then, Putin has aimed at reestablishing Russia as a major international power.

Re-Emergence of Russia

Russia's resurgence can be analyzed through three main endeavors: firstly, it becomes an energy superpower, secondly, balance against the West and lastly, reclaim its influence over the near abroad. On all these above fractions Russia has enjoyed some success. Following are the major factors which mainly contributed in the resurgence of Russia.

Putin's Policies

Vladimir Putin played a very important part as a President; he focused largely on reestablishing and maintaining Russian influence in the world while ensuring stability and security. Putin immediately launched an attack on government corruption before his election, when he was appointed by the ailing Yeltsin as an acting President in January of 2000. In his campaign, he showed a wise political tact, avoiding association with the unpopular Yeltsin and positioned himself as a strong leader.⁸

Putin took a much more realistic attitude to the ex-Soviet neighbors than Yeltsin, who till his very last days, felt his guilt

for bringing down the Soviet Union. Putin was not trying to recreate the Soviet empire. Rather, he quoted a Ukrainian politician who had cleverly remarked that those who do not regret the passing of the Soviet Union have no heart; but those who want to bring it back, he added, have no brains.⁹ Following are the salient features of Putin's policies which provided the base to the Russian re-emergence:-

- **A Rapid Economic Growth:** The core reason for Putin's success and popularity was revival in Russian economy. The progress made by the Russian economy in the past eight years is truly impressive. GDP has gone up about 70%, industrial growth has been 75% and investments have increased by 125%, regaining Russia its place among the world's top 10 economies. Russia's GDP in 2007 reached the 1990 level, which means that the country has overcome the consequences of the economic crisis that devastated it in the 1990s.¹⁰ Most importantly under his leadership, the Russian economy took an upward turn, largely driven by increasing oil revenues. In 2003, the profits of Lukoil (a major oil exporting firm) rose by an amazing 38%. Within the space of the first four months of that year, the Central Bank's currency levels rose by \$4.8 billion (10%).¹¹ This economic turnaround made Putin's dreams of a new Russia a possibility.
- **Russia – An Energy Superpower:** Putin adopted such a policy under which the government controls a

substantial part of the oil and gas sector and its revenues. State control of the sector in Russia has made the fuel and energy companies completely open and transparent to investors. After the government has taken over a controlling stake in Gazprom, the energy giant became a truly public company, and liberalized its share market. Rosneft, the largest state-controlled oil company in Russia, went public in 2006, attracting thousands of Russian and foreign investors, including many individuals.¹²

- **Well-organized Management of Oil Revenues:** By the end of the Putin's second term, it has become clear that the state has adopted a wise policy of managing oil export revenues, considering the growing increase in the oil prices. In 2004, there was a fund established to accumulate oil revenues for a rainy day. Soon after a year it exceeded to \$18 billion and within two years it accumulated enough revenues to repay all of the Soviet Union's debts. Deductions to the fund helped reduce the inflation pressure on the economy. In 2007, the fund accumulated enough for investment; some of it was channeled into Russian development institutions. In late January 2008, during the global financial crisis it was split into the Reserve Fund which has been designed to protect Russia from possible global financial shocks and the National

Welfare Fund, whose revenues will be used for the pension reform.¹³

- **Increase in Industrial Production:** The 1998 financial crisis in Russia boosted industrial development. According to the Federal State Statistics Service, industrial growth made 11.9% in 2000 but slowed down to 3.7% in the next two years as the effects of the crisis wore off. ¹⁴A new rise began in 2003 and industrial growth reached 6.3% in 2007. The situation in manufacturing was especially good and its growth exceeded that of GDP. Last year, production in manufacturing grew by 9.3%, while growth in mining was only 1.9% and electricity production dropped by 0.2%.¹⁵
- **Growth of Incomes:** There was an evident increase in the incomes of masses that has been seen in the term of Vladimir Putin which consequently decreased the poverty ratio in Russia. The proportion of population living below the poverty line decreased from 30% in 2000 to 14% in 2008. The average wage increased from 2,200 rubles (\$90) to 12,500 rubles (\$500) within eight years.¹⁶
- **Pension Reforms:** In 2002, the Putin government instituted pension reform to increase the level of retirement funds and reduce poverty among retirees. In addition, the reform was to move the responsibility for pensions from the government to employers.

- **Accommodation of Traditional Policies:** Putin's radical reforms in the areas of domestic and foreign policy have made a major impact on Russian politics and society and world has witnessed a new orientation in Russia's external relations with the West. Putin undertook measures to restore the primacy of the Russian traditional policies. And as a first step, Putin announced the appointment of seven presidential representatives who were explicitly charged with coordinating federal activity in newly-defined super-regions. He began to centralize the power of the national government and weakened the autonomy of regional governments and restricted the power of political parties within the Duma.¹⁷ Putin also instituted a major reform of Russia's upper house of parliament, the Federation Council. Putin and his team also entered into head-on confrontations with several uncooperative governors accused of corruption, though with only mixed success.¹⁸
- **Vision of a Multipolar World:** For Putin and his successor, Dmitry Medvedev, a unipolar international system dominated by a hegemonic US have become unacceptable, and much of the Russian population appears to have embraced the Russian vision of a Multipolar world.¹⁹ This vision, however, did not imply opposing the nature of Western economic and political systems, as the Kremlin had done during the Cold War.

Furthermore, recently Putin has announced his candidacy for the presidential post in the 2012 election. The return of Vladimir Putin to the post of President is totally logical, because he is considered as a father of “Resurgent Russia” and in addition he has remained extremely popular throughout his tenure. Thus it is widely assumed that with the return of Putin once again Russia will be back on its rapid resurgent track.

Pipeline Politics: Southern Stream and Nord Stream

It is estimated that the bulk of EU gas reserves will be almost completely exhausted by 2015. General EU gas consumption is already high. In addition, environmental policies are incentivizing countries and industry to shift their energy product mix in favor of natural gas. Older regulations with respect to sulphur emissions already favored natural gas over coal or fuel oil. Moreover, natural gas is less CO₂ intensive per unit of energy than coal. Therefore, in the absence of any strategic or national security imperative, current policies naturally encourage governments and industry to demand more natural gas rather than other energy means.²⁰

The Russian Federation holds the largest proven gas reserves in the world, with roughly one quarter of the global total. However, keeping in view the high consumption of Europe and as Western Europeans pondered their strategic choices; Russia seemed an obviously attractive partner. Thus, it is strongly evident that Russia uses its energy resources to

promote broader geopolitical and foreign policy objectives as well.

Russia started to seek partnerships with every other major gas producer that supplies the European Union. Russia has approached Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Iran, Qatar, and more importantly the Central Asian states in this regard. Moreover, Russia's energy strategy towards European states can be analyzed through its new planned pipeline infrastructure, Nord Stream and South Stream. These aspects of Russian strategy are ominous for European Union (EU), International Energy Agency (IEA) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) unity, not only in questions of energy policy and energy security, but also across the entire spectrum of Europe-Russia relations.

The Nord Stream project fits precisely within Russia's strategy in order to consolidate its position in the EU. In 2005, Gazprom signed an agreement to develop the Nord Stream pipeline. The other signatories were the two German companies, Winter shall and EON Ruhrgas, later joined by the Dutch gas company, Gasunie.²¹ The two 1,224-kilometre offshore pipelines are the most direct connection between the vast gas reserves in Russia and energy markets in the European Union. When fully operational in the last quarter of 2012, the twin pipelines will have the capacity to transport a combined total of 55 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas a year to businesses and households in the EU for at least 50 years.²²

The South Stream pipeline is another result of Russia's gas strategy towards the EU. In 2008, Gazprom signed an agreement with Italian energy company ENI for the development of second new pipeline to EU, coined South Stream. This pipeline would transport gas from Russia through the seabed of the Black Sea to Bulgaria. From there, the gas would continue in two directions: to Austria, crossing Serbia and Hungary, and to Italy, crossing Greece and the seabed of the Adriatic Sea. In May 2009, Russia signed an agreement to conduct South Stream feasibility studies with the governments of four involved countries, Italy, Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia. The pipeline is expected to cost USD 25bn and to be completed by 2015.²³

Russian Pipelines vis-a-vis US backed Nabucco Project

Russia likely has political and strategic reasons for building the new pipelines. The projects have raised fears in Central and Eastern European (EU) countries that Russia would become more inclined to cut off gas flows to this region for political reasons. In this respect, the Nabucco project is part of EU efforts to find opportunities to import gas without Russian interference.

The South Stream pipeline is promoted by the Russian authorities as a rival to the Nabucco project. South Stream promises to deliver twice as much gas to Europe as Nabucco, so that South Stream gas pipeline is considered as a potential competitor to the Nabucco project.²⁴ In other words, South

Stream becomes a strategic weapon by which Russia can get the upper hand in Europe. It can re-establish the former Soviet influence, attempt to reach the Mediterranean after three centuries of failures, and take on a dominant position in Europe.

