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**AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES:
A CENTERPIECE OF US-AFGHANISTAN
DRAWDOWN POLICY BEYOND 2014**

Ms. Afifa Kiran

Abstract

Afghanistan internal dynamics did not allow the society to prosper peacefully and the confrontations at various tiers continued between ethnic groups to dominate Afghanistan through power projection. Keeping in view the global economic pressure, America may fail to muster economic supports from its allies for very long time and the possibility for the US to support its client in Afghanistan alone become difficult. Thus, permanent solution to the Afghan problems lies from within and can't be imposed by external forces. Therefore, understanding international dynamics of Afghanistan is crucial to develop such strategy to bring sustainable peace in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been and would continue to be an important player in the outcome of Afghanistan issue. While Pakistan may not be able to help the US to win a lost war, but without Pakistan's support, the US can't even lose the war gracefully.

“The first step toward building a national army in Afghanistan is broadening the base of the government, which will promote political stability, public trust, and security in the country.”¹

Introduction

Building capable Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is the central pillar of the US–Afghanistan drawdown policy beyond 2014. On May 21, 2012, the leaders of the 50 countries contributing to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) mission in Afghanistan met in Chicago and agreed to a new transition plan that would put Afghan Security Forces in charge of security throughout the country by 2013.² US strategy for Afghanistan is critically reliant upon the transfer of responsibility to the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) for fighting the miscreants in Afghanistan. Towards that end, United States and its coalition partners have been building the ANSF to a combined strength of 352,000 soldiers and police which will cost \$4.1 billion per year to maintain a force of this size.³

Afghan National Security Forces are made up of two main forces; the Afghan National Army (ANA), including Afghan Air Force (AAF) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) under the authority of the Ministries of Defense and Interior of Afghanistan. For the security after 2014, the ANSF are being prepared by NATO forces to play their due roles. In this regard, these factors are critical. US-NATO should not regress from paying for the Afghan army and police. Their overall funding has been set at \$4.1 billion a year for a slightly smaller force than the current one, with \$3.6 billion provided by foreign donors.⁴ Americans and the Afghans must quickly reach a

bilateral security deal. US will keep up to 20,000 forces in the country to train the ANSF and assist it with logistics, air support, medical evacuation and intelligence.⁵ The ISAF participating countries have committed and re-committed at various level summits held at Lisbon, Bonn, Istanbul, Chicago, and lately at Tokyo to support Afghanistan over the next one decade.⁶ While Afghan National Army (ANA) operational capabilities, by all accounts, continue to grow, the Army continues to contend with critical gaps and challenges. Like the Iraqi Army, the ANA lacks sufficient enablers, including logistic, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR), and air capabilities such as Close Air Support (CAS). It heavily depends on US and coalition forces for all kinds of support.

Security is fragile in Afghanistan. There are limited government resources to provide protection. ISAF fundamental strategy is to build strong ANSF to enforce security throughout Afghanistan. There now are about 67,000 US troops in Afghanistan, and their mission is evolving from combat to advising, assisting and training Afghan forces. Apart from strict follow-up approach by US, Afghan army is still incompetent in terms of capabilities. Without US/NATO military support, Afghan army is unable to conduct Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN).

In fact, army combat readiness has been undermined by weak recruitment and retention policies, inadequate logistics, insufficient training and equipment and inconsistent leadership. The long term stability of Afghanistan is linked with

sustenance of Afghan economy. Logistics is still an issue due to variety of reasons. In addition, the ANA faces a significant demographic gap of personnel between the ages of 35 and 55, the legacy of Afghanistan's recent history of warfare. While the ANA can draw on its "older" personnel now to serve in leadership capacities, it will effectively take a generation to fully train and prepare the next contingent of ANA senior leaders. Further, ANA suffers from a ravaged supply of Afghan human capital. Moreover, an enduring concern is the ethnic makeup of the ANA. After years of civil war and mistrust among various groups in Afghanistan, achieving an ethnic balance has been a significant challenge.

This study is envisioned as analysis of US drawdown plan which includes the development of ANSF for handling future security of Afghanistan. This paper provides an overview of present status of ANSF with US efforts to improve and facilitate the training and development of Afghan security forces till 2014. It covers emerging structure of the Afghan security forces including its preparation level and major challenges that ANSF are facing with regards to their financing, training and security.

An Overview of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)

Afghans future security is related with the overall performance of the ANA. Efforts to rebuild the ANA have been going on for about six years, and the judgments about its progress and displayed performance have been mixed. The

overall standing of ANA revolves around the factors like manpower, infrastructure, training, operational proficiency, and most importantly, public perceptions. While the progress on the first four factors is steadily growing and would still take lot of time, if ANA is to succeed, however, it is encouraging that Afghan people view its army positively.⁷ Within Afghanistan's National Security Forces, **ANP organization includes Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP): 84,000, Afghan Border Police (ABP): 22,200, Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP): 16,500; and others: (Intelligence, Anti-crime/ CID, Counter Narcotics, Fire, Medical) 18,200.**⁸

Major Responsibilities of ANSF

Major responsibilities of ANSF are as under:-

- Serve as a frontline security force against Taliban.
- Provide an Afghan face to the security in Afghanistan.
- To maintain law and order and security in Afghanistan beyond 2014 when bulk of NATO forces would have been withdrawn.

Afghan National Army

The President of Afghanistan is the Commander-in-Chief of the military, acting through the Ministry of Defense that is headed by General Abdul Rahim Wardak. The National Military Command Center in Kabul serves as the headquarters of the Afghan armed forces.

Table 1-Number of Afghan Security Forces

Month	ANF	ANP	Total Afghan Security Forces
December 2011	179,610	143,800	323,410
January 2012	184,437	145,577	330,014
February 2012	187,874	148,932	336,806
March 2012	194,466	149,642	344,108
December 2012	195,000	157,000	352000 ⁹

Structurally, ANA is divided into six regional Corps of two to four brigades, with about 195,000 active troops as of June 2012¹⁰. Each brigade (4000) is comprised infantry kandaks (Afghan battalions), combat support kandaks, and combat service support kandaks in Central, Southern, Eastern, Western and Northern Afghanistan. These Infantry Battalions and the Brigade HQs are capable of conducting operations with minimal ISAF support.

Afghan National Army Current Deployment by Province and Area	
ANA Corps Commands	Province (Area)
201 Sailab ("Flood")	Kabul (Pul-e-Charkhi) (Central Afghanistan)
203 Tandar ("Thunder")	Gardez (Eastern Afghanistan)
205 Atal ("Hero")	Kandahar (Southern Afghanistan)
207 Zafar ("Victory")	Herat (Western Afghanistan)
209 Shaheen ("Falcon")	Mazar-e-Sharif (Northern Afghanistan)

Source: US Department of Defense, 2009.

The ethnic balance of the ANA remains an issue. Currently, Tajiks are overrepresented based on their share of the population, and Hazaras and Uzbeks are underrepresented.

Major Military Operations: ANA has conducted 90 percent of all operations with US/NATO troops, however, they have lead some 40 percent of operations themselves. Some of the successful operations are mentioned as under:-

- Operation Achilles.
- Battle of Musa Qala.
- Operation Panther's Claw.
- Operation Eagle's Flight.
- Operation Khanjar (Strike of the Sword).

Afghan Air Force: Afghan Air Force now has 134 trained pilots and has 98 aircrafts including gunship, attack and transport helicopters and light aircrafts. Shindand Airbase is a newly built airbase which will enable Afghanistan to develop its own air training capability.

	AAF Current Force Level	
Nov 09	Oct 12	2016
-	4,257	8,060

Afghan National Police: The role of the Afghan National Police is shifting from countering the insurgency to a more civilian policing role by further developing capabilities

from criminal investigations to traffic control. The ANP is composed of the following sub-agencies:-

ANP Current Force Level		
Nov 09	Oct 11	December 12
94,958	134,000	157,000

- **Afghan Uniform Police (AUP):** The AUP is the primary civil law enforcement agency in Afghanistan. It is divided into five regional command centres as well as the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Other forces falling under the command and control of the ANP include local traffic police departments and the fire department.
- **Afghan Border Police (ABP):** ABP is responsible for securing the borders of Afghanistan against the illegal entry of persons and the smuggling of illegal goods.
- **Afghan Highway Police:** The highway police is a sub-department of the national police that is currently being dissolved. Their primary responsibility is to provide traffic safety and overall security of the 'Ring

Road' highway that connects most of the major population centres in Afghanistan.

US Strategy for ANSF- Leading towards Transition

The basic approach of COIN operations in Afghanistan is “shape, clear, hold, build.” However, in recent years, it has shifted from COIN to (Security Force Assistance) SFA. To achieve the end, building the ANSF became one of the United States’ top priorities in Afghanistan. It has been realized at planning level that only professional, capable, respected, multi-ethnic ANSF, capable of directing, planning, commanding, controlling, training and supporting the ANSF would be the successful end state. At this point of time when US has announced its drawdown plans, it has become critical to build self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fight with minimum US support. Today, the US divides its strategy for fielding the ANA into three phases:-¹¹

- ANA Development.
- Transition to Afghan Primacy.
- Transition to Strategic Partnership.

In phase 1, the US, with coalition assistance, mans, equips, and trains a self-sustaining 122,000-man army. With an estimated population of 30 million people, it would not seem difficult to recruit an army of 122,000, particularly given the salaries, which are very good relative to the civilian population. In Phase 2, ISAF teams evaluate the ability of ANA units to conduct independent operations for six

consecutive months. In Phase 3, the ANA continues to conduct independent operations capable of planning, executing, and supporting multi-unit operations without oversight, while the US-Afghan relationship transitions to a traditional security assistance partnership.

As part of the overall transition security responsibility to ANSF, starting in early 2012, the Army and Marine Corps began training and deploying small teams of advisors with specialized capabilities, referred to as Security Force Assistance Advisory Teams (SFAATs). These teams will be located throughout Afghanistan and will work with ANSF personnel from the headquarters to the battalion level and advice and assist in areas such as command and control and intelligence.¹²

NATO Support for Development of ANSF

NATO's involvement with the ANA and ANP largely involves assisting the Afghan government and the United States with the operational employment and training of the ANA units. Germany was given lead role for training the ANP. In February 2002, representatives from 18 nations met in Berlin to discuss details of the ANP support mission. COIN efforts in Konar province in Eastern Afghanistan, along the border with Pakistan, are presented as an instructive model of future US and ANSF coordination. As in some areas in Afghanistan, US Army battalion working with a capable ANA unit first clear the area, and then establish outposts to provide

presence US forces, supported by a Provincial Reconstruction Team, then negotiated deals with local tribal shuras—if the shuras were provided security, they would receive economic development “in the form of roads, bridges, schools and health clinics.” The road gave forces the access they needed to secure village populations; it made it harder for insurgents. It gives civilian assistance agencies freedom of movement, and it gave local residents a critical tool to support economic development. In August 2002, the Germans officially instituted a three-year training plan for officers and a one year plan for Non-Commissioned Officers. As the largest donor for ANP training, the US assisted the German-led efforts.¹³ Although, early efforts had trained 35,000 officers in basic recruit schools during 2003 and 2004, this training was insufficient to strengthen the structures and senior command levels needed to create an effective police force. It receives funding, training and equipment from NATO states. Initially, it was Germany that took the lead role but later on various local and Federal government employees from the US as well as Germany and the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence Police provided most of the training.¹⁴

Table 2-Afghan Army Units Partnered with NATO

2007	2008	2009	2010	2012
0%	0%	10%	70%	89%

New Approaches- Lingerin Questions

US proposed level of Afghan troops is 352,000 approximately. However, keeping in view the threat environment in 2017, Center for US Army Analysis concluded that 230,000 ANSF would offer the best probability of success in given security milieu in Afghanistan. The military and political fracturing of Afghanistan would jeopardize core US interests such as preventing the reestablishment of safe havens for terrorists, forestalling regional conflict of the kind that Syria is now generating in the Middle East, and preventing the destabilization of careful but fragile regional stability.¹⁵ ANA would need around 6 billion dollars per annum to maintain such size of Army.

Major Challenges: Given the prevailing geopolitical setting and political environment in and around Afghanistan, the ANA is expected to provide military backing for the central government, which will entail offsetting the factional militias, disarming illegal armed groups, and backing up law enforcement agencies and other security forces in the country.

➤ **Formal Recruitment and Training Processes:**

The training period of ANA is just eight weeks. It is about one-half or less of the time any Army takes to turn an educated young recruit, from the same or similar human communities, into a disciplined professional soldier in an army based on the ethnicity-based regimental system. ANA has lack of training to

maintain equipment or if they broke once, ANA don't know how to fix modern equipment.

- **Inside Attacks:** Green on blue attacks by Afghan security forces on their NATO coalition partners have disturbingly increased. In 2007, it was only 2 incidents. However, in 2012, there have been 36 inside attacks which resulted into 51 casualties. Due to such situation, most of the collaboration confined at the battalion level. Out of all the attacks 2008-2012, over half (31 out of 60) took place in Kandahar, Farah, Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul. According to the report, 10% were by Taliban forces that had sneaked into Afghan military and police ranks.¹⁶ The implications of Green on blue attacks resulted into lack of trust felt by ISAF troops in terms of their ability to interact with Afghans that they are mentoring. An initial order to reduce the numbers of joint operations in September 2012 was in part motivated by a desire to reexamine the vetting procedure of Afghans joining the ANA or ANP¹⁷. It would be unsustainable for ISAF to permanently reduce the number of joint operations, especially given the small numbers of individuals involved in these attacks.¹⁸

**Table 3-Attacks by Afghan Security Forces against
Allied Troops¹⁹**

Year	Causalities	Attacks
2003-2009	12	N/A
2010	20	11
2011	35	21
2012	51	37

- **Security Challenges:** Al-Jazeera cites a recent analysis of Gilles Dorronsoro, Afghan expert with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, writes in recent analysis that “After 2014, the level of US support for the Afghan regime will be limited and, after a new phase in the civil war, a Taliban victory will likely follow.” Political competition is likely to turn violent on the heels of NATO’s withdrawal. “There is a real risk that the regime in Kabul could collapse upon NATO’s withdrawal,” said Candace Rondeaux, senior Afghanistan analyst. The security condition in Afghanistan does not support the reform program. In addition, corruption is a major issue in the Afghan society. The Transparency International reported that Afghanistan’s public sector ranks as the third most corrupt in the world. The previous US efforts to fight corruption met with failure and only resulted in worsening of ties. The operational and maintenance

cost of ANA is about \$3-4 billion per annum. According to Venda Felbab, “the post conflict Afghanistan had the lowest ratio of international peacekeeping troops to population as compared to other post conflict regions despite several heavily armed warlords”.²⁰

- **Corruption:** Corruption is one of the acute challenges which Afghanistan facing. Corruption among their officers, poor food and equipment, indifferent medical care, Taliban intimidation of their families and, probably most troublingly, a lack of belief in the army’s ability to fight the insurgents after the American military withdraws.²¹



- **Literacy and Leadership:** ANA is operating with 86% illiterate soldiers. There is insufficient ANSF

leadership capability specifically at junior officers/non-commissioned officers (NCOs) level. It will take lot of time to produce a leader. A significant majority of soldiers are illiterate, ANA training relies on methodologies that do not utilize written language; and a number of literacy instruction opportunities are available.

- **Financing:** Afghan economy is unlikely to match with its upcoming financial demands for establishing strong and capable ANSF. There is plan that the force level has to cut down by 120,000 troops by 2017. There is no clear direction as to where these well trained and battle hardened soldiers would be absorbed. In case, they are let free, it is anybody's guess as to where they would land up.²² In the US, Congress has budgeted \$12.8bn to support the ANSF for 2012, but Defence Secretary Robert Gates has said that level cannot be sustained for many years, meaning that much depends on a successful transition to the Afghans themselves. And at the moment, the Afghan government raises few national taxes to pay for its security force, despite its own ambitious plan to expand the final number of security forces by a quarter. Those on the front lines in Afghanistan working closely with the recruits of the ANA are all too aware that it is one thing to train and equip an army but another to lead and sustain it, which

is the ultimate aim in a very short time-frame indeed. For example, pay of Afghan police, starting with basic pay of about \$165 (£102) per month, which rises to roughly \$250 to \$280 per month when longevity bonuses are taken into account, or extra pay for specialisation or serving in the most high-threat areas such as Helmand and Kandahar. However, that pay is still below what a young recruit could earn by joining a private militia or security company. It is also below that offered by the insurgents, who pay \$10 (about £6) a day - assuming a recruit worked every day.

- **Logistics:** The logistics capacity of the Afghan national army and police does not seem to have caught up along with everyday operational capacity.²³ This is, somewhat, understandable given that logistics were not prioritized for many years, but it calls into question the sustainability of continued funding to the ANSF post-2014, when American logistics capacity will be heavily curtailed as a result of their own scaling-down; thus, even if money continues to be provided, it will be difficult for Afghan security forces to ensure the continued flow of supplies around the country without the air capacities, for example, that the current international troop levels facilitate. Moreover, the patches of stability that have appeared across the country do not appear to have meant an overall decline in the armed opposition's ability to carry out

attacks.²⁴If logistical problems persist, the Afghan army will have no choice but to close some of its bases, leaving the Taliban more room to maneuver.

- **Lack of Resources and Motivation:** Major challenge for the strong ANSF is the motivation. US is leaving around 200,000 Afghan soldiers without the equipment or wherewithal to defeat a resilient enemy. Moreover, 830 Afghan army personnel had been killed from April to November 2012. Afghan National Army and Taliban come from the culture that managed to drive out the British and the Russians; Afghans of any stripe will fight tenaciously even against great odds when the outcome matters to them. It is possible that the various insurgents simply care more about their mission. They may be paid a stipend, or ideologically motivated (pro-Islam or anti-foreigner), or politically opposed to the Karzai regime, or profiting from the drug trade, or simply happy with a job close to home. (It has been reported that most Taliban are fighting within 20 km of home.) The assignment of ANA soldiers often puts them some distance from home and in battles they do not want to fight. (Witness the number of desertions of ANA headed for Marjah in 2010.) While the ANA have gained respect from the population, at least relative to the police, they do not appear to be motivated by any great cause. There is

anecdotal evidence of families covering their bases with one son in the ANA and another in the Taliban.²⁵

- **Ethnic Composition:** Ethnic identity within ANSF is a core issue. Addressing the ethnic dimension of the identity discourse, which has emerged as one of the most daunting challenges in taking forward the process of state building and ‘reconciliation’ in Afghanistan.²⁶ There have been substantive efforts to recruit a balanced, ethnically diverse army, proportionally representative of Afghanistan’s population. Afghanistan has four dominant ethnic groups (42 percent Pashtun, 27 percent Tajik, 9 percent Hazara, and 9 percent Uzbek) and numerous smaller groups that constitute the remaining 15 percent.²⁷ The predominantly Pashtun southern and South Eastern provinces, Kandahar, Helmand, Oruzgan, Zabul, Paktika and Ghazni make up about 17 percent of Afghanistan’s total population, yet, they contributed just 1.5 percent of the soldiers recruited since 2009. ANA loyalty could not be trusted when the military moved against their home turf. In such cases the government usually disarmed units affiliated with the revolting area or tribe. As of summer 2012, that number has been reduced to 40 percent. For several years, the ANA has been nominally ethnically balanced, but it managed to recruit disproportionately low numbers of southern Pashtuns. Most of the

Pashtuns recruited for the ANA had come from central and northern Afghanistan.²⁸

- **High Desertion:** High rate of turnover in the ANA, driven by extremely high rates of desertion has serious implication for US strategy. Presently, Army's desertion rate is now 7 to 10 percent.

Present Shortfalls

US is facing serious disappointment to make the ANSF a full partner for transfer of lead security responsibility beyond 2014.

- There is lack of unity of command between ANSF and US/NATO forces across the operation areas in Afghanistan.
- There is a persistent lack of effective coordination among the ANSF.
- A lack of capability and willingness on the part of the government of Afghanistan to honestly and efficiently develop and deploy the security forces.
- In most of the conflict areas, ANSF is unwilling to directly deal with war loads and criminal figures, and insurgents.
- There is strong perception among ANSF that US/NATO would be unable to fund the ANSF till Afghanistan achieves enduring security and stability.
- Resources which are necessary to implement the transition goals and objectives are inadequate.

Expansion plan of ANSF demands adequate numbers of mentors and partners and to fund the level of effort required.

- No effort has been made to review and assess the motivation of ANSF forces by force element for recruiting, performance, motivation, and retention problems.
- A series of major shifts in the training effort for the ANP involving repeated changes of mission and policing concepts coupled to a failure to prepare police for the reality of counterinsurgency and the Taliban threat, and to tie police development to the creation of a practical approach to the rule of law that could provide a functioning mix of formal, informal, and prompt justice²⁹.
- A focus on creating large numbers of battalion sized Kandaks in the ANA with emphasis on quantity over quality, and formal training without effective mentoring and partnering of newly created units; failure to understand that newly formed units require extended training at the whole unit level.³⁰ Young officers lack adequate professional training. Many are former guerrilla fighters with no education. Many are illiterate. It will take at least ten years for Afghanistan to build a qualified officer corps, one which can help restore the military culture and replicate the units trained by the international community.

