



# ISSRA PAPERS

(The Journal of Governance and Public Policy)



**NATIONAL DEFENCE UNIVERSITY  
ISLAMABAD, PAKISTAN**

## ISSRA PAPERS

Institute for Strategic Studies, Research & Analysis (ISSRA)  
National Defence University, Islamabad

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## **Editor's Note**

The ISSRA Papers (The Journal of Governance and Public Policy) 1<sup>st</sup>Half 2015 is in your hands for your worthy readership. The contributors of the Journal have been seasoned writers, who have contributed policy relevant/ national & international governance related papers in this edition. It is hoped that their contributions will keep coming in future as well. The publication of the Journal has been receiving active support from the Faculty of Contemporary Studies, NDU, with specific reference to the Departments of Governance and Public Policy and Leadership & Management Sciences. The brief summary of papers and their contributors is given in the succeeding paragraphs.

The first paper 'Prospects for Sustained Economic Cooperation between India and Pakistan' has been contributed by Mr. Umar Farooq Baloch. In this paper the author aims to highlight the importance of bilateral trade between India and Pakistan. He has also endeavoured to explore the impediments towards co-operation and trade between both neighbouring countries.

The second paper 'Madrassa Reforms in Pakistan: A Historical Analysis' is contributed by Mr. Abdul Rauf Iqbal and Ms. Sobia Raza. A historical analysis of different reforms for the betterment of madrassa concept in Pakistan has been presented in this paper. The authors have also discussed certain reforms and ordinances.

'Mid-Term Elections in Israel: An Assessment of Netanyahu's Term in Office', written by Muhammad Shabbir, is the third paper. The writer has discussed and analysed the mid-term elections of Israel. The paper aims to give the scenario, aftermath, regional implications and key elements of 2015 Israel elections.

The fourth paper 'ISSRA's Discourse on Afghanistan Conflict' is written by Ms. Iffat Pervaz. The author brings out the outcomes of the ISSRA's discourse from 2009-2014, about the Afghan conflict. Involvements of stakeholders have been discussed, and recommendations proffered.

Next paper, titled 'Implementation of Disaster Risk Reduction Policy in Pakistan – An Evidence from Sialkot', fifth in line, is written by Ms. Afsheen Zeshan and Dr. Muhammad Bashir Khan. The study is about our State's approach towards disaster management, suggesting ways for its betterment also. Authors have highlighted the recurrent flood-hit area of Sialkot as a case study.

The sixth paper 'Drug Trafficking: A Non-Traditional Security Threat to National Security of Pakistan', has been contributed by Ms. Tehmina Maqbool. This paper aims to discuss the drug trafficking as a security threat for the national security of Pakistan. Drug trafficking is deemed as non-traditional security threat, and negative impact on the society is discussed in detail.

The last paper 'APS Peshawar Incident – An Appraisal' by Ms. Qurat-ul-Ain discusses the black day of Pakistan's history, the APS incident of Peshawar. The author has studied the plausible reasons, and has also taken into stock the National Action Plan which was devised after this horrendous tragedy.

At the end, the Editor extends his profound gratitude to all the writers and readers for pre-posing their trust in ISSRA Papers. Wish you all the best of luck and an intellectually rewarding reading.

## **Prospects for Sustained Economic Cooperation between India and Pakistan**

(M. Umar Farooq Baloch)\*

### ***Abstract***

*Bilateral trade between India and Pakistan is considered by certain quarters on both sides of the border as the most important confidence building measure in normalizing the strained relationship. In this connection, trade being most important confidence building measure, is believed to be the only way to transform the overwrought bilateral relations to sustained bilateral relations. It is prophesized in this case study that bilateral trade can not only help normalizing the strained relations, but also can serve as fundamental constructive step in the peaceful resolution of all ongoing bilateral issues. Trade related legislation in both countries has already reduced the volume of trade, and has allowed bilateral trade, based on a restricted list. The study highlights that the traditional rivals should focus trade liberalization, keeping in view the common goal of socio-economic development. The study will explore the impediments of economic cooperation and the trade potential between India and Pakistan.*

**Key Words:** *transform, bilateral relations, fundamental, legislation, economic*

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\*Mr. Umar Farooq Baloch is working as Research Associate at Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA), National Defence University, Islamabad.

### **Pak-India Economic Cooperation: A Prelude**

Not more than a year after the independence from a foreign colonial power, India and Pakistan entered a conflict-ridden course of relationship starting the first war over Kashmir in 1948. To address the questions that how and who started the war? Is beyond the purview of the study at hand, nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that due to this war the possibility of bilateral trade remained a remote course of action on the part of each warring state in the subsequent years. The period between 1947 and 1971, marked by three wars between the two countries, experienced the lowest level of bilateral trade.

However, there was a positive dimension in the bilateral relations right after the partition of British India too. Shortly, after the partition India happened to be the trading partner of Pakistan. The percentage of Pakistan's exports to India in 1948-9 was 56%, and 32% of Pakistan's imports were coming from India.<sup>1</sup> Two important developments resulted in the decline of bilateral trade and interdependence at that time: Currency devaluation in India and subsequent imposition of trade restrictions by Pakistan. Setting aside the old age interdependence, the two governments followed the path of diminishing interdependence to readjust the self-constructed political realities. Bilateral trade that started right after the partition halted as a result of 1965 Indo-Pak war. Furthermore, due to legal restriction, there has been a surge in the illegal trade through smuggling of goods from both sides. Even the security forces deployed on both sides of the border are accused to be involved in trans-border smuggling. This illegal trade has been, however, beneficial to the villages bordering on both sides.<sup>2</sup>

### **Policy Rationale & Comprehension: A Glance**

The situation of bilateral trade improved as a result of a trade agreement in 1975 between the two states. This improved the level of bilateral trade but did not lead to complete mutual agreement encompassing all aspects of bilateral trade. However, it was the government of Pakistan that proactively announced a positive list of 40 items for trade. During the 1990s, a period which saw a return of civilian rule in Pakistan after more than a decade, the bilateral trade increased often punctuated by fluctuations. This increase in bilateral trade was a result of two important policy decisions aimed at liberalizing bilateral trade: Both India and Pakistan joined World Trade Organization in 1995 and in 1996 India granted MFN status to Pakistan.

These developments were followed by another important development when both India and Pakistan signed South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA). By signing this multilateral agreement the developing countries in the SAARC region agreed to decrease the tariffs to a 0-5% level by 2013. Coupled with General Pervez Musharaff's initiation of trade talks with India, this agreement helped bilateral trade reach a record high figure. A major development since 2011 has been the annulment of the Positive list and announcement of a negative list by the government of Pakistan. This negative list enables more products to be traded through road and increased from 40 to 137 products.<sup>3</sup>

However, Pakistan has still not been able to reciprocate the Indian decision to grant MFN status to Pakistan in 1996. Pakistan's reluctance to grant the MFN status to India is viewed by the latter as a violation of the SAFTA. The PPP-led government decided principally to reciprocate the Indian gesture by giving her MFN

status but this has still not been realized and the official bilateral efforts are still minuscule and limited.<sup>4</sup>

Since the last few decades, both Pakistan and India have proved more open economies. Indian GDP's share of global imports and exports has risen from 10% in 1970 to 32% in 2010.<sup>5</sup> Similarly Pakistan's share has also increased from 12% to 34%. A realization of gains from the global trade has been observed on the part of both countries.

Nevertheless, increasing global trade of the two countries has not reflected in case of their bilateral trade. The table below elicits that Pakistan's exports to India are small both in scope and magnitude - only one percent of the country's global exports and a small amount of Indian imports. Similarly Indian exports to Pakistan constitute only 1% of its total exports. There has been no advancement in potential trade because of the strained political relations between the two countries.

**Table - 1: Trade between Pakistan and India**

**Pakistan's Exports to India**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Exports (US\$ million)</b>	<b>A percentage of exports</b>	<b>A percentage of Indian imports</b>
2000/03	56	0.8	0.1
2004/07	344	2.6	0.1
2008/11	268	1.9	0.1
2012/Present	264	1.0	0.1

**India's Exports to Pakistan**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Exports (US\$ million)</b>	<b>As percentage of exports</b>	<b>As percentage of Pakistani imports</b>
2000/03	238	0.4	2.7
2004/07	1236	1.1	5.1
2008/11	1226	0.9	4.2
2012/Present	1734	0.9	4.9

**Source:** *State Bank of Pakistan*

### **Current Scenario as a Case Study**

The feat of normalization of Indo-Pak relations received momentum when Modi led BJP came into power in May 2014. Pakistan had announced in 2011 to extend the MFN status to India to reciprocate a similar extension by the latter in 1996. Pakistan has renamed the MFN to Non-Discriminatory Market Access (NDMA) in a bid to detach the pejorative meaning attached to the MFN in the state and society of Pakistan.<sup>6</sup> To reach a consequence, on granting India MFN or NDMA, the talks between the two countries have been underway but so far, have not been able to produce any tangible results, because of the recurring tension on LoC and heating up debates by anti-trade lobbies.

A prominent round of talks after the resumption of composite dialogue in 2012 took place in New Delhi, thereafter, Pakistan's High Commissioner invited Kashmiri Hurriyat leaders ahead of Pak-India talks. Consequently, India cancelled the bilateral talks on accusing Pakistan of interfering in India's internal affairs. Variety of hindrances remained underway while granting India as full NDMA status, however, the clear understanding on both sides to normalize bilateral relations through unhindered trade enabled by open borders seems to be a matter of time now.

### **Tariff & Policies as Striking Barriers**

One of the major factors behind the low trade between Pakistan and India is the less diversified export base of Pakistan, and 60% of its exports are accounted for two products: agricultural and textile items. Moreover, these similar items also account for a large amount of India's exports too. It is against this backdrop, that free trade between the two countries is inevitable.

Tariff policies adopted by India have so far precluded the possibility of intra-industry trade. The intra-industry trade is also affected by the support provided by India in the form of relative large subsidies, especially in agriculture.<sup>7</sup> The table given below compares the level and pattern of import tariffs in the two countries, showing that custom duties on agricultural items are notably higher in India.

**Table - 2: Trade Items: Comparison between Level & Pattern of Import Tariffs**  
**MFN-applied tariffs by product group in India and Pakistan**

<b>Product Group</b>	<b>India</b>	<b>Pakistan</b>
Animal products	33.1	14.6
Dairy products	33.7	30.0
Fruit, vegetables, plants	30.4	18.2
Coffee, tea	56.3	12.8
Cereals and preparations	32.2	18.8
Oilseeds, fats, and edibles	18.3	8.8
Sugars and confectionery	34.4	17.2
Beverages and tobacco	70.8	52.5
Cotton	12.0	7.0
Other agricultural products	21.7	6.7
Fish and fish products	29.8	10.6
Minerals and metals	7.5	12.4
Petroleum	3.8	10.7
Chemicals	7.9	9.6
Wood, paper etc.	9.1	15.5
Textiles	14.7	16.7
Clothing	13.4	24.8
Leather, footwear etc.	10.2	14.9
Nonelectrical machinery	7.3	9.3
Electrical machinery	7.2	14.7
Transport equipment	20.7	24.7
Manufactures, n.e.s.	8.9	13.1

**Source:** *World Trade Organization, country tariff profiles*

It is worth mentioning that India also operates a wide range subsidy regime in agriculture. According to Institute of Public Policy, subsidies on agricultural inputs such as fertilizers, water, power, tractors and seeds etc, exceed 5% of its GDP. And yet the concomitant percentage in case of Pakistan is just 1% of GDP. However, there is no denial of the fact that the agriculture subsidies of India are compliant with WTO standards. An account of Non-Tariff barriers between the two countries are explained in succeeding paras.

### **Non-Tariff Barriers**

The prevalent perspective in Pakistan reflects that India restricts her trade with other countries not only through tariff barriers but Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) as well.<sup>8</sup> Some of these NTBs have more strictly been applied to Pakistani items. The following points explain Pakistan and India's operated NTBs.

#### ➤ **Indian NTBs**

According to the World Trade Organization, India operates the following significant NTBs:

- Sanitary and phytosanitary measures are harmonized with international standards and that engulf mostly food items.
- Complex nature of obtaining import licenses and permits.
- Blockade is imposed on imports of animals and plants.
- Certain goods can only be traded through some specific ports or trade routes and particular agencies.
- Antidumping and countervailing measures are taken actively by India.

➤ **Pakistan's NTBs**

In comparison with the aforementioned NTBs operated by India, Pakistan operates fewer and less rigorous NTBs that are described below:

- Unlike in India, the main trade policy instrument operated by Pakistan is the tariff regime including sanitary and phytosanitary measures rather than NTBs.
- Clearance of items such as pharmaceuticals, agricultural products and engineering goods require clearance from the relevant ministries/industries.
- Restriction on imports is applied for health, safety, security, religious and environmental reasons.
- A dominant role is played by state agencies, TCP in case of Pakistan, in the import of agricultural items.
- Unlike India, Pakistan seldom embarks upon antidumping and countervailing measures.

Together with tariff barriers, NTBs seem to have impeded and have major impact on the trade between the two countries. At lower level some steps have been taken so far to clear the situation, whereas, there is still lack of higher level efforts in this connection from both sides. Hence, it is clear that NTBs are more restrictive in India than in Pakistan, especially on agricultural items. In addition, there are several other impediments to bilateral trade, given they are removed, can lead to a significant enhancement in bilateral trade.

Further to the technical barriers to bilateral trade, the element of internal politics has a significant impact on trade liberalization related endeavors as well. The concern also includes pursuit of internal politics.

### **Pursuit of Internal Politics**

Domestic politics, both in Pakistan and India, have a great impact on their respective foreign policies when it comes to the bilateral relationship, Kashmir issue, the main cause for adversarial relations has taken a stronghold in domestic politics. Certain parties and quarters such as rightist parties in both countries champion the issue of Kashmir coupled with nationalistic fervor in their electoral campaigns. The groups and parties on Pakistani side develop a pressure group conditioning in soothing the relations with India on Kashmir issue resolution.<sup>9</sup>

Moreover, in the current scenario after coming into power of business friendly Nawaz Sharif, there appears to be cross-party consensus to a certain extent about easing and strengthening of trade relations with India. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has been an ardent supporter of friendly relations with India and called for peaceful resolution of all ongoing issues peacefully. It was also a BJP government in India last time when Nawaz Sharif was in power in 1999 and he successfully held Lahore Summit with Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpai, who came to Lahore through '*Sadai-Sarhad*' dosti bus. Again with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in power for the third time in Pakistan, in India BJP has once again come in power with Narendra Modi at the helm. Though Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has been promoting an agenda of friendly relations with India and even went to the swearing in ceremony of Narendra Modi, there has been no reciprocal response from India.