Nabucco will carry gas and oil from Central Asia and directly from the Caucasus to Europe via Turkey bypassing Russia. The project can be seen as a further effort to contain Russia because it provides a direct escape route to new markets for the former Soviet republics, freeing them from

Moscow. Nabucco provides Europe with a major new source of supplies. This will give them three lines of energy supplies: From African Middle Eastern and Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC); from Russia and thirdly from Central Asia and the Caucasus. With these supplies, European countries can expect to negotiate better prices for their fuel.²⁵

All these moves can be seen as legitimate, friendly and neighborly moves or as legitimate opposition to a dubious American Middle Eastern policy. In any case, they form the backdrop to the Russian-sponsored South Stream pipeline project, which was conceived after and in competition with the US-sponsored Nabucco pipeline project.

South Stream is supported by the Russian state and therefore has no funding problems, in contrast to Nabucco, which is a commercial project and needs to find funding in the market. A simple political and media push for South Stream

could disrupt Nabucco, which by itself has many political and technical problems before it can be implemented. For example, there is the big question of how to cross the Caspian Sea without clear agreements from bordering countries such as Russia and Iran. Once Nabucco is shipwrecked, South Stream may gain steam and look even more viable. Consequently, if Russia corners the European gas market, it gains a strong hand in determining overall prices for oil to America and Asia, which is really threatening for US.

Implications for South Asia

Soviet policy towards South Asia has consistently recognized the centrality and geo-political weight and importance of India. At the same time, Moscow never lost sight of the geo-political importance of Pakistan, the second major South Asian state.²⁶ India and Russia have shared a long history of close ties. Although India's growing partnership with the U.S. has somewhat complicated the picture, the Russian link maintains its considerable importance as far as India is concerned. Russia continues to be a primary supplier of arms and ammunition for the Indian military; and bilateral agreements in trade, business and economic co-operation are being signed. The first India-Russia-China trilateral business conference, which was held recently in New Delhi, aimed strengthening political, economic and business cooperation between the three economic power houses of the region. Russia has also been openly supportive of India's candidature for the permanent

membership of the United Nations Security Council. Both countries are cooperating significantly in the field of infrastructure, trade space, energy, science and technology.²⁷

In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist tragedy, the United States and its NATO allies established military bases in Central Asia and quickly drove the Taliban from power in Kabul. These developments were disturbing for Russian planners, who worried that Washington was gaining influence in the region at Moscow's expense.

In the case of US drawdown from Afghanistan, Russia and neighboring countries are not interested in a quick US withdrawal, as it could lead to the Taliban's return to power, or probably even worse. On the other hand, they do not want US bases permanently stationed in Afghanistan either. Russia, China, India and Iran have all supported a regional solution, and promoted the middle-term reliance on authorities in Kabul rather than on Western troops.

Russia has also sought better ties with Pakistan, a Soviet-era enemy seen as a key to stability in Afghanistan.²⁸ There have been great changes in Russian-Pakistani relations in recent years. Pakistan had long been a country that Moscow had antagonistic relations with. During the Cold War, on one hand, Pakistan was close relations with both the United States and China and on the other hand the Soviet Union was having close relations with Pakistan's main rival India. In addition, Pakistan's support for the Afghan Mujahedeen fighting against

Soviet forces in Afghanistan was also the main source of tension between the two countries.

But over the past few years, Russian-Pakistani relations have improved, in part as a reaction to warming Indian-American relations. Despite all differences of the past, rooted mainly in the experience from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980s, current Russian interest in Pakistan is tied to attempts to clarify the Afghan situation, which determines the atmosphere in Central Asia. Another important factor is the fact that Russia has discovered Pakistan to be a lucrative market for arms exports.²⁹

Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari's official visit to Russia is interesting especially as it held within a fortnight of the US raid in Abbottabad, although it was not predetermined but it has also put the US-Pakistan relationship under further strain.³⁰ In addition, Moscow's concerns regarding the situation were an attempt towards an initiation in the betterment of the relations. Both leaders discussed about a range of economic issues, including cooperation in the energy sector (electricity and gas) as well as industrial projects. But the main declaration from the Moscow meeting was political and not economic. Medvedev publicly endorsed Pakistan's claim to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This is a remarkable move indicating a new stage in the organization's development.

The intent of both countries to improve relations is gradually becoming more evident. Pakistan seems to be more

enthusiastic in improving relations with Russia in comparative terms. There are solid reasons for this relationship to grow in the future. Pakistan stands to gain by improving its relations with Russia in terms of having alternative options such as, for its security needs, technology transfer in the scientific and research fields, access to the Russian market for its exports, and strengthening relations with its Central Asian neighbors which are difficult to develop beyond a certain level without having improved relations with Russia first.³¹

Furthermore, Dmitry Medvedev recently met Presidents of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan and discussed regional issues and ways of developing economic cooperation, including in sectors such as energy, transport infrastructure, and the mining industry. The joint statement of the four presidents welcomed Russia's interest in participating in the TAPI project which aims to build a natural gas pipeline from ex-Soviet Central Asian nation of Turkmenistan to Afghanistan and on to Pakistan and India. Apart from political dividends, Russia is also hoping to gain economic benefits from a number of future regional projects.

The aforementioned details are analyzed subsequently, in the form of implications of the Russian engagement as a resurgent one in South Asia;

- Sino-Russian increased interests in South Asia will jeopardize the US endeavors, and its exercise influence over the relevant elites in its regional neighborhood.

- India and Pakistan as traditional hostile states, their interests in the region are unlikely to coincide, but a multilateral format like SCO could ease their bilateral tensions by introducing external factors.
- One of Moscow's ideas for a regional solution involves an enhanced role for the SCO, the most representative organization in the region. The member states are expected to lift the unofficial halt on the admission of new members that was imposed in 2006. India and Pakistan are the most likely candidates in this regard. The possible admission of those two countries is a delicate issue because of their very tense bilateral relations. Russia would have liked to see India become a full member, while China preferred Pakistan. But recently, Medvedev's statement shows that Moscow's position is actually changing in favor of Islamabad, while New Delhi's endorsement remains the same.
- The traditional issue of Kashmir between both the India and Pakistan which is still a bone of contention between both parties, by provide a multilateral forum in which Russia and China are playing a positive role in reaching a tangible solution of issues, it might be a way out for this particular issue at the SCO forum.
- South Asian region which has been strategically important for major States particularly for US, but with the emergence of Sino-Russian increased influence within this region and their additional reliance on the

economic sphere, the South Asian strategic objective is being replaced by economic interests.

- US has always extended its agreements unilaterally within sugar coated bi-lateral relations, contrarily Russia has been and still is supporting multi-lateral world order, this is appealing for countries who are extra dependent on the West including Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- Furthermore, uncertain commitment of US to fight against terrorists and its conditional alliance attitude towards South Asian states, it could provide an excuse to diversify their relations.
- The Pakistani leadership's efforts to reduce external pressure by diversifying its international contacts have provoked anger in Washington, but it can be useful for Pakistan to at least have alternatives in order to restore a certain ability to govern in a very tricky region.
- Increasing ties between Russia and Pakistan adds another interesting dimension to the Eurasian geopolitics. It will be interesting to see the future trajectory of this new-found friendship.
- The countries like Pakistan and Afghanistan needs to understand and analyze the current Russian standing in the world and its foreign policy priorities, so that they could reorient their options and take advantage of the immense potential that exists in the Russian resurgence.

- There is a divergence and convergence in the interests of Russia and China, where the two governments have adopted convergent and divergent positions on critical issues. Despite the recent improvement in Sino-Russia relations, both are divergent in their policies of national interests and relations with other states. For instance, Russia's ties with New Delhi still remain much stronger than those between China and India. Persistent border disputes, differences over India's growing security ties with the United States, competition over energy supplies are still hurdles in the good relations. The convergence of interests between both can be analyzed through their interest in US withdrawal from Afghanistan and US less influence within South Asia.

Conclusion

With its strategic assets intact, the economy was the only major constraint in Russia's exercising its traditional countervailing role to balance the United States. Now, the Russian economy is witnessing a revival in its economy especially with the flow of growing financial revenues from gas and oil. Due to its resurgence, the US sees its hegemony at stake. It is believed that with the rising China and resurgent Russia world will once again become multilateral. In a nutshell, Former Soviet Union urge for superpowerdom and the pursuit of reclaiming its traditional role will damage the US hegemonic attitude around the globe.

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**SOUTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK VIS-À-VIS
NORTHERN DISTRIBUTION NETWORK; AN
APPRAISAL**

Mr. Muhammad Saleem

Abstract

After the United States attack on Afghanistan in 2001, they are transporting need based non-lethal goods into Afghanistan to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces through Pakistan using the Karachi Sea port on Arabian Sea. This route is known as Northern Distribution Network (SDN). With the passage of time, Taliban militants started attacking the cargo ships and blocked the routes in different years up till now. This provoked the US to open new supply routes. Northern Distribution Network came as a significant option for them. These new supply routes from the Baltic and Black Seas through Central Asia have provided an urgently needed supplement to the single route through Pakistan that had been used exclusively since 2001. It is also expected that the NDN would be less subject to the armed attacks, unexpected delays, and pilferage that have hampered the movement of goods along that same Karachi-Peshawar road. This paper will elaborate the different parts of this specific route and the interest of different stakeholders, involved in this route. It also highlights the challenges and commonalities on both sides (SDN, NDN).