Way Forward

Key to Afghanistan's future stability will be a credible and inclusive presidential election in 2014, followed by a constitutional transfer of power.³¹ However, following factors are needed due consideration:-

- It is necessity to create effective forces on a financially sustained basis to compete with the Taliban and other insurgents.
- The ANSF has to be rationalized as per the population graph where Pashtun represents close to 60 percent of the total population.
- Afghanistan needs a military force capable of rapid deployment to any part of the country. This requires a force with high maneuverability and effectiveness. ANA needs to be composed of three elements:-
 - Defense force to maintain local stability, the lines of communication, and provide logistical support.
 - Mobile troops to security threats in their zone of deployment.
 - A central rapid deployment force to serve as the central reserve, responding to crises in any military zone.
- The persistent international funding commitments for building and training the national Afghan army. Insufficient funding will be devastating to the US ANA development plans beyond 2014.

- Maintenance/sustenance of the ANSF would continue to be serious challenge in the post US/ISAF drawdown. Although, pledges have been made to support ANA up to 2025, but it all depends as to what shape the security environment takes in Afghanistan and what kind of arrangements the ISAF would place before they leave. If the win-win situation is created, the ANSF would be able to perform as well as survive. But if Taliban are kept outside the power loop, then the chances of their success as well as stay as an organized force would be less.
- These Afghan “militias” are supposed to increase security in areas where ANA, ANP, and ISAF presence are highly limited.
- Effective military cohesion, leadership, particularly at the small unit level, is of vital importance. This further signifies the need for a highly trained and professionally effective officer and NCO corps, which is currently conspicuously absent in Afghanistan.
- Anti-corruption efforts should focus on limiting tribal or ethnic discrimination in access to jobs, especially in the ANA and ANP.
- Afghanistan security is vital to Pakistan national security interests. Strong and capable Afghan National Force would be an added factor for Pakistan to secure her western border. At the same time, Pakistan’s involvement is crucial for long term peace and

prosperity of this region as a whole, it is a reality that the US will have to live with it. If it does not happen, Pakistan will be at disadvantage and face the blow back.

Conclusion

Success will be all cosmetic and unreal, if real problem is not addressed properly. Due to inadequate troop levels, unit unity, bribery, and low literacy, and poor logistics systems, Afghanistan would not be able to operate and maintain its own security forces beyond 2014. The targets set for the Afghan security forces are extremely ambitious. Without effective logistics, close air support and better leadership, the Afghan army is likely to have an extremely tough time facing down the insurgency without the kind of US/NATO support, it currently enjoys. Success in the mission requires three parallel strands, Afghan Security Forces capable of keeping the Taliban from regaining control, credible governance at national and local level to give the Afghan people confidence in their democratically elected government, and economic development that gives Afghans a stake in their own future.

There is no military solution to the ongoing problem. The US can't win militarily even if it continues to fight for two more decades. It has the 'power' to disperse the Taliban, as it did within weeks of its invasion in October 2001. But it does not have the power to eliminate them from the fabric of Afghan society. Even placing of over 350, 000 Afghan troops are unlikely to yield the desired results in isolation, even

though they are well trained and well organized too, if political reforms are not compatible to the Afghan societal make up. The US can't achieve the lasting peace in Afghanistan by being selective as to who should and should not participate in the peace process. Thus, understanding internal dynamics of Afghan society is crucial to develop such a strategy. Besides Pakistan, other regional countries especially those which shares border with Afghanistan are also equally important to play their role.

End Notes

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CURBING THE MENACE OF VIOLENCE IN KARACHI

Ms. Asma Sana

Abstract

Karachi once the 'city of lights' has become a 'city of crime'. Since last three decades, it is overwhelmed by the menace of violence. The purpose of this research essay is to find out those systemic issues and social conditions that generated violence and bloodshed in Karachi. There is also a need to carve out possible solution which lies in roots of violence i.e. political fragmentation, economic disparity, lack of governance and alienation in society. The data used in the paper is based on secondary sources. The demographic and migration patterns of the city are analysed. The genesis of violence has also been traced in the history. The three dimensions of violence, ethno-political, sectarian and criminal has been examined for tracing out the factors of violence in the city. This paper focuses on ethnic, demographic, and political structure of Karachi and it highlights the causes and carving out the possible solutions for the curbing the menace of violence in Karachi.

Introduction

Karachi is a cosmopolitan city with the total population of 18 million,¹ spreads across 3,530 square kilometres. It is a hub of Pakistan's commercial activity and has a highest literacy rate i.e. up to 90 percent. The city is repeatedly hampered by the ethno-political, sectarian, militant, and criminal violence

erupted over the last three decades. Thousands of people have lost their lives in this violence. In the year 2012 alone, more than 1,800 people have been killed. Most of them were innocent common people.² In the first week of November 2012, Karachi alone counted for more than 90 deaths, mostly on the sectarian grounds.³

Economic stability of a country is essential for national stability. Karachi being the hub of economic activities plays a vital role in economic health of Pakistan. According to the official statistic, Karachi accounts for 25 percent of Pakistan's Gross Domestic Products (GDP), 65 percent of national income tax revenue⁴, 54 percent of central government tax revenues, and 30 percent of industrial output.⁵ Thus, peace and stability in Karachi provide guarantee to the economic security and subsequently, national security at large.

The violence in Karachi is a multifaceted phenomenon. The ethno-political tensions and demographic pressures provide a favourable environment to the terrorist organizations like Tehrek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to seek sanctuaries in Karachi. It is also significant as North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) supplies are transported through the Karachi port to Afghanistan.

From the perspective of domestic politics, Karachi is a battleground of political parties as all major political parties hold their influence in different ethnically segregated constituencies. Thus, clashes among those groups create chaos and law and order problem in the city. Violence is also

used as a tactic to influence decision-making at provincial or national level. To curb the violence in the city, the proposal to hand over Karachi to the Pakistan Army repeatedly emerged in different political debates.

In the above backdrop, the aim of this research essay is to find out possible solutions to eliminate the menace of violence in Karachi. The problem of violence in Karachi has genesis in the patterns of migration when the balance of ethnic composition transformed. The violence in Karachi is multifaceted; ethno-political, sectarian and even criminal elements are also involved. The actual factors of violence lie in struggle for land, resources, lack of law enforcement, weak judicial system, madrassas, socio-economic disparities, and lack of political representation. At the end, the recommendations are given for curbing violence in Karachi.

Migration Patterns

Karachi is not only a large city of Pakistan but also most diverse one, demographically. As a result of unplanned migration over the past many decades, the city is divided into planned and unplanned settlements. The migration towards Karachi has been identified in five phases.⁶


- The **first phase** was seen after partition when large number of refugees migrated from Northern India to Karachi which became a source to change the demographic profile of the city. These migrants are known to be Mohajirs and Urdu speaking community.

- The **second phase** of migrants was seen from the 1960s, when large number of Pashtuns from North Western area of Pakistan migrated to Karachi for better employment opportunities. Till 1980s, Pashtun population got hold of considerable squatter settlements.
- The **third phase** started from 1970s to 1990s, when large number of rural Sindhis shifted to Karachi for better jobs.
- The **fourth phase** started from the 1980s to 1990, when Afghanis and Iranian influx have been seen in Karachi due to Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and Islamic revolution in Iran.
- The **fifth phase** has been started from the 2001 after the US attack on Afghanistan. Large number of internally displaced people from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) migrated to Karachi as a result of military operations. The economic opportunities have been developed after opening of NATO supply lines also attracted people across country particularly from KPK to settle in the city.

Demographic Patterns

The last 1998 official census shows the demographic profile of Karachi by the linguistic breakdown as Urdu speaking (Mohajir) population at 48.52 percent, Punjabi 13.94, Pakhtun 11.42, Sindhis 7.22, Balochis 4.34, Seraiki 2.11 and other 12.4 percent.⁷ The geography shows the ethnic

patterns of Karachi. Language data in the 1998 census shows that District Central and District East were dominated by Urdu-speaking community.



Source 1998 Census

Ethnic Structure of Karachi (1998)

District	Urdu	Punjabi	Sindhi	Pushto	Balochi	Siraiki	Other
Karachi East	60.75	14.72	3.8	5.95	1.64	2.11	11.02
Karachi West	39.64	12.95	6	24.55	5.29	2.05	9.52
Karachi South	25.65	18.84	11.37	7.95	9.77	1.82	24.6
Karachi Central	73.57	8.63	1.59	4.56	0.77	2.3	8.58
Malir	15.87	17.46	25.08	20.67	8.51	2.36	10.06

Source 1998 Census

Violence in Karachi

Ethno-political Violence

The ethno-political landscape of Karachi can be identified as a major reason of violence in Karachi. The ethnic rioting has been a hallmark of Karachi's history. Many scholars regard it as a natural part of urbanization in a city that lacked proper planning. In such an environment, where different ethnic communities lived in ghettos, getting political control over an area resulted in violence. "MQM which consists of Urdu-speaking migrants set a plate for a face-off with Pukhtoons who control the transportation and construction arenas in Karachi."⁸ From 1947 to 1970, there was no delineation between ethnic parties and political parties in Karachi. The migrants joined Islamist Parties while others were on the side of Pakistan's People Party (PPP). However, in 1970s the ethno-political landscape changed with the policies of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to address Sindhis grievances. Under this policy, government introduced quota system, 60 percent state jobs and admission in government owned educational institutions were fixed for rural and 40 percent for urban population.⁹ Moreover, the language bill was also passed in July 1972 by the Sindh Legislative Assembly under which Sindhi was declared as the official language of the province and included as a compulsory subject in schools and colleges. Thus, it created grievances among the Mohajirs who regard it as conspiracy against them and the language riots broke out in 1972.


As a result, the first Mohajir Students Organization was formed in 1978 on ethnic lines. In mid 1980s, city politics became overly marginalized with the emergence of Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM), the party claimed to be a community of migrants and their descendants. PPP retained its support among the Sindhis and Balochis.

The ethnic violence erupted in the city after a deadly traffic accident of Mohajir girl, Bushra Zaidi by a Pakhtun bus driver. MQM retaliated against Pakhtuns who hold transport business.¹⁰ The clashes were over the control of inadequate resources and city's infrastructure. In the early 1990s, when the law and order situation extremely deteriorated, Pakistan Army launched 'Operation Clean Up' to eliminate militants in the Mohajir settlement areas. Latter on, Sindh police and paramilitary rangers took over the operation. The charges of treason were levied on MQM. Thus, tension exacerbate between the ruling party (PPP, 1992 and PML, 1994) and MQM. As a result, in late 1990s, to some extend peace was restored in Karachi.

In mid 2000s, Pushto-speaking community found political representation by Pashutun nationalist party- Awami National Party (ANP). The MQM after changing name from Mohajir to Muttahida is trying to have ingress in all provinces of Pakistan being representative of middle class. The two political parties ANP and MQM are the coalition partners of PPP since 2008 elections. Any stern action against the militant groups or mafia can severed the ties with any party which can result in

collapse of government. Since elections, MQM had thrice quit the coalition on the disagreement over sharing power and resources. Every time, people paid the price with their blood.

According to an estimate, in the second quarter of 2012 (April-June), 268 political violent incidents occurred.¹¹ Another report by the Citizen Police Liaison Committee (CPLC), most homicide cases happened in the city’s central and south zones. These areas are the battleground of the political areas for the struggle of land and resources. However, the majority of victims have no political affiliations; only 31 percent belong to MQM, 20 percent ANP, 19 percent PPP, 4 percent MQM (Haqiqi), 6 percent Sunni Tehreek and only 3 percent belong to Jamat-e-Islami.¹²



Data based on open sources by CPLC¹³

Military and Sectarian Violence

The Soviet intervention of 1979 in Afghanistan fuelled the violence by increasing the flow of arms in Karachi and creating a drug mafia. The second intervention in Afghanistan by International Security Assistance Force/US forces resulted in an increase in sectarian violence with the threat of Talibanization of the city. The sectarian violence originated in the 1990s due to Afghan Jihad and spread of Madrassas in Karachi, the extremist Sunni Muslim groups targeted prominent Shia Muslims. Since 2006 of Nishter Park bombing, Karachi has been tormented with sectarian violence. The militant threat gave a new dimension to the violence as ethno-political violence was confined to the national level but the militant threat is regional one. It is evident from the spill over of militancy from the Northwest to Southeast. In the first week of November 2012, Karachi alone counted for more than 90 deaths on the sectarian grounds. Militant and Sectarian groups operating in Karachi are as followed:-

- Jundullah
- Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
- Harkatul-Jihad al-Islami (HuJI), Arakan
- Harkatul-Mujahideen al-Alami (HuMA)
- Tehreek-e-Islami Lashkar-e-Muhammadi (TILM)
- Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
- Sunni Tehreek
- Taliban
- Sipah-e-Muhammad

- Jafria Alliance
- Tehreek-e-Jafria

Criminal Groups

There are more than two hundred well-armed and well-organized criminal gangs, which operate independently and in conjunction with political parties. Their activities including extortion, arms trafficking, smuggling, kidnapping, and robberies have severely degraded the overall security situation in Karachi.¹⁴ In 2012, there were 4,485 reported vehicle thefts/snatchings, more than 23,442 mobile phone thefts/snatched, 1,683 armed robberies and 114 kidnappings for ransom in Karachi.¹⁵ The criminal syndicates are as followed:-

- Shoaib Group
- Lyari Gangs
- Rehman Dakait Group
- Arshad Pappu Group
- D-Gang

Factors of Violence

There are systemic factors that contribute to exacerbate the ethnic, political, sectarian and militant violence in the city. These factors are as followed:-

- **Land:** Since 1947 with the influx of refugees, the struggle over land resources is one of the factors of conflict. The refugees settled in unplanned areas without proper sanitations, roads, and other facilities. The squatter settlements in the city also made difficult

for law enforcement agencies to maintain peace. The crime syndicates are also involved in the land grabs. They worked as a freelancer to grab land from one to the other who paid high price. The political parties also have contacts with the land mafia, as for winning votes they need support of population of squatter settlements. Promises of better housing facilities and roads can easily do this. Moreover, Karachi is among the fastest growing city of world with annual growth rate of 5.4 percent.¹⁶ Around one million people from the rural parts of Pakistan migrated to Karachi and take up residence in squatter settlements annually which are growing at an annual rate of 100,000 plots.¹⁷ Since 2001, the government is trying to increase the land acquisition and regulation of the existing settlement bringing them under their jurisdiction through mega development projects such as building roads and railway line.

- **Lack of Law Enforcement:** There is a serious lack of law enforcement in Karachi. The police force is inadequate to handle the city as for the population of about 18 million, only 32, 534 police officers are available and out of them 12,000 are deployed on special security duty and 8,000 are protecting important persons and government officials. Thus, 20,000 officers left to police the city.¹⁸ The city police is highly politicized and work according to the order of

'high ups'. Most of the recruitments in the police were also made on the political grounds. The politicization of Karachi's police force also escalated after Sindh government repealed the Police Order 2002. Now, the Sindh government can authorize appointments to higher position. Thus, such appointees do not take action against land mafias, extortionists, target killers and criminals operating on behalf of their patron political parties. It is evident from the security crackdown against target killer between July and September 2011 when 291 suspects were arrested and police submitted only 130 charge sheets against suspects to the court.¹⁹

- **Weak Judicial System:** There are certain judicial flaws in the judicial system of Pakistan. In most of the cases, criminals are acquitted because of absence of any witness as they refused to testify. There is no mechanism for the protection of witnesses from the retaliatory action by the suspects' criminal gang or militant organization. Moreover, those who are in the court are left pending for the years. The appointments in Anti Terrorism Courts are also overly delayed or done on the political grounds. The Anti Terrorism Act is also flawed and failed to meet the demands of present security environment. The act does not apply on the residents of FATA even held in Karachi nor deal

with the specific terrorists' acts such as suicide bombing.

- **Madrassas and Extremism:** Karachi has a large number of Madrassas. These are involved in indoctrination of young children with extremist Islamic ideology. Most of them are run by the funds coming from the outside. They are spreading religious extremism and intensifying the sectarianism in the city. Such Madrassas are used as a place of recruitment and training by the militant groups. It also provides an opportunity to extremist groups to generate funds, as there is no monitoring of Madrassas funds. According to government estimates, there are more than 1,000 but the social society organizations estimate the total to be over 3,000.²⁰
- **Socio-economic Disparities:** The socio-economic disparities among the population are also one of the factors as the city is divided into two classes. The Mohajir and Punjabis are affluent groups and the Pashtun and Balochs are among the poor class. The small segment of Pashtun population linked with transportation sector has immensely benefited from the NATO supply route. In addition, Karachi has a large number of unemployed youth. Lack of jobs, education, and entertainment activities attract the youth towards violent and criminal activities. Another aspect is of migration of low skilled labor from rural areas towards

the urban centre. This also created a void between the urban and migrant rural population. The locals saw it as usurpation of their employment opportunities. Employment is also based on ethnic background as to reduce tension at workplace employer's recruited employees from the same ethnic background.

- **Lack of Political Representation:** Over the last decade, the demographic pattern has been changed in the city. The Pashtun population has grown from 10 percent to 22 percent and ANP has consolidated as representative of Pashtun population and gained two seats. PPP has a strong base among the Baloch and Sindhi population but could only secure 6 seats. MQM is holding 34 seats in Karachi and they wished to maintain their position in next elections.²¹ Demographically, ANP and PPP should have more shares in the government. Claims of 'Pashtunization' and 'Wahabization' are common talking points of MQM to maintain their monopoly over body politics.²²

Recommendations

- **De-politicization of Police Force:** To maintain law and order situation, the police force should be depoliticized. Sindh government should reinforce the Police Order 2002 as under it, the Provincial Police Officer had the power to appoint and transfer all police officers. Thus, it will decrease the influence of political parties in appointments at higher posts. Moreover,

police force should be increased and distributed according to the ratio of population. Interagency security cooperation is also necessary for effective policing. The existing police force should be trained according to the current security threats.

- **De-weaponization of Karachi:** There is an urgent need of de-weaponization of not only Karachi but also all of Pakistan. The de-weaponization bill was also submitted by the MQM in January 2011. However, no genuine step has been taken on this issue, as it is not in the interest of political parties. The government should at least ensure that all weapons are under license. In this regard, the city government also launched the Computerized Arm License Management System in November 2011. After just one month of the launch, the process was halted due to transfer of local government system from decentralized city government system to commissioner system. Now, National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) re-initiated the process of re-validating arms license.²³
- **Special Parliamentary Committee:** To improve the law and order situation, a Special Parliamentary Committee consisted of all political parties should be formed. It will help to improve law and order situation, as it will bring consensus among the political parties on major issues. In August 2011, National Assembly formed seventeen members 'Special Committee on Law

and Order Situation in Karachi and Balochistan' consisted of multiple parties, but the committee failed to yield any results. Therefore, parliament is working on forming a special committee specific to Karachi.²⁴

- **Delimitation of Constituencies:** The settlement pattern of the city polarized the ethnic population into different constituencies. There is a need to delimit city in a manner that they comprise 'mixed population'. In this regard, Supreme Court has also issued notice to the Election Commission.²⁵ Secretary Election Commission, Ishtiaq Ahmad Khan said, "we are fully prepared for the delimitation in Karachi but the first step has to be taken by the Sindh government through its revenue department, but no action has been taken so far by the provincial government."²⁶
- **Reforms in Judiciary:** There is a serious need of reforms in judicial system. The Anti Terrorism Courts need to improve their efficiency in terms of ensuring speedy justice. The vacant posts should be filled by the judges on merit not on political references. There is a dire need of witness protection programme so that criminals could not escape punishment for their crimes. The Anti Terrorism Act should be amended according to the requirements of present security environment. Sindh High Court and Supreme Court should monitor the Anti Terrorism Courts to ensure impartiality, transparency, and early disposal of cases.

- **Regulation of Land and Resources:** The issue of squatter settlements is a major problem in the development of the city. They also provide safe havens to terrorists and recruitment ground for the potential terrorist. Thus, it is important to regulate the land and resources by the government. New infrastructure projects and developments in the areas of illegal settlements can eliminate the problem. However, these development projects should be started after conducting a land use survey. For the residents of illegal settlements, there is also need to ensure the adequate provision of low-income housing and public spaces.
- **Proper Representation:** The last available data on demography is of 1998 census, almost 14 years have been passed thus the demographic pattern of the city has been changed. There is a need of transparent data collection at governmental level. This will help to bring inclusive political representation and in delimitation of constituencies.
- **Local Self Government System:** Restoration of local government system in Karachi is more beneficial for the people of Karachi. The unnecessary delay in the holding of elections has inflicted colossal damage on the process of good governance. Local self-government stands for the rights and ability of local authorities to regulate and manage a substantial share of public

affairs under their own responsibility and in the interest of local population.