Nevertheless, Narendra Modi is also trade friendly and wants to see the bilateral trade increasing, on the one hand, while his anti-Muslim actions in past place him at an antagonistic position with Pakistan. Nevertheless, both countries seem determined to proceed

further and make things happen at least about issues regarding business and trade. At a recent meeting in New Delhi, the commerce ministers of India and Pakistan discussed several measures to accept liberalization and facilitation actions.

**Most Favored Nation Status: Apprehensions**

When the World Trade Organization was established in 1995, both India and Pakistan joined it as members. It is enshrined in the first article of GATT that all the signatories to the agreement are bound to undertake trade with one another in the light of MFN principle. India complied with the GATT and extended MFN status to Pakistan soon after joining WTO, however, Pakistan has not been able to reciprocate this so far.

The MFN treatment ensures non-discriminatory trading terms among the WTO members. It is based on the principle of guarantee that if favorable tariff rates are given to one trading partner then all the member countries will get the same terms. The principle does not require extending extra advantages to any trading partner, but rather uniform terms for trading for all member countries of WTO.

Hence, there is no uniformity among the member countries in obliging these principles and not all countries fulfill this obligation. There are few clauses in GATT that allow one country to discriminate against the other in addition to the permission to form Preferential Trade Agreements.<sup>10</sup>

It was 2011, when Pakistan took principle decision to accord MFN status to India under a new name, Non-discriminatory Market Access. In 2012, it was decided that the two countries will enjoy mutual MFN treatment from January 2013; however, this has not been materialized. It is expected that the current government of Pakistan will soon fulfill its promise to grant MFN status given the

pressure from business community within the country and international donor agencies.

India imposed Non-Tariff barriers, as those serve as one of the main hurdles in Pakistan's reciprocity of MFN treatment to India. These Indian imposed NTBs are complex and range from quality assurance, physical inspection by custom officials to visa issuance. NTBs constitute a significant proportion in the composition of the Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (OTRI) of India. So, here seems a paradigm shift in both countries and the hurdles in the way must be removed for the realization of free trade between the two countries. India needs to shun her policy to impose NTBs on one hand, while Pakistan on the other hand needs to expedite the process of realization of MFN treatment to India.

#### **Impediments and Opportunities: Rhetorical Situation**

It has been observed that Trade-Liberalization would result into benefits for both the trading partners, though, in case of Pakistan and India the opportunities are coupled with some threats as well. Following concerns take into account certain business modalities that can be faced with threats as a result of trade liberalization between Pakistan and India.

- **Textile and Clothing:**

The industry of textile and clothing is a major industry in Pakistan and India that plays an important role in the economic dynamics of both the countries. The goods produced by this industry account for a large portion of trade in both countries and contribute 18.8% in India and 65.6% in Pakistan, as per the total value of exports in previous fiscal years<sup>11</sup>. Both countries rely hugely on these sectors for the creation of employment opportunities and

export revenues. As of now, trade in textile and clothing between India and Pakistan is so much low as to be considered non-existent. In both countries, the textile and clothing sectors elicit different levels of specialization. In Pakistan, the specialization of this industry is in cotton textile intermediate goods including towels and bed linen, while Indian firms have developed high expertise in fiber production and garment manufacture and packaging. Firms in both countries are not vertically integrated and most of them are operating as privately owned small and medium size firms. However, in recent times both textile and clothing industries, to some extent, have vertically integrated.

- **Agriculture:**

Therefore, India is the leading producer of wheat and sugar, Pakistan would be in a position to tap substantive gains from trading with it in these items. In addition to major crops such as wheat and sugar, both countries can explore a number of trading opportunities in other food items. Moreover, India also can tap the potential so that it can export the products that Pakistan has been importing from destinations other than India.

- **Automobile:**

The automobile industry of Pakistan is characterised by protective measures for a long time. The industry was given a boost towards growth through the Automobile Industry Development Plan (AIDP) from 2008. Hence, the automobile industry stands second largest in terms of its contribution to custom duty and sales tax, its contribution to

the GDP in terms of exports has been relatively small and is growing on a slow pace.

Indian automobile Industry is, to the contrary, one of the most rapidly growing automobile industries in the world where India has been bringing forth innovations. Indian automobile industry is technologically more advanced and sophisticated as compared to Pakistan's corresponding industry.

Despite Indian automobile industry's sophistication and increasing global auto exports, Pakistan has not been able to get benefit from this through imports, because various barriers in the way of free trade are being operated by both countries over various different products. If the trade liberalization is realized, Pakistan would be able to import not only Indian cars and tractors but Pakistan's automotive industry can also benefit from the increased exports to grow the national economy also.

In addition, Pakistan can also serve as a potential destination for outsourcing the Indian automobiles. Pakistan's policy of protection in the case of automobile industry has not brought benefits to the industry and it has been unable to make the industry competitive enough to equalize with the global automobile industry.

- **Pharmaceuticals:**

In pharmaceutical sector, India holds an advantageous position as compared to Pakistan. Currently, India has the third largest pharmaceutical industry in the world. The number of pharmaceutical units in India is much larger than in Pakistan, such as India has over 200,000 pharmaceutical

manufacturing units while there are only 400 units operating in Pakistan. The foreign investment in the Indian pharmaceutical sector is also huge with multinational companies investing over \$6 to 10 billion within the last decade exclusively.

On the other hand, though Pakistan's pharmaceutical sector and healthcare sectors are expanding and evolving rapidly, there is still half of its population that does not have access to modern medicines and pharmaceuticals. Given this, Pakistan can benefit from huge and growing Indian pharmaceuticals through free and liberalized trade with it. As well as, Pakistan can also learn from India in the field of pharmaceutical industry as Indian machinery used in pharmaceutical industry is cheaper than half of the other international suppliers from whom Pakistan imports these equipments.

- **Manufacturing:**

The overall share of manufacturing sector in GDP of Pakistan has been higher than India in the year 2009-10, 18% in contrast to 16 % in India.<sup>12</sup> Despite the growing energy shortage and rising inflation domestically, manufacturing industry of Pakistan has shown some positive growth over last five years. There has been 31.3% growth in India's manufacturing sector. Chief Indian exports in terms of manufacturing sector are cellular phones, data processing machines, aircraft parts and air conditioning machines. Pakistan has developed special expertise in manufacturing highly developed and famous sports goods and surgical instruments. Apart from these products, Pakistan is also

able to export light engineering products to India. In other Pakistani manufacturing sectors, there are various pitfalls arising from the weaknesses such as obsolete machinery, lack of standardization, poor quality control practices, meager R&D and the small amount of market capacity. Unless these weaknesses are addressed properly, Pakistan's manufacturing sector will continue to face the challenges in realm of export competitiveness, especially against India.

### **Prospects of Sustained Economic Cooperation**

The prospects of economic cooperation between India and Pakistan are given with the socio-economic needs and geographical proximity of both the countries. The volume of trade between India and Pakistan could reach up to \$9 billion, which currently is around just one billion dollars. But the important question is that in the environment of military rivalry marked by huge mistrust how can and how much these two countries could strengthen their economic ties? As discussed earlier, the current era is of economic cooperation and, through economic ties, the old rivals can become today's allies. The world has transformed in a manner where even the enemy states are doing trade with each other despite all the political differences.

Ever since the beginning of composite dialogue between India and Pakistan, both countries were on the right track and serious chances prevailed of substantial economic cooperation between both the countries. Therefore, the developments following the Mumbai attacks have overshadowed the trade ambitions. But later, in the following years, the relative peace has prevailed; as both the countries have broken the ice and have formally resumed the composite dialogue. The change of governments in both India and

Pakistan has proved as a good sign for the trade relations between India and Pakistan. Prime Ministers, Nawaz and Moodi are considered to be the pro-trade personalities. To prioritize the economic sector and improve economic relations with other countries was also the major goal in their election manifesto. The Prime Minister of Pakistan also declared the policy of having good relations with India during his election campaign.

Nirindra Moodi's decision to invite Pakistani counterpart on oath taking ceremony and subsequent visit of Nawaz Sharief denoted a positive beginning for the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan. Though, nothing significant has been achieved thereafter and the formal resumption of composite dialogue is still awaited and the current trends in Indo-Pak relations reflect persistence mistrust between the both nations. Although improving the economic sector has been the major priority of both governments but achieving this goal from enhancing trade with the neighboring country seems the option not being considered.

The economies of both India and Pakistan have huge potential to extract benefits from increasing trade with each other. The economic relations can not only be strengthened at bilateral level but also strong regional economic forum could come into existence by using the platform of SAARC to enrich potential benefits of trade and impediments in economic cooperation.

### **Economic Integration: Trade Liberalization Paradigm**

It is a positive sign that both India and Pakistan have opened up their economies, relinquishing the old import-substitution policies favoring autarky, and adopted a policy of economic integration with the world economy. The reforms carried out as a result have placed

the two countries in a better position to follow preferential trade liberalization.<sup>13</sup>

Pakistan and India, along with other South Asian countries, signed South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) in January 2004 that came into force in January 2006. The main purpose of SAFTA was to reduce and subsequently eliminate tariff barriers, facilitate cross-border movement of goods, promote intra-regional fair competition, and create an effective and efficient framework for regional cooperation. However, the efficacy of the agreement is still impeded by the restrictive sensitive lists adopted by the member countries.

A recent study has showed that India is increasingly shortening its sensitive list under SAFTA. Out of five SAARC member countries covered in the study, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bhutan have already signed bilateral trade agreements with India. Bangladesh has been given a Least Developed Country (LDC) status and only 331 items are placed under the operational list applicable to it.<sup>14</sup> These leave Pakistan to be the only state with a non-LDC status and resultantly the sensitive list applicable to Pakistan contains the largest number of items, 868.

If implemented in their true essence and spirit, the regional trade agreements like SAFTA are destined to produce a positive effect on trade, growth, technological dissemination, and increased Foreign Direct Investment. Intra-regional trade will unchain innovative technology, lower domestic prices, ensure the market expansion. There are several fronts on which joint ventures can be successful under SAFTA, for instance, in pharmaceuticals, chemicals, petrochemicals, automobiles, agro processing,

technology transfer among Information Technology firms and joint gas pipelines.

Different studies have shown different results about the prospects of regional trade in SAARC area under SAFTA. Empirical studies carried out on the subject have elicited mixed results given the smaller size of the member countries that are either landlocked or very small in size in comparison with a huge economy like India. Research studies based on computable general equilibrium model simulations suggest that the policy of unilateral liberalization would benefit the South Asian countries much more than under SAFTA, as in this case smaller countries would gain little or even lose.<sup>15</sup>

However, a different and opposite to the above comprehension is reached by a European Study Group (ETSG) report regarding trade in South Asia using the gravity model.<sup>16</sup> During the course of its analysis, the study showed that there is a significant trade-creation effect with the outside world under the South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA). The report does not find any evidence of the trade diversion effect with the rest of the world, and states that increased regional integration may bring substantial benefits to the SAARC region and the agreement will enhance intra-regional trade though the elimination of tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers among the member countries.

### **Indo - Pak Trade Potential: Recommendatory & Policy Posture**

The trade potential for mutual trade between Pakistan and India is significantly high. According to Dr. Ishrat Hussain, a renowned economist of Pakistan, "India-Pakistan is a win-win situation," arguing that even a 10 per cent share of a 300 million-strong Indian middle class market would double the market share of Pakistani

companies and businesses.<sup>17</sup> It is evident from the economic advantage pointed out by economists that the bilateral trade is advantageous to both countries.

Out of these advantages, the major advantage for both Pakistan and India is the cheaper transportation costs due to shorter distances thus reducing the costs of trade. If the trade of \$1.5 Billion carried out illegally is brought under the official trade it will increase the revenues of the state. If the process of trade liberalization continues, in the longer term there is potential for increased investment including joint ventures.

Comparing with India, the advantages for Pakistan as a result of trade are greater. Trade with India would result in the growth of Pakistan's economy, the growth which stands stalled now. There are two ways through which economic growth can take place: through major structural transformation or through trade. In case of Pakistan, the economic structure has remained unchanged for at least 40 years; the only way left is economic growth through regional trade and investment. In this backdrop, India can be a major trading partner to flourish the economic growth of Pakistan as Pakistan's textile and food industries can find markets in northern India, while India can meet her energy requirements through tapping Pakistan's huge reserves of coal, the world second largest reserves.

Both countries enjoy advantages in different items. India has an advantage in rice, maize and grains while Pakistan enjoys advantage in Basmati rice, cotton and fruits and these items easily find markets in India. Pakistan's agriculture has become more efficient in recent decade and is in a competitive position with Indian agricultural sector despite the latter's huge input.<sup>18</sup> In addition,

there is a relation between the Indian success and Pakistan's benefit as Pakistan's farmers would significantly benefit from the Indian success in raising yields per acre through improvements in seed, irrigation and mechanical technologies.

Such views that underscore the resultant mutual benefits of trade are held by most of the mainstream political spectrum. The mainstream political parties favor enhancement of trade with India which they believe would bring enormous benefit to Pakistan and help it meet the worst energy crisis. In this way, both countries have to find ways for greater economic cooperation, without losing principle stances on Political realities and issues.<sup>19</sup>

In order to revamp the benefits of trade liberalization and economic cooperation, Pakistan and India need to introduce visa regime changes. It is comprehensible that without the movement of people there is no thinking of movement of goods. Both India and Pakistan have many tourist destinations and tourist trade can account for a huge amount of trade and exchanges between the neighboring countries. However, the current visa regime of the two countries imposes severe restrictions on trans-border travel, including long processing time; a single-entry limit; city specific authorization, with a three city limit; police reporting requirements; and the same entry and exit points.<sup>20</sup> In relation to visa regime changes, the Islamabad-New Delhi dialogue has provided some progress with both parties agreeing, in principle, to a more liberal visa regime for the business community. This principle understanding needs to be materialized so that the pace of trade should increase.