Key words: Southern Distribution Network and Northern Distribution Network, challenges, advantages.

Methodology: Primary resources; debates, class discussion Secondary resources, Research journals, articles, internet sources and newspaper

Introduction

Critical to the success of any military mission is the ability to provide timely logistics support throughout the theatre of operations. In case of Afghanistan, the salience of transporting materiel is compounded by the geopolitical sensitivity of the region. The country's neighbours -Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian republics (CARs) - all complicate this fundamental aspect of military planning. Pakistan offers the most direct and the cheapest routes to Afghanistan. No U.S. military transportation units is operating in Pakistan, only private contractors are to transport supplies and equipment along the 1200-mile ground route and to provide security to the cargo, while in transit.

The **War in Afghanistan** was launched in response to the 9/11 attacks. The purpose of the war was to capture Bin Laden, destroy Al-Qaeda, and remove the Taliban regime. The NATO-led international forces in Afghanistan are depending heavily on far-flung supply lines for the food, fuel, and goods they need to go on fighting.

U.S. and allied troops require a Herculean mass of supplies from ammunition to toothbrushes, fuel, computers, night-vision goggles, concertina wire etc. at the rate of thousands of tons per day. Even with the containerized packing systems and all the technology that made-in-USA delivery systems

have made available to the military, the traffic volumes are immense. In 2008, nearly 30,000 containers were sent to the front – or about 75% of the total need in fuel, food, equipment and construction materials. Traffic reportedly doubled in 2009, and the requirements for 2012 will likely double again.¹

Until recently most of those supplies were shipped by sea to the Pakistani port of Karachi, and then shipped overland into Afghanistan. This route is known as SDN. But after Taliban militants and their sympathizers began to attack the supply convoys, NATO planners began to cast about for more reliable alternatives. These days they are increasingly focusing their efforts on a web of routes reaching from ports on the Baltic and Black seas to the CARs that border Afghanistan. Together these routes are known as the NDN. The NDN is growing in significance for NATO planners. These new supply routes from the Baltic and Black Seas through Central Asia have provided an urgently needed supplement to the single route through Pakistan that had been used exclusively since 2001. It is also hoped that NDN would be less subject to armed attacks, unexpected delays, and pilferage that have hampered the movement of goods along the same Karachi-Peshawar road. Many have expressed concern that the NDN makes the United States more vulnerable to certain states whose interests may not be fully aligned with Washington's in Afghanistan. This concern is genuine and justified, but the critics of the viability of the new northern routes underestimate the vulnerability of reliance on Pakistani routes

as well as the value of engaging other states in the region in concrete cooperation with economic and political benefits.

The web of all the supply routes, US can utilize for NATO supplies (map I)



Source: Google earth maps, NATO supplies to Afghanistan.

Southern Distribution Network

On December 7, 2001, 300 U.S. Special Forces and 110 Central Intelligence Agency operatives, working in tandem with local Afghans, seized the seat of the Taliban regime in Kandahar. In the intervening years, strategic neglect, ineffective governance, corruption, and a cross-border safe haven in Pakistan, among other factors, have led to a resurgent Taliban, prompting President Obama to call the situation “increasingly perilous” in March 2009.²

There are 2,500-4,000 NATO supply vehicles plying on Pakistani roads at any one time en route to Afghanistan through the Torkham or Chaman border crossings.³

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The U.S. Embassy said there are no weapons or ammunition that moves through Pakistan, but everything from technical equipment, food, clothing and blankets come through Pakistan and keep NATO soldiers warm and fed. The tons of ammunition, from small artillery to missiles, are delivered entirely by aircraft landing at military air fields. But the bulk of the traffic is carried by sea-lift, mainly cargo ships that dock in the Indian Ocean port of Karachi in Pakistan, and then are off-loaded onto trucks. The route north is a dangerous trip of nearly 1,000 miles, finally passing through the difficult and often-hostile land of the Hindu Kush and then over the unfaithful Khyber Pass before finally dropping down into Afghanistan.

Map of SDN through Pakistan to Afghanistan (Map II)



Source: Google earth maps, NATO supplies to Afghanistan.

Challenges on SDN

The bulk of U.S. supplies bound for Afghanistan are routed through the Pakistani port of Karachi (see map II). These shipments do not include any critical or sensitive material. Once in Karachi, 66% of this volume enters Afghanistan via the Torkham Gate near the city of Peshawar. The other 34% travels through the Chaman Gate in Baluchistan. These shipments are handled entirely by commercial carriers and require no U.S. military presence.⁴

Because of Pakistani sensitivities about sovereignty, these trucks are 100 percent civilian-operated, with no military escorts. The pay is good but the work is dangerous. Drivers are subjected to kidnapping, and destruction by roadside bombs or rocket and bazooka ambushes. U.S. sources report that over 450 trucks were destroyed in 2009, and one international shipping company confirms to European Affairs that 50 of its trucks were attacked, many of them fatally.⁵ Pilferage along the Pakistani route is another challenge U.S. logisticians face. At one point, pilferage in Pakistan reached 1%. Even being small, this figure still amounted to \$16 million worth of U.S. government property. Through a series of measures, the U.S. military subsequently reduced pilferage to 0.5%, which is less than what is lost at the civilian freight facility in Bayonne, New Jersey.⁶

The Baluchistan route being used for NATO supplies in Afghanistan through Chaman border has been declared most dangerous after an estimated 112 attacks on the NATO tankers

during which 254 vehicles were burnt and 50 people were killed in the last four years, since 2008.⁷The attacks caused damages of billions of dollars on the resources of the NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan in addition to the death of innocent Pakistani drivers. Official sources said that two routes leading to the Chaman border, were being used for the NATO supplies i.e. one through Qalat division and the other Bolan, from Karachi port.

In 2009, NATO supplies were kicked off through the two routes for the NATO forces stationed in Afghanistan. Most of the attacks on the NATO tankers were reported from Qalat division where some 90 NATO tankers were set ablaze in more than 60 terror attacks inflicting losses of millions of dollars on the NATO resources. The NATO tankers were attacked eleven times in Quetta, the provincial capital of Baluchistan, in which 42 tankers were torched.⁸

The worsening U.S.-Pakistani relationship and increasingly bold attacks by Pakistani Taliban on the southern supply routes have impelled the United States and its allies to diversify their transit corridors, looking north to the CARs for assistance. Thus, in addition to restructuring the contracts awarded to companies traveling through Pakistan, U.S. military planners have adopted the NDN, a commercially based logistical corridor connecting Baltic and Black Sea ports with Afghanistan. Between expenses incurred for supplies such as jet fuel, base rental fees, and necessary upgrades to airport facilities, the NDN is an expensive alternative to the

southern truck routes. In essence, the NDN represents the ultimate geopolitical cost-benefit calculation: is it better to pay more in transport costs and ship supplies through Afghanistan's northern neighbors or to pay bribes along southern routes?

Northern Distribution Network

A lack of projected surplus capacity along the Pakistani routes in conjunction with ongoing insurgent attacks, pilferage, trucking strikes, and growing fears of other scenarios led defense planners to search for new ways to resupply their forces. One option was to increase shipments via air. According to General McNabb, "If we had to do everything by air, you would see a Berlin airlift." This option would have been extremely expensive. Estimates by NATO place the cost of airlifting supplies to Afghanistan at \$14,000 per ton, or \$7 per pound.⁹ The fact that U.S. airlift is already being contracted out to Russian and Ukrainian companies such as Volga-Dnepr demonstrates that the United States does not have sufficient airlift capacity to make this option viable.

Given the growing insecurity of the Pakistani supply routes and the exorbitant costs associated with a "Berlin Airlift" to Afghanistan, the United States sought to create new ground lines of communication—military parlance for supply routes—into the theater. Ultimately, the United States opted for a route that connected Baltic and Black Sea ports with Afghanistan named as Northern Distribution Network. This arrangement is an outgrowth of NATO's Lines of

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Communication Project, which sought agreements from Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan to allow nonlethal cargo bound for Afghanistan to traverse their territory by train.¹⁰ U.S. planners first started working seriously on this option in the summer of 2008. By September, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) had approved the Northern Ground Line of Communication campaign plan. In October, the campaign plan was renamed the NDN (see map I).

With a plan in hand, U.S. officials had to convince transit states to allow non-military supplies to traverse their territory. The United States had already secured permission to transport nonlethal supplies via Russia at the NATO-Russia summit in April 2008. It had similar permission from Georgia under an agreement signed by NATO and Tbilisi in March 2005.¹¹ The first new state to approve nonlethal transit through its territory was Kazakhstan, which agreed in February 2009.