- **Job Opportunities:** The government should take steps to increase the job opportunities for particularly young generation. Youth is a target group for militant and criminal groups. The government should take proper steps to indulge the youth in creative and productive activities. The government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should start free technical education and vocational training courses to produce skilled labour. The services sector should be at the top for the economic progress. Only by focusing on producing skilled labour, the issue of population bomb can settle.
- **Ban on Religious Groups and Monitoring Madrassas:** To curtail sectarian violence, the government should ban religious groups from disseminating hatred against other sects. In this regard, the government should strictly monitor the madrassas to ensure that funds raised by them could not end up in the hand of extremist religious groups. In the recent act of terrorism on Muharram, the Federal Minister for Religious Affairs, Syed Khursheed Shah identified the involvement of Taliban and said, “Talibanization has risen in Karachi and the government is trying to curb it.”²⁷

- **Eliminate the Militant Wings of Political Parties:** The political parties should disband their militant wings. Almost all political parties have militant wings in Karachi. At the local level, the supporters and activists are mostly armed and involved in turf wars which escalated into ethnic violence. The mixed population settlements encouraged parties to become involved in enforcement activities, which can easily transform into extortion rackets. Over last five years, these activities have led to increase in violence and instability. Thus, to restore peace, all should negotiate and particularly close down the militant wings. Similarly, display of weapons should also be banned.

Conclusion

Karachi is a metropolitan city, divided in the terms of ethnicity, development, and class. There is not a one political party, which enjoys popular support. There are certain constituencies, where one ethnic group is in majority. The political parties are immune to the charges of maintaining links with armed groups and exacerbating violence. The economic and political disparities are visible across the city.

Curbing the menace of violence in Karachi is an uphill task, as the problem is multifaceted and the interest of political parties is involved. Solution of ethno-political violence is in negotiations and peace deals amongst the political parties. The religious and sectarian violence is not just an issue of Karachi; it is national security issue and needs

to tackle be tackled with the encompassing policies such as Madrassa reforms. There is a need of cleansing Karachi from the criminal groups. The Army intervention or deployment of rangers in the city is a short-term solution to the problem. For long-term peace and stability in the economic and commercial hub of Pakistan, effective policing is necessary along with good governance. The improvement in law and order situation can restore peace of ‘City of Lights’.

End Notes

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**THE POST-GWOT SEARCH FOR PEACE AND
PROGRESS, HARMONIZING AND REINTEGRATING
THE ROLES OF STATE AND NON-STATE ACTORS**

Mr. Muhammad Shabbir

Abstract

After eleven years of carnage, the so called Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) is coming to an end. From GWAT, violent non-state actors, against whom the war was being fought, have emerged as a threat to state security. This paper argues that states need to adopt the policy of integration towards non-state actors for achieving peace and progress in post GWOT phase. The central argument of this study is that state responses to emerging threats is driven by and limited to every state's own national interests, its security, political, economic and social configurations. For better understanding of the relationship of warring parties (state and non-state actors) in pre and during GWOT, framework of new war thesis is applied. The scope of this study is limited to the threat of terrorism. Response of Pakistan to counter terrorism and its limitations is selected as a case study to evaluate the above stated argument.

Introduction

The 'War on Terror' or 'Global War on Terrorism' (GWOT),¹ the latest phase in the long history of warfare "is coming to an end".² As a result of wars, nation-states change. Some disappear; some decline; while others become super-powers. As a consequent to Cold War and GWOT violent non-

state actors have emerged as powerful opponents of states. While in old militarized approach states used to fight against states, in GWOT, States are colliding or colluding with non-state actors; resultantly, non-state actors such as Taliban, Hizbullah and Hammas have emerged as powerful opponents in international politics.

On the other hand, eleven years of war has not broken the resilience of terrorism rather it has become worse and given birth to new threats and increased violence. The central argument of this study is that state responses to emerging threats is driven by and limited to every state's own national interests, its security, political, economic and social configurations. The scope of this study is limited to the threat of terrorism and violent non-state actors due to space constraints. Response of Pakistan to counter terrorism and its limitations is selected as a case study to evaluate the above stated argument. For better understanding of the relationship of state verses non-state actors in pre and during GWOT, framework of new war thesis is applied.

New War Thesis

Since 1990s, scholars are claiming that “transformation of modern warfare -- especially intra-state warfare -- has taken place.”³ Arguably, triggered by the ending of Cold War and assisted by globalization, the shape of modern-day intra-state wars has been changed. Two key proponents of the new war thesis, Mary Kaldor and Herfried Münkler, developed the term 'new wars' to differentiate them from old, inter-state

wars.⁴ According to new war thesis, “new wars are characterized by fragmented actor constellations featuring many kinds of warring parties such as militias, paramilitary units, mercenaries, security companies, and privately organized self-defence units.”⁵ Additionally, warring parties increasingly fund combat through criminal activities as, blackmailing international aid agencies, looting the local population and trafficking natural resources such as timber, diamonds or drugs, as happened in Afghanistan and Somalia. Furthermore, ideological and identity-based war motives have a tendency to be replaced with economic motives that in fact seem to have been the prevailing war motives in Sierra Leone.⁶ Lastly, as a war strategy, warring parties increasingly subject the civilians to extreme brutality, as in the Democratic Republic of Congo.⁷

Eleven years of GWOT has made it clear that contrary to the traditional strategies that heavily depend on the militarized element for countering emerging new threats like terrorism, military operation alone often creates more problems than solutions. Insurgencies like situations cannot be dealt with by military alone, rather, it requires a major resolve from the government to address core issues that give rise to militancy and encourage terrorist recruitment. Therefore, a comprehensive strategy, based on good and effective governance, institutional reform, political inclusion and economic development is required. Any foreign source may provide limited government services, however it does not

and cannot be substituted for homegrown civilian government.

The Old and New Wars: A Secernment

Acts of military violence involving the regular armies of two or more states are Inter-state wars. Whereas intra-state wars are acts of military violence either between the state government and internal non-state actors or between different internal non-state actors without the involvement of government. Intra-state wars are also the wars in which an external state or non-state actor is involved, provided that this involvement does not lead to war between the regular armies of the states. Based on a review of the works of advocates of new war thesis, old and new intra-state wars are distinguished by means of four points criteria that relates to: first, the warring parties, second, their war economy, third, war motives and fourth, warfare strategies.

- **Criminalization of War Economy:** According to Cooper, “the loss of superpower support motivated the warring parties to develop independent war economies often based on criminal activity,”⁸ and Herfried states, “new wars differ from old wars insofar as they feature a criminalization of war economies.”⁹ In old intra-state wars, at least in theory, particularly socio-revolutionaries, but also conservative rebel parties, were geared to Mao's principle, “the fighters represent the interests of the population, which backs them in return.”¹⁰ However, in practice, the warring parties of

old intra-state wars in the Cold War period were mainly financed by the superpowers and to some extent by other allied states as well. Depending on their ideological leanings, the warring parties could count on financial support either by the US or the Soviet Union. For instance, in the Guatemalan civil war, the US backed the government and the Soviet Union supported rebel forces, while in Nicaragua Soviet Union supported the government and the US the Contra rebels.¹¹ The proponents of new war thesis assert that abandonment of superpower aid after the Cold War, “precipitated the criminalisation of war economies as the actors involved in warfare compensated this loss with independent -- frequently criminal -- sources of income,”¹² As in Sierra Leone, warlords used their fighters to loot the belongings of civilians.¹³ Moreover, criminal networks were used by warring parties to sell natural resources in the global market.¹⁴ For example in Democratic Republic of the Congo, “rebel movements relied on trade in coltan, gold, copper, diamonds and coffee.”¹⁵ “In Myanmar, armed groups trafficked drugs and timber.”¹⁶ And in Congo, even “a militia sold rights on the exploitation of oil reserves”.¹⁷

- **Fragmentation of Warring Parties:** According to the champions of new war thesis, “new wars are usually characterized by a fragmentation of warring parties which is, at least in part, due to the criminalization of

war economies.”¹⁸ Their central argument is that the “criminal war economy frequently enables individual factions to finance themselves independently, allowing them to break away from their central leadership. Thus, instead of a limited number of groups fighting each other, more and more combat units emerge, forming at most loose alliances with a low degree of cohesion.”¹⁹ According to Paul Rich, these combat units range from “criminal militias to foreign mercenaries, from powerful warlords to local self-defence units, and from private security companies to regular government forces or paramilitary troops.”²⁰

- **Economization of War Motives:** The proponents of new war thesis also imply that criminalization of war economies leads to the fragmentation of warring parties along with facilitating the economization of their war motives.²¹ In new wars ideological and identity-based war motives of old wars, normally do not fade away but unite with or are dominated by economic motives. Without a doubt, the central mechanism is that the criminalization of war economies provides opportunities for personal enrichment and thus facilitating a gradual transformation towards the economic war motives.²² According to Cooper, “usually, economic motives are of less importance at the beginning of a war but gain significance as the warring parties develop their (criminal) war economies. This

does not imply that rebel groups no longer seek to topple governments and assume power, but rather they frequently strive for power because control of the government facilitates access to economic resources.”²³ Ideological and identity-based motives are often merely an ordering device or appealed to as a rhetorical device to justify warfare.²⁴ For example, Sierra Leonean Revolutionary United Front (RUF) justified its violence with ideological motives, even though control of the country's lucrative diamond deposits had actually become one of its chief goals.²⁵

- **Brutalization of Warfare Strategies:** Finally, it is argued by the advocates of the new war thesis that criminalization of war economies, economization of war motives and fragmentation of warring parties are contributing to the brutalisation of warfare strategies.²⁶ In support of this point, it is argued that to wear down the government, the rebel groups of the classic intra-state wars mostly pursued guerilla warfare strategies. They normally avoided major battles with the government, relying instead on small ambushes. The support of the local population and provision of shelter for their combatants were absolutely vital for the success of guerilla strategies. So, the rebels had to avoid violence against the civil population so as to be able to move with ease. In old wars, only government-affiliated actors resorted to violence against the civilian

population.²⁷ According to the new war thesis, since the end of the Cold War warring parties have increasingly relied on warfare strategies that entail brutal violence against the civil population. In contrast to old intra-state wars, not only government-backed forces, but also rebel groups deliberately commit violence against civilians and break taboos that used to be respected.²⁸ The systematic mutilations committed during the war in Sierra Leone, suicide attacks and killing of children by Taliban serve as particularly drastic examples of brutalization of warfare strategies.

Cost Assessment of GWOT

War, the great historic change agent, has worked its “magic” once again and the withdrawal of US from Afghanistan will be the last nail in the coffin of GWOT. However, the cost world has paid in fighting GWOT is enormous. Non-state actors as Hezbollah, Hamas and Taliban have emerged as powerful opponents in global environment. As a result of GWOT, unipolarity which US had achieved during 1990s is withering away. Trust of citizens in state institutions and confidence in the future prospects for America, has been eroded. Plus there is no defined endgame for the Orvellion GWOT. The writ of the state is weakening as is proven in “Arab Spring”, where decades of regimes were toppled in days and today Middle East stands at the cusp of future uncertainties. Despite US announcement of withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014, final political settlement in the

country remains obscure. Furthermore, situation in Iraq is still unstable and threat of terrorism in the world is greater today than it was a decade ago. Pakistan has to pay the worst price both in men and material for being the frontline state in GWOT.

Pakistan and GWOT

Pakistan is a frontline state in war against terror and is the victim of continuous terrorists attacks. Its weak political institutions and economic conditions make it a state, which is going through a whole array of security, economic, identity and democratic crises. Nevertheless, its importance in GWOT cannot be denied. Martin emphasizing its importance argues that Pakistan shares the longest border with Afghanistan and provides the easiest way to access it. Moreover, Pakistan also has an effective intelligence and military service, therefore, it could serve as an important ally for anti-terrorist operations.²⁹ Study of Pakistan's motivations to support Taliban therefore, gives practical insight of the domestic limitations faced by a state in responding to new threats.

Last two decades before 9/11 are very important for the study of terrorism. Pakistan played an important role in the Afghan war of 1980's. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) of Pakistan that are situated along the Pak-Afghan border were used during the war. This is the same terrain that is the focus of world's attention presently and is under siege for the hunt of terrorists by both US and Pakistan. M. E. Ahrari states that in late

1970s, one of the main reasons of Pakistan's involvement in the power struggle in Afghanistan and becoming a foremost party to terminating the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was that it wanted to establish a friendly government in its neighbouring country. Furthermore, Pakistan also wanted to permanently remove the Soviet Union and Indian influence from Afghanistan. At last, in 1996 with the emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan as ruling power, Pakistan succeeded in achieving this objective.³⁰

These war-trained human resources were used equally as an asset by regional and international competing powers in Afghanistan during the Soviet war and after they were abandoned by the Americans following the Soviet withdrawal from the country. It created a monster in disguise in terms of long-term domestic, regional and international security environment. With the passage of time, these extremists got out of the control of their own feeding hands. This security tactic ultimately backfired, when some of these extremist groups took their arms against Pakistan's security forces and started challenging the state itself. This transition did not happen in a single day. The security implications of this period proved critical in the post 'Lal Masjid' incident period, when a strong wave of suicide bombings emerged on the domestic security scene. This scenario has become so complex that it has created a security dilemma for Pakistan. It feels itself sandwiched between an Indian threat from eastern and

western borders in addition to extremist threat from within that is targeting now the main cities of the country.

9/11 redesigned the politico-ideological contours of world politics.³¹ It raised serious concerns for Pakistan. Pakistan was offered with sharp choices to select from i.e. whether to fully support the US in its campaign against Taliban in Afghanistan or to face the consequences.³² Pakistan decided to support United States. This shows clearly that the decision to facilitate and align with United States was not voluntarily taken, rather, it was the only viable choice for Pakistan as perceived by the then leadership.

After eleven years of suffering, situation for Pakistan is much more complex, fragile and requires immediate correction strategies in terms of revisiting of whole counter-terrorism strategy based on ground realities. Pakistan is in such a complex security position that it cannot simply follow a path advised by the west. Terrorists, on the other hand, are taking full advantage of its scattered security assets. Pakistan is in a fragile security condition, where the stakes are very high and has to prioritize its own national security agenda to make sure, it survives as a state. According to Martin, the two outcomes of GWOT for Pakistan are: firstly, either Pakistan could emerge as a developing, stable state where extremists have no support or recruits, and it could provide a role model for other Islamic states and play leadership role in bringing stability and progress in the region. Or, secondly, Pakistan could disintegrate into a nightmare of sectarian violence,

ethnic conflict and humanitarian disaster. Under such conditions, extremists could seize political power, and, therefore, can control nuclear weapons.³³ Considering this, it is important to realize that the outcome for Pakistan depends on the strategy and wisdom of the national leadership as well as the contribution by other countries, importantly, US and EU.

Counter Terrorism in Pakistan and Harmonizing the Roles of State and Non State Actors

Institutional factors count a lot in terms of responding to new threats and harmonizing of the emerging powerful non-state actors and states in the time to come. Given the multidimensional and complex nature of the new threats, the strength of institutions in a state defines the basic capacity the state has to respond to these threats. Arguably, in responding to terrorist acts, a state can use two possible legal theories: (a) law enforcement approach or (b) use of armed force (conflict management) approach. Until recently, the law enforcement approach has dominated. This approach considers terrorist events as entirely criminal acts to be addressed by civil government institutions and the domestic criminal justice system and its components such as: police, investigators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, juries and appellate courts. Above components and their performance will determine the outcome of the process. Therefore, the importance of internal state machinery is highlighted in the case of preventing emerging new threats like terrorism.³⁴

State role is vital for the outcome of counter-terrorism operations even when a strong and well equipped military like the US military is operating on ground. In counter-insurgency operations, the role of military is to provide a shield, behind that the interagency community can support the terrorist-affected country in institutional reforms and economic development. But that shield is not impermeable or unending, the longer there is no credible government, economic development or reform, the more difficult it is to continue the shield.³⁵ Analysis of Pakistan's political system is, therefore, critical. Institutional study of Pakistan is subdivided in two categories, policy-making institutions i.e. the parliament and policy implementation institutions i.e. the bureaucracy.

The Parliament

Parliament as the supreme policy-making institution in Pakistan was never developed. Repeated military takeovers further deteriorated the political development process. Time and again derailment of democratic process has been a problem for Pakistan's political development, which seriously hampered the growth of healthy and positive political culture. Even during democratic eras politicians contacted army to intervene in the political process.³⁶ Political legitimacy and democracy is, therefore, required to resolve complex new threats such as terrorism.

It is argued that Musharaf could not counter terrorism appropriately because of his political problems.³⁷ Importantly, weak parliament and by implication political system has led to

strengthen extremism and the extremists. It damaged the nation and state building and encouraged separatism and violence, a basic ingredient for terrorism. That is how weak political institutions in Pakistan are considered unable to respond to the threat of terrorism effectively.

The Bureaucracy

There are problems with the policy implementation institutions or the bureaucracy which is causing problems for Pakistan in responding to the threat of terrorism. Because of the corruption, lack of accountability, old departmental procedures and lack of inter-departmental communication, the overall threat-response capability in Pakistan has become somewhat compromised and poses a built-in the system limitation.

Taking counter-terrorism scenario, there is a serious institutional overlapping in security agencies work, which limits a focused response and contributes in wasting already few available resources. For example, there are separate police intelligence agencies under provincial governments, Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) under Ministry of Interior of Federal Government, Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Military Intelligence (MI) under the control of Army etc. Their lack of coordination, especially considering the political culture and the military-politicians relations is a serious limitation to effectively workout a coordinated strategy against terrorists.

Economic Factors and Counter-terrorism

Economic configuration is another area of key concern that decides the ability of a state to effectively counter the new security threats because the capacity of the state to fight or respond to these threats is dependent on the availability of resources. The phenomenon of economies unable to keep pace with population growth and failure of regimes to provide for peaceful political change, along with demands for equally distributed benefits provide fertile ground for the expansion of extremism and political violence. Plus, traditionally unresolved ethnic and nationalist conflicts have been a principal source of terrorism.³⁸ Terrorism directly affects the economic progress of the state, and, on the other hand, due to poor economic condition of a state, it limits the availability of resources for that particular state to combat terrorism. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is long ignored for economic and social development, and it is one of the important contributing factors for the recruitment of terrorist in this region. The absence of any employment other than narcotics and arms trade has made this region a heaven for 'criminals'.

The economy of Pakistan was already in a bad shape before the event of 9/11. However, year 2007 onwards, economic problems of Pakistan began to surface quickly and the common population was faced with electricity and gas crisis, high fuel prices, unemployment, food shortage, day by day degrading law and order situation, increasing suicide attacks

on civilians, political turmoil and scandals of corruption. In this economic scenario majority of the population considered their economic survival as their first priority and they took the war against terrorism as “not their war” but the war of Americans and the west.

On the other hand, the Government of Pakistan is finding it difficult to tackle economic crisis prevailing in the country, and it has very few resources available to run effective counter-terrorism campaign that has already become another priority concern. Further, the terrorist attacks and specially the suicide bombings resulted in fleeing of foreign investors from the country, further complicating already deteriorating economic conditions. Another important development was the launching of Pakistan Armed forces operation against the militants in Swat, Waziristan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which resulted in huge domestic displacement of population, i.e., more than one million Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's) were to be accommodated further pressurizing the economy. It is also important to mention here that bad economic condition of Afghanistan has also served negatively under the circumstances, as it is heavily dependent on Pakistan for even most of food supplies. Economic survival has, therefore, become imperative problem for the current Government to look into while the day by day deteriorating security situation is making this task even more difficult.

Social Factors and Counter-terrorism

Viewing poverty, however, as an exclusive root cause of terrorism is evidently not enough; the September 11 terrorist attackers were educated and certainly not poor, but they were motivated by politico-religious zeal, not related to a particular nation or state. According to Kenneth Comfort, “Most terrorist organizations exist primarily because failed and failing states cannot control areas within their borders.”³⁹

Terrorism uses fear as a tactic and innocent civilians are the main target of the terrorists to achieve this goal. This means that the social impact of terrorism is very direct and high. Analysis in the case of Pakistan reveal that the problem of countering terrorism has been not so successful even with foreign assistance, because of the complex social problems existing in the Pakistani society.

It is a chain reaction. Absence or lack of true political representation leads to weak democratic institutions and corrupt political culture, which in turn leads to economic underdevelopment. Lack of economic opportunities undermines the economic well being and in severe circumstances like Pakistan, it puts economic survival of the common man at stake. This ultimately leads to elitist and corrupt economy, where unequal distribution of resources promotes the culture of violence and transforms criminals into organized criminal organizations with a systematic network to infiltrate the society. These criminal organizations remain no more a domestic problem, when they are

networked and attain transnational character. They, then, have the ability to form a nexus with terrorists and this mutual relationship is based on complementing each other. In case of Pakistan, the problems from violent culture and other threats rose to such levels that some analysts have even viewed Pakistan as 'failing state'.⁴⁰

Globalization as Facilitator of Promoting Terrorism

Globalization, led by complicated communication networks, swift money transfers and transportation networks strong and fast enough to enable transportation of weapons and illicit materials throughout the globe, may also work as a great facilitator for terrorist groups. Globalization in this sense, however, has more serious domestic implications that facilitate terrorism. One of these is the societal reactions to a seemingly unjust and overwhelming economic globalization. Mostly, local religions and cultures feel and see the global culture as a risk to their way of life. Communities that are sensitive, proud and value their cultural heritages and beliefs are more prone to this threat. Information revolution, diminishing of national borders and access to global information through global information media such as satellite TV channels and the internet have created a sense of awareness and comparison among the poor. This deprivation and alienation created by globalization may lead to creation of communities who are more vulnerable to the terrorist recruitment.