Moreover, in the meantime the governments and business communities from both sides should form more contacts of

potential traders and investors, for instance, through organizing trade exhibitions that could provide an environment facilitating access, interaction and sharing of information and goods alike. Softening of visa regime would ensure an easy cross-border movement that in turn would enable potential investors to gauge opportunities. This would also increase the Indian FDI in Pakistan and vice versa.

Although Pakistan has already been allowing incoming Indian FDI, Indian businessmen have been showing hesitance in investing in Pakistan given the political instability and security related problems. A major part of Indian business community wants to invest in Pakistan on the one hand while they fear to come to Pakistan because of security fragility on the other hand. Many prospective investors in Pakistan distanced themselves from such a venture after the Mumbai terror attacks and terrorist activities in Pakistan after 9/11. Ultimately, the prospects of Indian investment in Pakistan depend upon the security and democratic transition in Pakistan that would ensure stability.

**The Public Policy Concern: A Futuristic Picturesque**

The study has recommended policy options for both countries that are imperative for the purpose of gradual increase towards the path of economic cooperation between India and Pakistan in the environment of hostility and mistrust. The first step towards a peaceful and economically developed region is that both countries need to indulge in negotiations to seek the permanent solution of all bilateral outstanding issues between the both countries.

The major factor for failure of negotiations has been the inability of both countries to sustain the dialogue process. During the last few decades it is seen that a single incident can disrupt the

whole process of dialogue. Only a sustained peace process can guarantee any significant development in the solution of bilateral issues.

Moreover, the leadership of India and Pakistan needs to understand the significance of economic cooperation for the regional peace and stability. The initial steps on behalf of the governments could include the softening of visa restrictions and providing the suitable environment for investment to the people from each other's country. In this regard, track-II channel of diplomacy needs to be effectively utilized.

Now, it is the time when the NGOs from countries, leading economists and civil society representatives need to play their respective role for bringing both countries towards the path of peace through encouraging and promoting the economic agenda that includes the close cooperation between India and Pakistan.

The outcomes of the study narrates that there are huge prospects for economic cooperation between India and Pakistan and this cooperation would not only help these two nations but would also contribute significantly towards the regional peace and stability. In this context, strong policy making as well as implementation to, urge between both the governments to increase the trade and other economic linkages between India and Pakistan. However the political differences are causing the major hindrance in the enhanced economic relations.

The complexity of nature of such political issues denotes the normalization of relations between India and Pakistan which seems an uphill task but the progress on the issues can easily be resolvable. The major bone of contention between India and Pakistan; Kashmir issue will remain a source of conflict and its solution seems

impossible. In such situation, the substantial breakthrough on economic cooperation between India and Pakistan seems ordinary.

Therefore in spite of great prospects for economic integration the volume of trade between India and Pakistan would remain low and no significant improvement is sighted in foresighted future. The sustained thaw of peaceful relations of both countries is prerequisite for any positive outcome related to enhance economic cooperation between India and Pakistan.

### **Advocating the Conclusions**

The 21<sup>st</sup> Century in international politics is considered to be the era of economic cooperation and integration among the regional states. The old rivals have become the partners due to their common goal of socio-economic development through the economic cooperation at regional as well as at bilateral level. Though the economic integration is being witnessed throughout the world but the South Asian region is still the least economically integrated region of the world. The region has huge potential of economic integration but the rivalry between India and Pakistan is the major hurdle in the process. The enhanced economic cooperation would make the stakes high for both parties to indulge in hostile activities against each other. But the chances of close economic cooperation between India and Pakistan should not be expected in near future. There are multiple factors that have squeezed the prospects for trade liberalization between India and Pakistan.

The political issues between India and Pakistan are very complex and these issues would remain the cause of tension between the two neighboring nuclear armed countries. The study has identified that the issue of Kashmir is the major obstacle for normalization of relations between the both countries. The

terrorism factor has added a new dimension to the hostile relationship of India and Pakistan. In the backdrop of all these issues of divergences and the resulted mistrust the close economic cooperation seems a difficult goal to achieve in near future.

Finally, the study has identified that economic cooperation between India and Pakistan would not only be beneficial for the social development in both states but it would also significantly contribute towards regional peace and stability. The benefits of economic cooperation would equally be great for both countries. For Pakistan, economic cooperation with India would help in recovering its economy hard hit by the energy crisis. For India, Pakistan could provide a link to its market in Central Asian states through Afghanistan. The economic cooperation would also be a blessing in disguise for the Afghan people as well. This development would not only decrease the chances of proxy war between India and Pakistan in Afghanistan but would also bring economic prosperity in the country as a result of economic stability in the region.

### **End Notes**

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<sup>1</sup>Dr. Ijaz Nabi, 'Integrated Report and Summary of Findings, Pakistan India Trade Study', Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, September 1996, p.2.

<sup>2</sup>Op.cit , 41-42.

<sup>3</sup> An S.R.O. No. 280 was issues by Pakistan's Ministry of Commerce on March 20th, 2012, which entails the list of 1209 items not importable from India. It also has the list of 137 items which are allowed to be traded via land route. To find out the list see <http://www.tdap.gov.pk/.php> In Jan

2014, an item Petroleum Coke was also permitted to be traded through Wagah-Attari border. See <http://www.dawn.com/news/1079280/import-of-petroleum-coke-allowed-by-road-from-india>.

<sup>4</sup>Nabiha Gul, 'Enhancing Indo-Pak Trade', Issue Brief, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, September 2009. 2-4.

<sup>5</sup> Hafiz A. Pasha, Muhammad Imran, "The Prospects for Indo-Pakistan Trade", *The Lahore Journal of Economics*, Vol.17, (September 2012), 293-313.

<sup>6</sup> J. Whalley, Non-discriminatory Discrimination: Special and Different Treatment under the GATT for developing countries, *The Economic Journal*, 100. 20.

<sup>7</sup> ibid

<sup>8</sup> ibid

<sup>9</sup> F.S. Aijazuddin, "Divided Attentions," *Dawn*, September 20, 2012.

<sup>10</sup> See Article XX and Article XXI for general exceptions in the text of The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade formulated in Geneva.

<sup>11</sup> Implications of Trade Liberalization between Pakistan and India, Working Paper for Conference on Pak-India Trade Potential, Punjab Board of Investment and Trade, 03, May, 2012.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 23.

<sup>13</sup>Zareen Naqvi, "Pakistan-India Trade Potential and Issues" (Unpublished Paper), 2008. 12.

<sup>14</sup>Nisha Taneja and Saon Ray, Neetika Kaushal, Devjit Roy Chowdhury, "Enhancing Intra-SAARC Trade: Pruning India's Sensitive list Under SAFTA," ICRIER Working Paper 255, New Delhi, (April 2011).

<sup>15</sup> J.S. Bhandara, "How Desirable is the SAFTA? A Quantitative Economic Assessment," *The World Economy*, 2003.

<sup>16</sup> S.W. Hirantha, "From SAPTA to SAFTA: Gravity Analysis of South Asian Free Trade", European Study Group, 2004.

<sup>17</sup>Ishrat Hussain, Prospects and Challenges for Increasing Pakistan-India Trade, Issue Brief, Atlantic Council, November 2011. 15-16.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid, 25-26.

<sup>19</sup> Pakistan's Relations with India: Beyond Kashmir, International Crisis Group, Asia Report, No.224, (May) 2012. 16.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 19-20.

## **Madrassa Reforms in Pakistan: A Historical Analysis**

(Abdul Rauf Iqbal & Ms. Sobia Raza)\*

### ***Abstract***

*Madrassa is an old and customary idea of teaching. This article addresses diverse changes which occurred after the formation of Pakistan. It will likewise manage the historical assessment of madarssas. In the absolute starting there were a little number of Madrassas existed in those areas which constituted Pakistan however over recent decades, particularly after Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, it picked up prominence and became fundamental feeder to the Afghan Jihad against Soviet control. In the first instance an ordinance called the Pakistani Madrassas Education Ordinance was promulgated on August 18, 2001. Its aim was to secure the registration, regulation, standardization and uniformity of curricula and standard of education of Madrassa imparting specialised Islamic education in Pakistan with the general education system. There were different reforms and ordinances introduced time by time for the betterment of madarssas system.*

**Key Words:** *assessment, fundamental, standardization, sectarianism, religious*

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## **Introduction**

Madrasa, plural Madrassas, is the Arabic word. In literal terms it means a place for education; school either secular or religious.<sup>1</sup> It is an age-old institution, which over time came to be recognised as a place for Islamic religious education. At the time of independence very few prominent Madrassas existed in territories constituting Pakistan but over past few decades, especially after Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, this institution gained prominence for the fact that it became main feeder to the mainly US-Saudi Arabia and other Western and regional powers sponsored Afghan Jihad against Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Approximately 1000 madrassas were established for the purpose with aid from Middle Eastern countries. Many of these Jihadis came from madrasas. Therefore, mushrooming of madrasas was witnessed in Pakistan during 1980s. After abrupt withdrawal of USA sponsored international help and support in 1989/90, Pakistan was left alone. It had to confront the severe fallout consequent to Afghan infighting. In that security vacuum the phenomenon of Taliban was evolved. Taliban, the students of these madrassas, took control of major part of Afghanistan. In Post 9/11, the madrasas became the target of US led, supported by 42 countries, coalition operation duly authorised by UN. Pakistan decided to support this operation, which was named Enduring Freedom (OEF). In a rebound phenomenon to this, Pakistan started facing terrorist attacks by the Taliban. This time again the madrasas came into focus, but a negative one: the

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<sup>1</sup>Christopher M. Blanchard, "Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background" (DTIC Document, 2007), <http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA463792>.

Washington Post articles since 9/11 have portrayed the Pakistani madrassas in derogatory manner and addressed them with severe criticism. At the time of independence in 1947, Pakistan inherited just 200 madrassas, which have grown now close to approximately 40000. Majority of them are like nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) feeding and teaching the orphan and poor children.

Few of the madrassas fuel sectarianism, and proxy war of external and internal hardliner Sunni and Shia factions. A meager percentage of these are reportedly involved in feeding the fighters and suicide bombers to the terrorists fighting the state of Pakistan. There have been reports of some of the Madrassas of Tribal Areas of Pakistan sending fighters for Afghan Taliban (Daniel S Markey, 2014). As per P.W Singer (2001), approximately 10-15% of the Madrassas are involved in feeding the militancy. Madrassa education provides their finances, and their sway in the society has been a subject of appraisal inland and abroad. Demands to harness these and bring them under strict governmental control and reform their education system have come regularly from scholars, academicians, Law Enforcement Agencies, the policy makers and even from the *Ulema* (religious scholars) themselves. The issue of their reforms assumed greater significance post 9/11.

With this in the backdrop this essay is aimed at tracing back the history of Madrassa as an institution, the role these played in pre and post independent Pakistan, especially after 1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan. The perceptions that haunt this institution today and realities of its functioning will also be discussed. More importantly why was the need felt to reform these? The steps and legislation done for the purpose, impact of the governmental efforts made and the way forward will also be focused at in this essay.

## **Literature Review**

Post 9/11, international focus on countering extremism and terrorism has generated a new debate about the role of madrassas. One can find a variety of literature on the subject in the form of books, journals and newspaper articles. Jamal Malik has done the first comprehensive and in-depth study on the subject. He concludes that the Ulema (religious teachers) of different schools lack a unanimous approach on the syllabus, role and financing of Madrassas. These differences are deeply rooted in society because students and the teachers of madrassas represent different segments of society”.<sup>2</sup> He also highlights that some madrassas have left their actual role of imparting religious education and have engaged in preaching extremist views projecting their school of thought, which then fuels sectarian militancy. Tariq Rehman relates the rising militancy to Afghan Jihad that was conducted post Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. He not only identifies that the curriculum is too old but also highlights the role of madrassas in promoting sectarianism by refuting each other’s beliefs.<sup>3</sup>

Mohammad Qasim Zaman in his book discusses the reform plans and their failures also. He argues that opposition to the government agenda of reforms exists to varying degrees among the Ulema. His study contains dissenting views regarding the issue and the motives behind them.<sup>4</sup> A leading book on the subject in India by

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<sup>2</sup>Jamal Malik, “Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions of Learning,” *New Delhi, Manohar*, 1996.

<sup>3</sup>Tariq Rehman, *Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Study of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan*, vol. 17 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

<sup>4</sup>Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010).

Yoginder Sikand is an invaluable contribution and perhaps unrivalled among the contemporary works. He has discussed Madrassa reforms in historical perspective. This study has valuable information regarding different aspects of reforms. It also carries the detail of reformed madrassas in India that can serve as guidance for madrassas in the entire region.<sup>5</sup> Another article which is highly informative about the role of madrassas in the socio-political life of Pakistan is written by Christopher Candland. The author believes that a section of the Ulema also favours reforms in order to adjust themselves to modern needs. He advises that the religious and social services of the madrassas should be recognized by the government and they may be assigned appropriate role to ensure peace in the society.<sup>6</sup> Other contributions by the same author on the same topic can be found in Robert M. Hathaway's recent anthology. They contain details of recent government initiatives of reforming Islamic education. These writings make valuable suggestions for policy makers in this regard.<sup>7</sup> Maqsood Ahmad Shaheen, Dr. Farish Ullah Yousafzai and Amna Yousaf have conducted an analysis of Religious Madrassas in Pakistan being on 231 articles published in Washington Post since 9/11. As per them, most of these madrassas have been portrayed in a negative tone. Malik Mohammad Tariq in 'The Rise And Impact of Islamic Fundamentalism In Pakistan After the Soviet Invasion In Afghanistan With Special Reference to KPK

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<sup>5</sup>Yoginder Sikand, *Bastions of the Believers: Madrassas and Islamic Education in India* (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2005).

<sup>6</sup>Christopher Candland, "Religious Education and Violence in Pakistan," *Pakistan*, 2005, 230.

<sup>7</sup>C. Candland, *Pakistan's Recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Education, Extracted from Madrassa in South Asia: Teaching Terror? Abingdon* (United Kingdom: Routledge, Taylor and Francis Group, 2008).

and Balochistan' has conducted a detailed research on the Madrassas including their history specially after Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan and role that was played by them and possibility of their linkages to terrorism and extremism in Pakistan.