Later that month, Rear Admiral Mark Harnitchek of U.S. Transportation Command announced on Tajik state television that Tajikistan had agreed to allow non-military goods bound for Afghanistan to transit its road and rail network.¹² During a three-day meeting in Baku that ended on March 11, 2009, “Azerbaijan made it clear that it would agree to the use of Baku for both the transit and export of goods to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan.”¹³ In April 2009, Uzbekistan followed suit and

agreed to nonlethal transit. Kyrgyzstan was the final state to sign a nonlethal ground transport agreement, which it did in the summer of 2009.¹⁴

What began as an idea in the middle of 2008 has since evolved into a robust transit network. Today, the NDN involves three spurs. These are known as NDN North, NDN South, and Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan route (KKT).

Map of NDN North (Map III)



Source: Google earth maps, NATO supplies to Afghanistan.

NDN North

NDN North begins at the Latvian port of Riga. From there, it uses existing Soviet-era rail lines to traverse Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. Once in Uzbekistan, cargo enters Afghanistan at Termez (see mapIII). It costs approximately more than 2 to 3% as compared to the expenses on SDN as the total length of this route is 8000 kilometres. So this option is also extremely expensive one.

Map of NDN South (Map IV)



Source: Google earth maps, NATO supplies to Afghanistan.

NDN South

NDN South transits the Caucasus and completely bypasses Russia. This route originates in the Georgian port of Poti on the Black Sea and crosses Azerbaijan before arriving in Baku. From there, goods are loaded onto ferries for their journey across the Caspian Sea. These supplies make landfall at Kazakhstan's west coast port of Aktau and then proceed to Uzbekistan before entering Afghanistan (see map IV). If and when the United States secures a transit agreement from Turkmenistan, the port of Turkmen bashi could be an additional destination for goods leaving Baku by ferry.

Although this route is more feasible than NDN North and KKT as it is very close to Afghanistan, but it also costs double as here the cargo is first loaded from Georgian port to Baku, and then it is unloaded to cross the Caspian sea by loading on

ferries. After reaching at Aktau, the sea port of Kazakhstan, it is again loaded on trucks and trains after unloading. So it also doubled the cost of cargo transportation. But still the option is workable.

Map of KKT Route (Map V)



Source: Google earth maps, NATO supplies to Afghanistan.

The KKT Route

The KKT route includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It provides a backup to the Uzbek border crossing at Termez (see map V). According to TRANSCOM, this route has some bad stretches of road in Tajikistan that limits throughput. The route is also comprised of a long, highly expensive and time consuming way to Afghanistan.

The NDN is a multi-route logistical network that transports non-military supplies using commercial providers and existing infrastructure. With the exception of the Uzbek

air cargo hub at Navoie and the Caspian Sea ferries, the NDN relies on road and rail.

From a purely logistical standpoint, the NDN is a resounding achievement, both in its genesis and in its continued viability and effectiveness. Close interagency cooperation among U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), US-Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), the Defense Logistics Agency, the Office of the Secretary of Defence, and the State Department, and others—though not perfect—was sufficient to make the NDN an operational success. As a result, 300 TEUs (20-foot equivalent units) are currently transiting the NDN per week, although at a cost of 250% more per TEU than supplies moving along the Pakistani line. The number of TEUs could easily be expanded to 500 per week, if needed. As of November 2009, the NDN had brought 4,500 TEUs into Afghanistan. This figure represents 12.5% of the total number of TEUs shipped through Pakistan in 2008 and is additive to the supplies currently entering Afghanistan from Pakistan.¹⁵

Russia's Concern in Afghanistan and NDN

Afghanistan's northern neighbours have enduring interests in, and influence over, particular segments of Afghanistan. They pursue objectives that are not necessarily congruent with ISAF's mission. ISAF's Northern distribution Network and logistical hubs are dependent upon support from Russia and Central Asian states, giving them the potential to act either as spoilers or positive influences.¹⁶

Russia supports international coalition forces against Afghanistan in concern of its own important security interests. Her main focus is to curtail the Islamic insurgent movements as she had remained under the great threat of terrorist activities for more than 15 years. Cross border drug trade is another dilemma for Russian state. The impact of the flow of opiates from Afghanistan also touches a very raw nerve for the Russian people.

Russians are keen to provide the Americans this much-needed facility as this would provide them a chance to retaliate into Afghanistan after their retreat from the country more than 20 years ago. The Russians themselves offered this route to the US but the Bush administration was reluctant to accept. By granting the Americans permission to use their territory and air space for flying American troops and supplies to Afghanistan, Russia could again become an influential player in Afghanistan.

Interests of CARs

NDN offers numerous potential benefits to the Central Asian Republics. Its cross border nature will provide new openings to the land locked countries. Natural resources rich states would be able to access new markets. Tajikistan's position at the crossroads of Central Asia connecting the state with the major seaports of the Indian Ocean, with China's Karakorum highway, with Iran, and through Iran with the states of Persian Gulf is of a great importance to the state's economy.

The NDN cannot remake the region or clear longstanding logjams. It can make a positive contribution, however, through the modest motivation of economic activities unrelated to resource extraction or labour migration, the encouragement of cross-border trade within Central Asia, and the strengthening of legal commercial links to replace the flourishing drug trade that is today the primary commercial tie between Central Asia and Afghanistan.

Georgia and Azerbaijan's Concerns over NDN

Georgian deputy defence minister Giorgi Muchaidze underlined his government's commitment to the success of NATO operations, stating in July 2009 that Georgian officials are "fully aware of our strategic responsibility, we stand ready to provide the full access to our infrastructure and the facilities needed for this purpose."¹⁷

Georgia having western-oriented foreign policy is much profound of NATO membership. It is widely believed that the successful implementation of the Caucasus supply route directly benefits Georgia as an informal security guarantee against further Russian aggressions. Russian forces would be far more hesitant to target military installations and infrastructure in a country through which NATO equipment was passing. Georgian decision makers have aspirations to establish a U.S. military base in the country, perhaps in conjunction with supply route efforts. Georgian foreign minister Grigol Vashadze said "If the United States thinks it wants to establish a base, we would seriously consider it"¹⁸

Azerbaijan has also extended its role as part of the Caucasus supply route. For Baku decision makers, the use of Azerbaijan's territory as a supply route to Afghanistan highlights the country's strategic position as a gateway to Central, Inner and South Asia, as well as Baku's support to struggle against trans national terrorism. However, Baku has been cautious with its support because open engagement with NATO could challenge Azerbaijan's carefully balanced foreign policy.

Recommendations to Improve the Efficiency of NDN

Despite the NDN's early success, military and civilian planners should not become complacent. The network remains subject to a range of geopolitical dangers and logistical inefficiencies. With adequate attention and effective policies, however, the United States could bolster the NDN's resiliency and improve its effectiveness by implementing several specific measures:

- If the U.S. government could successfully navigate the challenges associated with increasing the local procurement of supplies for Afghanistan, it would strengthen the NDN in two important ways. First and foremost, it would generate goodwill among NDN participants, giving them a greater stake in the NDN's continued operation. Second, enhanced local procurement would get more goods to Afghanistan with fewer transport assets and shorter delivery times. Taken together, these advantages would make the NDN

less vulnerable to political risks and increase the quantity of goods it can deliver to the theatre. Rather than forcing a substantial and difficult change in Department of Defence procurement policies, the U.S. government should encourage small scale local producers to pool their resources, enabling them to meet the military's needs and standards. In the long term, the best solution to this problem may come from the private sector. With the proper encouragement and facilitation, the U.S. government can help commercial entities capitalize on this potentially lucrative opportunity and assist decentralized local suppliers in tapping into the military's sizable demand.

- Pakistan began the development of Gwadar with aid from China and has now engaged Singapore for the second phase of work. If the links to Kandahar were reopened, Gwadar would cut the transport time from Europe to Pakistan, India, and Southeast Asia substantially. Iran, with help from Russia and India, is developing competing port at Chabahar, but it is not as well situated as Gwadar for continental trade, that is already beginning to emerge.
- Strengthening NDN South has important political and strategic benefits. One, the viability of this route adds capacity and reduces dependence on Russia in the new northern transit corridors and strengthens key U.S. partners in the Caspian, Georgia and Azerbaijan. These

political and strategic considerations clearly compensate for the higher cost of the NDN South route. Every effort should be made to use this opportunity to improve transport infrastructure in these two countries to enhance their longer-term economic viability as a transit hub. One factor contributing to the higher costs of NDN South is Turkmenistan's refusal so far to agree to ground transport of nonlethal goods. This refusal forces NDN South to follow a more circuitous route from the Caspian up through Kazakhstan before coming back south to Uzbekistan. The United States should continue efforts to secure permission for nonlethal, overland transport through Turkmenistan.

Such a development would provide a third point of entry into northern Afghanistan (Uzbekistan and Tajikistan being the first two). Access to Turkmenistan would also allow ferries from Baku to offload in the port of Turkmen Bashi, providing an alternative to the Kazakh ports on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea.

- Disputes over water use, payment for natural gas and electricity, militant incursions, the status of ethnic minorities, and espionage have marred relations among countries in the region. Border closures are the all-too-frequent result. Inasmuch as these disputes could threaten NDN shipments, the United States should monitor relations among NDN states with particular

attention to incipient conflicts and, where appropriate, work quietly to facilitate a rapid resolution.