The case of Pakistan is, however, much more complex than a simple nexus of organized criminal organizations and the terrorists. The violence is only one dimension to it. Religious extremism is another very critical dimension. Pakistan has a long history of sectarian violence. The US used Pakistan to intervene in Afghanistan.⁴¹ Afghan 'Jihad' converted the already lawless areas of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) into militant training grounds. The same could be argued with regard to the creation and rise of Taliban from the religious schools. Taliban's own interpretation of religion and its forced implementation was not only aimed at Afghanistan but also at Pakistan. Taliban used the US attack of 2001 to fuel their hatred against the West in general and Americans in particular, declaring Pakistan as an ally to the West. Further, killings by the US Drones fueled hatred in the tribal areas, where large numbers of civilians were killed in the attacks. This seriously limited the ability of the government to respond as civilian casualties made the task of terrorist recruitment easy for the terrorists, and made it difficult for the government to present itself as a helper of the local population. Moreover, lack of credible democratic system prevented surfacing of moderate public opinion.⁴² Social factors are not limited to the above. Poverty for example, education, access to basic resources etc., all shape the social mix and affect the capability of state to effectively handle the situation.

Conclusion

Above analysis presents a holistic picture of how domestic problems limit the ability of a state to respond to new security threats. Analysis shows that they are all inter-linked and one cannot be separated from the other. Be it security, political, economic or the social factors, all pose different limitations from different angles. Post 9/11 Pakistan shows the exact transition, it experienced from within i.e., from disowning terrorism as a direct threat to its own security to the top national security priority especially after 2007, when the terrorists challenged not only the authority of the state, but the whole social and political fabric of Pakistani society. The security infrastructure of the country requires a credible and trustworthy leadership to share sensitive information and to get vision to respond clearly. Mistrust between the political leadership and the military leadership, inter-departmental communication gap, professional ego, non-coordination and scattered approach hamper the ability of a state to respond to threats like terrorism. New security threats are domestic as well as transnational in nature. Apart from the Pakistan's case, any state that is to respond to new security threats has to be helped in building its own capacity. Further, no new threat can now be left isolated. Technology and its global availability is like a double-edged sword, it can cut both ways. It provides the same tools to the terrorists for more destruction. Therefore, countering the threat requires a comprehensive and focused strategy that is coordinated and well

communicated to all the stakeholders. Socio-economic factors are of great importance, as the new complex security challenges require a non-militarized approach to resolve these. Contrary to the argument of some that state's borders are diminishing, state is still the most important player and the most reliable circle of containment as far as peace and progress after GWOT are concerned. Nation-building is an important tool that can help in countering emerging new threats like terrorism from inside. It is important to realize that terrorist organizations are eager to exploit the deprived and alienated segments of the society. It is, therefore, necessary for a state not to lose its focus from common economic, political and religious issues. Communication and integration is the better approach towards rooting out terrorism.

End Notes

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FOOD SECURITY IN PAKISTAN

Mr. Muhammad Usman Asghar

Abstract

Wheat is the main staple food and national diet in Pakistan. Pakistan maintains support price mechanism for wheat crop. The wheat pricing mechanism is centralized through support price. It is analyzed that increased support price for wheat crop inflates the flour bread price.

Pricing mechanism analysis shows that higher support price is the basic factor for inefficiency. Positive impacts of increasing the wheat yield and production for food are nullified due to support price. Targeted subsidy on input cost is more effective option for the nation rather than support price. Acute rise in one side of the pricing equation which sets flour price causes the nation and more exclusively vulnerable group to suffer with appropriate magnitude pushing them between food security and food insecurity.

Introduction

“Hunger is exclusion-exclusion from the land, from income, jobs, wages, life and citizenship. When a person gets to the point of not having anything to eat, it is because all the rest has been denied. This is a modern form of exile. It is death in life...”

(Josue de Castro)¹

Staple crops are meant to define the food of any country. The impact of price increase in staple crop influences the

nation in accordance to its use in food basket. Wheat flour caters 48% of caloric needs of Pakistan.² Pakistan has witnessed spiky increase in wheat made flour price over the last two decades from Rs. 3.66 per kg in 1990-91 to Rs. 32 per kg in 2011-12.³ This inflationary pattern affects the population's food consumption with increase in expenditure on flour out of their total household income. The sharp upward trend in flour price has contributed to accelerate in overall consumer prices which push the inflation rate upward. High food inflation rate has become a matter of concern for Pakistan in recent years.

This paper focuses on the support price for wheat and its impact on the finished good, flour price as a factor of flour price acceleration in Pakistan. It takes pricing perspective of contributing factor (support price) to wheat production and seeks to understand the correlation among these variables since 1990-91 to 2010 which has brought Pakistan to current situation.

It is a matter of policy preferences and decisions at national level while setting the wheat support price which is the only assured purchasing price for any crop in whole agriculture sector since last five decades to present. In 1960s, Support Price mechanism was advocated by development economists for the development of agriculture production against the prevailing low crop prices but this pricing mechanism has always benefited only 12% large farmers (holding above 12.5 acres of land) while ignoring 88%

majority of small farmers (holding 12.5 acres or less).⁴ These small farmers already have scarce financial and pest resources with low storage capacity. They do not have reasonable access and affordability to markets, so middleman gets the benefit of small farmers. Furthermore, 60% of rural poor are landless in Pakistan.⁵

Government has increased the wheat support price from Rs.425 per 40kg to Rs.1200 per 40kg in a record time of five years 2007 to 2012. If wheat price is increased 10% then overall inflation rises 3%.⁶ These policy decisions have immediate effect on agriculture sector. Farmers opt for the crops on the basis of these policies. But on the consumer side, flour demand is inelastic. On the other side, government intervenes the wheat market to ensure sufficient wheat production in the country through incentives to farmers with fixed support price.

Problem Definition

“Pricing mechanism of wheat is inefficient in Pakistan”.⁷ It is assumed that the problems in pricing mechanism lead towards the food insecurity in Pakistan which is analyzed in this paper.

Research Objectives

This area for research is selected with the intention to investigate the wheat-flour pricing mechanism which is supposed to be responsible for setting the flour price in Pakistan. Any increase or decrease in flour price is dependent on the pricing policy for wheat. A study warns large increase

in wheat support price will have its negative effects on inflation reducing strategies and even if the supply of food increases as a result of higher support price, food security of the poor in Pakistan will not be assured.⁸ High food price of flour in the event of high wheat support price in past three years has pushed another 16 million people below poverty.⁹

It is a matter of concern when international organizations and agencies like World Food Program (WFP) and Pakistan's own governmental agencies declare in their reports that about 30 million people are food insecure in Pakistan. Either Pakistan is really food deficit country in sense of production, availability, storage or the pricing policy for flour makes people food insecure? Another report on "Food Insecurity in Pakistan" observed that wheat consumption in Pakistan declined by 10% in 2009-10 due to lack of purchasing power of the buyer.¹⁰ If food prices are increased due to higher wheat support price abnormally, more people are supposed to deprive of their food need. If price of a loaf of bread is increased from Rs.2 to Rs.3 then this one rupee increase will compel people to cut short their expenditure with stagnant income. A study analyzes the food inflation impact in a cross country study of Pakistan and Philippines, comparing increase in number of poor people with food price increase, shown as under.¹¹

IMPACT OF PRICE INCREASES ON POVERTY

	CHANGE IN NUMBER OF POOR (IN MILLIONS)		
	WITH INCREASE IN FOOD PRICES BY:		
	10%	20%	30%
Philippines	2.72	5.65	8.85
Pakistan	7.05	14.67	21.96

Source: Asian Development Bank, Impact of Food Prices on Households, 2008

There are many externalities of this price hike in the society. People have no option with them except to change their lifestyle and basic needs. People may prefer to send their children for labor rather than to school, because they do not have enough money to eat. They need more earning hands. Their affordability is at stake with increased expenditure on food. These shifts in public behaviors can disturb the whole national development cycle. For food, the compensating variation of a price fluctuation is the money by which consumer expenditure would also change to get same utility.¹² Pakistan's poverty measurement is also caloric based which has base line of 2,350 kcal per capita per day.¹³ Flour demand in the country is inelastic and majority of population eats flour made bread three times a day to fulfill their caloric requirement.

In Pakistan, studies show that basic problem does not pertain to food availability or physical access but economic access (buying power) is the core issue. Flour is available on the shelf in the markets but buying power of the consumer is

reduced to afford the flour for its caloric intake. Inelastic demand compels poor people to spend more money to purchase flour with every progressive increase in flour price. This restricts their other basic utilities of life like medical, education, etc along with bringing them below poverty line.

Literature Review

“Imagine a canal 10 m deep, 100 m wide and 7.1 million km long (enough to go around the world 180 times). That is the amount of water it takes each year to produce food for today’s 6.5 billion people....add 2-3 billion more people and accommodate their changing diets from cereals to more meat and vegetables and that could add another 5 million km to the channel of water needed to feed the world’s people.”

Mukand S. BABEL

On average a human being requires 2100 kilocalories per day in diet for a healthy life.¹⁴ When a person does not get the required diet value then he is said to be suffering of malnutrition. Malnutrition is the single key factor of more than 50% diseases in the world.¹⁵

Food situation varies around the globe as some nations are net buyers; some are net sellers and mostly are both buyers and sellers. Some countries have surplus production of staple food while some are in deficit. Alberto et al. (2008) explains that households gain welfare with increase in staple food prices if they are net sellers but same is reversed if they are net

buyers.¹⁶ Governments support their local sellers and buyers by introducing support price suitable policies. Food pricing policies vary all over the world. These variations are subject to local food situation and food demand, supply of each country. In 2007-08 food crises, Argentina, Bolivia, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, and Venezuela opted to restrict food exports as a policy matter to avoid the crises.¹⁷

Commission for Costs & Prices in India and Agriculture Policy Institute in Pakistan, work for pricing staple food items to safeguard both farmers and consumers. Both governments are supposed to subsidize input cost and output price to incentivize the local farmer. India and Pakistan still observe centralized pricing mechanism for staple food crops. While Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal shifted towards open market operations regarding price mechanism in 1979, 1980 and 1998 respectively.¹⁸

Wheat is the only crop in Pakistan which is priced at a support price each year by government. Wheat pricing has direct impact on flour price in Pakistan. Agriculture Policy Institute (API) was the sole responsible establishment for proposing the wheat support price for approval from Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MINFAL) and ECC accordingly in past. API worked under the MINFAL. At present, Pakistan has Ministry of National Food Security and Research (MNFSR) which is responsible for setting the support price of wheat in the country.

Since the Food Crisis 2007-08, food prices have risen rapidly. FAO's food price index increased 40% as compared to 9% in previous year.¹⁹ There were many factors who contributed to the food crises in 2007-08. Hike in Energy prices disturbed the food prices majorly because oil prices were all-time high, more than US\$100 a barrel.²⁰ Biofuel was the second major cause for food scarcity. Australia suffered severe drought that year, which is the one of the largest wheat producers in the world.

Pakistan is also facing continuous rise in staple food prices after food crises of 2007-08. Staple food is a type of food which is regularly eaten in such quantity that fulfills major dietary needs.²¹ The price of national diet, flour has increased to Rs. 31 per Kg in 2012 as compared to same quantity available for Rs.4 in 1991.²² Soaring flour prices restrict population's poor segment to fulfill their Minimum Dietary Energy Requirement (MDER).

Food situation all over the globe have been devastating in last couple of years especially in 2007-08. United Nations estimated 800 million people suffering from chronic hunger in 2008 which was doubted to increase in number with further increase in food prices.²³ Global economy is food surplus even 852 million people which constitute 17% of world population go hungry daily due to the lack of access to food.²⁴ Gustavo et al. claim that increase in food prices not only reduce the mean consumption of dietary energy but deteriorate the nutritional status of the population.²⁵ As a

consequence of policy decisions, Food inflation affects the nutritional intake which ultimately affects the household welfare and progress.

In Pakistan case, it is learnt in a study by Dorosh and Salam (2006) that market forces are more vital in food pricing policy in Pakistan and suggests that private sector wheat trade can be useful in price stability and reduced fiscal costs.²⁶ Farooq (2009) emphasizes on the long term solution to ensure food security because setting the higher wheat support price may guarantee food security in short term.²⁷ Higher support price of wheat may ensure the production in the country but government has to subsidize heavily the procured wheat for flour availability at affordable price in the market.

Naheed et al. (2002) conclude that wheat production is not minor issue, so macro management policy must be central to wheat production and wheat grower's income.²⁸ In 1960s, same approach advocated for fixing the support price as a tool to agricultural development. FAO declares Pakistan as 7th largest wheat producer country in the world.²⁹

Geographical Food Consumption scenario is also demanding as Afghanistan is the neighbor country of Pakistan which majorly depends on Pakistan for its food requirements, other than food imports from all over the world.³⁰ Food prices in Pakistan are very important for the export of food items. Smuggling of food items is a great matter of concern. Food shortage in Pakistan has its impacts on Afghanistan as well. In

an article, Siddiqui explores in his study that about 1800 tons of flour is smuggled to Afghanistan every month.³¹

Abnormal increase in support price of wheat in Pakistan also affects negatively other major cash crops like cotton, rice and sugar-cane which have seen highest open market prices in the season 2010-2011. Farmers chose the cash crops to maximize their profit. In this case, they prefer to cultivate such quantity of wheat which fulfills their specific need of staple food.

In Pakistan, Support Price for wheat was Rs.425/40kg in 2006-07, Rs.625 per 40kg in 2008, Rs.950 per 40kg in 2009, Rs.1050 in 2011 and Rs.1200 for the upcoming harvest in 2013.³² On the expense side, cost of production for average yield of 27 mnd per acre was estimated Rs.648 per 40kg and for 35 mnd yield cost was estimated Rs.700 per 40kg in 2008-09³³.

Theoretical benchmark of Pareto efficiency frontier seems to be miscalculated by the decision making authorities. This high price enabled Pakistan to be self-sufficient in wheat production but food inflation also increased which deprived vulnerable people more abruptly from their basic food requirement. Vulnerable households are defined as those households who spend more than 30% of their total expenditure on food items out of their total income.³⁴

Literature review portrays the research already being done in the field of food security in context of staple food prices, but it is learnt that food inflation and its factors are not analyzed

to see their impact on food security. Research is available on the food inflation and its impact but the underlying gross root factors of this inflation and their trend is not seen.

This report analyses the role of pricing mechanism in food inflation which ultimately determines the food situation in the country. Investigation is based on the research question “Does food inflation is the outcome of inefficient pricing mechanism in Pakistan?”

Food Pricing in Pakistan: Understanding the Food Situation

“Support price is nothing short of implicit mass murder”.³⁵

Prof Amartya Sen and Prof Jean Dreze

Food situation in Pakistan is good in respect to the production targets but bad as per the definition of food security. Agflation has caused the prices of food items out of reach of ordinary population.³⁶ Physical access to food is there but economic access is core problem, especially for vulnerable groups of the population. Despite the fact, Pakistan has surplus wheat in stocks; even 35 million people are food insecure.³⁷

Pakistan government is responsible for this food situation because it has centralized pricing mechanism for basic staple food wheat since decades.

Constitution of Pakistan

Article 38 (d) ensures provision of basic necessities of life including food for the citizens of Pakistan as: “The state shall provide basic necessities of life, such as food, clothing,

housing, education and medical relief, for all citizens, irrespective of sex, caste, creed or race, as are permanently or temporarily unable to earn their livelihood on account of infirmity, sickness or unemployment”.³⁸

Food is basic need of human existence and core obligation for governments. Food Security as a concept has origin in late 70's. The term food security emerged as a concept with the intention of food availability and access (physical & economic) for the population. The 1996 World Food Summit narrated even more complex definition of food security as “Food Security, at the individual, household, national, regional and global levels (is achieved) when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life”.³⁹

Food Situation in Pakistan

A brief description of each factor is given to illustrate the complexity of the Food Security which depends heavily on effective pricing mechanism in Pakistan.

Population & Food Demand

Data shows that more than 3.2 million new mouths are being added every year in Pakistan which demands food for their nutrition needs.⁴⁰ In response to above argument, 6.4 million hands are also added to labor force but lack of work opportunities hinders the development. Population size is the core problem which addresses the demand side of food. All

people need food for their survival which makes food inelastic. Average household size is 6.5 persons in Pakistan.⁴¹ Assuming the per capita wheat consumption at 124kg per annum, Pakistan's domestic need comes to about 23.48 million tones including 10% allowance for seed, feed and wastage.⁴² With the increase in population, food demand also increases. Per Capita Household Income and expenditure plays fundamental role in economic access to food.

Agriculture and Wheat

Pakistan economy is agriculture (Agro) based. Agriculture sector contributes over 21% to Pakistan's total GDP with absorption of 45% of country's total labor force.⁴³ Pakistan's 62% of population resides in rural areas which are one way or the other way linked with agriculture for their livelihood.⁴⁴ Coleman estimates that wheat is grown by 80% of farmers, about four million in number; almost equal to 40% of cropped area.⁴⁵ In Pakistan, 26% of households are wheat producers while 97% are consumers.⁴⁶ This shows that Pakistan is not a net seller economy. Net buyers of wheat product are three times larger than net sellers.

National facts state that Pakistan is the 8th largest wheat producer in terms of area and 6th in production but holds 49th position in terms of yield.⁴⁷ Pakistan lacks in wheat yield so far which is the bitter reality of our agricultural development. Good yield is supposed to guarantee the physical access of food. In the absence of good yield, farmers have to cultivate more area to get the desired production.

Punjab and Sindh contribute about 76% and 15% in wheat production while KP and Baluchistan share is 5% and 4% respectively.⁴⁸

Food Pricing Mechanism in Pakistan

Pakistan has centralized pricing mechanism. Ministry of National Food Security and Research (MNFSR) in Pakistan advises government on crop pricing. API drafts the policy regarding pricing the important crops, for further approval from Federal Cabinet and Economic Coordination Committee (ECC). Support price data is also given below in table.

Wheat Support Price

FY	Support Price in Pakistan (PKR/40 Kg)	Change	%	Support Price in India (Indian Rupee/100kg)*
2000-01	300	0	0%	610
2003-04	350	50	17%	630
2004-05	400	50	14%	640
2005-06	415	15	4%	NA
2006-07	425	10	2%	NA
2007-08	625	200	47%	NA
2008-09	950	325	52%	NA
2010-11	950	0	0%	NA
2011-12	1,050	100	10.5%	1,285
2012-13	1,200	150	14%	1,350

Source: Table by author on data from different sources and MoF, India (2005)

* Indian price is measured in Indian Rupee per quintal (1 quintal = 100kg) and One Pak rupee is equal to 0.56 Indian rupees as the value retrieved on Dec 30, 2012.⁴⁹

Methodology

*United Nations conducted a survey, Question was: **Would you please give your honest opinion about food shortage in the rest of the world?** The survey badly failed because in Africa, People did not know what **FOOD** is! Chinese did not know what **OPINION** is! European did not know what **SHORTAGE** is! Indian and Pakistani did not know what **HONESTY** is? Arab did not know what **PLEASE** is! & American did not know what **REST OF THE WORLD** is!”*

(Anonymous Joke)

The paper is confined to only issues with wheat-flour pricing policy. Food inflation is referred as hike in the price of flour in the market. Flour is the national diet of Pakistan and contributes more than half of the national caloric intake hence; food security is referred as economic, social, physical and safe access to flour for the people of Pakistan.

Data

As the report is based on the analysis of support price causing food inflation and their share in the price hikes, entire cycle of pricing mechanism is analyzed to draw the results and their correlation. Sample of this study is selected in context to the policy making for food pricing in the country by API. A time series of 20 years starting from fiscal year 1990-91 to 2009-10 is selected for the study. Twenty year time series is selected to get the maximum realistic results as current base

year is 2000-01. Different political regimes in 20 years time span is not discussed separately.

Analysis Technique

This section describes the analysis technique and selection criteria for tool used in the report. Linear Regression Analysis technique is used.⁵⁰ This has enabled the author to predict the factors of food inflation and their relationship with share in setting the food prices.

This argument is elaborated in the given equation of multiple regression models.

$$\hat{Y}_i (\text{FP}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 (\text{SP}) + \varepsilon_i$$

Where

FP= Flour Price

SP= Support Price

ε_i = Standard Error

Results Discussion

*“Food Insecurity anywhere, threatens peace everywhere”.*⁵¹

Food inflation is the output of inefficient wheat crop pricing mechanism. Multiple variables are involved in this process which should be considered while drafting pricing policy in Pakistan. An increase in food prices has direct effect on people's buying power if their income remains constant. People have to spend more with the each unit increase in flour price to fulfill their daily nutritional intake. Analysis results show that support price has positive correlation with flour price. An increase in the support price variable, results hike in flour price.

Conclusion & Recommendations

The primary objective of this research has been to analyze the pricing mechanism of wheat crop in Pakistan and its implications for food security. Pricing has emerged as a core issue in overall food situation in the country. Increase in factors of input price result in higher flour prices which leads towards the food inflation. This inflation threatens the food security situation as an outcome. By fixing the support price at higher than real level, government passes on the burden to the poor.