### **Madrassas - A Historical View**

As was the practice since the days of Prophet (PBUH), mosques served as the centers of Muslim education for almost three centuries. It was during the Abbasid period (750 - 1258 AD) that the need for a more organized educational system was felt because of the rapid expansion of knowledge and to meet the administrative needs of the empire. This gave birth to the Madrassa as a separate institution. It is believed that the first Madrassa in the Muslim world was established in the ninth century in the city of Fas (Fez) in Morocco.<sup>8</sup> The syllabi of earlier madrassas included the teaching of the Qur'an and Hadith with increasing emphasis on fiqh with the passage of time. The emphasis on *fiqh* was aimed at providing trained people for the imperial courts. The subjects of mathematics, astronomy, and other human sciences were also taught in these madrassas. Thereafter, Muslim rulers, nobles and wealthy traders established madrassas in different areas. This system of Muslim education spread elsewhere in the Muslim world and Turkish rulers brought it to India when they consolidated their rule there. This leads to religious and socio-political transformation on Indian soil afterwards.

### **Madrassas in the Indian Subcontinent**

The consolidation of the Muslim empire in the subcontinent facilitated the establishment of an organized educational system.

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<sup>8</sup>Sultan Ali, *Madrassa Reform and State Power* (Islamabad: FNF, 2012).

Royal patronage was always available for this purpose. After the fall of Baghdad in 1257 A.D, a large number of scholars were attracted towards India. The courts of the Delhi Sultans were flooded with scholars and intellectuals from Central Asia. Some of the Sufis and scientists also migrated from Central Asia. They started preaching and teaching on their own without seeking royal patronage. They contributed to the conversion of large number of people of Indian Subcontinent to Islam.<sup>9</sup> The traditional madrassas in India mostly taught Hanafi fiqh. The descendants of Central Asian 'ulema' were preferred for teaching. These institutions taught specially prescribed courses, which were not too rigid. Changes were introduced at different times, and, in some places, certain subjects were given more importance than others. But these changes were not affected in consequence of official interference.

#### **Madrassas under British Colonial Rule**

After the decline of Muslim political power had begun in the eighteenth century, the Europeans in the Subcontinent rapidly introduced modern education. In the changed context of socio-political life in the Subcontinent with the establishment of British Rule, the Ulema's role was also to be seen from a different context. Under Muslim rule, the Ulema had enjoyed special privileges. With the collapse of Muslim political authority this source of patronage, which strengthened their claim as representatives and leaders of the community, was lost. In the changed political context the ordinary Muslim also became more conscious about the survival of his faith. Therefore, a new relationship between the Ulema and the common

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<sup>9</sup>Mohammad Hamid Uddin, *History of Muslim Education (712-1750 AD)*, vol. 1 (Academy of Educational Research, Karachi:1967).

Muslim was established under which the source of strength for the Ulema were common Muslims rather than the rulers of the time. Most of the reformist movements during the eighteenth century and early nineteenth century were led by Ulema with support from ordinary Muslims.

### **Growth of Madrassas in Pakistan After Independence in 1947**

At Independence very few madrassas existed in Pakistan. Leading centers of Islamic education were situated in other parts of India. Pakistan inherited around 200 madrassas, which, as per the government's conservative estimates, and a BBC report has now increased to over 17,000, although some analysts put this number at 25–40,000. These religious schools cater for 2.5 to three million students and employ thousands of mullahs as teachers, mentors, and instructors.<sup>10</sup> There are five Islamic schools of thought in Pakistan which operate their own systems of madrassas. They are Deobandi, Bareilvi, Ahl-i Hadith, Jamat-i-Islami, and Ahl-i-Tasheh. Each school of thought organized madrassas under different boards that are responsible for registration, examinations, and syllabus.<sup>11</sup>

- **Wafaqul-Madarisul-Arabiya:** Central board of Sunni Deobandi institutions; established at Multan in 1960.
- **Tanzimul-Madaris:** Central board of Sunni Bareilvi institutions; established at Lahore in 1960.
- **Wafaqul-Madaris Shi'a:** This board of Shia institutions was established in 1959 and has its centre in Lahore. Shia madrassas

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<sup>10</sup>M. Ismail Khan, "Inside the Booming Madrassa Economy," *The News*, July 21, 2007.

<sup>11</sup>Ali, *Madrassa Reform and State Power*.

teach fiqh Jafariya named after Imam Jafer Sadiq, while other madrassas in Pakistan teach fiqh Hanafia.

- **Rabitahul-Madrisul-Islamiya:** This board was established by the Jamaat-i-Islamiat Lahore in 1983, and recognizes the madrassas of all Islamic thought. They teach more modern subjects
- **Wafaqul-Madarisul-Salafiya:** This board was established by the Ahl-i Hadith at Faisalabad in 1955.

### **Curriculum of Traditional Pakistani Madrassas**

The syllabus in almost all traditional madrassas conforms to the basic structure and scholarly standard of the Dars-i-Nizami. The course of study in all madrassas except that of the Shia, revolves around the teaching of Hanafi fiqh. Most of the texts are 500 years or more old. These texts are taught with the help of commentaries and marginal notes penned by medieval Hanafi Ulema for South Asian students, who did not know Arabic well. They no longer explain the original text. They have to be learnt by heart, which makes students use only their memory, not their analytical powers. Thus the system functions with the effort that the old traditions are preserved. This led to the stagnation of knowledge which earned criticism not only from Western critics but also from Arabic-knowing Pakistani Scholars.<sup>12</sup>

### **Students of Traditional Madrassas**

While traditional madrassas attracted people from all social classes during the Mughal and Sultanat periods, now these madrassas cater for the children of the lower middle class, the

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<sup>12</sup>Rehman, *Denizens of Alien Worlds*.

peasantry, and the poor with few exceptions.<sup>13</sup> This shift in student composition owes largely to the fact that education in a traditional Madrassa is no longer seen as providing its students with skills needed for lucrative occupations. Well-off Muslims send their children to regular schools or might arrange for a religious teacher to come to their homes to teach the Qur'an, and Islamic rituals, but few send them to full-time madrassas.<sup>14</sup> As the Muslim education system characterizes rigid dualism between traditional madrassas and modern schools, it is important to note that a fairly large number of middle-class families send one of their wards to madrassas and the rest to regular schools. Some families known for their Islamic scholarship also carry on in an ancestral tradition by having at least one son trained as a religious teacher, while others are educated in schools and colleges.<sup>15</sup>

The students of madrassas belong to families having emotional attachment with a particular school of thought and send their children to the Madrassa of same fiqh. The followers of different sects mostly oppose each other due to which, the sectarian divide has become sharper and more violent in the society.<sup>16</sup> Because of weak economic and social backgrounds the students are often reactionary and inflexible in their attitude and seek extremist ways for the realization of their ideological goals.<sup>17</sup> Their understanding

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<sup>13</sup>Vivek Kumar Mishra, "Madrassas and Extremism in Pakistan: Post 1977," 2014, <http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/handle/10603/29510>.

<sup>14</sup>Sajjad Hussain et al., "Theoretical Analysis of Socio-Economic and Political Causes of Terrorism in Pakistan," *Pakistan Journal of Criminology* 6, no. 2 (2014): 2002.

<sup>15</sup>Ali, *Madrassa Reform and State Power*.

<sup>16</sup>Pervez Hoodbhoy and Amir Ali, eds., *Education and the State: Fifty Years of Pakistan* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998).

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

of the modern world is limited because teaching of modern subjects, games, literature, art and extracurricular activities are always ignored in most of the madrassas.<sup>18</sup>

In addition to madrassas in rural areas, the majority of students in madrassas in major cities of Pakistan also hail from rural areas. In Karachi, the Madrassa students represent all the districts of Pakistan.<sup>19</sup> Pashto-speaking students always outnumber any other community.<sup>20</sup> The graduating students are normally 17 to 27 years old. The girl students are on an average younger than the boys. One reason for this is that their course duration is shorter than that of boys.<sup>21</sup> Larger madrassas attract students from different parts of the country and from different communities.

Admission to a traditional Madrassa is relatively informal. While some have an entrance examination and fixed quotas at each level, others are more flexible. Larger madrassas have specific dates for application for admission, usually soon after the month of *Ramzan*. The schedule of admission is advertised through leaflets and wall posters. In smaller Madrassas, the procedure is much simpler and the students can join at any time of the year. They may not be able to afford to issue advertisements, and news of open admissions is spread simply by word of mouth. Most madrassas have a somewhat open admission policy with no rigid entrance requirements. Most madrassas charge no fee and also provide food,

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<sup>18</sup>Maj Gen Nasurrullah Dogar, "Madrassa Reforms - Problems and Prospects," *NDU Journal XXIII* (2010): 1–25.

<sup>19</sup>Tahir Andrabi et al., "Religious School Enrollment in Pakistan: A Look at the Data," 2005, [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=667843](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=667843).

<sup>20</sup>Mumtaz Ahmad, "Madrassa Education in Pakistan and Bangladesh," *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia*, 2004, 101–15.

<sup>21</sup>Ali, *Madrassa Reform and State Power*.

hostel accommodation and books free of cost.<sup>22</sup> Thus, madrassas also serve as a kind of orphanage for those having no elders or relatives.

### **Management of Madrassas**

Traditional madrassas are individual enterprises in Pakistan. Larger madrassas are, however, run by an elaborate hierarchy of functionaries. At the apex is the *Sarparast* (Chancellor), who is also often the founder of the Madrassa or his successor, in such case he is generally a direct descendant of the founder. Below him is the *Muhtamim* (Vice Chancellor), who is followed by the *Sadar* (Dean) and teachers of different subjects. The senior most teacher is the *Sheikh-ul-Hadith* who teaches the books of Hadith to senior students. The rector of the Madrassa is assisted in his work by a committee of elders (*shura*) consisting of senior Ulema and teachers, and sometimes of notable Muslims including rich traders, philanthropists and important donors. In theory, elaborate rules govern the management of madrassas and all decisions are supposed to be taken through discussion and consensus. In practice, however, things are always very different. The managers and administrators often override the decision-making process for their personal interests.<sup>23</sup>

### **Madrassa Finances**

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<sup>22</sup>Ibid.

<sup>23</sup>Muhammad Akram, "The Authority of Ulama and the Problem of Anti-State Militancy in Pakistan," *Asian Journal of Social Sciences* 42, no. 5 (2014): 584–601.

Traditional madrassas run on self-help. These rely on a variety of sources to meet their expenses. The vast majority depends on local funds, which are generated from within the community. Many madrassas have land or property endowed to them as *waqfs* from which they earn some income. Madrassa authorities regularly issue appeals to Muslims to contribute in cash or in any other kind. Such appeals appear in the publications of madrassas. Some people make donations to Madrassa as an act of piety. This is done in different ways, i.e. constructing a room in a Madrassa or donating fans or coolers or any other items of common use to madrassas simply to earn the blessing of Allah for living or deceased. The peasants of the localities also contribute in kind of grains after harvest. In smaller madrassas, teachers and even students are sent to neighbouring towns and villages to collect donations in cash and in kind. Larger madrassas appoint special staff to collect funds for the Madrassa on commission.<sup>24</sup> Beside this the administrators also accept financial help from those who earn money illegally, which negatively impacts the integrity of Ulema. The proper use of funds is also not ensured often.<sup>25</sup>

### **Need for Madrassa Reforms**

Reforming madrassas is a major concern. New developments at international level, especially the events of 11th September 2001, increased the importance of Madrassa reforms not only for Pakistan but also for the whole Muslim World. The Government of Pakistan and countries in the West, particularly America, are now eagerly seeking to enforce changes in the Madrassa system with the belief

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<sup>24</sup>Muhammad Amir Rana, "Choking Financing for Militants in Pakistan," *Pakistan's Counterterrorism Challenge*, 2014, 149–68.

<sup>25</sup>Ibid.

that non-reformed madrassas are rapidly emerging as major training grounds for terrorists. In addition, many Muslims, including the Ulema, are also at the forefront of demand for change in the Madrassa system. The different actors in this complex game have widely differing understandings of reforms, each reflecting their own particular agenda.

### **Agenda of Reforms and the President Musharraf Regime**

The government policy towards reforms dates from August 2001, prior to the 11<sup>th</sup> September terrorist attacks on the USA. General Musharraf, the then President, underlined the need to curb the influence of religious institutions. His proposals included widening the Madrassa curricula and bringing them within the mainstream of education and prohibiting madrassas accepting students from other countries. As a part of the Madrassa reform program of the government, the National Education Policy 1999-2010 had envisaged the major objectives in the context of the Madrassa. It included bridging the existing gulf between formal education and the madrassas; equating their degrees with the formal education system; recognising them and providing valuable and related books for research and reforms; and evolving an integrated system of national education by bringing madrassas and modern schools closer in the curriculum.<sup>26</sup> In line with these objectives the government initiated certain revolutionary steps for improvement of the working conditions of madrassas across the country.

### **The Pakistan Madrassa Education Board Ordinance, 2001**

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<sup>26</sup>Ali, *Madrassa Reform and State Power*.

In the first instance an Ordinance called “The Pakistani Madrassas Education (Establishment and Affiliation of Model Dini [Religious] Madaris [Madrassas] Board Ordinance, 2001) was promulgated on August 18, 2001. The aim of this ordinance was to secure the registration, regulation, standardization and uniformity of curricula and standard of education of Madrassa imparting specialised Islamic education in Pakistan with the general education system.<sup>27</sup> The ordinance afforded representation of the different schools of thought in the Board. To start with, a Pakistan Madrassa Education Board under the provisions of this Ordinance was setup on 8 September 2001 under the control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The Ordinance, however, could not be properly enforced, as religious circles did not cooperate with the government. In this backdrop, the government reviewed its policy and initiated additional steps in the context of registration of madrassas, rationalizing of their syllabus and mainstreaming them.