- Pakistan-based militants have already threatened to hit the NDN, and they may succeed if they try hard enough. Militants could also target U.S. or European assets in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, or Uzbekistan. NDN stakeholders, including regional governments, should discuss potential attack scenarios beforehand and develop common strategies for coordinating communications and altering security procedures if an attack, or attacks, take place.

Critical Analysis

The Russian route is not only costly, it is also time consuming. Apart from that, some American circles believe that the Russian route is fraught with dangerous implications for the long-term strategic interests of the US, not only in Afghanistan but also in the whole of South-west and Central Asia. This may lead to an increased US dependence on Russia for fighting an anti-Taliban war in Afghanistan, handing over a powerful leverage to the Russians in an area from where they were forcibly ousted two decades ago. The Russian supply route, running through the Central Asian Republics, could also ignite anti-American sentiments in the region, which is already beset with numerous social and political tensions. It could also become vulnerable to attacks by local militants in alliance with the Taliban. The Central Asian Republics fear

that the region will run the risk of increased Talibanization in case NATO supplies are allowed through this route.

Another possible route, theoretically, could be through Iran. A southern trade corridor linking Iran with Central Asia and Russia through Afghanistan has been developed with the help of India. She has recently completed the construction of a 218 kilometre long Zaranj Delaram road connecting land-locked Afghanistan to the Iranian port of Chabahar. The establishment of the Chabahar Free Zone Authority in 2002, within the framework of a Tehran-Kabul bilateral Trade Transit Agreement, is considered to be an important benchmark for carrying out Afghanistan's external trade in case transit trade arrangements with Pakistan run into trouble. Given the current status of US-Iran relations, there does not seem even the remotest possibility of NATO using this route for supplies. However, the route is open for use by Afghanistan for trade purposes, which can also include the import of items for use by foreign troops in Afghanistan. At least for Afghanistan and the international community, especially India, the route does provide an alternative for reducing their dependence on Pakistan for transit trade. Compared with the transit facility provided by Pakistan for logistics support to NATO troops fighting in Afghanistan, the northern route offered by Russia or the southern route through Iran markedly lack the capacity to meet the requirements of NATO forces in Afghanistan. This is the reason why the US war effort in Afghanistan is heavily

dependent upon the logistics support provided by Pakistan. But Pakistan is cautioned against taking this dependence for granted. As mentioned earlier, the ISAF authorities in Afghanistan are giving serious thought to finding some alternative routes for logistics support to avoid the attacks on supply vehicles and reduce their heavy dependence on Pakistan. NATO authorities may not be able to immediately find such an alternative given the enormous amount of supplies that need to be delivered to Afghanistan. But the process has started, and if NATO trucks and tankers are constantly targeted by the militants, the process may be accelerated.

Conclusion

The gradual increase in insurgent attacks, pilferage, kidnapping and other impediments on SDN have compelled the US policy makers to open new web of supply routes that can serve as an alternative source of cargo supplies into Afghanistan.

Although the NDN is no exception, but the network offers an important supply line for the U.S. military and, with expanded local procurement, could provide economic opportunities for many Afghans. In addition, if the NDN successfully stimulates other cross-border commercial activity between Afghanistan and its neighbours, even more jobs will be generated. By creating these opportunities, an enhanced NDN would give the civilian population a personal stake in ensuring its success and protecting it from insurgent activity.

The potential of the NDN to contribute to the counterinsurgency mission should not be discounted. Though the impetus behind the NDN is grounded in the military's immediate needs, its establishment nonetheless also offers a unique opportunity for the United States to help facilitate intercontinental trade. Such commerce can provide sustainable income for Afghanistan, deepen its integration with neighbouring states, and ultimately contribute to the country's stabilization. There is a need to address some situations which are expected to be a hurdle on the way. The recommendations given above are highly considerable. NDN South and Chabahar Sea port in Iran, these are the two most important corridors to transit NATO supplies and further they are to play an important role to boom up the trade relation among European and Asian states as land routes.

End Notes

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BOOK REVIEW

WOLPERT, STANLEY. INDIA AND PAKISTAN: CONTINUED CONFLICT OR COOPERATION?

(Los Angeles; University of California Press, 2010), PP.126.

Air Commodore Zia ul Haque Shamsi

The book 'India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation?' is the latest addition to Stanley Wolpert's works on the issues and personalities of South Asia. The book is divided into ten chapters over 126 pages. Keeping in view his vast experience and expertise of the region, this book appears to be a lucid narrative of the historical facts and incidents of distant and near past, and therefore best be seen as a routine work by an otherwise very accomplished and renowned writer.

In his introduction, the author, at the outset, declares Kashmir conflict as deadly, costly and the most dangerous of all prevailing disputes between the two neighboring nuclear states. He earnestly desires a peaceful resolution of the dispute, for which he is making contributions through his writings and organizing conferences with representations from all the concerned stakeholders.

First two chapters deal with the historical problems and the first Kashmir war of 1947-48. Wolpert begins with the narrative of the ancient Kashmir from the days of Emperor Asoka, who founded Srinagar as the capital of Kashmir during 269 to 232 BC. The author, very passionately describes the beauty of the Vale, its gardens, eclectic culture and the craftsmanship of its artisans. Islam's entry into Kashmir in the 11th century started to change the complexion of its predominantly Buddhist population. The author remembers the Rule of Zain-ul-Abidin (1420-70) as the golden period during which Hindus and Buddhists enjoyed equal rights. Mughal King Akbar annexed Kashmir into his kingdom in 1586. With decline of Mughal Empire, Kashmir was captured by Abdalis who proved very ruthless to the otherwise generous people of Kashmir. The people turned towards the Ruler of Punjab for help, and Sikh Maharaja Ranjit Singh responded positively to their call. Subsequently, it was Dogra Rajput Gulab Singh who brought both, Jammu and Kashmir together as one state which proved to be the largest Indian state during the British era. However, at the time of partition in 1947, its

ruler Hari Singh could not decide about the accession to Pakistan, though Muslim population of his state stood at 77% at the time. Hence began the period uncertainty, bloodshed and an unending struggle of the people of Kashmir for their right of self determination.

The author is extremely critical of Lord Mountbatton's role in hurrying up the process of partition. Mountbatten was not aware of the history and culture of the subcontinent, and unnecessarily tempered with drawings of the partition maps by Radcliffe, who himself was a stranger to Indian conditions. Mountbatton obliged Nehru by handing over Gurdaspur district to India so that land route to Kashmir could be secured and Ferozpur for its hydroelectric generation capability. This unjustifiable action alone led to the large scale killings in the process of intra-state migrations.

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Graham of North Carolina and Sir Owen Dixon of Australia. However, while writing about the assassination of Pakistan's first Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, the author has made a factual error that he was killed at Pakistan's army headquarters while addressing its officers corps (p.25). In fact, late Prime Minister was addressing a public gathering in the Company Bagh, later named after him, Liaquat National Park, in Rawalpindi on 16 October, 1951. The author links Liaquat's killing with Pakistan army's rise into state's politics, and interestingly quotes Nehru who once said, "Most nations have an army but Pakistan's army has a nation" (p. 26). Towards the end of the chapter, he describes how Pakistan joined the western block during the early years of the cold war.

In Chapter III, 'The Second Indo-Pakistani War', Wolpert describes the events related to Sino-Indian war of 1962; Bhutto's entry into Pakistan's establishment, Ayub's military takeover in Pakistan, and his expectations from Nehru on resolution of Kashmir dispute. However, Nehru rejected Ayub's offers of talks on Kashmir by declaring him, "as a 'lackey' of Washington, as well as the usurper of Pakistani civil

power” (p.31). Ayub on the other hand, consolidated his power and improved relations with US and received lot of new military hardware, about which Nehru was assured, would never be used against India. The author then briefly writes how Bhutto convinced Ayub, after Nehru’s death in 1964 that now was the time to “take back” Kashmir - thus starting the sequence of armed engagements between India and Pakistan. Rann of Kutch in the south and ‘Operation Gibraltar’ in the north were all part of the same effort. The author, very firmly believes that the operation proved disastrous due to Bhutto’s insistence on its urgency. He also opines that the entire events of 1965 were Ayub’s most humiliating defeat, facing which he begged US President Johnson for an immediate cease-fire, who not only froze all military assistance to Pakistan but also referred the case to Russians to mediate (p. 32). Subsequently, the cordial talks were held between Ayub and Shastri at Tashkent in January 1966, in which the two leaders pledged to make a fresh start toward the peace and prosperity of their people. Bhutto being Pakistan’s foreign minister, was extremely unhappy on the outcome of the talks and declared

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In Chapter-IV, ‘The Third Indo-Pakistani War and the Birth of Bangladesh’, Wolpert traces back the seeds of separation into the issues related to ‘Urdu-Bengali’ language. The author makes a mention of Quaid-i-Azam’s speech in Dacca during his first visit after the creation of Pakistan in which he declared that official language of Pakistan would be Urdu only. Wolpert also hints at Jinnah’s accepting divided

Pakistan comprising 'moth-eaten' pieces offered by Mountbatten. Due to his poor health, Jinnah did not want to delay the partition any longer. The two wings got divided by votes by the people in 1970 elections, before the formal creation of Bangladesh as Bengalis voted for Mujib and the majority of West Pakistanis voted for Bhutto's newly formed Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Wolpert briefly writes about the Bhutto's role during the 1971 crisis and India's support to Bangladesh insurgency, which ultimately led to a full scale war culminating in the creation of a separate homeland for Bengalis. Rest of the chapter is a narrative of the important events such as Bhutto's speech at the UN, his return to Pakistan as the new President, and Mujib's arrival in Dacca. Wolpert praises Indira Gandhi for brilliance in diplomacy and strategic acumen during the entire episode of the creation of Bangladesh. He concludes the chapter with a somber observation that in less than quarter of a century since its birth, Pakistan not only lost more than half of its population but also "the respect of most of the world" (p.45).