Results show that support price has direct impact on flour price increase. With support price, wheat crop production target is achieved but on the other side many people are deprived of required food due to increased support price impact on flour price. Support price needs to be declared by state after taking into account the contemporary food situation in the country.

Wheat procurement on high support price under the centralized pricing mechanism costs the government heavily. Subsidy is unavoidable if government proceeds to sustain low flour price in the market. In case of surplus wheat, government has to allocate export subsidy from its resources if international wheat prices are low. While production is less than the requirement, government has to subsidize the imported wheat to curtail prices at affordable level if international wheat prices are high. It seems that Pakistan's

pricing policies are addressing one perspective ignoring the many other damaging frontiers.

The impact of effective pricing mechanism will yield benefits for both farmers and consumers. Market will learn to adjust according to the demand and supply of wheat in the country. Support price is short term solution but it damages in long term.

As a matter of case study, Pakistan's neighbor India has established its National Food Security Mission (NFSM) in 2007 which provide up to 100% cost of seeds as subsidy and 50% cost of other input tools like fertilizers, drills, rotavators and installation of diesel tube wells under different schemes.⁵² This is the perfect example of targeted subsidy in the economy. Benefits of subsidy are only for those who fulfill the criteria. This reduces the moral hazard in the society and promotes effort based competition.

Pakistan has the potential to export the wheat and it is suggested that it should incorporate its flour industry in earning the foreign capital. Higher production also guarantees the availability and do not let the speculations and chaos to sustain in economy. Check and balance by the state should be there but it should intervene only in severe conditions. With the passage of time, people will learn in this process to secure their interests themselves rather than relying on state. This sense of confidence will provide the society more just and participatory approach for food security.

Appendix
Linear Regression b/w Flour Price & Wheat Support
Price

FY	Flour Price (Y)	Wheat Support Price (X)	Y²	X²	XY
1990-91	3.66	112	13.40	12544	409.92
1991-92	4.20	124	17.64	15376	520.80
1992-93	4.44	130	19.71	16900	577.20
1993-94	4.93	160	24.30	25600	788.80
1994-95	5.78	160	33.41	25600	924.80
1995-96	5.90	173	34.81	29929	1020.70
1996-97	7.32	240	53.58	57600	1756.80
1997-98	8.64	240	74.65	57600	2073.60
1998-99	8.35	240	69.72	57600	2004.00
1999-00	8.92	300	79.57	90000	2676.00
2000-01	9.80	300	96.04	90000	2940.00
2001-02	9.67	300	93.51	90000	2901.00
2002-03	10.14	300	102.82	90000	3042.00
2003-04	11.71	350	137.12	122500	4098.50
2004-05	13.28	400	176.36	160000	5312.00
2005-06	13.06	415	170.56	172225	5419.90
2006-07	13.64	425	186.05	180625	5797.00
2007-08	18.07	625	326.52	390625	11293.75
2008-09	25.64	950	657.41	902500	24358.00
2009-10	29.05	950	843.90	902500	27597.50
Σ	216.20	6,894	3,211.09	3,489,724	105,512.27

$$\hat{Y}_i (\text{FP}) = \beta_0 + \beta_3 X_3 (\text{SP}) + \varepsilon_i$$

X_i = Independent Variable

Y_i = Dependent Variable

26.36

900

$r^2 = \text{SSR} / \text{SST}$			
=			99%
$\text{SST} = \text{SSR} + \text{SSE}$			
=			874.13
$\text{SSR} = \beta_0 (\sum Y_i) + \beta_1 (\sum XY) - (\sum Y)^2 / n$			
=			868.13
$\text{SSE} = \sum Y_i^2 - \beta_0 (\sum Y_i) - \beta_1 (\sum XY)$			
=			6.00

\hat{Y}_i = Flour Price for i th value of Wheat Support Price

β_0 = Y intercept for the population (value on Y-axis when X is zero on X-axis)

β_1 = Slope for population (value of y with reference to X on the slope)

ε_i = Random error in Y for observation i

$$\beta_1 = \text{SS}_{xy} / \text{SS}_x$$

0.028

$$\beta_0 = \sum Y_i / n - \beta_1 (\sum X_i / n)$$

1.16

$$\text{SS}_{xy} = \sum X_i Y_i - \{ (\sum X_i) (\sum Y_i) \} / n$$

=

31,174.14

$$\text{SS}_x = \sum X_i^2 - (\sum X_i)^2 / n$$

=

1,113,362.20

End Notes

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**ASSURED ACCESS TO THE GLOBAL COMMONS:
REVISITING THE QUESTION FROM
A POLITICO-LEGO PRISM**

Ms. Beenish Sultan

Abstract

The term 'Global Commons' is not new, inclusive of four domains namely: Maritime, Air, Outer Space and Cyberspace. Over the years, the phenomenon has matured as a vital dominion for interplay of states seeking economic development and security. In this pursuit, major powers tend to exploit the commons by putting the security of smaller states like Pakistan at stake. Furthermore, after the twin tower attacks, the commons are also subject to threat from non-state actors, thus evolving the nature of terrorism completely. Nevertheless, the commons exist today as a point of conflict and threat for the global peace and security. In this context, the possibility of protecting fading phenomena like 'Sovereignty', 'Morality' and 'Legality' in the global arena seems meager; also making the threats posed from the commons an unchangeable reality. NATO and U.S. have a long term agenda of assuring access to the commons in the name of securing their own interests by using political pressures and loopholes in International law. This turns out to be a threat not only to the weaker states but also may disturb the global peace and security. The aim of the study is to firstly examine the interplay of major powers with the

potential of the global commons. Secondly, it provides an analysis of how states which are far behind in the race of technological advancement are exploited by major powers in the global arena. Lastly, the study endeavors to examine the effects of the exploitation by major powers on the global peace and security.

Introduction

The interface of major powers, particularly the U.S., in the global commons provides an index of a quest for reordering their priorities. This shift in pattern is manifest in their search for exploiting the potential of the commons for securing their own national interest. In this backdrop, states like Pakistan remain aloof which are unable to catch up with the technological advancements in the global race of accessing the commons. In fact, this pursuit proves to be a forerunner for causing to diminish phenomenon's like: sovereignty and legality of the weaker states. This is threatening for the very concept of a peaceful global layout. Nevertheless, the scenario becomes more complicated when viewed from the fragile prism of international politics and international law.

Defining the 'Global Commons'


The word *Commons*, originally derived from the Roman Law, was primarily related to governance of public rights in natural resources i.e. land, waters, wild animals and fish. For facility of cataloging, the concept described everything in the world pertaining to the rights of 'ownership'. In this regard, wild animals like stray dogs and dolphins, were considered *res*

nullius, (owned by no one), while sunlight and rain were *res communes*, (available to all but not subject to exclusive ownership).¹

In feudal England, Commons were areas of land held by members of a group, typically local villagers or *commoners*, to be used according to legally explicit limits that prevented the land's division or over-exploitation. The thread that runs through these definitions is the idea of *use*. However, more recently the term was adopted in an entirely larger canvas with a view that no national sovereignty existed in certain areas and that states had the right to exert sovereignty.² It is considered to include four domains of: high seas, international airspace, outer space and cyberspace (incorporated lately). For the facility of further discussion the commons are defined separately as following:

- **High seas:** Due to the importance of the portion of sea referred to as 'High Seas', a separate convention 'the Geneva Convention on the High Seas' was promulgated in 1958. It defined High Seas as 'all parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a state'.³ The figure below refers to it as international waters, which are outside the territorial jurisdiction of a state. This flows from the classical description of seas offered by father of international law Hugo Grotius in his famous work '*Mere liberum*'. According to Grotius, the open seas are

free to be used for trade and travel by all of the nations.⁴



However, high seas cannot be defined properly in geographic terms. It is deemed to be that area of the sea which is free for navigation, over flight, the laying of submarines cables and pipelines, and any lawful activity.⁵

- **International Airspace:** Airspace that does not fall under the jurisdiction of any state is deemed as the space free for global air transit. Simply put it is, in fact, the air space above the high seas.⁶ The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (UNCLOS 1982) also defines this space for regulating global passage through this area. However, this freedom cannot be exercised by overrunning the interest of any other state. Under this convention, the airspace under

a country's jurisdiction is declared to be 12 nautical miles off its coastline. However, no international agreement exists regarding a country's air strip vertically towards the outer space.

- **Outer Space:** The international regime deems outer space to be the 'province of all mankind'.⁷ The Outer Space Treaty while promulgating this assertion, further puts an obligation on states to conduct state programs and activities in accordance with the prescribed principles of international law.⁸
- **Cyber Space:** The most recent domain of the global commons the cyber space can be defined as 'The electronic medium of computer networks, in which online communication takes place'.⁹

'Assured Access': Exploring the Meaning

Assuring access to the commons remains a primary concern of the 'hegemonic powers' in the global arena. This is predominantly present in the policies of the two Anglo-saxon powers, Great Britain and the United States. Both the powers have indeed been acting according to the prescribed policy with considerable composure for more than two centuries now.¹⁰ Prior to the technological outburst, the powers considered the commons as exceptions subject to difficulty in their access.¹¹ However, today 'technology has caught up with desire'.¹² States like the U.S. and NATO alliance are able to patrol the high seas for days, maneuver remote controlled Unmanned Ariel Vehicles (UAV), launch spy satellites against

any state and access any Uniform Resource Locator (URL). Thus, assuring access to the commons relate to using any means possible either technological, military, political or legal in order to ensure safe linkages and control over the interwoven domains.

Amidst importance of the commons in a globalized world, military security and economy remain the prime reason for pursuing assured access. On one hand non-state actors are deemed to be an immense threat for the peace and security even in the commons. While on the other hand, the global recession and economic blows have further pressed on the importance of exploiting the potential of the commons.

Furthermore, the pursuit becomes easier for major powers in the backdrop of technological backwardness of weaker states. The fact remains that weaker and developing states are highly interdependent on international linkages. The term 'globalization' has been a menace for their security and economic development. Their financial markets are highly exposed to the international arena and they import technology from abroad, making them dependent on foreign aid and assistance due to weak infrastructure.

Various Trends of Major Powers

In the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report' 2010* "Assured Access" to the commons was designated as a pinnacle goal for U.S. military forces.¹³ Undoubtedly, major powers have managed to access the global commons since quite a while now. However, their primary concern now

remains that of 'assuring' access to them in the longer run. This is made easier on one hand through their technological development and on the other hand backwardness of smaller states as discussed above. Consequently, the trends of major powers for exploiting the commons envisage a comprehensive strategy, which sometimes include the domains of the four commons at the same time. In this regard, inclination of major powers in each domain is listed below separately:-

➤ **High Seas and Air Space:** The world's oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, littorals, and the airspace above them support 90% of the world's trade carrying the lifeblood of a global system that links every country on earth.¹⁴ Consequently, exploitation of both the domains remains a necessity for major powers due to a two-fold focus:-

- Sea Trade and Communication
- Political Pressurization

The strategically important Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOC), which fall within the jurisdiction of coastal states, remain a point of conflict within the global arena. Not only do they serve as a lifeline for global trade of oil and natural resources, but they also act as a conduit for linkages between various parts of the globe. Controlling these lanes means that the state is able to exercise power in the international political arena. Flexing muscles in the high seas would in turn facilitate a closer contact with the SLOC at any time required. In

addition, it also provides an opportunity for political inclination for weaker states, which is a threat to global peace in security.

In this regard, the concept of managing 'blue water navy' has gained immense importance for most of the states. The U.S. has been focusing on a grand military strategy termed as 'off-shore balancing'.¹⁵ This it intends to do by shifting its burden to its allies (including NATO) in order to increase strength in airpower and sea power to assure continued command of the commons.¹⁶ The modern technique of achieving this goal is indeed manifest in technology.¹⁷

As an example, the Indo-US partnership for ensuring an undisturbed access to the Pacific is very relevant. This is not only in the interest of the U.S. long term strategy for 'containing' China in the backdrop of its economic growth, but also serves U.S. interests in nearby pockets of its engagement. The Indian Air Force is seen as a 'tilt' to the scales in the Indo-Pacific by reducing the burden on the U.S. Air Force and providing support in the global commons. This is where technology plays its part. For instance, if India is helped by the U.S. in air refueling, its SU-30MKI's combat radius can include either the Straits of Malacca or the Persian Gulf. ¹⁸ This would not only serve the American regional designs but also help the Indian Navy and Air force to grow as a major military force. In fact, it has managed to climb up the list of becoming the 5th largest navy in the world which aims at becoming blue water navy in the near future.¹⁹

On the other hand, technology has played its part in helping the U.S. gain command over various air space, even which falls under the territory of states. A recent visit to the Persian Gulf during an international mine clearing exercise, the US revealed that the entire area was being constantly monitored by a ‘Broad Area Maritime Surveillance’ (BAMS) drone.²⁰ The picture below is of a BAMS drone added in the US Naval fleet recently.




Figure (a)

Source: <http://theaviationist.com/tag/broad-area-maritime-surveillance/>

The BAMS drone comes with the specifications of 360-degree radius scanning ability along with and Automatic Identification System that can monitor surface vessels from 60,000 feet.²¹ Through its help, the U.S. is constantly monitoring five operating bases where the MQ-4C fleet is being used with the help of networking with other Navy and

Air Force drone. The figure (b) demonstrates the radius of the BAMS drone while figure (c) provides an insight into the BAMS linkage with satellites.



The MQ-4C is designed for persistent Maritime Surveillance and intelligence gathering. After its making, it will be able to make coverage of 24/7, requiring refueling after travelling at 11,450 miles per hour. Its features include 360-degree scanning, capturing images and making full motion

video at high resolution. The Persian Gulf is monitored by the overlapping domain of two BAMS.

- **Cyber Space and Outer Space:** In August 2012, a public sector oil company in Saudia, 'Aramco', and a Qatari natural gas producer company 'RasGas', became victims of a substantial cyber attack. 'Shamoon' the computer virus entered the URL domain of both the companies and crashed altogether 30,000 computers at a time.²² This case was later declared as 'one of the most destructive cyber attack' by U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta. Preliminary investigations by the U.S. revealed Iranian involvement in the attack, however, Tehran denied it ever since.

What we understand from the aforementioned scenario is that the cyber space is yet another domain involving power politics and issues regarding jurisdiction and sovereignty. Where the U.S. itself was not safe from cyber attacks (BBC news reports the White House declaring that cyber attacks against its networks were not 'infrequent'),²³ it has not let go of its established practice of laying allegations on various states and non-state actors for the cyber breach. Secretary Defence Leon Panetta even warned the Americans from an unfolding scenario of a 'Cyber Pearl Harbor'²⁴

However, where the US declares such kind of attacks as 'acts of war',²⁵ it is itself not far behind in attempting such kind of breach. In the scenario discussed above, the 'Stuxnet' virus²⁶ launched against the Iranian nuclear program seems to

be a precursor of the Iranian attack on the Saudi and Qatari oil and gas corporations (only if the cyber attack was Iranian based). The fact remains that no state including the U.S. is lagging behind in the race of intruding the cyber domain of the one another. It is a domain easy to intrude and cause enough damage as compared to waging wars.

The cyber space helps intrude into and monitor any state's activities through the interwoven nature with the outer space. Spy satellites are no more a subject of fiction movies and novels. Through the NROL-25, the U.S. is capable of surveying the entire globe as a 'national security payload'.²⁷ In this regard, the Chinese and the Russians are not far behind as well. This scenario not only leaves the smaller states way back in the race of technological advancement but also puts long forgotten phenomena like sovereignty on the back foot. In addition, this technological race can be deemed similar to the Ronald Reagan era. Is the world ready for such confrontation again? This indeed is for time to decide. However, up till now the inclinations can be analyzed within the political and legal canvas.

The Political and Legal Prism

Political: The technological struggle within the commons pose grave political imbalances in the global arena. For instance, during the proceedings of the Third Law of the Sea Conference (1973- 1982), the countries, which were lagging behind in the technological development race, argued that deep sea mining in the high seas should be monitored by an

international regime along with the revenues distributed to all the countries. Contrarily, the developed countries emphasized on having a registry to endorse international claims and boundary disputes and let deep sea mining be a private business of countries.

The situation raises political questions regarding the equal distribution of resources in the commons as ‘the common heritage of mankind’. Do they belong only to the countries which are technologically superior and can undergo expensive expeditions within in the commons? As far as deep sea mining was concerned the final treaty did establish an international regulatory regime, however the private firms were given utmost feasibility of undergoing mining endeavors. Hence, the outcome was too politically exploiting for the developing states.

Differences in technological capacity have also complicated global coordination when poor and fast-growing countries have laid claim to a larger share of resources than their present capabilities and economic weight suggest they should be entitled to. For example, in 1979, developing countries claimed radar frequencies based on their future, not current, needs, for fear of the frequencies would no longer be available when they achieved the ability to use them. While complicating negotiations, these claims can make outcomes more equitable and more efficient in the future, as a larger share will go to countries that will need, and will be better placed to use, these resources.

Advances in technology can also create frictions between industrial and developing countries, as has happened in fisheries. “Factory Ships” that can harvest and process very large quantities of fish have threatened the sustainability of many traditional fishing areas. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization estimates that almost 30 percent of global fish stocks are overexploited, depleted, or recovering and that 50 percent are fully exploited. Setting and enforcing limits on fish harvests is, therefore, essential but balancing the interests of industrial-scale and traditional fishing when forming an international agreement is problematic particularly given the limited information on fish stocks and the administrative weaknesses of regional fishery organizations in many developing countries.²⁸

Legal: The legal concept of exploiting the commons becomes relevant when states claim to resources located in areas outside territorial sovereignty and beyond national jurisdictions.²⁹ Some resources like magnetic fields or sunlight do not fall under the jurisdiction of any state and can be used by any state to ascertain its national interest. However, the legal problem starts, when the four commons are exploited in a way which in turn hurts the national integrity of other states. The conventional law proves to be inadequate in order to regulate the actions of states in this regard. As a result, the policy of ‘might is right’ prevails even in the commons.

The United Nations Convention on The Law of the Seas 1982 has outdated clauses as compared to the evolving nature

of threats posed at sea and air space. In addition, cyber terrorism unfolding in the backdrop of technological advancements is a menace for the cyber world and outer space alike. In this regard, major states are at more ease to exploit the loopholes in the international law and get away with it. For instance if only the cyber space is analyzed pertaining its legal ambiguities, three issues come forth as given below:-

- Should cyber space be considered as a distinct domain far from sovereignty?
- If it is to be considered as a domain entailing sovereignty of a state should it be regulated by conventional legal instruments?
- How should the idea of free speech in trans boundary disputes be handled?

In the absence of strict legal boundaries, the commons turn out to be a point of conflict and intense power politics, which is bound to have long term implications on the global peace and security.

Pakistan- A Case Study

Until quite recently, Pakistan initiated a process to propose an entirely unique form of legislation. The laws are intended to limit and forbid the private practices of mapping the geography of Pakistan. Maps which were printed for commercial or humanitarian purposes without prior permission from the Survey of Pakistan are going to be banned after this legislation becomes law.³⁰

The idea of this legislation is to restrict inaccurate or duplicative mapping of Pakistan in order to protect sensitive information and geographical disposition. However, the fact remains that in this highly globalized and interconnected world, ideas like these have become obsolete. As discussed in the paragraphs above, major powers are able to monitor and take pictures of each and every inch of the world. Not only this, the recorded minute details are easily available and accessible on the internet as well.³¹

Where Pakistan is facing internal and external national security threats, it needs a well planned strategy and not such legislations. Pakistan is lagging behind in the technological race altogether. As compared to India which now has one of the most advanced nuclear submarines³² in its naval fleet, Pakistan Navy has still been relying on conventional ships and aircrafts. What Pakistan can do is develop its capabilities in the cyberspace domain. The new world order is all about intense developments in the computer world. In fact the other three domains are also dependent on the cyber world. Pakistan can depend on its youth in this regard. Various universities offer computers as a major subject, and the expertise of young Pakistani's is highly acknowledged abroad. The dire need is to formulate a mechanism through which more of the youngsters are involved in developing this domain and provide tangible input at the state level. It would take less investment and give a considerable output.

Findings

The tussle in the global commons exists as the next domino of a great power game. In this regard, during the course of the study the deductions may be enlisted with a four-fold focus:-

Firstly, despite their rising importance, the commons have never looked as vulnerable as they do today. Whether it is terrorists targeting civilian air traffic, pirates threatening vital sea-lanes, or cyber militias attacking computer networks, the capacity of small but well-organized groups to disrupt vital common spaces has increased significantly.

Secondly, in order to maintain primacy in the global commons, the U.S. has strengthened linkages with its partners in the backdrop of perceived challenges from rising powers and non-state actors.

Thirdly, the criticality of the commons in international relations has risen in direct proportion to the globalization of national economies in the last century.

Fourthly, Military uses of space-based assets for intelligence, reconnaissance and communications are a reality, now the world is at a point where rules of the road are required as soon as possible.

Conclusion

Everything has its pros and cons, so does the technological advancements. After rapid globalization and interconnectivity between states, the global arena has become vulnerable than ever before. States, in fact, have more chances to exploit the

weaknesses of each other. This is even evident in the way global commons are being perceived by major states. They have already managed to access the commons for securing their economic and trade linkages, and they would strive to maintain their control for a longer term. This is in pursuance of controlling and gaining economic and strategic benefits even through the commons.