#### **Societies Registration Ordinance of 2005**

This ordinance is also called the “Madrassas Voluntary Registration and Regulation Ordinance, 2005”. Under its provisions “no Madrassa shall operate without getting itself registered; every Madrassa shall submit an annual report of its educational activities and performance to the registrar; every Madrassa shall cause to be carried out the audit of its accounts by an auditor and submit a copy of its audited report to the registrar; and no Madrassa shall teach or

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<sup>27</sup>Mumtaz Ahmad, “Madrassa Reforms and Perspectives: Islamic Tertiary Education in Pakistan,” 2009, <http://ir.nmu.org.ua/handle/123456789/145284>.

publish any literature which promotes militancy or spreads sectarianism or religious hatred”.<sup>28</sup>

### **Madrassa Reforms Project (MRP)**

The Madrassa Reform Project (MRP) is a part of the government comprehensive program for the reform of religious institutions in the country. The aim of the project is to teach formal subjects such as English, Mathematics, Pakistan Studies/Social Studies, and General Science along with religious education. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) agreed between the federal, provincial and regional educational authorities for executing a multi-million rupees project for reforming 8,000 madrassas within five years was a ground-breaking event.<sup>29</sup>

### **Concerns about Militancy by Foreigners in Madrassas**

The role of the madrassas in national political developments and armed conflicts has been a subject of intense debate in Pakistan since 1980. Much of the armed resistance against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was initially organised in the then North Western Frontier Province (now Khyber-Pakhtun Khwa) and Balochistan. Afghan and Pakistani madrassas students were in the forefront of the jihad movements against the communist regime. Dar ul-Ulum Haqqania of Akora Khattak near Peshawar and several other Deobandi madrassas played an important role in the mobilizing and recruitment of the thousands of volunteers for the Afghan jihad. The vast amounts of funds from Muslim countries

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<sup>28</sup>Syed Manzar Abbas Zaidi, “Madrassa Education in Pakistan,” 2013, [http://strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner%202013/2013-03-04\\_\\_SISA3\\_Madrassa\\_Education\\_-\\_Syed\\_Manzar\\_Abbas\\_Zaidi.pdf](http://strategiskanalyse.no/publikasjoner%202013/2013-03-04__SISA3_Madrassa_Education_-_Syed_Manzar_Abbas_Zaidi.pdf).

<sup>29</sup>Ghulam Shabir, M. U. F. Abbasi, and Amant Khan, “Reforming the Madrassa System,” *Pakistan Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS)* 32, no. 1 (2012): 147–56.

received in the name of Afghan relief, and jihad projects were used for recruiting more students, expanding the madrassas, and also for sectarian activities, including the acquisition of weapons.<sup>30</sup> Later in the 1990s, these madrassas became major centers for training of foreign and indigenous warriors for jihad. According to Ahmad Rasheed, the Taliban primarily evolved from the dozens of madrassas established in the refugee camps along the Pak-Afghan border territories.<sup>31</sup> Besides teaching, these children received hands-on training on some of the most lethal weapons in the world. The Taliban, as a result, soon became an invincible force.<sup>32</sup> According to government sources, the madrassas that impart training to militants to fight the security forces also included the madrassa of Maulana Fazlullah, a key leader of the Tehreek-i-Nifazi-Shariat-i-Muhammadi (TNSM) Swat. A similar reference was also made to the madrassa of Maulana Liuqat in Bajaur. The same madrassa was later destroyed as a result of a drone attack.<sup>33</sup>

### **Response of Madrassas to Madrassa Registration Ordinance**

According to Madrassa Registration and Control Ordinance 2002, promulgated in August 2002, no Madrassa would function without government permission. The officials of the Madrassa Authority would monitor the activities of madrassas, and no Madrassa would accept foreign financial help without government

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<sup>30</sup>Ahmad Mumtaz, Craig Baxter, and Charles H. Kennedy, "Continuity and Change in the Traditional System of Islamic Education: The Case of Pakistan," in *Pakistan 2000* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001).

<sup>31</sup>Noman Ahmad, "Do Madrassas Need Revamping?," *The News*, April 20, 2008.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid.

<sup>33</sup>Umer Cheema, "Over 12 Madrassas Training Militants: Official," *The News*, July 11, 2007.

permission. The representatives of madrassas of four schools of thought rejected the said ordinance. They were of the opinion that 'measures like registration, change of curriculum, and mainstreaming madrassas were aimed at depriving them of their independence and to destroy their Islamic identity.<sup>34</sup> They claimed that all such measures were a part of the American agenda to secularize the educational system, which madrassas would resist at any cost'. However they assured their support to the government against madrassas involved in sectarianism, terrorism or possessing weapons, provided solid proofs existed in this regard.

### **Prospects of Reforms**

An analysis of the response of madrassas to state-sponsored reforms during the last eight years has attracted deep suspicion among the madrassas. How to address this challenge is a big question? A number of options are available which require strong steps by the government that are accompanied by potential political risks. For these reforms, there should be a formal regulatory mechanism, developed with due understanding and after a legislation. It should encourage registration, create concomitant statutory obligation on the registered entity and its sponsors by way of governance, financial accountability, and responsibility towards society.<sup>35</sup> The reform efforts should build around following:-

- Registration of Madrassa as well as private schools for quality control purposes is essential. However, to give more credibility to the efforts, this process could be best managed

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<sup>34</sup>Ali, *Madrassa Reform and State Power*.

<sup>35</sup>Saleem H. Ali, *Islam and Education: Conflict and Conformity in Pakistan's Madrassas* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009), <http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:282660>.

at the provincial level with minimum interference from Federal Government.

- Construction of madrassas on public lands must be scrutinized more carefully.
- Inclusion of local council representatives in the management committee or board of directors of madrassas in order to ensure that locals are involved in the working of madrassas.
- There is a need to set up an interdepartmental committee to steer the reform agenda.
- Measures to ensure that the local students representation is more than the external students in urban madrassas.
- Job provision to the Madrassas graduates through apprenticeship programmes to make them more productive members of the society.
- Curriculum to ensure that hatred based on sect and language does not develop, and the students get balanced education.
- English, General Science, Social Studies, Social Sciences, Literature, modern Philosophy, Computer, Mathematics, Accounts and Economics etcbe included in Madrassa syllabus. This will broaden their mental horizon make their thinking logical and respect others' thought, lives and values.

### **Conclusion**

The institution of the Madrassa is about a thousand years old. As a system of Muslim education, it has always played an important role in teaching and preservation of Islam. It also played this role in the lives of millions of Muslims of the Subcontinent from eighth century AD on wards. However, after establishment of British colonial rule here, a modern system of education was introduced.

That modern education system, by default, became a rival of Madrassas. They opposed it tooth and nail, and it was regarded as European (non-Muslim) and a privilege of modern and rich Muslims. The modern education also threatened the traditional hold, role and authority of the religious leaders. The polarization between the two institutions increased manifold with the passage of time. This schism impacted every aspect of Muslims of Subcontinent lives and shaped two politically opposed ideologies amongst those who studied in the different educational systems. The same bi-polar system of education was inherited by Pakistan after its independence in 1947. The Madrassas were playing an important role in the social and religious lives of Muslims, and still act as NGOs, looking after poor and orphan. But after the negative focus in post 9/11 scenario the madrassas feel isolated and perhaps unduly targeted. They cautiously guard their turf and regard the modernisation, integration measures and calls for increased transparency in their financial matters as interference.

Being predominantly a Muslim country, Pakistan cannot simply ignore this important educational cum social welfare system. In order to counter the negative perceptions about them and reported negative role of few of these, Musharraf government took multiple steps including introduction of two ordinances, to monitor and regulate their activities and to reform their syllabi. Such moves did not bear desired fruits as Madrassas owners became more critical of these measures with the passage of time. The Madrassas Reform Project (MRP) initiated for reforming the curriculum of Madrassas during Musharraf Regime almost failed to achieve its objectives, partly because of opposition from madrassas, but mainly because of the insufficient preparation and lack of determined implementation

of the legislations due to the fear of violent reactions from Madrassas.

After ongoing operation against the terrorists the environment is considered more conducive for renewing the reform efforts. The present government should therefore not abandon the efforts of reforming Madrassas. It should proceed further after strengthening the laws and regulations on the subject. After ensuring better coordination amongst all relevant state organs, the government must give Madrassas a chance to come under governmental control. Their finances should be kept transparent. Their syllabus should be a balanced mix of religious and modern education. Madrassa students should be awarded appropriate degrees opening avenues of progression, higher education and better job security for them. Government's absolute sincerity and determination for the reform agenda will be essential for better future of Pakistan. Before moving further all political parties and Madrassas' administration should be taken into confidence.

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## **Mid-Term Elections in Israel: An Assessment of Netanyahu's Term in Office**

(Muhammad Shabbir)\*

### ***Abstract***

*In the aftermath of mid-term elections, the incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu narrowly succeeded in forming a right wing coalition government, fourth in a series. Although the current regional environment favours Israel, Netanyahu is likely to face a multitude of challenges. The opportunities emerge from the neutralization of most if not all militaries in the region, besides Israel's standing as undeclared nuclear power. Concurrently, the same regional chaos that played a role in neutralizing most of regional militaries in Israel's favour and a potential US-Iran nuclear deal pose challenges for Israel. The impact of these elections becomes more significant, as Israel's status of undeclared nuclear power established. The elections in Israel and their results although do not directly impact Pakistan, the economic and strategic significance of Middle East as well as close military relations of India and Israel require us to study the current trends. In this context, this study gives a rundown of election scenario and its aftermath. It also talks about Netanyahu as prime minister along with underlining the regional implications of these elections.*

**Key Words:** *environment, neutralization, strategic - significance, negotiations*

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## **Introduction**

The mid-term election process in Israel has been completed as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu established a right wing coalition government with the bare-minimum majority. Netanyahu though succeeded in forming a coalition for the fourth time, is likely to face a multitude of challenges in his current term. The elections were held amidst economic issues at domestic front and rapidly changing regional and global environments. The impact of these elections becomes more significant, as Israel's status of undeclared nuclear power is ingrained in the establishment's posture towards its neighbours and most of its adversaries in the region have fallen.

The elections in Israel and their results do not directly impact Pakistan. However, a political dispensation in Tel-Aviv remains relevant as the Middle East is significant for Pakistan from psycho-social, economic and religious standpoints. Concurrently, India's close military cooperation with Israel, its regional ambitions, and hardliner ideas of Prime Ministers Modi and Netanyahu unfold security concerns for Pakistan. In this context, an analysis of these elections in the backdrop of Netanyahu's time as prime minister is carried out in this study to assess its future implications for the region and Pakistan.

This study gives a rundown of election scenario and its aftermath and discusses the key elements of 2015 elections in Israel; Israeli standing amidst the region-wide changes; and the country's foreign policy posture. It also talks about Netanyahu as prime minister along with underlining the regional implications of these elections.

### **A Rundown of Election Scenario and its Aftermath**

The early elections for the twentieth Knesset were held in Israel on 17 March 2015, nearly two years before time. Disagreements, particularly over the budget and a "Jewish state" proposal within the governing coalition, had led to the dissolution of the government in December 2014.<sup>1</sup> In the elections, the Labour Party and Hatnuah formed a coalition, called Zionist Union, with the hope of defeating the Likud Party, which had led the previous governing coalition along with Yisrael Beiteinu, Yesh Atid, The Jewish Home and Hatnuah. The incumbent Netanyahu of Likud, declared victory in the election with his party picking up the highest number of votes. President Reuven Rivlin granted Netanyahu an extension until 6 May 2015 to build a coalition when one had not been finalized in the first four weeks of negotiations. Netanyahu's Likud Party formed the coalition with Jewish Home, United Torah Judaism, Kulanu, and Shas, with the bare minimum 61 seats.

To recall, Israeli politics is characterized by short-term coalitions in which big parties make concessions to smaller parties in exchange for their participation. Except for a short period in 1969, when the Labour Party merged with the leftist party Mapam, a single party has never held a majority of seats in Knesset. The outcome of the elections was however something of a surprise. After a lacklustre run-up to the polls, Israelis cast their votes amid uncertainties or predictions of defeat and a slender win for Benjamin Netanyahu. Nevertheless, if PM Netanyahu completes his current term in office, he will become the longest serving prime minister in the country's history. In this context, it is prudent here that key elements of the Mid-term election scenario are reviewed.

### **Reviewing the key elements of 2015 mid-term elections**

The campaign for 2015 mid-term elections was driven by domestic and foreign policy concerns. Issues such as, Palestinian peace process, Iran-US nuclear deal and economic issues remained at the forefront of political parties' agenda.

Likud at the domestic front called for "free market economy with social sensitivity", suggesting that in order "to remain competitive in a global market, there is a need for budgetary discipline, lowering taxes, an effectively managed stock market and growth of the private sector".<sup>2</sup> On international front, Netanyahu's main focus remained on the prevention of Iran from obtaining nuclear capability by trying to convince the world to maintain and expand economic and diplomatic sanctions against it.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, backing-up from previously accepted position of two-state solution, Netanyahu also stated during his election campaign that if he was elected, "there will be no Palestinian State".<sup>4</sup>

Maintaining its position firmly within the Israeli peace camp, Zionist Union (Labour and Hatnuah) pledged to reignite a process with the Palestinian neighbours based on a regional platform, foster unique and special relationship with Washington and 'rescue Israel from its international isolation'. It also focused on economic issues by the country, and lowering the costs of education, healthcare and basic goods.<sup>5</sup>

Despite the official anti-Zionism stance by some sections of the Joint List, the party's platform on the Middle East peace process made an effort to stake a moderate position. The Joint List's policy on the peace process called for a just peace based on UN resolutions, termination of all occupied land captured in 1967 by Israel, dismantling of all Israeli settlements and the security barrier,

releasing all political prisoners and forming a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. It also called for full equality in state budgeting for Jewish and Arab municipalities and institutions, as well as affirmative action to help the poor – who are disproportionately Arab.<sup>6</sup>

### **Threats and Opportunities for Israel in the Changing Regional Environment**

The changing dynamics of the Middle East over the last decade or so have favoured Israel's standing in the region as well as posed some threats to the country's security. The opportunities emerge from the neutralization of most if not all militaries in the region, besides Israel's standing as undeclared nuclear power. Concurrently, the same regional chaos that played a role in neutralizing most of regional militaries in Israel's favour and a potential US-Iran nuclear deal threaten Israeli policy makers.