In Chapter-V, 'From the Simla Summit to Zia's Coup', Wolpert explains how Bhutto recovered the defeated nation and earned massive concessions from India at the Simla summit in 1972. However, he writes about "93,000 Bihari prisoners back" (p.48), whereas the fact is that these were Pakistani soldiers who were taken prisoners of war after the tragic surrender at of Dacca on 16 December 1971. Another important feature of the summit was the agreement reached between Bhutto and Indira to "settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations" and renaming the UN cease-fire line as "Line of Control" (p.47). He observes that "no mention was made of any future plebiscite in Kashmir", for which Bhutto was bitterly criticized at home for selling out Kashmir; a charge he vehemently rejected. Bhutto, he writes, very ably navigated the country on path of progress and in 1974 organized an Islamic summit conference attended by 38 heads of Muslim states. He goes on to write about India's first nuclear test in May 1974, and Bhutto's effort to match the capability by launching Pakistan's own programme under Dr A. Q. Khan. Wolpert declares that General Zia's

selection as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) was Bhutto's 'fatal mistake'. Wolpert also correctly analyses the reasons of Bhutto's ouster by his trusted General Zia, after street riots due to massive riggings in 1977 elections. Wolpert then writes about Bhutto's arrest and his trials for the murder of one of his political opponents, and points a finger at Zia's high court as being 'Punjabi'. He also makes a mention of Bhutto's writings from his cell in which prophesied that if he was eliminated 'Sind is [will] not be part of Pakistan' (p.52). He concludes the chapter with the remarks that Zia remained in power because of Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan.

In Chapter VI, 'Afghanistan's Impact on Indo-Pakistani Relations', Wolpert briefly outlines the historical overview of British desire and effort to reach Kabul to check invasions into India through the Khyber Pass. He also touches upon the Russian moves toward south in pursuit of the 'Great Game', before writing about how the Soviet forces moved into Afghanistan. Here, author makes a mention that Indira was initially reluctant in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, until she was cautioned by her aides on

Chanakiya's philosophy that one's "neighbor's neighbor" was always 'the friend' (p.56). Moreover, she was weary of Zia's fundamentalist approach and support to thousands of Pathan mujahedeen. He describes the happenings of Zia's regime including his mysterious death due to tragic accident of the C-130 on 17 August 1988. He also mentions Indira's assassination on October 1984 following Indian army's action on Sikh's sacred place 'Golden Temple' in Amritsar. In the same breadth, he very briefly writes about the Indian occupation of Siachin and its ill effects due to its location and climate. However, he does not criticize India for her actions in violation of Simla Accord. Prime Ministers Benazir and Rajiv Gandhi's short and useful interaction is viewed positively by the author. He is critical of Rajiv's style of leadership which lacked "initiative and energy" in crucial state affairs (p.60). Then, on he runs through two tenures of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, Soviet departure and rise of Taliban in Afghanistan. He is critical about ISI's role in politics of Pakistan, and also makes a mention of Benazir's husband - Asif Ali Zardari - for being corrupt and a reason for her two time ouster from

power. The author draws an interesting comparison between Benazir and Sharif on Kashmir policy observing that the former was seen as more inclined to accept LoC as international border.

In Chapter-VII, 'Pakistan's Proxy War and Kashmir's Azaadi Revolution', Wolpert focuses on Kashmir's Azaadi (freedom) movement for which he points a finger at Pakistan's ISI. However, he does trace back the unrest to Indira's tenure, during which Indian troops were amassed in the Vale. He also writes about Kashmir elections and Governor Jagmohan's iron rule of the state in 1990, who believed that the "bullet was the only solution for Kashmir militants" (p.66). Yet, he reminds the readers about ISI's role in supporting the uprising by Kashmiri youth as well as the role of Lashkar-e-Taiyba (LeT). He is of the view that because of Jihadi outfit's involvement, Azaadi revolution turned into terrorist movement due to which an "estimated 130,000 people migrated to Jammu" (p.68). India, he writes, launched an aggressive counter insurgency "catch-and-kill" strategy in the Vale due to which tens of thousands of young Kashmiris "disappeared", a

majority of whom were taken away by LeT and “ISI-trained group Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)” (p.68). By mid 1995, he views that the Azzadi movement had “cooled down” and the state government organized the elections in September 1996, in which Farooq Abdullah became the Chief Minister again.

In Chapter-VIII, ‘Recent Attempts to Resolve the Escalating Conflict’, the author writes about the nuclear tests by both nations, after which the entire international community got extremely concerned about safety of over one billion people of the region. He is appreciative of all the major world leaders who made sincere efforts that proved fruitful. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visited Lahore where a landmark agreement ‘Lahore declaration’ was signed calling for mutual cooperation and bilateral dialogue on all issues including Jammu and Kashmir. However, the process was derailed by events in Kargil, where Pakistani troops had occupied Indian empty posts on the LoC. He writes that Vajpayee protested to Sharif and President Clinton strongly advised Pakistan to withdraw from the Kargil heights. Sharif surprised everybody when he revealed that his army chief General Musharraf had

acted at his own. Subsequently, Sharif accepted Clinton's advice of pulling back his troops. Musharraf, he writes, did not swallow Sharif's surrender under Clinton's pressure and overthrew him in October 1999 to become country's Chief Executive. Sharif was arrested on charges for treason, but was allowed to leave the country for ten years to Saudi Arabia. At this stage, Wolpert draws a brief comparison of the two countries political culture; India's robust democracy and Pakistan's comfort under the military dominance. He believes that Pakistan needs Indian democracy's assistance to fight the menace of extremism and terrorism. He also refers to common calls by influential leaders on both sides of the divide to go for "preventive war", even under nuclear over hang. General Sunderji's, referred as the India's boldest chief of army staff, 'Exercise Brasstacks' is seen an effort in this context. However, military engagement was averted with due diligence and restraint. Wolpert, reminds his readers about Musharraf's initiative in Kargil in 1999, which could only be averted with active intervention by US President Clinton. Subsequently, he quickly narrates 9/11 incidents, Musharraf's

decision to side with US in war on terror, US decision to move to Iraq rather prematurely, Indian Parliament attack on 13 December 2001, and a long stand-off between the two armed forces until US declared the place too dangerous for the American citizens to travel. The author bitterly criticizes that billions of dollars donated by the US for institutional capacity building were spent unaccounted for and Pakistan continues to slide deeper in despair for lack of security and deteriorating of law and order in the country.

Chapter-IX is titled as “The Stalled Peace Process”. In this chapter, author briefly describes Vajpaae-Musharraf efforts to improve bilateral relations from the SAARC platform by launching a number of confidence building measures (CBMs), most noteworthy amongst them being the ‘Peace Bus’ between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar, dialogue on Siachin and Sir Creek. At this juncture, the author writes a page on the most uncalled for political unrest due to Musharraf’s gravest error of his tenure; removed of the Chief Justice of Pakistan from his office on charges of corruption. This took the country by storm and Musharraf’s efforts to patch up with Benazir and

removal of his uniform to serve as civilian President could not save him for too long. Benazir's coming back home was short-lived and she was assassinated on 27 December 2007, at the same stadium in Rawalpindi where the first Pakistani PM Liaquat Ali Khan was killed. Yet, the elections were held in Pakistan under Musharraf. PPP rode on the sentiments of the people after the killing of their beloved leader Benazir. However, her tragic death paved the way for her husband - Asif Ali Zardari - who was once referred as 'Mr 10 percent' for his corruption. Military actions in Swat also find a mention in this chapter. Rest of the chapter is narration of terror incidents in Pakistan, including Marriot bombings, attack on Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore. After the terror attacks in Mumbai by Lashkar affiliates on 26 November 2008, the tension between the two states rose to newer heights. On the other hand, President Zardari resisted to popular calls for restoring the Chief Justice but succumbed to Nawaz-led long march for his restoration. At this stage, the author turns his attention to some of serious issues in India; like 'Babri Masjid', the rise Hindutva during BJP rule, and Gujrat

massacre of the Muslims for which he puts the blame squarely on Chief Minister Modi. The author turns toward Kashmir where the movement erupted again in June 2008, when the Congress-led state government tried to appease the Hindus by offering land to Amarnath Shrine Board, a decision which had to be reversed under mass protests. The author ends the chapter with the observation of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon that, 'the Kashmir question.....of nearly six decades will not go away and an effort is urgently required to resolve it" (p-93).