The global commons are a no man's land. The one's who can control them at this stage are going to be the winners in the longer run. The U.S. and its allies are working in conformity with this presumption. It seems to forgo any political, moral or legal boundaries in order to keep up the track. It is high time that states undergo a process of managing the commons for the universal good and restrict their exploitation by major powers.

End Notes

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PAKISTAN-IRAN PIPELINE PROJECT – A LIBERAL PERSPECTIVE

Mr. Muhammad Umar Farooq Baloch

Abstract

The global energy resources have constantly been depleting. Oil as an example, meets up with 37% of the global energy needs, and is expected to last only 42 more years¹ pertaining the current rate of consumption. In this regard, the energy crisis in Pakistan has also seriously aggravated affecting the economy and growth besides paralyzing the routine life. Consequently, Pakistan is in dire need to address its energy issues. Given its geopolitical disposition with energy rich Central Asian Region (CAR's) and Iran in its neighborhood, Pakistan has a chance to come out of the crisis in time. Nevertheless, plans like the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project, thus exists with extreme essentiality with no apparent alternatives in the foreseeable future. Concurrently, where Iran is in a state of confrontation with US due to the controversy of its nuclear program, it faces numerous challenges and US led sanctions. The US in order to isolate Iran has also been forcing international community to follow the same pattern. In this pursuit, it also managed to convince India to abandon the very project and has been pressurizing Pakistan to look for other alternative; despite the fact that the project has immense importance for the region. Hence, the premise of the

paper is that the importance of the project should be objectively highlighted in front of the international community by putting forth the mutual stakes of the states involved. The entire scheme of study envisages a liberal perspective applied on the factual layout of the gas pipeline project.

Background

The idea of the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project was initially published by Malik Aftab Ahmed Khan, in mid 1950s, through the Military College of Engineering, Risalpur, Pakistan². Later, he retired from the Pakistan Army as a Lieutenant Colonel. The project was conceptualized in 1989 by Rajendra K. Pachauri in partnership with Ali Shams Ardekani, former Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran. Dr. Pachauri proposed the plan to both Iranian and Indian governments in 1990. The government of Iran responded positively to the proposal.

At the annual conference of the International Association of Energy Economics of 1990, Dr. Ardekani backed Dr. Pachauri's proposal. The project after being conceptualized to India in 1989 came with a proposition by Iran for extension of the project to India using Pakistani territory. This was followed by signing of the agreement by Indian and Iranian governments in February 1999. Initially, the Indian government was reluctant to enter into any agreement with Pakistan due to the historically tense relationship between the two neighbours. As an alternative, India suggested the

development of a deep sea pipeline, where no threat to security of resources could exist.³ The project has since then faced many ups and downs without making any meaningful progress.

Technical Details of the Project

- **Country:** Iran, Pakistan, India (In 2009, India withdrew from the project).
- **Route:** Originates from Asalouyeh (South Pars gas field), passes through Bandar-Abbas, Iranshahr, Khuzdar up to Sui and Multan.
- **Type:** Natural gas.
- **Partners:** National Iranian Oil Company, Sui Northern Gas Pipeline Limited, Sui Southern Gas Company Limited.
- Expected to be completed by mid – 2015.
- **Length:** 2,775 kilometers (1,724 mi), From Iran side 1100 Km (730 miles), Pakistan 1000 Km and India 600 Km.
- **Discharge:** Initially 22 billion cubic meters per year (21.5 million cubic meters per day) (750 million cubic ft), will be raised up to 55 billion cubic meters per year.
- **Diameter:** 48 inches (1,219 mm).
- **Estimated Cost:** US \$ 7.5 billion.
- **Estimated Time:** 3-5 years.
- In Khuzdar a branch would spur off to Karachi. From Multan the pipeline may be expanded to Delhi.

- Alternative route proposed by India; Iran to the maritime boundary between India and Pakistan off Kutch. From there one branch to run to Pakistan hence the other branch to run to Kutch.

Finding Common Interests – A Liberal Perspective

As this research paper is aimed at suggesting a viable course of action for Pakistan for under taking the project and meeting its energy demands, it is perceived from liberal paradigm that the proposed project of construction of Iran-Pakistan-India/ Iran-Pakistan pipeline could be possible, if some common interests of all the stakeholders are identified and suggested to the decision makers. Basing upon this ideology a tangible hypothesis may be spelled out which states as follows:-

“The commonality of interests leads to viability of a project”

In this statement, “viability” is a Dependent Variation, which is related to “interests” being a Permanent Variable and “commonality of interests” being an Intervening Variable and helps in decision making process. When the above theory is applied on the proposed IPI / IP Pipeline Project, following common interests are identified:-

- **Demand and Supply Requirements:** It is a matter of fact that all (main and other) stakeholders in the project are subjected to energy crisis. The demand and supply gap is increasing day by day and all of them are in search of alternative and urgent means of energy

sources. The fulfillment of the IPI / IP Project would go a long way in meeting the requirements of all stakeholders. Moreover, a lot of work has already been done and the materialization process would entail minimum time. The direct stakeholders i.e. India, Pakistan and Iran shall get immediate dividends, whereas the other stakeholders would also be benefitted in due course of time. As regard to US, it mostly meets its demand of oil from Gulf countries and is in the process of concluding a number of agreements with CARs as well for future needs. Furthermore, its reservations and hard stand on IPI project is due to Iranian nuclear issue. It is also interesting to note that US intelligence agencies are of the view that Iran has not crossed the limit of enriching Uranium up to 20% and hence, still away from making nuclear arsenal.

- **Economic Interests:** It is also a fact that the proposed project would bear tremendous economic dividends for all stakeholders especially the regional countries. As regards to the US, the proposed project is important not only in meeting its energy requirements but also beneficial in flourishing its industries, hence, strengthening its economy which has been showing negative trend for the past one decade. The success of this project can turn to be a trigger point for development of other pipeline projects, hence, not only ensuring constant and uninterrupted supply of oil and

gas to new markets in the west but also generate tremendous economic activities all over the globe.

- **Socio-political Interests:** The Socio-political dynamics of South and Central Asia are very unique in nature. Both the regions are house of one fifth of the total world population with half of the world largest resources. It is also pertinent to note that there are four nuclear powers in the region (China, India, Pakistan and Russia) and the fifth one (Iran) is about to take off. Furthermore, the region is home of world's most ancient civilizations and the largest emerging economies with huge prospective for investments. As Asia has become more important, there has been renewed and increased great powers involvement in the region. The US policy with regard to the region has been to promote democracy, economic liberalization and to engage countries in the international system. This policy has been underlined by multiple military bases to fight terrorism and to protect US national interests.⁴

The following chart helps us understanding the relationship between the stakeholders with various factors associated with the project, showing positive signs of commonalities of interests:-

Stakeholders	Demand and Supply	Economic Interests	Socio-political Interests
Pakistan	Yes	Yes	Yes
Iran	Not Pertinent	Yes	Yes
India	Yes	Yes	Yes
China	Yes	Yes	Yes
Russia	Not Pertinent	Partially Yes	Partially Yes
USA	Yes	Partially Yes	Not Pertinent
CARs	Not Pertinent	Yes	Yes

An Appraisal

The proposed pipeline serves the best interests of both Iran and Pakistan. Technically there seems to be no hitch in the project; however, question arises to assess the suitability of the project from economical and geo-political perspective. The need of exploring the realistic paradigm of the issue arises as it is feared that a technically and economically pragmatic project may not suffer due to geo-political scenarios of all the stakeholders. One main player of this game is the United States which is aimed at isolating Iran on both economic and political front. How the US pursues its policies for this IPI pipeline and response of two beneficiaries Pakistan and India is not merely an economic issue, but also a political issue.⁵

Economic Viability

While technically being a viable project, the question arises whether the project stands economically feasible as well. Two important factors are associated to the query of economic viability of the proposed project – the project finances and the gas price.

➤ **Finances:** The total project estimates have been assessed to \$7.4 billion. Iran is subjected to US sanctions due to its nuclear standoff and is likely to face even tougher sanctions from United Nations or even strike on its nuclear installation. The regional conflict situation would have serious consequences not only on financing the project but will also put the process of construction of the pipeline in jeopardy. However, following positive indicators have shown that the funding of the project is no more a critical issue:-

- A consortium was also under discussion among BHP (*Broken Hill Proprietary*) Australia, NIGC (National Iranian Gas Company) Malaysia, TOTAL France, SHELL Netherlands, British Petroleum UK in addition to Iranian, Pakistani and Indian national gas companies.
- Russian Gazprom has expressed interest and last month Russian Prime Minister Mr. Fradkov visited Pakistan and signed a number of co-operation

agreements. China has also offered to help finance the project.

- Norwegian Prime Minister has also expressed investment interest in the IPI pipeline at least in Pakistani part.
 - The most recent breakthrough came on May 2nd 2007, when the World Bank's vice president confirmed that the World Bank is willing to fund any of the gas pipelines [IPI & TAPI] though not officially approached by any member country after looking at land acquisition procedures and environmental issues. The statement came at the same day when US congress committee on international relations wrote a hard tone letter to Indian prime minister⁶.
- **The Gas Price:** There have been a number of rounds amongst the member countries over the question of deciding the gas rate⁷. Iran initially demanded US\$ 7.20 per million thermal units (mBtu). The same was almost double of what India offered at border i.e. US\$ 4.25 per million thermal unit (mBtu). As stated by Iran's deputy oil minister Mohammad Nejad-Hosseinian, "the price suggested by India and Pakistan is almost half of the price we demanded. If the two governments intend to subsidize their domestic gas, there is no reason for Iran to pay this subsidy."⁸

- According to the new formula the price of gas will translate to \$4.93 per MBTU that is linked to the Japan Crude Cocktail (JCC) price (at current US \$ 60 per barrel) at Pakistan-Iran border. In the case of oil price being US\$ 40 or US\$ 70 per barrel, the equivalent gas prices would be US\$3.67 and US\$ 5.56 respectively. All three parties have expressed satisfaction with the formula while Pakistan has officially approved it. A high level Economic Cooperation Committee (ECC) officially endorsed the formula and plans for the construction of Pakistani segment showing a commitment on the Pakistani side to go ahead with the pipeline even without India. However, a new glitch in the price issue arose when Iran demanded revision of formula after every three years. In case India also undertakes the project, Pakistan would get additional benefit on account of transit and tariff fee for which dialogues between the two nations have not yet been concluded.
- **Political Acceptability:** Ever since an agreement has been signed to undertake the project, there has been no meaningful progress in its implementation. It is, however, encouraging that both Pakistan and Iran are determined to convert the “dream pipeline” into a “reality pipeline”. Although, there were initially two stake holders in the project; India joined later and then dumped it amidst under immense US pressure. US on

the other hand also claims to be the stakeholder in view of linkage of its strategic interests in the region especially its policy of containment of Iran and China. China being a significant global player, a de-facto leader of regional politics and economic giant of the present era, cannot remain aloof from the development. China is also one of the financer of the project and hence, has become another stakeholder. The sum of all above matrix has added a political chapter to this purely economic issue, which is now facing unprecedented delay. Realistic perspectives of the western interests of all regional and global players in the project are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Iranian Interests

In the proposed project Iran being the major entrepreneur is the prime stakeholder and so are her interests. As stated earlier, Iran possesses second largest gas reserves in the world. But, despite its vast oil and gas reserves, Iran is suffering a staggering decline in oil exports caused by lack of investment by foreign energy companies.⁹ In the wake of US sanctions prohibiting US companies and their foreign subsidiaries from conducting business with Iran, the Iranian energy sector has been adversely affected. According to one credible estimate, investment in Iran's energy sector has plummeted as a result of these sanctions, and Iran export has reduced to 2.34 million barrels of oil per day, about 300,000

barrels below its OPEC (*Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries*) quota.¹⁰

Under such critical situation, exploring new markets for its huge quantity of hydrocarbon is on the top agenda of Iranian economic policy. So, the proposed pipeline is considered as the lifeline for Iranian diminishing economy. However, it is not as simple an affair. Iran's political scenario especially after 1979 revolution is altogether different as what it used to have during Shah's time. The Shah's of Iran chose to align himself with the United States in order to avoid a domestic communist advance on his power.¹¹ As result of Iranian Revolution-1979, there occurred a strategic shift in the Iran's foreign policy paradigm.

Iran developed shoddier relations with west especially USA, which even kept on showing trend in passing moment of their history. As a matter of fact, Iran also failed to maintain exemplary relations either with its neighbors, Gulf States or other regional countries. Iran's prevailing nuclear programme has made her position bad and the diplomatic ties with US. The fallout of the situation has adverse effect on the proposed gas pipeline venture which would have paved way for economic and social uplift of Iran in particular and the region in general. Today, US following the policy of its containment, maintains a very hard stance against Iran. In the historical context, Iran's aspiration to emerge as a regional power is linked to its close relations with the United State.¹² So, the proposed pipeline project is vital for Iran not only to shoulder

its stranding economy but also to keep its standing in the comity of nations.

Interests of Pakistan

Due to its geo-strategic location, Pakistan has been bestowed upon two most vital oil and gas export corridors in the world. If Pakistan is able to cash this opportunity, it will not only help Pakistan to overcome its economic hardships but shall also go a long way in improving its relations with Gulf countries and CARs. It is also pertinent to highlight that the hydrocarbon resources of CARs would gradually become focus of world attention for at least next century. Fortunately, the route of all these commodities to international market passes through Pakistan which makes its position even significant in the international comity. Gwadar deep sea-port is being developed by Pakistan on modern lines and it is expected that this port would generate revenue of approximately \$1.5 billion dollars.¹³

As a matter of fact Pakistan is also facing serious energy crisis. The present availability of energy is 64907 Thousand Tons of Oil Equivalent (TTOE) against its demand of 63088 TTOE, which is being shared by oil, gas, electricity, nuclear energy and coal. The available gas and oil resources are depleting rapidly and the gap between the demand and supply is increasing on daily basis. According to a moderate demand estimate, the demand-supply gap in Pakistan's gas sector shall rise eight times in 2015.¹⁴ So, the materialization of this pipeline project (either from Iran / CARs or both) is of

paramount importance to meet the energy demand of Pakistan and flourishing of its industries.

However, the fulfillment of this dream project is deeply linked with geo-political environments of the other stakeholders. In case of Iran-Pakistan / Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline Project, the Iranian factor is very important and in case of TAP / TAPI Pipeline Project, a peaceful and stable Afghanistan is a pre-condition for successful flow of export. Above all the interests of other regional and international players, especially those of USA, are also required to be coincided with the interests of Pakistan. It is also extremely important for Pakistan to ensure internal peace and stability as Pakistan's internal security situation has a direct impact on any pipeline project being put on ground.

Indian Perspective

India under heavy US pressure has almost shelved the project of gas pipeline from Iran through Pakistan. Critically analyzing, India's energy situation is much more alarming than Pakistan. India depends largely on Gulf for import of oil to meet the requirement of industry and transport for generation of electricity. Moreover, the situation of gas in India's case is also not satisfactory at all. India produces only 2275 billion cubic meters and consumes the same with tremendous short fall. India's gas consumption is likely to rise 400 million cubic feet a day with current supply of just 100 million cubic feet a day.¹⁵

Now, in order to meet its energy requirement which is mostly natural gas based, India has three available options; the domestic reserves, the LNG imports and pipeline projects. Domestic reserves being far short of its demand India is compelled to resort to gas import. Import through LNG technically viable but being a very expensive leaves no option other than pipeline import.¹⁶

Although a number of different pipeline options have been explored, there are only three that currently seem to carry any prospect of success. The first is a pipeline from Myanmar, where Indian companies have equity holdings in a gas field. The second pipeline option would capitalize on central Asian gas, extending from Turkmenistan, through Afghanistan, Pakistan and into India (TAP / TAPI). The final option for gas imports is the IPI, which would be the largest and most expensive option, but has also emerged as the one with the best chance of success.¹⁷

After weighing all options, the experts are of the view that, as long as natural gas is used to move India's power turbines, Iran, geographically closest to India, will be the lowest cost supplier. India has three options to acquire natural gas from Iran (i) in the form of LNG (liquefied natural gas), using LNG fleets through the Arabian Sea (ii) through a deep sea pipeline or (iii) through land route. The land-based option is four times cheaper than others, when including transit fee payments to Pakistan.¹⁸ Hence, one can conclude that India have inbuilt economic and strategic interests in the proposed IPI project. It

may delay the project but cannot deny it for its booming economy.

Interests of China

It is beyond any doubt that China today is holding the strongest economy in the world, which is growing even fast. China is also well aware of its future energy needs to run its industries. China's energy demand is projected to increase steeply. According to estimates by the Institute of Energy Economics, energy demand in China will increase from 1,765 MTOE in 2007 to 2,539 MTOE in 2020 and 3,451 MTOE in 2035. China will account for roughly 30% of the increase in global primary energy demand from 2007 to 2035.¹⁹ Driven by this burgeoning demand, the Chinese government has made securing access to the largely untapped reserves of oil and natural gas in Central Asia which is considered as a corner stone of its economic policy for the next two decades.

China has developed strong economic and trade relations with CARs. China has also announced a number of oil pipeline growth programs along the borders with CARs. China which is presently the sixth largest oil producer in the world still needs to import oil to meet domestic demand, which is projected to double in the next fifteen years. China is committed to build a \$ 12.5 billion worth of oil pipelines from CARs to China and has also offered to build a strategic 1000 km pipeline from Uzen in Kazakhstan to Banadar Abbas on the Persian Gulf from where tankers could ship oil to China's coastal cities and westward towards Europe.²⁰ As regard to Iran-Pakistan

Pipeline, Chinese banks had been forthcoming in financing the project which speaks of Chinese interests in the proposed project. It is also pertinent to highlight that Chinese are assisting Pakistan in developing Gwader deep sea port which will be a short route for import of raw material for Chinese industries and a quick outlet for their finished products.

US Interests and Obstinate Stand

United States is the largest consumer of oil in the world i.e. Over 25% of the world's consumption.²¹ Possessing only 3% of world's known oil reserves US imports 60% of oil for her daily oil consumption.²² In order to meet its future energy needs US has launched a diplomatic offensive in CARs by sending many high powered delegations to CARs. While accepting that Washington does not see pipelines and new oil and gas supply developments as a zero-sum game, the US clearly has a range of cross-cutting and sometimes conflicting strategic and energy goals in the region that must be constantly balanced and re-evaluated. US have announced its energy security goals of maximizing the flow and transport diversity of oil and gas supplies to Asia and Europe, but on ground its implementation is altogether different.

US on one hand has shown keen interest in CARs energy resources and further promoting investments that bring more incremental supply of oil and gas to international market yet wants to keep a check on Russian and Chinese influence in the projects. While the United States has a basic interest in promoting the flow of Eurasian oil and gas to Europe and

Asia, it has also actively sought to influence the geography of pipeline routes from Central Asia in order to limit Russia's control over European oil and gas markets as well as over the scale and direction of oil and gas supplies from Central Asia.²³

Coming over to the proposed IPI Pipeline Project, US has taken a very hard stand and announced a number of times that the project is directly tangent to US interests and policies in the region. In the overall scenario, the question of the Iran–US dispute over Iranian Nuclear Standoff is central to the venture. Viewing the hostility between Washington and Tehran, it is unlikely that US will support any venture that Pakistan or India wish to pursue with Iran.²⁴ While the US is keen on developing economic ties with India, it is adamant on isolating Iran from the international community. On 27th of March 2007 American Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman on a visit to New Delhi warned India to 'shelve plans to participate in the project'. His remarks can't really be termed diplomatic or nuanced; he appeared to be reading the riot act to India.²⁵ Although, Indian government initially shown, no signs of accepting any pressure from US but now it seems that it has most probably abandoned the project on the pretext of security situation in Pakistan and the gas price. US, on the other hand, has given various incentives to India for meeting its energy demands including nuclear civilian technology and acceptance on TAPI Pipeline Project.

Pakistan has, on the other hand, shown resilience in undertaking the project at all costs. Pakistan is a frontline ally

of US in the ongoing war on terror, which is in the critical stage in the region. So, the US cannot afford to ignore Pakistan's perspective in any issue related to its interests in the region. The western press has reported that the US pressure is building up on Islamabad not to enter into pipeline deal with Iran. Apparently, it seems that that till such time Iran's position is not clear on its nuclear confrontation with the US, there are remote chances of materialization of this project. Contrarily, the TAP / TAPI project enjoys backing of US but it is again linked with situation in Afghanistan.

Findings

The following findings may be deduced during the course of the study;

- IPI Pipeline Project is a technically feasible and economically viable project. However, it is suffering from political non-acceptability from US due to which an unprecedented delay is occurring in the execution of the project.
- Pakistan, Iran and India are the main stakeholders in the project and have inherent interests which include energy requirement, economic benefits and socio-political rewards.
- The other direct or indirect stakeholders include mainly China, Russia and USA, whose interests are also associated with the project. The urgency and the priority of these interests, however, vary from country to country.