The incidents as: dismantling of Iraq's army, Arab Spring, violent regime change in Libya, similar unsuccessful attempt in Syria, sectarian polarization and consequent power vacuum in both Iraq and Syria have favoured Israel. As a result of violent regime change in Libya, the US dismantling of Iraqi army and Syria in turmoil, most of the armies in the region that could have challenged Israel have been neutralized. The sectarian strife and interjection of IS in Shia Crescent provides Israel a space to advance its national security interests and the crisis offers an opportunity to marginalize Hamas and prevent solution of Palestine. Moreover, the Islamic State besides serving an engaging point for Iran also represents a cap on the Iranian influence and may function as its buffer with the Israeli domain on to the west. One scholar very succinctly puts the same concept in these words:

"When viewed in the current context, the war on Iraq, the 2006 war on Lebanon, the 2011 war on Libya, the ongoing war on Syria, not to mention the process of regime change in Egypt, and developments in Yemen, Bahrain, annexation of Arab areas in West Bank and oppression and isolation of Gaza must be understood in relation to the Zionist Plan for the Middle East. The latter consists of weakening and eventually fracturing neighbouring Arab states as part of an Israeli expansionist project."<sup>7</sup>

With regards to the challenges, since the last major Arab-Israeli War in 1973, Israel had retained the three advantages, backed either implicitly or explicitly by the US: overwhelming conventional military superiority; formally ambiguous but universally presumed regional nuclear weapons exclusivity;<sup>8</sup> and de facto or de jure understandings with the authoritarian leaders of its Arab state neighbours aimed at preventing interstate conflict. Although Israel's conventional military advantages are clear, the other two advantages could face threats from the regional dynamics. They are therefore subjects of serious concern among Israelis.

Iran's possible achievement of a nuclear weapons capability, either for direct use or to exercise indirect but decisive influence on the region, could worsen security dilemmas for Israel. Israeli leaders have asserted that even if Iran does not use, intend to use, or even manufacture a nuclear weapon, its mere capacity to do so will increase its deterrence by raising the potential costs Israel and others would incur by acting against it or its allies (i.e., Hezbollah and various Palestinian militant groups). The resulting intimidation could lead Arab Gulf states in proximity to Iran to adopt more quiescent or pro-Iranian policies or to pursue nuclear capabilities of

their own. In turn, this could open the way for increased Iranian influence and/or nuclear proliferation throughout the region.

Prime Minister Netanyahu reportedly fears that such intimidation could lead to a mass exodus of Jews from an Israel under nuclear threat, weakening the state and compromising the Zionist dream."<sup>9</sup> Moreover, ungoverned or minimally governed spaces are proliferating near Israel's borders in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt's Sinai Peninsula, and Libya. These areas attract or could attract terrorists, weapons traffickers, criminal networks, refugees, and migrants, and contribute to trends that appear to threaten Israeli security.<sup>10</sup>

### **Israel's interface with the region and international community**

A qualitative change in the US posture towards Israel during the last few years was being marked. This started perhaps as early as 2009 when President Obama first demanded a halt to the construction of Jewish settlements in Israel's occupied territories.<sup>11</sup> Particularly, the events that unfolded over the past few months have the potential to make a tense situation even worse. The invitation from John Boehner, the Republican speaker of the House of Representatives, for Netanyahu to address Congress reflected a deep bipartisan schism in American politics. It was also a sui generis situation in international relations that defied traditional diplomatic protocol. The tactic had multiple motivations. It was an attempt to torpedo the negotiations with Iran over its nuclear program, to strengthen the Republican campaign for additional sanctions against Iran, and to boost Netanyahu's profile prior to the elections.<sup>12</sup> The Obama administration's disapproval over Netanyahu's speech was perhaps indicated in Obama's

congratulatory phone call to Netanyahu, in which he clearly stated that the US would “reassess” its approach to the peace process—and therefore its overall relationship with Israel.<sup>13</sup>

In the run-up to the election, Netanyahu had declared that there would never be a Palestinian state, at least not on Netanyahu’s watch, although later he retracted his statement.<sup>14</sup> However, his fourth term with weak government may provide the Palestinians with even greater momentum and create a critical mass for a solution to the regional crisis, “two-state” or otherwise. On the other hand, there could also be another spell of aggression against Palestinians to keep away the attention from the weaknesses of the government. The Israeli leader has been undoubtedly emboldened and will step up his efforts—along with mobilizing sections of the US Congress—over the coming critical weeks. The open letter sent by 47 Republican senators to the Iranian leadership, questioning the credibility and reliability of their own president was merely one of many potential tactics that can be expected.<sup>15</sup> Concurrently, India has been improving its ties with Israel as well as with Iran, without sacrificing one for the other.

India’s ‘major power syndrome’ sets the pace and direction of the country’s interface with power centres in the Middle East, proceeding with Iran and the Arabs besides Israel, in an apparent equi-distant approach. The Indian policy in broader terms reflects continuity, unaffected by the change of government. India and Israel cooperate in security and defence sectors and both have signed agreements related to homeland security. The bilateral relations between the two countries have seen a flurry of activity after the new Narendra Modi-led government took power at the Centre and India stands “Israel’s largest buyer of defence

equipment”.<sup>16</sup> Besides economic and energy linkages with Arabian and Persian flanks of the gulf, India’s traditional relationship with Iran carry twin objectives: secure a foothold in the rear of its neighbour Pakistan, and to find a ladder for its access with the Central Asian and European markets.

While India has been increasing its influence in the region, during recent years, Pakistan’s erstwhile influence in the Middle East has been lessening due to its preoccupation with War on Terrorism and internal instability. This coupled with its vast population and burgeoning economy, India has been trying to fulfil the vacuum created by Pakistan’s weakening position and regional instability in the contemporary scenario. Previously, India’s engagement with the region was economic while Pakistan maintained both economic and security relations. In almost all military doctrines in the Gulf, “Pakistan was seen as pivot for their defence”.<sup>17</sup>

### **Implications for the Region and Pakistan**

The implications of Israeli elections on the region may be viewed with a six-fold focus:

- First, it seems that this time possibly, Netanyahu will be more focused on internal issues. Having the bare minimum majority means that he will be constantly required to tow the line between pushing policy and ensuring that his coalition remains happy. For instance, any agreement on the rights of the Palestinians might be enough to push Jewish Home away, and even the loss of one of the smaller ultra-orthodox parties would be enough to topple the patchwork coalition.
- Second, a diplomatic pressure is now likely to build on Israel to offer gestures to the Palestinians in return for which the

Palestinians would re-enter negotiations. Therefore, this can be the right time for the Palestinians to mobilize their efforts for the peace process.

- Third, with Netanyahu spearheading the mindset in Israel that refuses to take the peace process further, or to give Palestinians the right to decide their fate, the region carries the potential for an extended violence. These activities may be carried out by Palestinians or IS like entities.
- Fourth, the results of these elections and their aftermath are perhaps the most compelling indication possible that change in the status of the West Bank and the Palestinians, will not come from inside Israel. This places even greater pressure on the United States, if it hopes to affect real change in the region.
- Fifth, as the things currently stand, there is a possibility that US-Iran deal will get some sort of acceptance with or without Israel's acceptance. With Obama serving his second term, he would surely like to leave some legacy in the foreign policy domain.
- Sixth, the current regimes in India and Israel are headed by hardliners. considering the level of military and intelligence cooperation between the two countries, it is possible that both undertake covert activities in Pakistan to further destabilize it.

### **Conclusion**

To sum up, the change in the government underscore a new government in Israel but with the same leadership and policies. Netanyahu's bear minimum majority coalition signals a weak future government. This coupled with economic challenges faced by the

country spells trouble for the future of new government. The composition of the new government in terms of parties and individuals represents a determination to resume the settlement and Judaisation policies and a refusal to respond to the conditions necessary for a political settlement for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. There are also factors that portray that Israel will plunge deeper into settlement and Judaisation initiatives and become harsher in terms of its relationship with Palestinians and Arabs in general.

Meanwhile, the region faces numerous challenges: Palestinians remain hostage to a repressive occupation, the state of Iraq sits somewhere between a police state and civil war, fragmented by ISIS, a military-and possibly nuclear- standoff exists between Israel and Iran, and extremism threatens the entire region as well as the whole world. These foreboding factors have the ability to cause immense strife and conflict in the region if not confronted using all the resources and ingenuity of the collective Arab states. Moreover, if Arab states use these complex issues to place blame and acquire power rather than assist weaker neighbours and develop the region, hardship and violence may well prevail.

### **End Notes**

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<sup>1</sup>Elie Leshem and Ilan Ben Zion, "Accusing Lapid and Livni of attempted 'putsch,' Netanyahu fires them, calls elections", *The Times of Israel*, 02 Dec. 2014.

<sup>2</sup> Gil Hoffman, "Israel politics: Platforms for the politically perplexed", *Jerusalem Post*, 28 Feb. 2015. Accessed on 16 Apr. 2015 from, <http://www.jpost.com/Israel-Elections/Platforms-for-the-politically-perplexed-392386>

<sup>3</sup>Ibid.

<sup>4</sup>Nicholas Casey and Joshua Mitnick, "Israel's Netanyahu Says No Palestinian State If He's Re-Elected", *The Wall Street Journal*, 17 Mar. 2015.

<sup>5</sup> Gil Hoffman, "Israel politics: Platforms for the politically perplexed", *Jerusalem Post*, 28 Feb. 2015.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup>Aftab Ahmad Khan, "The Zionist Plan for the Greater Israel by dividing Middle East: Oded Yinon Plan", *Defence Journal*, 18.9 (Apr 2015): 35-48.

<sup>8</sup> Israel is not a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and maintains a policy of "nuclear opacity" or *oramimut*. A consensus among media and analysts' reports is that Israel possesses an arsenal of 80 to 200 nuclear weapons. See, e.g., Timothy McDonnell, "Nuclear pursuits: Non-P-5 nuclear-armed states, 2013," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 69(1), 2013.

<sup>9</sup> Leslie Susser, "Spy vs. Spy," *Jerusalem Report*, 26 Mar. 2012.

<sup>10</sup> Leslie Susser, "Strategic dilemmas," *Jerusalem Report*, 20 May. 2013.

<sup>11</sup> Jim Zanotti, "Israel: Background and US Relations", *Current Politics and Economics of the Middle East*, 5.3 (2014): 229-291.

<sup>12</sup> Rachelle Marshall, "Netanyahu's Speech to Congress Causes Tremors in the "Unshakable" Alliance", *The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, 34.3 (May 2015): 8-10.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup>Jodi Rudoren and Michael D. Shear, "Israel's Netanyahu Reopens Door to Palestinian State, but White House Is Unimpressed", *The New York Times*, 19 Mar. 2015.

<sup>15</sup>For complete text of the letter see, "Text of GOP Senators' Letter to Iran's Leaders on Nuclear Talks", *Washington Wire - WSJ*, 09 Mar. 2015. Accessed on 12 Apr. 2015 from, <http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/03/09/text-of-gop-senators-letter-to-irans-leaders-on-nuclear-talks/>

<sup>16</sup>Mirza Mohammed Ali Khan, "Balancing in the Middle East: India's relations with Iran, Israel", *Hindustan Times*, 17 Feb. 2015.

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## **Implementation of Disaster Risk Reduction Policy in Pakistan – An Evidence from Sialkot**

(Afsheen Zeshan & Dr. Muhammad Bashir Khan)\*

### ***Abstract***

*Pakistan's approach to disaster management has improved much since the initial challenges faced following the 2005 earthquake. The threats posed by natural catastrophes are intensifying. As a consequence, the volume of effort in the field of disaster management has been accelerating, mainly in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). DRR concentrates on pre-disaster actions. In current years, vulnerable groups have had to endure the impact of the hazards. Sialkot District in Punjab province of Pakistan has experienced more recurrent floods in these years. In This article, the implementation phenomenon of Disaster Risk Reduction policy, particularly in the areas of Early Warning, Building Codes and Awareness Campaigns at district level has been studied. The losses caused by floods in Sialkot during 2013 and 2014 have been compared in order to specify whether successful DRR practices are minimizing the impacts of flood disaster or not. The losses trend indicates that current DRR practices are not satisfactory especially at the district level and more efforts are required to strengthen the vulnerable communities in pre and post-disaster situations.*

**Key Words:** *disaster management, geo-physical, Hydro-meteorological, earthquake, post-disaster*

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## **Introduction**

Due to geo-physical risks, extreme climatic conditions and high degrees of vulnerability, Pakistan is a disaster-prone region. Hydro-meteorological, biological and geo-physical hazards such as cyclones, avalanches, storms, floods, droughts, glacial lake outburst floods (GLOF), landslides, earthquakes, epidemics and tsunamis are threats for Pakistani nation.<sup>1</sup> Some of these dangers (e.g. landslides, floods etc.) are mainly recurrent and occur almost annually whereas other risks such as tsunamis and earthquakes are infrequent happenings but potentially extremely damaging. In addition to natural hazards, man-made disasters also impend Pakistani society, environment and economy. They incorporate transport and industrial catastrophes including nuclear hazards, oil spills, civil unrest, forest and urban fires. 2005 earthquake and regular floods have exposed the vulnerability of Pakistani nation and economy to disasters. Losses and damages have been huge but could have been really reduced if disaster risk reduction practices had been integrated into social, physical and economic development.

## **Background**

The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) presented the paradigm change from a reactive to a proactive tactic in the form of the Hyogo Framework of Action (2005-2015) in which 168 countries including Pakistan are engaged.<sup>2</sup> To fulfill the international duties as well as to handle the challenges appeared in the repercussion of the October 2005 earthquake, the Government of Pakistan publicized the National Disaster Management Ordinance in 2007 to lead a comprehensive National Disaster Management System in the country. The Ordinance became the Act, and was called the National Disaster

Management Act in December 2010. The Act launches three layers for the disaster management system: i.e., national, provincial and district levels. Under the Act, the National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) was established at the national level, and has the obligation for setting guidelines and policies for disaster risk management and sanction of the National Plan. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) was consequently established in 2007 in line with the Act, and assists as the implementing, coordinating and monitoring organization for disaster risk management at the national level.