Chapter-X, titled as 'Potential Solutions to the Kashmir Conflict', is by far the most interesting chapter of the book. Here, he makes an attempt to outline possible solution which unfortunately is not new. Vajpayee-Musharraf effort of 2004 is referred as 'last try', which primarily was the acceptance of present LoC as the international border. However, Pakistan's 'Punjabi military' did not support the idea and Musharraf had to regress. Wolpert is of the opinion that Pakistan is internally so weak that it cannot effectively provide support to Kashmir cause. His support for statuesque should not be taken as

approval of Indian atrocities against the poor Kashmiris who have suffered immensely in last six decades. He praises Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's effort for the solution through bilateral dialogue; however Mumbai incident is seen as the major impediment. Wolpert proposes the creation of 'Pakistan Quaid Service Corps' on the pattern of 'AmeriCorps' to build their capacity and contribute for nation-building. Author describes an ordinary American's frustration on the internal situation in Pakistan with regard to terrorists' acts and their desire of lasting peace in the country. Towards the end, he writes about some of the Jehadi outfits which are actively involved in extreme acts of violence in the country. He also makes a mention of Mumbai trials and its adverse affects on the ongoing dialogue between the two countries.

Wolpert's book, 'India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation?' attracts attention of the reader due to author's huge experience, and expertise in the context. I must admit that Wolpert has reported nearly all events and incidents of the past and near past to keep his work relevant. Surprisingly,

there are mistakes which do not go with the author's or publisher's name well.

It is with great authority and passion that he has concluded that Pakistan is internally too weak to support the Kashmir cause. Both, India and Pakistan, are nuclear weapon states, but India's status has been accepted, and concessions have been made after the Indo-US nuclear deal. At the same time, Pakistan continues to struggle for its recognition; primarily because of its failure to deal with extremism, and terrorism as per the demands of the international community. Pakistan, despite being the frontline state in war on terror has not been able to gather enough support for the just cause of Kashmir, whereas India has successfully projected Kashmiris' struggle of self determination as acts of terrorism. I partially agree with Wolpert's conclusion that Pakistan has not been able to effectively project, and protect the interests of the Kashmiri people since the Kargil episode, and than in the post 9/11 environment, particularly since the attack on the Indian Parliament in December, 2001.

Wolpert supports the idea of converting the LoC as the new international border between India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute is not new. This is puzzling for the reader because it comes from a person who has been so intimately involved with this particular conflict, and had made so much effort to highlight the plight of the Kashmiri people. Perhaps, he too is losing hope. However, his proposal to invoke the forum of SAARC for the support to resolve the Kashmir issue is noteworthy.

In my opinion, this book is one time read for the students of history to refresh the historical aspects of this 'hate-hate' relationship between the two nuclear neighbors, and remain abreast with the evolving situation. Also, a useful read for the policy making elite and the strategic community in Pakistan. However, as student of strategic studies, I had expected to learn something new and different from the author who is considered an authority on the political and historical dynamics of the area.

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In Chapter III, 'The Second Indo-Pakistani War', Wolpert describes the events related to Sino-Indian war of 1962; Bhutto's entry into Pakistan's establishment, Ayub's military takeover in Pakistan, and his expectations from Nehru on resolution of Kashmir dispute. However, Nehru rejected Ayub's offers of talks on Kashmir by declaring him, "as a 'lackey' of Washington, as well as the usurper of Pakistani civil power" (p.31). Ayub on the other hand, consolidated his power and improved relations with US and received lot of new military hardware, about which Nehru was assured, would never be used against India. The author then briefly writes how Bhutto convinced Ayub, after Nehru's death in 1964 that now was the time to "take back" Kashmir - thus starting the sequence of armed engagements between India and Pakistan. Rann of Kutch in the south and 'Operation Gibraltar' in the north were all part of the same effort. The author, very firmly believes that the operation proved disastrous due to Bhutto's insistence on its urgency. He also opines that the entire events of 1965 were Ayub's most humiliating defeat, facing which he begged US President Johnson for an immediate cease-fire, who not only froze all military assistance to Pakistan but also referred the case to Russians to mediate (p. 32). Subsequently, the cordial talks were held between Ayub and Shastri at Tashkent in January 1966, in which the two leaders pledged to make a fresh start toward the peace and prosperity of their people. Bhutto being Pakistan's foreign minister, was extremely unhappy on the outcome of the

talks and declared that Ayub had “betrayed” Pakistan (p.34). He, then, describes how Bhutto, back home, exploited Ayub’s signing of Tashkent Agreement and raised his own political party aiming to oust his master and replace him in the presidency. However, the author has wrongly referred Bhutto as ‘Quaid-i-Azam’ instead of writing ‘Quaid-i-Awam’ (p-35), probably by mistake, because the English translation ‘leader of the people’ is done correctly. Also, in the next paragraph he writes 25 March as the Pakistan Day, whereas, Pakistan Day is celebrated on 23 March to commemorate to the passage of Pakistan Resolution in Lahore in 1940. Towards the end of the chapter, he makes a mention of 1970 elections in Pakistan and the beginning of troubles in East Pakistan.

In Chapter-IV, ‘The Third Indo-Pakistani War and the Birth of Bangladesh’, Wolpert traces back the seeds of separation into the issues related to ‘Urdu-Bengali’ language. The author makes a mention of Quaid-i-Azam’s speech in Dacca during his first visit after the creation of Pakistan in which he declared that official language of Pakistan would be Urdu only. Wolpert also hints at Jinnah’s accepting divided Pakistan comprising ‘moth-eaten’ pieces offered by Mountbatten. Due to his poor health, Jinnah did not want to delay the partition any longer. The two wings got divided by votes by the people in 1970 elections, before the formal creation of Bangladesh as Bengalis voted for Mujib and the majority of West Pakistanis voted for Bhutto’s newly formed Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). Wolpert briefly writes about the Bhutto’s role during the 1971 crisis and India’s support to Bangladesh insurgency, which ultimately led to a full scale war culminating in the creation of a separate homeland for Bengalis. Rest of the chapter is a narrative of the important events such as Bhutto’s speech at the UN, his return to Pakistan as the new President, and Mujib’s arrival in Dacca. Wolpert praises Indira Gandhi for brilliance in diplomacy and strategic acumen during the entire episode of the creation of Bangladesh. He

concludes the chapter with a somber observation that in less than quarter of a century since its birth, Pakistan not only lost more than half of its population but also “the respect of most of the world” (p.45).

In Chapter-V, ‘From the Simla Summit to Zia’s Coup’, Wolpert explains how Bhutto recovered the defeated nation and earned massive concessions from India at the Simla summit in 1972. However, he writes about “93,000 Bihari prisoners back” (p.48), whereas the fact is that these were Pakistani soldiers who were taken prisoners of war after the tragic surrender at of Dacca on 16 December 1971. Another important feature of the summit was the agreement reached between Bhutto and Indira to “settle their differences by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations” and renaming the UN cease-fire line as “Line of Control” (p.47). He observes that “no mention was made of any future plebiscite in Kashmir”, for which Bhutto was bitterly criticized at home for selling out Kashmir; a charge he vehemently rejected. Bhutto, he writes, very ably navigated the country on path of progress and in 1974 organized an Islamic summit conference attended by 38 heads of Muslim states. He goes on to write about India’s first nuclear test in May 1974, and Bhutto’s effort to match the capability by launching Pakistan’s own programme under Dr A. Q. Khan. Wolpert declares that General Zia’s selection as Chief of Army Staff (COAS) was Bhutto’s ‘fatal mistake’. Wolpert also correctly analyses the reasons of Bhutto’s ouster by his trusted General Zia, after street riots due to massive riggings in 1977 elections. Wolpert then writes about Bhutto’s arrest and his trials for the murder of one of his political opponents, and points a finger at Zia’s high court as being ‘Punjabi’. He also makes a mention of Bhutto’s writings from his cell in which prophesied that if he was eliminated ‘Sind is [will] not be part of Pakistan’ (p.52). He concludes the chapter with the remarks that Zia remained in power because of Soviet’s invasion of Afghanistan.

In Chapter VI, 'Afghanistan's Impact on Indo-Pakistani Relations', Wolpert briefly outlines the historical overview of British desire and effort to reach Kabul to check invasions into India through the Khyber Pass. He also touches upon the Russian moves toward south in pursuit of the 'Great Game', before writing about how the Soviet forces moved into Afghanistan. Here, author makes a mention that Indira was initially reluctant in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, until she was cautioned by her aides on Chanakya's philosophy that one's "neighbor's neighbor" was always 'the friend' (p.56). Moreover, she was weary of Zia's fundamentalist approach and support to thousands of Pathan mujahedeen. He describes the happenings of Zia's regime including his mysterious death due to tragic accident of the C-130 on 17 August 1988. He also mentions Indira's assassination on October 1984 following Indian army's action on Sikh's sacred place 'Golden Temple' in Amritsar. In the same breadth, he very briefly writes about the Indian occupation of Siachin and its ill effects due to its location and climate. However, he does not criticize India for her actions in violation of Simla Accord. Prime Ministers Benazir and Rajiv Gandhi's short and useful interaction is viewed positively by the author. He is critical of Rajiv's style of leadership which lacked "initiative and energy" in crucial state affairs (p.60). Then, on he runs through two tenures of Benazir and Nawaz Sharif, Soviet departure and rise of Taliban in Afghanistan. He is critical about ISI's role in politics of Pakistan, and also makes a mention of Benazir's husband - Asif Ali Zardari - for being corrupt and a reason for her two time ouster from power. The author draws an interesting comparison between Benazir and Sharif on Kashmir policy observing that the former was seen as more inclined to accept LoC as international border.