- The practical manifestation of the project is only possible, if there is convergence of interests of all the stakeholders and key political players. The correct identification of common interests and appropriate diplomatic and other tactful measures are essential for converting the dream pipeline into reality.
- Whether the project is acceptable to the international players or not, it is also a fact that it can only be delayed and not denied.

Conclusion

In the given backdrop, it is now easy to conclude that the geopolitics of energy is important segment in International Relations. If the US and the West are sincere in meeting their political objectives in this region, then they should by all means support the proposed IPI Project and other such projects in the region. These will definitely result into defeating terrorism, social uplift of the people and establishment of true democracy in the region.

As regards to bilateral relations amongst regional countries the pipeline project can turn out to be a peace pipeline or prosperity pipeline. In the context of India - Pakistan relations, the issue of energy goes beyond traditional trade and economic relations, and has wide-ranging effects on economic growth, peace negotiations and regional power status. The need for energy also ties in closely with the issues linked with the globalization of these countries as multinational energy corporations become the true players on

the Asian markets with economic and political consequences which cannot be entirely foreseen at this stage.²⁶

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**YOUTH BULGE IN ASIAN SOCIETIES:
A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS**

Ms. Aina Tariq

Pakistan is proud of her Youth, particularly the students, who are nation builders of tomorrow. They must fully equip themselves by discipline, education and training for the arduous task lying ahead of them.¹

Quaid-e- Azam

Abstract

A nation's destiny rests on the shoulders of its youth. If these vibrant people are guided well, they can change the destiny of their respective nations and the globe at large. The youth has the capacity of extensive thinking and innovation, sustained hard work thus, leading to progress and development. They are flexible in their search for truth and readily accept the new and different ideas may that be challenging. Unfortunately, Pakistan is not independent in policy making especially those related to economic reforms because of the involvement of foreign donors like the IMF and World Bank. Pakistan needs to evolve comprehensive economic policies followed by provision of infrastructure to implement those policies involving the youth. Nevertheless, the best possible employment of this youth (63 percent of the total population), which is an asset, is only possible, if an investment is made on them in appropriate professional education, according to their intellectual level. Regrettably,

the government has been unable to address the core problems of the youth including their education and employment. Resultantly, this national asset is becoming a drain on national resources and a constant source of insecurity, because they are vulnerable to be exploited by anyone who has the money. This paper focuses on these internal/ external pressures and their effects and suggests a way forward.

Introduction

Asia has experienced huge social, demographic, economic and cultural transformation especially in the last two decades. These transformations have an impact on Asia's youth population, which is actually a bridging generation between the old and the new. This generation is different from earlier generation as it has grown up in the era of globalization.²

Youth is the treasure as well as the strongest weapon of the state. They have fresh minds with fresh blood that flows in the body of the nation. The term "youth" defines a period when a person moves from its dependence on guardian or parents to independent life of adulthood.³ The youth is passing through transition period, which is more challenging. They need to be employed to have an independent life from their family, so that they are able to establish meaningful relationship with people around them.

At global level, youth represents more than twenty five percent of the world's working-age population.⁴ Youth constitute the future promise and development of every

nation. They represent its academics, political leaders, doctors, engineers, tradesmen, innovators and artists. Institutions are realizing the need to invest in building the capacity of young people and utilize their potential in a positive way.

According to the ‘The World Development Report 2007’, youth is the topic of the global agenda that focuses on their education and qualification needed by them and the changes in a young person`s life: knowledge for their life and work, remaining healthy, making families and enjoying citizenship.⁵ In the words of Julian Schweitzer, Director for Human Development, World Bank, “in addition to their primary education, we need to also provide them access to secondary and higher education. This will help turn the youth bulge problem into the youth bulge opportunity”.⁶

Pakistan is blessed with the large population of youth; it is around 63 percent of total population, which is probably the highest ratio in the world. This generation is a blessing for Pakistan subject to its optimum utilization. Certainly, it can play an extraordinary role in the development and progress of the country.⁷

In this backdrop, through this paper, an endeavor has been made to three different aspects. One, understanding human resource management, two, defining youth bulge and lastly , highlighting the importance of youth coupled with youth bulge as state power. The paper begins by examining the rapid growth of Asian youth population, their problems, education,

and jobs, and makes some suggestions for them. It also includes the economic effects, the influence of increased mobilization and the proliferation of mass media and finally recommends options primarily related to Pakistan.

Understanding Human Resource Management

Human Resource Management (HRM) covers a wide range of activities. In 1960`s and 70`s the concept of human resource management was presented for the first time by the U.S. But the idea was inspired by the increasing competition of making products predominately in Asia, Japan and four Asian tigers namely Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.⁸ The concept of human resource management was a mingling of eastern and western concepts, but it remained a misconception for quiet sometime, that it is a western idea, which has been later introduced into the world. This misconception created a lot of confusion among scholars and practitioners of human resource management.⁹ In many of the “developing countries”, it is seen as a “developing field” for which it has both pros and cons.¹⁰

The encouraging aspect is that great interest in this field is being observed by both business organizations and students of specialization in human resource management. This subject does not have a rigid definition. What is the proper subject matter for HRM is still under debate? In spite of the fact that identifying the detailed activities and policies is the focal point of the theoretical approaches to human resource management. Yet, there is not a single complete list of what human resource

management actually covers.¹¹ Most of the subjects that human resource management seems to cover are resourcing development, and other topics as employer participation, trade union relationships, safety and health, equally divided opportunities, elastic and flexible working, cases progression, work design and environmental concerns.

Defining Youth Bulge

“Youth Bulge” is the demographic terminology commonly used to describe a population in which the proportion of young people is significantly large in comparison to other, older age groups.¹² According to the UN-affiliated Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), UN agencies define the youth bulge as large cohorts (in excess of 20 percent) between the ages of 15 and 24 relative to the total adult population.¹³ Some countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam are still experiencing rapid birth rates, which create an increasing pressure from youth in the demand for resources, services and jobs and other necessities of life.¹⁴

According to an estimate, 1.2 billion people today are between 15 and 24 years of age and almost 40 percent of the world’s population is below the age of 20.¹⁵ Most of the young people (82 percent) live in developing countries, with approximately 60 percent in Asia alone.¹⁶ By 2025, the number of young people living in developing countries will grow to 89.5 percent.¹⁷ In the next decade, more than one billion young people will enter the working age population

worldwide. They are an important population group with great potential for economic and social development. Unfortunately, more than 200 million are unemployed and need jobs for their survival. The global unemployment rate is 6.0 percent and the youth (15 - 24 years of age) unemployment rate stands at 13 percent and is expected to increase over 15 percent as a result of the financial crisis.¹⁸

Youth is a demographic concept that has both biological and sociological aspects. It relates to an age group that is transiting between childhood and adulthood. But, sociologically it is a category, not a group. This category may consist of several groups. As a category, represented by certain biological attributes, this is found in all societies but the roles and expectations associated with it differ from culture to culture.¹⁹ The region of Asia is so vast and so culturally diverse that no generalizations can be made at the regional level without stating their limitations.

Many similarities exist between countries like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Singapore and the Republic of Korea, and the countries of Europe and North America in terms of their youth profiles, marked by high rates of literacy to the extent that “youth” and “students” have become overlapping categories in these countries.²⁰ However, other countries with low literacy rates and high percentage of population, mostly residing in the rural areas, have relatively small percentage of the urban student population compared to illiterate and the rural youth.²¹

Youth in Asia is not a homogeneous group. Problems of the youth in developing and developed countries within the Asia-Pacific region are also commonly different. The dissimilarities in the youth situation within the region can be related to different social, political and economic structures of the countries.²² In the countries where, for example, joint family are the guiding principles of family and kinship organizations, the socialization of the young is of a different order compared to societies where the nuclear family is the norm. In the South Asian countries, where the joint family norm prevails, the family of orientation meets the obligation of providing the young with financial support for education and during the period of their unemployment. In such societies, the functional jointness, even where there is physical separation, offers a kind of social security net. Thus, unemployment in such societies has a different implication than the societies where nuclear family norm prevails.²³

The main problem in comparing the countries in terms of their youth profile is caused by the differences in the definition of youth. While the United Nations treats the age group of 15-24 as the core of the youth category,²⁴ however, Nepal, for example, has set the lower limit at 10 for this age group, and India has stretched the upper limit to 35.²⁵ Obviously, the people between the ages 10 to 15 and between the ages 24 to 35 have different problems compared to the core group.

Even the core group can be subdivided between 15-20 and 20- 24. The 10-15 age groups should be seen as consisting of those preparing to enter the youth category and experiencing major physiological changes. The 15-20 subgroup of the core consists of those new entrants, who are in the process of being recognized as youth and struggling to train themselves for their eventual entry into the adulthood with participation in the economy. While the age group from 20-24 has settled for a career and has an additional responsibility of establishing their own family of procreation.²⁶ Similarly, the 24-35 age groups may contain people, who are already out of the education system and are either waiting to be absorbed by the economy, or already in it, with different degrees of satisfaction.²⁷

There are sixty two countries which are ranked as young nations, because their two third majority of population is under the age of thirty. The developing countries like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh and India have a large number of young people facing major challenges due to lack of opportunities for their employment. In 1970s, 1980s and especially in 1990s, these countries that had a majority of younger population experienced three times more civil conflicts as compared to any mature nation.²⁸ During 1970s to 1990s almost eighty percent civil conflicts occurred in these countries where more than thirty percent of the population was under thirty.²⁹

One of the highest proportions of the young people is from Islamic countries. Here are the Islamic countries, which have younger population under the age of twenty-four: Iraq-nearly half of its population is less than fourteen years old, Pakistan at 63 percent, Saudi Arabia at 62.3 percent, Algeria at 56.5percent, Yemen at 44.2 percent and Iran at 59.3 percent.³⁰ This demographic percentage has serious effects on the future of these countries, particularly on their economic, social and political situation.

Youth Bulge at Regional Level

It is believed that by 2050, the youth around the world would be double than what it was in 1950 i.e. 1.2 billion. It is interesting to note that majority (nine out of ten) of the youth is a member of developing countries, where as 50 percent of this youth by 2050 would be in the regions of Asia/pacific and another 30 percent will be in Africa. This implies that the societies containing that youth would face tremendous challenge of providing them basic education and employment facilities.³¹

Regional Demographics


If we look at the basic demographics, we find that Pakistan is better off as compared. to its immediate neighbours. Yet, it is noteworthy that Pakistan's population growth rate is alarming. In fact, it is the highest among China, Afghanistan, India and Bangladesh as indicated in the table & figure below. The growth is dense towards the young and youth bulge is formed with a passage of time.

Table 1: Demographics of Asian Countries

Country	Births Per 1,000 Population	Deaths Per 1,000 Population	Population Million	Growth Rate (Percent)
China	12.29	7.03	1,300	0.49
Pakistan	24.81	6.92	177.2	1.57
Bangladesh	22.98	5.75	158.1	1.56
India	20.97	7.48	1,100	1.34
Afghanistan	37.83	17.39	29.8	2.375%

Source: US Census Bureau International Database, 2012.³²

Graph 1--Data Base of Asian Countries



Source: US Census Bureau International Database, 2012.³³

Comparative Analysis of Major Asian Countries

It has been noticed that using global data to make comparisons by regions or by countries, possesses several potential complications. Firstly, every country has its own system to quantify indicators. There has been no worldwide standardization of measurement, and many countries label the informal economy with a range of titles from “self-employed”, to “informal”, to “enterprises”.³⁴

A second problem, and probably the most challenging, is the vast difference in the quality of the census data that comes from NGOs, research centers, or private firms. The resources and capacities of these institutions vary greatly by country and by region, thus, affecting the ability to compare data. Lastly, indicators for the number of migrants flowing into a country, the economic needs of youth, and literacy rates can represent highly charged political debates both internal to a nation and in the wider international realm.³⁵

Donors rely on these numbers to provide aid, which can also influence methodology depending on the country. Despite these challenges, there is a wealth of information that exists even for the poorest nations. The key is to understand the context in which the data was collected, rely on established sources, and maintain a critical eye throughout the analysis.

Table 2: Population Estimates of Asian Countries

Country Name	Population	Year of Estimate
Afghanistan	29,835,392	2011
Bangladesh	158,570,528	2011
China	1,336,717,952	2011
India	1,189,172,864	2011
Pakistan	187,342,720	2011

Source: CIA World Fact book - January 1, 2011³⁶

Afghanistan

Afghanistan is experiencing a significant youth bulge. According to the CIA World Fact Book, 42.3 percent of Afghanistan's population is under the age of 15.³⁷ A United Nations Development Program (UNDP) report states that 68 percent of the Afghan population is under the age of 25 with an average life expectancy of 44.6 years.³⁸ Youth in Afghanistan faces various kinds of problem, related from security issues to economic and social problems. Social problems are related to education, health, drug abuses and unemployment. Education for girls is a bigger issue.³⁹

Certain groups in Afghanistan still disagree with the idea of education for girls. They try to enforce their ideas to local people and target schools and colleges for girls. On the other side, because of the security reasons, some parents are reluctant to send their girls to school. Nevertheless, Afghanistan currently has an estimated 500,000 girls enrolled in schools all over the country.⁴⁰ The 2010 USAID technical

brief reports that the burgeoning population in Afghanistan places stress on the state's capabilities.⁴¹ According to a 2010 article by Elizabeth Cutler published by the Stimson Centre, meeting the education, health and employment needs of the large youth population will prove critical in Afghanistan.⁴² The current population imbalance, says Cutler, will exacerbate the already high unemployment rates, currently estimated at 40 percent, and could potentially lead to high levels of social and political dissatisfaction.⁴³

Bangladesh

Bangladesh has a large population (around 142.3million), includes 71.2 million males and 71.0 million females.⁴⁴ Majority of the population, almost 90 percent are Muslims, only 9 percent belong to Hinduism and one percent from other different religions. Its economy depends on its agriculture sector.⁴⁵ Out of this, almost 135 million people are not living a standard life. People are deprived of their basic human needs, which make it one of the poorest countries in the world.⁴⁶ Since the last two decades, some progress has been made in this regard. Countries of South Asia have taken some positive initiatives in improving the lives of people and reducing their poverty to achieve its poverty reduction Millennium Development Goals (MDG) targets. But on the other side, Bangladesh is facing a great challenge of ensuring food security and therefore, its government is afraid that the MDG target for hunger might not be achieved properly.⁴⁷

China

China is a country of 1.3 Billion people, which is approximately 21 percent of the world population and it is the largest in the world so far.⁴⁸ It is threatened to face huge social and economic issues related to over population in coming years. A lack of land and resources, pollution and disastrous living conditions are caused by overly polluted areas. The government has made an effort to resolve the issue of increasing population in which they have succeeded moderately. Government of China has applied many techniques to keep the population growth under control including introduction of a one “child policy” in 1979.⁴⁹

Under this policy, those citizens who agree to have one child are given special benefits and encouragement. On the other hand, parents having extra children are taxed as much as even the fifty percent of what they earned. Other punishments include losing their jobs or other advantages.⁵⁰ In 1980, an institution was established to check the growth of population. Government decided goals for each area, officials were appointed to keep the growth of population under target goals. In case of failing to meet the targets, the local officials are liable to be punished.

There is special encouragement and advantages for those couples, who agree to have one child. No fee is charged for their medical checkups and best education is provided to for child. In addition, an extra three months maternity leave to their women. The situation is different in countryside; farmers

need more children to work on their agricultural area. In this regard, a relaxation in one child policy was given for the people of rural areas in 1980s, which is still continued⁵¹.

India

World's 2nd biggest country is India. According to population of India; it will cross China's by 2030. The population forecast for India and China by 2030 is 1.53 and 1.46 billion respectively. 17 percent of the world population i.e. 1.21 billion people live in India.⁵² According to arguments of youth bulge, young people of a large population will face more violence. A Congress Party official said, "This is India's youth bulge. It's as restive and impatient as say, the Arab youth bulge violence in an area".⁵³ In the next decade, 100 million Indians are going to join global workforce which is more than labour force of Britain, France, Italy and Spain.⁵⁴ This will give India a higher potential productive workforce.

Pakistan's Challenges and Opportunities


Out of Pakistan's 187 million population, 63 percent is youth i.e. less than 25 years old.⁵⁵ They do not have education and employment. In 2007, according to the Economic Survey of Pakistan, there were 113 main universities enrolling 424,271 students.⁵⁶ This ratio of youth is very important. The war against terrorism and unemployment has lead to frustration in youth. From 1975-2005, Pakistan has doubled its population becoming 6th most populous country. Pakistan is facing demographic transition. It is expected that by 2040,

Pakistan will become fourth biggest country, according to its population, after China, India and the US.⁵⁷

The US Census Bureau made a recent research, which says that in 2012, Pakistan's population was 187,342,721, only 30 percent of which was active youth.⁵⁸ This youth bulge would not have been dangerous if government could provide work for them but this is not the case. In next twenty years, Pakistan will have 85 million people added to its population. Educating, feeding and taking care of such a large youth would be challenging. Every year, the number of unemployment frustrated youth will increase.

In 2010, it was realized that fertility rate should decline in Pakistan, and dividend, of youth bulge should be extracted by providing education. Increasing labour force should be given work, else these will have serious complications for Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in Pakistan. Stakes are getting higher due to youth bulge. Pakistan can benefit from it, if it can provide jobs and work; otherwise, the opportunity will cause social damage. In spite of enactment of a National Youth Policy (NYP), we need a policy to accommodate this youth at national level.

Graph 2-Pakistan Population Graph



Source: US Census Bureau International.⁵⁹

There is another angle to Pakistan's problem. Pakistan is producing an estimated 10,000 students from Madrassa (religious seminaries) every year. We have about two million pupils in these Madrassa compared to only 7,000 some 30 years ago. The degrees held by these students have no usage in the open market, and they stand nowhere in open competition. This unemployed youth is vulnerable to exploitation by anyone, who has the money. Despite tall claims made by the government, no concrete steps have been taken to redress the problems attached to Madrassa culture.⁶⁰

Pakistan has taken some steps to support its youth by creating Ministry of Youth Affairs and Pakistan Youth Parliament. Pakistan is supporting the young jobless graduates and postgraduates through national internship programme. The aim of the programme is to give some financial relief to fresh graduates and also utilize the potential of youth in a positive manner by giving them work experience as well as additional knowledge. But, unfortunately, these institutions are not working in a true sense as explained and demonstrated in their policies, because these lack capacity to address the problems of such a huge strength.⁶¹

Brain Drain: A Real Challenge

When the intellectuals of a country can not get their desired standard of life like salary and access to advanced political conditions, they migrate to some other country which offers them all those opportunities. This is a drawback in developing countries, because these people are unlikely to fall back. The recipient countries have the advantage, because they get young trained work force for no expenses.⁶²

Brain drain is a global phenomenon. Usually it is from 3rd world countries to Europe or USA. It is good for development of the world but not so advantageous for the 3rd world countries. It has a bad effect on culture, when these high intellectuals migrate from their native countries. Chinese and Japanese cultures are rapidly mixing with the whole world due to the very same reason. Many able scientists and engineers are following this trend of migration, and it needs to be

checked by providing them opportunities to flourish in their own countries.

Brain Drain: A Critical Issue for Pakistan

There are numerous causes of brain drain in Pakistan. Some of the key grounds include⁶³ Attainment of job, higher education and a better political environment, and for research purposes. Hence, Europe and USA attract the research oriented youth. Pakistan is far behind in the field of science and technology. Therefore, for higher and better education youth migrates to advanced countries. Additionally, naturally harsh environment, poor scientific values and society, lack of competition and a very challenging culture, no place for development and research and finally, lack of merit criteria compels youth to migrate to better destinations. Therefore, it is strongly felt that Pakistan must develop a political environment which promises a better future to the youth. It will help decreasing the brain drain.

Implications of Brain Drain for Pakistan

- The results of brain drain are dangerous. The active youth is moving to other countries and intellectual resources are depleting rapidly. If the trends continue, Pakistan may have to import highly expensive work force for its dire need thus, it will lower the economic growth rate.
- As the research oriented intellectuals migrate to other countries which provide a better environment for research, the research process of the developing

countries slows down as the expert's researchers are not available.

- In every field due to the non-availability of experts and professionals, it is a serious blow to country's progress.
- The country becomes intellectually starved.
- Progress is discontinued and a vacuum is created, which can not be filled by the less able individuals.

Way Forward

Improving education and providing employment is an issue of national as well as global security. If we are able to understand correctly and predict the future trends of population, we can provide education and employments for all, thus, continuous monitoring is an important factor to plan for future.

- According to research and studies, it has been seen that conflict reduces considerably, when quality education at a primary and secondary level increases. This is much more pertinent with regards to all third world countries especially Pakistan and Afghanistan. Increasing opportunities of formal schooling can reduce the danger of their getting involved into conflict by 20 percent.
- Around the whole world, about 67 million children and an additional; 74 million adolescent are presently aspiring to become profitable member of the society but lack requisite opportunities globally. If necessary steps are not taken, their numbers will blast as

population surges in the poorer and poorest countries. Effective strategies and additional resources are needed to reach the growing population around the world.