Along with the Ordinance (now Act), the National Disaster Risk Management Framework (NDRMF) was prepared by the NDMA in March 2007. The NDRMF worked as a complete framework for disaster risk management at national, provincial and district levels.<sup>3</sup> In March 2010, the NDMA articulated the National Disaster Response Plan (NDRP) ascertaining particular roles and tasks of the important stakeholders in crisis response including Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Establishment of NDMA and formulation of NDRMF & NDRP proved to be a milestone in field of disaster management in Pakistan. The National DRR Policy, which was formulated in 2013, delivers a complete guiding agenda for addressing the increased levels of disaster risk invading Pakistani communities.<sup>4</sup> Sialkot that it is the first District in Punjab province to formulate a comprehensive District Disaster Risk Management Plan with hazard assessment and vulnerability study of the district to encounter the future calamities in the district<sup>5</sup>. The villages of Sialkot face major damages and lack of food stocks due to flood water. The details of these losses in floods 2013 and 2014 are:

*Implementation of Disaster Risk Reduction Policy*

<b>Damages / Losses Floods (Sialkot)</b>	<b>2013</b>	<b>2014</b>
Deaths	8	37
Injured	-	3
Villages Affected	319	312
Houses Damaged	713	2,497
Completely Damaged (Kacha)	83	-
Completely Damaged (Pakka)	107	-
Total (Completely Damaged)	190	-
Partially Damaged (Kacha)	144	-
Partially Damaged (Pakka)	379	-
Crop Area Affected (acres)	13,845	53,639
Cattle Head Perished	-	122
Compensation Paid	-	37
Population Affected	-	95,000
Persons Evacuated	-	2,509
Persons Evacuated	-	2,509
Patients Treated	-	27,832
Livestock Vaccinated	-	671,848 head

(Source: NDMA)

People of Sialkot District had to face more losses in year 2014 as compared to year 2013 and it is a very thought provoking scenario. DRR policy was formulated in 2013 and according to the officials of disaster management authorities at national, provincial and district level, implementation process of DRR policy is in its execution phase. But DRR initiatives always reduce the losses that did not happen in case of Sialkot district.

## **An Overview of DRR Policy's Interventions in Sialkot District**

The vulnerabilities in villages of Sialkot district include poor construction practices, poverty in hazard prone areas, physical isolation of settlements, poor transport & communications infrastructure, poor human and animal health and fragile natural environment. Dynamic pressures in these villages are population size and speed of growth, urbanization & industrialization, degradation of environment and climate change. There are three main areas for DRR policy's interventions; risk knowledge, prevention & mitigation and preparedness.<sup>6</sup>

- ***Risk Knowledge:***

DRR initiatives and plans are established upon clear assessments of disaster threats, i.e. a qualitative and quantitative understanding of the fundamental causes and weaknesses, geographic distribution of susceptibility and hazards, the likelihood of hazard happenings and expected losses. National risk analysis categorizes extremely vulnerable districts and is supplemented by higher determination at local level to detect the core reasons of hazard, discover concrete risk reduction possibilities and apprise prioritization exercises, development planning or/and disaster preparedness planning.<sup>7</sup> Data from loss and damage assessments offer understandings of patterns of vulnerability, risk occurrence, scale and severity.

With technical assistance from JICA, the NDMA has drafted a database of natural hazards and their risks on the basis of statistical data collected from concerned organizations. Much of these data are, though,

established on limited sources, and consequently, more explanation and updating of the data are required.

The formula for calculation of Risk Index is:

<b>Risk</b>	<b>Hazard</b>	<b>Vulnerability</b>
(Consequence)	Mostly Natural)	(Man and Built Env.)
Death/Injury	Geological	Physical
Financial Loss	Hydrological	Social/ Cultural
Social Loss	Meteorological	Economic

Flood Risk Index of district Sialkot is **5** which is very high on scoring key. Flood Risk Index of Sialkot indicates that DRR initiatives must be exercised on highly prioritized basis to reduce the flood losses and to save the lives. Unfortunately, no such activities can be observed in the union councils, tehsils and villages of Sialkot.

- **Prevention and Mitigation:**

Resilient communities are familiarized to hazards and are capable to recover more speedily from shocks.<sup>8</sup> Bonds and collaborations must be generated between high-risk communities, voluntary organizations, civil society and local government at district, tehsil, village and union council levels to make the greatest utilization of inadequate resources. Purposefully the emphasis must be on making sure that new houses and building structures fulfill the building codes. In countryside areas with commonly non-engineered buildings and changed land-use arrangements, the safer building techniques must be promoted through awareness raising and training of local construction workers on the basis of experience collected from earlier recovery and reconstruction efforts.<sup>9</sup>

No building code is followed or conveyed in Silakot district. People build their houses according to the conventional methods that are highly susceptible for flood disasters. The respondents say that there are no awareness campaigns addressing preventive measures in monsoon season. They try to do what their forefathers did in heavy rainfall or flood situations. They are not equipped with modern techniques to save their lives, land and livestock.

- **Preparedness:**

The fact that Pakistan experiences a series of frequently occurring threats gives a solid motivation for spending in multi-hazard Early Warning Systems (EWS) that provide advance cautions to both decision-makers and communities. Communities are the primary groups to respond to calamities and the significance of training the community in preparation and life-saving methods is well accepted.<sup>10</sup> Financial securities must be created with the help of insurance companies or other funding institutions to save people from monetary losses.<sup>11</sup>

In district Sialkot, early warning system exists as local are intimated with help of radios, Masjids and other sources about upcoming flood situation but this system does not work effectively because of the lack of training programs on evacuation procedures. People receive early warning messages but they do not have information about safe places to where they have to move in order to save them from losses. Training programs are conducted for district disaster management staff but not for the first responders; the residents of villages. The communities do

not have any type of financial security and have to face severe losses due to floods.

### **Weaknesses in DRR Policy**

After conducting research, comparing losses and studying flaws in implementation mechanism of DRR practices, the three main weaknesses in DRR policy are identified.

- There is a section in DRR policy's draft that highlights the policy challenges. While debating the policy challenges, there is no discussion about "Institutional Vulnerability" which is a very critical factor because it always impede effective disaster risk management. Institutional vulnerability covers the arguments about fundamental institutional overlaps, misperception about DRR terminologies, jurisdictional clashes, resource gaps and policy disconnects. Due to institutional disarray, many lessons had to be learnt and these lessons persist even today.
- The DRR policy does not produce any clear institutional collaborations to attain the suggested policy goals. The harmonization of DRR initiatives is mentioned but there is no concrete responsibility fixing of relevant organizations. According to the policy there is a need for a clear description of roles, responsibilities and tasks between different layers of governance and players. Being general in nature, the policy seems silent on allocating responsibility.
- The DRR policy acts as an extension of the NDRMF (2007-2012) and fails to integrate the changes created by the 18th Amendment to the constitution. In the light of the democratic devolution led by the 18th Amendment, the role of federal institutions is to plan and monitor the

implementation of DRR policy whereas its actual execution is responsibility of provincial, district, union council and tehsil authorities. It is very important to decentralize disaster management function in Pakistan for successful implementation of DRR policy. This entails an interplay between policy and institutions for effective and efficient delivery. The element of this interplay is missing in the draft policy making it structurally incompatible with the existing governance systems and structures in Pakistan.

- The significant role that local knowledge and activities can play in decreasing risk and refining disaster preparedness is not recognized by disaster risk reduction experts and not included in DRR policy. Such practices must be incorporated in national DRR strategies and integration of this indigenous knowledge with science & technology initiatives increase the effectiveness of disaster management policies.

### **Recommendations for Better Implementation of DRR Policy**

- **“Prevention is Better than Cure”:**

Accessing appropriate resources to sustain DRR, at the basic scale, continues to be a trial. It is main responsibility of DRR specialists to make this prevention cheap than cure.

- **Improvement in Early Warning System:**

It is indispensable to enhance and strengthen the capacity of the weather forecasting system for the improvement of the early warning system against meteorological disasters, such as floods, landslides, cyclones (with storm surges), GLOFs and avalanches. In addition, the adoption of new technology for multiple observations with reliable operation is also

required. The transmission system for warnings, alerts and evacuation orders should be assured, swift and immediate. Therefore, multiple accessibility or redundancy will be indispensable. A broadcasting system utilizing the SMS (multicast service by cellular phone lines) and electronic media (specifically radio broadcasting organizations) might be deliberated and suggested in synchronization with the mobile phone firms and electronic media companies.

- **Serious Efforts in Community-Based Disaster Risk Management:**

In many vulnerable communities, it is common observation that flood concerns are not constantly on high precedence compared to everyday survival problems such as livelihood, lack of sanitation facilities, deficiency of water, law and order etc<sup>12</sup>. This makes the community unreceptive against flood threats and sometimes more exposed to floods. To elude such vulnerability, incentives or motivations for instigating community involvement, such as socio-economic reasons and methodical training are crucial. Many organizations have piloted Community-based Disaster Risk Management (CBDRM) activities, and modules and training materials have been arranged.<sup>13</sup> However, formation of staff and budgets for implementation face challenges. To up-scale CBDRM activities nationwide, the implementing mechanism needs to be clearly defined. DRR training programs for community must provide clear knowledge about the floods preparation and evacuation procedures, transform knowledge into practical actions and exercise trial & error mechanisms for further improvement.

- **Harmonization of Human Resource Development Plan:**

There is no specific institute to harmonize and lead human resource development accomplishments in the field of disaster management in Pakistan. Human resource development in the field of disaster management incorporates an extensive range of actions comprising search and rescue training and technical research on disaster management.<sup>14</sup> These activities have been directed by several organizations. In order to administer the variety of activities in human resource development, it is critical to have an institution which takes the responsibility to synchronize and enhance whole spectrum of human resource development activities. The NIDM should perform a prominent role in the field of disaster management.

- **Establishment of Research Center:**

Unfortunately, there are lots of gaps in current research phenomenon in our country on how science & technology is used to figure societal and political decision-making in the perspective of hazards and disasters. Addressing this challenge requires a methodology that incorporates research and policy-making across all threats, disciplines and topographical regions. Past experience and research results in the field of disaster management have not been well gathered in Pakistan. A database of historical records of hazards is not completely accessible and research in the field of disaster management has not been efficiently conducted even though Pakistan has faced huge disasters. It is crucial to increase knowledge and technology in the field of disaster

management. For this purpose, establishment of a research center in the field of disaster management is required. A coherent approach for research related to disaster risk reduction and management must be developed. NIDM has been established but there is a strong need of incorporating research initiatives in the scope of NIDM's objectives.

- **Improvement of Information Technology:**

Information Technology plays a noteworthy role in emphasizing risk areas, vulnerabilities and possibly affected populations by generating geographically referenced analysis through, e.g., a geographic information system (GIS).<sup>15</sup> This technology infrastructure must be installed and updated regularly to ensure successful implementation of DRR and DRM.

- **Infrastructure:**

A well-distributed and safe infrastructure is important for disaster risk management.<sup>16</sup> Strengthening of physical infrastructure is significant for mitigation of fundamental risk factors and effective response during disasters,<sup>17</sup> It is essential to execute evaluation of physical infrastructure, especially transportation and communication facilities.<sup>18</sup> A more improved flood management or integrated watershed management system in the Indus River basin including the Kabul and Swat Rivers is needed. To avoid extensive damage due to disasters in urban areas, it is indispensable that urban planning and development should consider disaster risk management. Schools, hospitals and other important public facilities must be retrofitted against disasters. Important coastal facilities must be developed safe (i.e., ports and

industrial facilities) against disasters taking into consideration climate change (sea level rising, increment of intensity of cyclones, etc.).

**Conclusion:**

Pakistan is a developing country and does not have the means to be able to face and recover from several large-scale disasters. It needs to take actions to reduce vulnerability and exposure, to mitigate the effect of disasters, and prepare for effective response when they occur. In other words, it needs to strengthen its disaster risk management mechanism. While Pakistan has formulated DRR policy and governance system, it needs better funding, political will, and synchronization of effort across disaster management bodies. Most of the emphasis is on response and rescue. It is clearly indicated from above discussion that implementation mechanism of DRR must be improved to avoid losses from floods.

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## ISSRA's Discourse on Afghanistan Conflict

(Ms. Iffat Pervaz)\*

### **Abstract**

*Much has been written on Afghanistan under decade long war, possible scenarios of post US withdrawal from Afghanistan, War on terror and its implications on X, Y, Z etc. From north to South Pole of this globe there are so many discourses available on it. Think tanks as important source to provide the research oriented picture of any phenomenon have their specific discourse about specific phenomenon. Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA) is an army based think tank which depicts the intellectual discourse on Afghanistan Issue. This paper aims to examine the discourse given by ISSRA (in Margalla Papers, ISSRA Papers and through a seminar) by dividing it into different configuration based on the discourse narrated from 2009 to 2014*

**Key Words:** *scenarios, phenomenon, configuration, epistemological, communicatively*

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## **Introduction**

Afghanistan, bordering with Pakistan, Iran and Central Asian Republics (CARs), comprises of 28 million population divided into multi ethnic groups having multiple competing and clashing interests. After going through a decade long war (following the 9/11 attacks), now US forces are withdrawing from Afghanistan, a process initiated in 2014. Since last thirteen year much has been written on ontological and epistemological position of Afghanistan. Abundant of discourse is available in books, journal, magazines, newspaper, reports, talk show, conferences and seminars. As this paper is examining the ISSRA's discourse on Afghanistan, so it is necessary to define discourse first.

Discourse can be understood as the “study of language viewed communicatively and/or of communication viewed linguistically.”<sup>1</sup> It is broad term which mainly focuses on qualitative method of reading text, dialogue, conversation documents which explores the connections between language, communication, knowledge, power and social practices. In short, it focuses upon the meaning and structure (whether overt or covert) of acts of communication in context.<sup>2</sup>

A manner of impending and thinking about a problem can be described as Discourse Analysis. It is not a problem solving method on scientific research; rather it deals with the facilitating to access to the ontological and epistemological assumptions behind a text

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<sup>1</sup> HUGH TRAPPES-LOMAX, “Discourse Analysis”. Accessed from <http://www.wyxy.snnu.edu.cn/yy/uploadfiles/201006/20100606095647740.pdf>

<sup>2</sup>John Muncie, “Discourse Analysis” accessed from <http://srmo.sagepub.com/view/the-sage-dictionary-of-social-research-methods/n54.xml> accessed on April, 2014

project, a statement, a method of research. In other words, Discourse Analysis will enable to reveal the hidden motivations behind a text or behind the choice of a particular method of research to interpret that text. Discourse Analysis will, thus, not provide absolute answers to a specific problem, but enable us to understand the conditions behind a specific "problem" and make us realize that the essence of that "problem", and its resolution, lie in its assumptions; the very assumptions that enable the existence of that "problem" by making us ask ontological and epistemological questions.<sup>3</sup>

'ISSRA's Discourse on Afghanistan' highlights the different nuances of view point to analyse and evaluate the Afghanistan conflict. As this paper is focusing on the specific approach taken to the subject area from 2009-2014, so for the sake of fulfilling this appetite two journals and one seminar on Afghanistan addressing the different aspects of the Afghanistan issue are consulted. ISSRA's discourse (2009-2014) on Afghanistan issue can broadly be divided into four main segments, first three segments are dealing with specific apprehensions, last segment will consist upon the recommendations proposed by ISSRA regarding those apprehensions. This paper will be concluded following the frequency of repeated words and analysis.