In Chapter-VII, 'Pakistan's Proxy War and Kashmir's Azaadi Revolution', Wolpert focuses on Kashmir's Azaadi (freedom) movement for which he points a finger at Pakistan's ISI. However,

he does trace back the unrest to Indira's tenure, during which Indian troops were amassed in the Vale. He also writes about Kashmir elections and Governor Jagmohan's iron rule of the state in 1990, who believed that the "bullet was the only solution for Kashmir militants" (p.66). Yet, he reminds the readers about ISI's role in supporting the uprising by Kashmiri youth as well as the role of Lashkar-e-Taiyba (LeT). He is of the view that because of Jihadi outfit's involvement, Azaadi revolution turned into terrorist movement due to which an "estimated 130,000 people migrated to Jammu" (p.68). India, he writes, launched an aggressive counter insurgency "catch-and-kill" strategy in the Vale due to which tens of thousands of young Kashmiris "disappeared", a majority of whom were taken away by LeT and "ISI-trained group Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)" (p.68). By mid 1995, he views that the Azzadi movement had "cooled down" and the state government organized the elections in September 1996, in which Farooq Abdullah became the Chief Minister again.

In Chapter-VIII, 'Recent Attempts to Resolve the Escalating Conflict', the author writes about the nuclear tests by both nations, after which the entire international community got extremely concerned about safety of over one billion people of the region. He is appreciative of all the major world leaders who made sincere efforts that proved fruitful. Prime Minister Vajpayee's visited Lahore where a landmark agreement 'Lahore declaration' was signed calling for mutual cooperation and bilateral dialogue on all issues including Jammu and Kashmir. However, the process was derailed by events in Kargil, where Pakistani troops had occupied Indian empty posts on the LoC. He writes that Vajpayee protested to Sharif and President Clinton strongly advised Pakistan to withdraw from the Kargil heights. Sharif surprised everybody when he revealed that his army chief General Musharraf had acted at his own. Subsequently, Sharif accepted Clinton's advice of pulling back his troops. Musharraf, he writes, did not swallow

Sharif's surrender under Clinton's pressure and overthrew him in October 1999 to become country's Chief Executive. Sharif was arrested on charges for treason, but was allowed to leave the country for ten years to Saudi Arabia. At this stage, Wolpert draws a brief comparison of the two countries political culture; India's robust democracy and Pakistan's comfort under the military dominance. He believes that Pakistan needs Indian democracy's assistance to fight the menace of extremism and terrorism. He also refers to common calls by influential leaders on both sides of the divide to go for "preventive war", even under nuclear over hang. General Sunderji's, referred as the India's boldest chief of army staff, 'Exercise Brasstacks' is seen an effort in this context. However, military engagement was averted with due diligence and restraint. Wolpert, reminds his readers about Musharraf's initiative in Kargil in 1999, which could only be averted with active intervention by US President Clinton. Subsequently, he quickly narrates 9/11 incidents, Musharraf's decision to side with US in war on terror, US decision to move to Iraq rather prematurely, Indian Parliament attack on 13 December 2001, and a long stand-off between the two armed forces until US declared the place too dangerous for the American citizens to travel. The author bitterly criticizes that billions of dollars donated by the US for institutional capacity building were spent unaccounted for and Pakistan continues to slide deeper in despair for lack of security and deteriorating of law and order in the country.

Chapter-IX is titled as "The Stalled Peace Process". In this chapter, author briefly describes Vajpae-Musharraf efforts to improve bilateral relations from the SAARC platform by launching a number of confidence building measures (CBMs), most noteworthy amongst them being the 'Peace Bus' between Muzaffarabad and Srinagar, dialogue on Siachin and Sir Creek. At this juncture, the author writes a page on the most uncalled for political unrest due to Musharraf's gravest error of his tenure; removed of the Chief Justice of Pakistan from his office

on charges of corruption. This took the country by storm and Musharraf's efforts to patch up with Benazir and removal of his uniform to serve as civilian President could not save him for too long. Benazir's coming back home was short-lived and she was assassinated on 27 December 2007, at the same stadium in Rawalpindi where the first Pakistani PM Liaquat Ali Khan was killed. Yet, the elections were held in Pakistan under Musharraf. PPP rode on the sentiments of the people after the killing of their beloved leader Benazir. However, her tragic death paved the way for her husband - Asif Ali Zardari - who was once referred as 'Mr 10 percent' for his corruption. Military actions in Swat also find a mention in this chapter. Rest of the chapter is narration of terror incidents in Pakistan, including Marriot bombings, attack on Sri Lankan cricket team in Lahore. After the terror attacks in Mumbai by Lashkar affiliates on 26 November 2008, the tension between the two states rose to newer heights. On the other hand, President Zardari resisted to popular calls for restoring the Chief Justice but succumbed to Nawaz-led long march for his restoration. At this stage, the author turns his attention to some of serious issues in India; like 'Babri Masjid', the rise Hindutva during BJP rule, and Gujrat massacre of the Muslims for which he puts the blame squarely on Chief Minister Modi. The author turns toward Kashmir where the movement erupted again in June 2008, when the Congress-led state government tried to appease the Hindus by offering land to Amarnath Shrine Board, a decision which had to be reversed under mass protests. The author ends the chapter with the observation of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon that, 'the Kashmir question.....of nearly six decades will not go away and an effort is urgently required to resolve it' (p-93).

Chapter-X, titled as 'Potential Solutions to the Kashmir Conflict', is by far the most interesting chapter of the book. Here, he makes an attempt to outline possible solution which unfortunately is not new. Vajpayee-Musharraf effort of 2004 is referred as 'last try', which primarily was the

acceptance of present LoC as the international border. However, Pakistan's 'Punjabi military' did not support the idea and Musharraf had to regress. Wolpert is of the opinion that Pakistan is internally so weak that it cannot effectively provide support to Kashmir cause. His support for statuesque should not be taken as approval of Indian atrocities against the poor Kashmiris who have suffered immensely in last six decades. He praises Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's effort for the solution through bilateral dialogue; however Mumbai incident is seen as the major impediment. Wolpert proposes the creation of 'Pakistan Quaid Service Corps' on the pattern of 'AmeriCorps' to build their capacity and contribute for nation-building. Author describes an ordinary American's frustration on the internal situation in Pakistan with regard to terrorists' acts and their desire of lasting peace in the country. Towards the end, he writes about some of the Jehadi outfits which are actively involved in extreme acts of violence in the country. He also makes a mention of Mumbai trials and its adverse affects on the ongoing dialogue between the two countries.

Wolpert's book, 'India and Pakistan: Continued Conflict or Cooperation?' attracts attention of the reader due to author's huge experience, and expertise in the context. I must admit that Wolpert has reported nearly all events and incidents of the past and near past to keep his work relevant. Surprisingly, there are mistakes which do not go with the author's or publisher's name well.

It is with great authority and passion that he has concluded that Pakistan is internally too weak to support the Kashmir cause. Both, India and Pakistan, are nuclear weapon states, but India's status has been accepted, and concessions have been made after the Indo-US nuclear deal. At the same time, Pakistan continues to struggle for its recognition; primarily because of its failure to deal with extremism, and terrorism as per the demands of the international community. Pakistan,

despite being the frontline state in war on terror has not been able to gather enough support for the just cause of Kashmir, whereas India has successfully projected Kashmiris' struggle of self determination as acts of terrorism. I partially agree with Wolpert's conclusion that Pakistan has not been able to effectively project, and protect the interests of the Kashmiri people since the Kargil episode, and than in the post 9/11 environment, particularly since the attack on the Indian Parliament in December, 2001.

Wolpert supports the idea of converting the LoC as the new international border between India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir dispute is not new. This is puzzling for the reader because it comes from a person who has been so intimately involved with this particular conflict, and had made so much effort to highlight the plight of the Kashmiri people. Perhaps, he too is losing hope. However, his proposal to invoke the forum of SAARC for the support to resolve the Kashmir issue is noteworthy.

In my opinion, this book is one time read for the students of history to refresh the historical aspects of this 'hate-hate' relationship between the two nuclear neighbors, and remain abreast with the evolving situation. Also, a useful read for the policy making elite and the strategic community in Pakistan. However, as student of strategic studies, I had expected to learn something new and different from the author who is considered an authority on the political and historical dynamics of the area.