- In purely Pakistani context, we are lucky to have 63 percent young work force which can do miracles in economic development, provided they are taken care of. The government must convert its youth into a skilled work force by introducing professional schools and colleges at least at the district level. However, the ongoing trends are detrimental to Pakistan's national security as Pakistan is unable to focus its energies on education sector, which has been left to private sector including religious seminaries.
- Every member of the youth can not become a doctor and an engineer or a lawyer. Majority of them have to be trained in technical trades according to their trends and market demand so that they have the job opportunities within the country and they are also productive members of global society. Well trained youth employed abroad can also help the country in collecting huge foreign remittance.
- The skilled labour can only produce results when they have the opportunity to work. Unfortunately, because of a number of factors, our existing industrial setups are forced to wind up their businesses. Many of them have already shifted their business in countries like Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, because of a number of factors

including energy shortage and poor law and order situation in the country. In this context, rather than creating more jobs, we are heading towards losing the jobs. The government needs to take steps on war footing otherwise, the wonderful youth may become a drag on nation's exchequers.

- Besides other reforms, education reforms in Pakistan are needed badly to bring a large segment of our youth that is currently focusing on religious education only, having no place in the educational fold. If we are sincere to bring lasting peace and stability in our country, education reforms are vital. The divided society especially the youth needs to be united, if we are to get full advantage of their potential.

Conclusion

Youth's contribution in education plays a key role in improving the literacy rate of the country, hence, gaining more and more education and transmitting to the next generation. Pakistani youth while promoting a culture of higher education can take country towards success by adopting new technologies and ideas. Their progress in the streams of commerce, engineering and medical can help the nation in improving the living standards and health of the people of Pakistan.

Youth bulge is basically an energy reservoir and as it is the law of energy, "it can neither be created nor destroyed, however, one form of energy can be changed in to another

form.” Hence, youth bulge also can neither be created nor destroyed. If it is utilized properly by the nation and government of a country, it becomes a positive energy. On the other side, if a country fails to utilize the energy of its youth due to lack of resources, it changes into a negative form of energy which is destructive for a country as well as its progress. As the father of the nation once said:

*You must concentrate on gaining knowledge and education. It is your foremost responsibility. Political awareness of the era is also part of your education. You must be aware of international events and environment. Education is a matter of life and death for our country.*⁶⁴

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PSYCHOLOGICAL CONTOURS OF STRATEGIC TERRORISM: A CASE STUDY OF PAKISTAN

Ms. Qurat ul Aain

Abstract

Pakistani society underwent a noteworthy change at the onset of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and with new era of War on Terrorism. These two factors have transformed Pakistani society; there are rising advocates of suicide bombing as a justified notion and contenders rejecting suicide bombing as a justified action. However, the notion of psychological factors involved in persuading an individual to conduct terrorist acts has not been debated in our society. Furthermore, there is lack of debate on how terrorism is impacting governments strategically, and how terrorists are persuading governments to align their policies according to their goals. Subjects of extremist ideologies and religious militancy have been debated; however psychological contours have not been paid enough heed. It is significant to analyze the impact of psychological pressure on society and government and how both are getting affected vice versa.

Introduction

“Everyone’s worried about stopping terrorism. Well, there’s really an easy way: Stop participating in it.” – Noam Chomsky

Terrorism has two dimensions which operate simultaneously; terrorism as a means of violence and as a

means of strategy of violence to achieve a putative end. Controversy surrounds in explaining and defining the term terrorism, different definitions have been laid out by different international organizations and agencies. Terrorism according to Central Investigation Agency (CIA) and US State Department, “is pre-meditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by substantial groups or clandestine groups as defined by CIA and US State Department.”¹ According to UN General Assembly Resolution 49/60 adopted on December 9, 1994 defines terrorism as “criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in circumstances unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic or religious or any other nature that maybe invoked to justify them.”²

Arab convention for the suppression of terrorism defines terrorism, “Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes that occur in the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda and seeking to sow panic among people, causing fear in harming them or placing their lives or liberty in danger, or seeking to cause damage to the environment or public/private institutions or property or to occupying or seizing them or seeking to jeopardize national resources.”³ Difficulty in defining terrorism arises, when it comes to agreeing on legitimizing of violence against whom it is directed and by whom the violence is being employed and to

attain what certain ends. As it is difficult to layout one universal definition of terrorism, so terrorism cannot be confined to one type but there are different typologies of terrorism. The article will explore “strategic terrorism” and its impact on societal and governmental level as well as psychological aspects of terrorism as “how an individual becomes a terrorist?” The article would be exploring certain questions that are; 1) What are the psychological factors that lead an individual to become a terrorist? 2) How terrorism impacts government strategically?

Theoretical Perspectives

Theory of Overreaction

Theory of overreaction is subject to both target and the insurgent groups, which consequently results in loss of public support. Indiscriminate use of violence by target (government in this scenario) injuring the innocent, makes the populace overtly or covertly condemn government’s actions, subsequently, public becomes receptive to recruitment by terrorists groups. As noted by Carlos Marighela, “in overreacting the target has transformed a country’s political situation to a military one.”⁴ Denial of civil rights without cause, another overreaction, will be interpreted as protecting the target and not the people, and if the target overreacts with ostentatious protective measures, the political stature of and the threat from terrorists is magnified.”⁵

Theory of Power Deflation

Theory of power deflation notes that if the target (government) fails to respond to terrorism and cannot protect its citizens, regime will lose public support, and further it will lose capability to thwart terrorism and resultantly will lose legitimacy. Same results are seen if terrorists operate against their victims without hindrance and then successfully collect ransom, release prisoners, manifestos available for reading or printed in the media, destroy symbols, and kill/injure victims. Thornton calls “disorientation” is clearly seen in the behaviour of the target, it is bad theatre for target and the terrorists, supposedly weak seem to be in control.”⁶

Strategic Terrorism

Strategic Terrorism is a form of military strategy to attain political gains by the terrorist groups. Strategy here is defined how military supremacy will be employed by the perpetrator to attain political interests. To attain political objectives, it is not necessary that the terrorist group or conflicting actor would employ a single blow, but it can be rather a slow procedure with a series of blows, which can entail a bargaining structure, which can make the governments comply with the demands instead of resisting them. According to Carl Von Clausewitz, “the aim of the warfare is to the raise the price of further hostilities to such an extent that the opponent will desist.”⁷

There is a relationship between strategy and terrorism, and distinction between tactical and strategic terrorism. Terrorism

itself is “form of strategic coercion”, where target is a voluntary agent and has an option either to comply with pressure or reject the pressure. Whereas, strategic terror outlined by Lawrence Freedman is “attempt to use acts of violence to gain political ends.”⁸ However, sometimes the perpetrators aim is not to achieve political gains but to remove an entire ethnic group from a particular territory, such kind of violence has been witnessed in Rwanda, Armenian and Bosnia.

Strategic Terrorism explained by Lawrence Freedman is two-fold staged process: “first, independent deliberate acts of violence, or threats of violence against a populace, intended to produce a particular psychological effect on the assumption that second, will influence the target’s whole political system through shifting its behaviour and attitudes.”⁹ Tactical terrorism is the art of employing available means for counter fighting, drawing an opponent to use a desired attack in order to present an opening attack, stop retaliation, adopting non-aggressive posture to mentally disarm an aggressor, and employing same tactics of violence in order to promote target (government) to expect the same attack, however, resort to different technique.


Dimensions of Terrorism

Terrorists are now technically advanced and outsmart the intelligence setup in planning and tactics. Previously, terrorists employed conventional weapons which caused limited casualties and less destruction. Hacked email

accounts, foreign Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) which makes it for the authorities to trace the call or know the origin of the caller and cloning of Internet Protocol(IP) address to erase their traits of origin by resorting to cyber-attacks. Terrorists are now employing more enhanced explosive material especially ammonium nitrate used in 2,053 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) attacks in Pakistan causing 2,073 deaths.¹⁰

Disorientation

Terrorism has robust psychological dimension, where the modus operandi is to instill terror at societal level and to undermine economic, societal and political stability. Peter Neumann and Martin Smith define the objective of disorientation, “Alienate the authorities from populace, reducing government to impotence in the eyes of population, which will be perceived as unable to cope with a situation of evolving chaos.”¹¹



Peter Neumann and Martin Smith Terrorism modus operandi Efficacy

Number of theories have been laid out to determine the efficacy of terrorism, however, there's also a growing trend that is striving to prove "terrorism is not an effective tool" to attain political gains. Contenders of efficacy of terrorism Robert Pape, believes that suicide terrorism has become a popular tactic due to groups recognizing that it pays.¹² Research study conducted by Robert Pape, concluded that six out of thirteen campaigns proved to be successful which resulted in noteworthy policy.¹³ As suggested by Nicholas O Berry, "effective terrorism is when the target of the terrorism acts in such a manner that it either loss public support for its political position or it lessens its own political capabilities. Therefore, terrorists must know how to manipulate target's psychological perceptions to induce to act in the way it is predisposed to act."¹⁴

Impact on Pakistan – An Analysis

The theoretical findings of this article affirm the ongoing scenario in Pakistan, there is growing gap between populace and citizens. To thwart terrorism, Pakistani government has taken stringent measures to tackle the menace of terrorism, however, in doing so; the government has ignored civil liberties, right to life and security, which is protected under Pakistan's constitution. With the insurgency beginning to have spillover effect from Afghanistan into Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Federally Administered Tribal Areas

(FATA) border, Pakistani government had no choice but to use brute force as the government neither had adequate law nor institutions¹⁵. Pakistan's efforts to squash terrorism cannot be ignored, the country has setup huge array of forces including tribal levies (lashkars), army soldiers, Inter Service Intelligence Agents, tribal police and Frontier Corps.

Amnesty International reports that Pakistani government has illegally detained many people on suspicions of having links with Al-Qaeda and Taliban and has ill-treated them. As documented, hundreds of suspects have been handed over to US for financial rewards, thus the government has its own extradition law null and void.¹⁶ Other than enforced disappearances and illegal detentions, the operation(s) carried out by security forces is also hitting on the moral of the civilians, reason being, the insurgents have scattered themselves in the civilians, which makes it difficult for the security forces to distinguish between civilians and insurgents. Bajur Agency and Mohmand Agency Operation of 2008 affirm that the security forces failed to protect civilians from their shelling.¹⁷

Pakistan is also facing Power Deflation; the government has failed to curtail terrorist activities which are making citizens lose trust in the government. Thousands of civilians and security personnel have been killed in an effort to curtail terrorism. According to South Asian Terrorism Portal since 2003 till today 44,998 people have been killed (including terrorists).

Years	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/ Insurgents	Total
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1522	597	1479	3598
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2324	991	8389	11704
2010	1796	469	5170	7435
2011	2738	765	2800	6303
2012	2938	691	2443	6072
Total*	15086	4781	25131	44998

*Data till December 23, 2012

<http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm>

There is a soft approach on terrorists, which is an ideal scenario for terrorists to regain and reshape their planning. Another reason of distrust on government's efforts is due to weak judicial system of the country, the apprehended walk free on bail or sometimes, the accused can never be put behind bars due to lack of evidence, there are plenty of cases to quote. Recent example of such case is of Malik Ishaq, leader of banned militant outfit Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), who had

been responsible for 2011 attacks in Mastung Balochistan, attack on Sri Lankan team (2009) and assassination of Iranian Cultural Counsel Muhammad Ali Rahim (1997).¹⁸The testimonies which appeared against Malik Ishaq were also killed during the trial. But this is just not one case of prejudice in Pakistan, founding father of LeJ Akram Lahori along with accomplices Ishaq and Basra slipped through judicial system.

Psychological Theories of Violence


To develop a counter-terrorism strategy, it is necessary to first understand the motivations and causes of violence only then a comprehensive working counter terrorism strategy can be developed. Furthermore, it is significant to note that terrorists are not insane or mentally unstable there are different reasons for terrorists to join, remain or leave a terrorist organization. Following psychological theories to comprehend violence have been put forward which are as follows:-

- Psychiatric Theories of Mental Illness
- Instinct Theory
- Drive Theory
- Social Learning Theory
- Cognitive Theory

Psychiatric Theories of Mental Illness

Jerold Post advocates terrorists as mentally ill, he argues that terrorists face negative childhood experiences and have a damaged self. Moreover, he asserts that the most dangerous terrorists are “religious terrorists”. The analysis given by

Jerrold Post is that it is mental illness that forces a person to commit atrocities.¹⁹ Another view point is given by Walter Laquer who has given the idea that there has to be a line drawn between extremist and fanatics. According to Walter Laquer extremists are political zealots and fanatics are religious zealots, however, Laquer strips away religious connotations and thus concludes mostly terrorists are fanatics.²⁰



Instinct Theory

Pioneer of instinct theory Sigmund Freud noted that all human behaviour is motivated by instincts, which are represented by neurobiological physical needs. Neurobiological approach relates the behaviour to the electrical and chemical events taking place inside the body and emphasizes the need to understand the activities within brain and nervous system, and together their effect on human behaviour.²¹ Sigmund Freud noted that aggression is human instinct which matures in the normal development of an

individual. Recent developments in Freud's theory added "humans have two energy of life force, 1)Eros (life force) and 2) Thanatos (death force), which are seeking internal balance, violence is displaced and thus thanatos (death force) is transferred from self and onto others."²²

Ethology

Ethology deals with the study of animal behavior and its focus is on animal behaviour under natural conditions. According to ethologist Konard Lorenz, aggression arises from biological need "fighting instinct". He added that it is a mode of expression in humans; however, it is learned through interaction with the environment. The theory suggests aggression in individuals is built by time, simulated through psychological or emotional provocation and is released by a process of catharsis, which lowers the drive.

Drive Theory

The drive theory of Frustration Aggression is the most well-known to understand the dynamics of behaviour, which notes that frustration leads to aggression. Ted Robert Gurr (expert on violent behaviours) advocates the hypothesis, notes every form of frustration leads to aggression.²³The prerequisite condition, however, for frustration leading to aggression rests on the premise of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation is "actors' perceptions of discrepancy between their value expectations and their environment's apparent value capabilities."²⁴ Concept of relative depression among individuals affects their behaviour which increases the

feeling of stress which consequently results in change of their political attitudes and participation in collective action.



Social Learning Theory

Social Learning theorist Bandura suggests that aggression is a learned behaviour, aggressive behaviour is employed to achieve desired results, once desired results are achieved through aggression then that aggressive behaviour will be persistent in an individual. On the contrary, if aggressive behaviour is employed but desired result is not achieved then it is likely followed by punishment. Bandura (Social Learning Theorist) made claim that “aggressive behaviour is not only learned through one’s direct experience, but also through observation of how such contingencies occurs in one’s environment.”²⁵

Cognitive Theory

Cognition theory suggests that knowledge about surrounding environment is acquired through intuition, perceptions and reasoning. People interact with the environment according to their internal perceptions and how

they interpret it rather than viewing the environment objectively. Two common deficits have been found among highly aggressive people “1) they cannot generate non-aggressive solutions to conflicts 2) hypersensitivity to hostile aggressive cues in the environment, particularly interpersonal cues.”²⁶

Psychology of Terrorist

Different scholars have laid numerous theories to understand what motivates individuals to join banned terrorist groups. Socio-economic factors mainly have been pointed out by theorists, which motivate individuals to join terrorist groups, however, all individuals whom are living under deprived socio-economic conditions do not suffice individuals to become terrorists. Joining terrorist groups is not an overnight decision, as noted by Horgan and Taylor, “what we know of terrorists suggest that there is rarely a conscious decision made to become a terrorist. Most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialization towards extreme behaviour.”²⁷To understand what goes in a terrorist’s mind following factors need to be considered:

- Motivation and Vulnerability.
- Radicalization and Terrorism.

Motivation and Vulnerability

Motivation and vulnerability arise out of physiological factors; motive is defined as emotion, physiological need or desire which furthers an individual to take an action.

Vulnerability defined by Chambers is exposure to risks and difficulty in coping with them. However, vulnerability has two sides; an external side (the external threats) and internal side, which is defenseless (lacking capacity to cope with problems or given situation).²⁸ Motivation and vulnerability according to psychological perspective explain that terrorists are unable to succumb persuasion (motives).



Martha Crenshaw’s Categorization of Motivating Factors for Terrorists

Ideology plays a pivotal role in motivating terrorists, which acts as a cause for furtherance of terrorist activities and justifies their actions. Psychiatrist Jerrold Post explains “cause (of the terrorists) is not actually a cause for persuasion of terrorism, but cause is codified as ideology of terrorist group, according to this line of reasoning, cause becomes a rationale

for the acts the terrorists are driven to commit.”²⁹Three factors of vulnerabilities have been pointed out by psychologists:-

- Injustice.
- Identity Foreclosure.
- Belonging.

Injustice

Injustice is the prerequisite condition pointed out by psychologist to understand terrorists’ behaviour. To overcome feeling of injustice vengeance or revenge is common tool to redress, Martha Crenshaw notes, “vengeance can be specific or diffuse, but it is an obsessive drive that is powerful motive for violence towards others, especially people thought to be responsible for injustice.”³⁰

Identity Foreclosure

Identity according to psychology is related to a person’s self-image, self-esteem and individuality. The way a person construed himself in the past and what an individual aspires to become in the future. An individual’s psychological self-identity development is necessary for the integrity and continuity of the personality.³¹An individual’s quest for personal identity can stray him/her towards a terrorist organization. Psychologist Jim Marcia calls this condition as identity foreclosure, where a role and set of ideas and values are adopted by an individual without critical examination, the absolutist black and white nature of most extremist ideologies is attractive to those who want to escape a complicated

world.”³² Sense of uniqueness and individuality in an individual is lost and the only identity an individual has is of the group they belong to, “for these individuals belonging to the terrorist group becomes the most important component of their psychological identity.”³³

Belonging

Individuals belonging to extremist/terrorist groups have a strong sense of belonging, affiliation and connectedness. Alienated individuals who feel disconnected and rejected from the mainstream society find terrorists groups as bliss for them thus, this strong sense of belonging makes the individuals to join and stay with these terrorist groups. “Observations on terrorists’ recruitment show that many people are influenced to join by seeking solidarity with family, friends and acquaintances that individuals who become active terrorists, the initial attraction is often is with group or community of believers, rather to ideology or to violence.”³⁴

Radicalization and Terrorism

An individual doesn’t become terrorists overnight; it’s a gradual process which involves socialization with the terrorist groups. Individuals interact with the terrorist groups, with this socialization they are exposed to extreme behaviour. Generally terrorists follow a four stage process which includes social alienation which leads to boredom, then occasional unconformity within oneself and then eventually becoming terrorists. Eric Shaw outlines a four staged process which explains how individuals become terrorists:-

- *Early Socialization Processes.*
- *Narcissistic Injuries (critical event that happened which affects self-image or self-esteem).*
- *Triggering Events.*
- *Personal Connections with Terrorist Groups.³⁵*

Extremist ideologies and their justification of violence also develop in four stages as laid out by Eric Shaw. First phase starts with **its not right** which is the initial stage of development of grievances, these grievances can vary from people to people. Second stage start with the arousing feeling of **its not fair** feeling of prejudice arises, which gives rise to comparison and feeling of resentment. Then the process follows and feeling of blaming others start, as noted by Eric Shaw, “**Just World Hypothesis**”, in which individuals have a need they will get what they deserve and deserve what they get, and if however, they become victim of injustice then they assume it is someone else’s fault for that condition.³⁶ Final stage follows **you’re evil**, which is the process of stereotyping and generalizing, which acts a justification for the violence that is directed against an individual/group or institution.



Eric Shaw's Model of Process of Ideological Development

Recommendations

It is evident there is no decided definition of terrorism and over the years research has brought up a number of perspectives that define terror at different levels. The strategy used by governments and other organizations in dealing with terrorist incidents has been a failure as new ways and attempts are made to instill fear into people. Thus keeping that in mind, following are the recommendations to deal with it:-

- Immediate punishment by use of force has been a failure thus need is to redirect the behaviour by objectively verifying consequences of engaging in that behaviour at any point in the process.
- The label "terrorism" is misleading the perceptions and understanding of the problem. So instances need to be dealt properly and in entirety as the concept involves more people and more activity.

- A process based approach should be developed towards terrorism to analyze each situation. It helps to draw distinctions at several phases of a particular scenario.
- The impact and assessment of a particular situation and the motives behind needs to be in depth before any particular action is taken. That would help in linking the strategic paradigm of the act with psychological paradigm in assessing as to what can be defined as an act of “terrorism”.
- The historical events need to be analyzed in a way that the focus should be on the lessons drawn from the event that caused terror.
- Loopholes in the judicial system need to filled so that terrorists due to “lack of evidence” should not be walking freely on bails.

Conclusion

To conclude theories and perspectives on terrorism provides us lenses to understand a particular act of violence, but the need is to deal with a particular event and act accordingly without fitting it into a perspective or a perspective onto the particular event. The act of violence may or may not have political connotations behind it. Violence in its form instills fear into the minds of the people. The need here is to understand the underlying factors of a violent act before labeling or framing it as terrorism. Dealing with an act of terrorism with equal force of violence generalizes the issue to a level that those fighting for rights are stereotyped and a

dehumanized image is portrayed whereas, actual belligerents gain sympathy of masses against government's action of dealing with a particular act. Terrorism as a broad term and with no agreed upon definition needs to be dealt with more depth and better understanding to create a strong link from a broader perspective i.e. to a strategic level to a niche i.e. psychological level.

End Notes

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