### **SEGMENT 1**

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<sup>3</sup>" Discourse analysis". Accessed from <https://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~palmquis/courses/discourse.htm>

### **Conflict Sustaining Factor not Dealt by US NATO**

Why US and NATO are not able to deal with those dynamics which are contributing to prolong the conflict? Was the need to use soft power was most required than use of military means in Afghanistan? Why ISAF is still unable to cut the economics of militants? These are the underpinning questions which are answered by the ISSRA. Every writer who wrote in Margalla and ISSRA Papers answered these questions by looking at the issue from his own standpoint.

### **Cultural Knowledge**

For Muhammad Athar Javed cultural knowledge is very important in any conflict. For instance, he writes that neither NATO nor US has a lucid picture about the Language and cultural aspects in Afghanistan. It is important to learn about the “cultural intelligence” which includes learning about the family, tribe, hills, roads, wells, and also about friends and enemies. How to use and exploit the culture is a contributing factor which can strengthen the “Modern Security Strategy”. He also focuses on the differences in perceptions of US and Taliban towards desired scenario of Afghanistan, for that matter his article reflects the definition of victory which for Taliban is 1) nature of fighting against the foreign powers and 2) to make the Afghan Government de-legitimize. On the contrary NATO is doing all its efforts to legitimize the Afghan government. Besides that there was a need for US to bring good image of her in Afghan masses which could not happen as NATO, with the help of US and Pakistan, remained unsuccessful with regards to a public campaign and could not create a positive image

in Afghanistan, on the other hand Taliban are continuously destroying the infrastructure to break the US morale.<sup>4</sup>

### **Doubts on US intension to Stabalize Afghanistan**

Dr Muhammand Khan highlights that Afghan people have doubts about US intension, why? He answered by quoting the statement of General Stanley McChrystal which he gave in his assessment in which he stressed on “buying the loyalties of locals, rather use of military might”<sup>5</sup>, that is another lacuna which US should have filled but it did not. Khan also mentioned that the way Muslim Diaspora is being treated in the west and the concerns of the Muslims towards immigration policy of west in general and in US in specific is a cause which affects the perspective of Muslim community from which they see the US-NATO efforts to bring stability in Afghanistan as “doubt”.<sup>6</sup> Maryam Mastoor has referred in her paper that one of the important factors to sustain the conflict in Afghanistan is the flaw in the strategy adopted in Afghanistan during the Bush administration. The system which west tried to bring in Afghanistan was very fragile. The territory which fell under Taliban was almost one third of Afghanistan.<sup>7</sup>

Ambassador Rustam Shah in a seminar highlighted that 62% of area is still under the control of resistance so US used to carry out “night raids” against the supporters of resistance. The

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<sup>4</sup> Muhammad Athar Javed, “Doing More Together: Stabilizing Afghanistan and Beyond” *Margalla Papers 2010. Page 112*

<sup>5</sup>Dr Raja Muhammad Khan, “ISAF, Afghanistan, and Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities”. *Margalla Papers 2012.Vol XVI, Issue I*

<sup>6</sup> Muhammad Athar Javed, “Doing More Together: Stabilizing Afghanistan and Beyond” *Margalla Paper 2010. Page 112*

<sup>7</sup>Maryam Mastoor, 2013, Resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan; Impacts on Pakistan. *ISSRA Papers.Vol VI, Issue II*

way US forces behaved with prisoners like physical and sexual abuse, torture, beating, and killing for fun and made fun of Islam are the things which create hatred amongst people which strengthens their doubts.<sup>8</sup>

### **Narcotics Trafficking**

No insurgency can sustain without the financial support. Same is the case with Afghanistan insurgency. Mehwish Nigar Qureshi considers “Narcotics Trafficking” as financial channel which is sustaining the insurgency in Afghanistan by applying the “conflict tree model”. It is outcome of the focus on the strategy to use “hard power” and ignoring another facet which demands the use of soft power, Narcotics industry is one of them. ISAF Commander in Afghanistan focused on military power to defeat the insurgency but ignored its economic means. Besides pro conflict-sustaining factors, there are some causes which make the conflict complex. For Afghanistan, “unstable security environment since last three decades, with periods of civil unrest, and foreign interventions have made the conflict more complex”. As it provided and facilitated the Norco-Traders so they took advantages from the weak Afghan Government. Norco-Trafficking and involvement of external hands in that poses serious hurdles in way of US and NATO efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. She refers this era as “Genesis of Afghan opium trade”. In post 9/11, the absence of strong government has weaken state writ outside Kabul, which gave the opportunity to

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<sup>8</sup>Amb Rustam Shah “Afghanistan in the course of transition: costs and risks”. Seminar on *Afghanistan endgame: quest for peace and stability*. 27<sup>th</sup> June 2012

war lords and drug lords to burgeon, as war lords were there to provide protection to drug lords and drug lords were there as a source to generate revenue for war lords.<sup>9</sup>

Khan has brought some facts in this regard. He writes that year 2002 to 2012 witnessed the increased cultivation of Poppy in Afghanistan. \$65 billion opium is received by Europe from Afghanistan on annual bases. It is estimated that production of opium constitutes 9% of entire Afghanistan's economy. And ISAF is not halting the drug trade.<sup>10</sup> Ambassador Rustam Shah also presented in seminar that the production of poppy has increased from 50 tons in 2010 and thousands of tone today which is a sad story.<sup>11</sup>

### **Availability of Weapons**

For Khan, ISAF being unsuccessful in dismantling the economic means for militants also remained unsuccessful in terms of dealing with the extensive availability of weapons in Afghanistan. There are vigorous ways to sustain the Afghan insurgency operations as there is abundant availability of small weapon, arms, ammunitions, and also Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) etc.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>Mehwish Nigar Qureshi, "Narco-Trade and conflict resolution: a case study of Afghanistan". *ISSRA Papers*, 2012.Vol IV, issue I

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### **Role of ISAF and ANSF**

Dr. Raja Muhammad Khan views the role of ISAF with “pessimism” as the mandate of ISAF was to maintain the security in Kabul as well as in the adjacent parts by assisting the Afghan Government. This was assigned task to ISAF because, through this, smooth environment can be provided to Afghan administration and also to United Nation personnel. But it is neither successful to maintain peace and stability, nor could ensure security and development in Afghanistan. As a result Pakistan is bearing the cost. As US and ISAF (up to 148,000 troops) still not able to formulate such mechanism through which Afghan people can be engaged economically. Estimatedly, only \$89 billion was spent for rebuilding process in Afghanistan out of pledged \$550 billion. ISAF and US are unable to make any decisive endeavor to bring Taliban and some other groups in Afghanistan on negotiating table. There is still dominance of war lords and Taliban over half of Afghans. Khan writes “this does not mean a Taliban takeover of Afghanistan is imminent, but implies the fact that ISAF is not winning either”. Even US military considers its achievements in Afghanistan as “Fragile reversible”.

Besides ISAF the situation of Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) is also not optimistic. Raza Ali Khan writes that it was established fact that ANSF was supposed to take the security segment of the country and in fact maximum area of Afghanistan was taken over by ANSF. The process of handing over the bases to ANSF by ISAF is still ongoing, 202 bases are closed, 282 bases are being handed over to ANSF, and process is

ongoing about remaining 400 bases.<sup>13</sup> Afghan National Army was established in early 1900s and it was taken as Afghanistan's national institution. Dealing with the national security was considered as its backbone. Its number was 70,000 in 2009 but currently it has expanded to 134,000, and according to Mr Obama it will increase in its number to 260,000 in coming five years which will cost \$20 Billion. It is facing so many challenges staring at its face. Amongst them the most considerable challenge is its acceptance as a legitimate force by people. For him, ANA neither is playing any momentous role to contain the Taliban nor to fight with them.<sup>14</sup> Besides all the above mentioned factors Maryam Mastoor has mentioned that the ineffective government which was unable to deliver the services to the masses in Afghanistan is another considerable stress. Francesc Vendrell, who was the EU's envoy to Afghanistan once referred that justice is the essential element in the Muslim society, and in Afghanistan it is nonexistent.<sup>15</sup>

## **SEGMENT 2**

### **Role of India in Afghanistan**

What India is doing in Afghanistan and what it is intended to do is posing and will pose serious threat to Pakistan. India's investment in Afghanistan must have a hidden agenda against Pakistan, is the main theme of this segment.

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<sup>13</sup>Dr Raja Muhammad Khan, "ISAF, Afghanistan, and Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities". *Margalla Papers* 2012.Vol XVI, Issue I

<sup>14</sup> Lieutenant colonel Raza Ali Khan, "Afghan National Army-An Assessment of Promises and Dangers". *Margalla Papers*. 2009.

<sup>15</sup>Maryam Mastoor, 2013, Resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan; Impacts on Pakistan. ISSRA Papers.Vol VI, Issue II

### **Indian Interests in Afghanistan: Pakistan's Apprehensions**

Afifa Kiran analyzes and evaluates the Indian stakes and stances in Afghanistan and its implications for Pakistan. She mentioned that except the era of Taliban, India and Afghanistan both shared very cordial relations. After 9/11 India has adopted policy of “high-level engagement” in Afghanistan, by giving the reason the it is for the sake of creating stability in Afghanistan, but what exactly are motives behind this policy is a subject to question as India considers Afghanistan as a gate way to enter into Central Asian Republics (CARs). Another factor for which Afghanistan is important for India is bilateral trade between both the countries. India finds Afghanistan as impending market for Indian business. “India had totally backed Afghanistan to continue propaganda against Pakistan to serve her own interests”. Once Ehsanullah Aryanzai (Afghan Government advisor) stated on April 2, 2009, “India is using Afghan soil to destabilize Pakistan and Afghan security agencies are unable to stop Indian interventions due to absence of centralized government mechanism”.

Above all that, Obama gave Af-Pak policy in 2009 in which India was considered as great role player. India is supporting and assisting Afghanistan in building of infrastructure, and developmental projects. This foreign policy agenda of India is posing challenge to Pakistan. As strategic interests of India show that it does not want any influence on Afghanistan from Pakistan side either political or strategic, for that matter India wants to have a government in Afghanistan that is pro-India. India is investing substantially in Afghanistan in terms of cultural diplomacy, financial aid, media (to make the Indian culture and norms persuasive and tempting for Afghan masses), and through

consulates. The theory that enemy's enemy is a friend can directly be applied as far as relations between India and Pakistan are concerned. India, via Afghanistan, is sending weapons to Taliban in Pakistan's security prone areas.<sup>16</sup>

### **SEGMENT 3**

#### **Role of Pakistan**

As the last segment dealt with the Indian stance that it does not want Pakistan's role in Afghanistan, the other way round is the theme of this segment in which for Pakistan, Afghanistan is a strategic depth so Pakistan wants to limitize the role of India in Afghanistan. Pakistan being a front line ally, has borne the cost of WOT so bounty of war should not be given to India.

#### **Pakistan: A well-wisher of Afghanistan**

Khan accentuates upon Pakistan's importance for Afghanistan and Afghanistan's importance for Pakistan. Afghanistan is going to witness the drawdown of US forces in 2014. Being "responsible neighbor" the role of Pakistan is very important. There are many differences between both the states but they share similarities as well in terms of religion, norms, culture and society, so "Pakistan will continue to play a constructive role to end the war in interest of Afghanistan and for lasting regional peace and stability" besides continuation of monitoring the developmental aspects in Afghanistan.

He also mentioned Pakistan's stakes in Afghanistan. If Afghanistan becomes peaceful, friendly and stable it will provide a "strategic depth" to Pakistan as Pakistan then will feel its western

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<sup>16</sup>AfifaKiran, "Indian Quest for Strategic Ingress in Afghanistan, and its Implications for Pakistan".ISSRA Papers. 2009. Vol I

border secure. Pakistan also wants to limit the Indian role only to the developmental aspects; it should not gain edge over Pakistan in Afghanistan as Pakistan cannot afford India sitting in Afghanistan replacing the US. "We cannot wish for Afghanistan anything that we don't wish for Pakistan".<sup>17</sup>

Mr Rahimullah Yousafzai, in a Seminar presented that one possible scenario is: Taliban will get power in southern and eastern Afghanistan after withdrawal of US forces and weak government will be in place in Kabul which will depend on the US aid. And Pakistan as a friend to Taliban will have strong hold in Afghanistan which she does not have at the current moment.<sup>18</sup>

Raza Muhammad and Dr Saifur Rehman discussed that there was a deep mistrust which was developed by Karzai and his team for Pakistan. But the bilateral relations have no alternative. Recently, the change of guards in both countries, Pakistan's operation in FATA to destroy the terrorist network in Afghanistan and Pakistan, these elements brought a ray of hope as far as the bilateral relations are concerned.<sup>19</sup> Iffat Pervaz and Sheharyar Khan have proposed some policy recommendation as far the bilateral relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are concerned that now the issues should be delinked with the political grievances. Through

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<sup>17</sup>Dr Raja Muhammad Khan, "ISAF, Afghanistan, and Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities". *Margalla Papers 2012*. Vol XVI, Issue I

<sup>18</sup>Mr Rahimullah Yousafzai, "Responsible end to the war: Wither Reconciliation process". Seminar on *Afghanistan endgame: quest for peace and stability*. 27<sup>th</sup> June 2012

<sup>19</sup>Raza Muhammad and Dr Saifur Rehman, 2014, Emerging Regional security Milieu in Post 2014 Afghanistan. *Margalla Papers*, Vol XVIII

this both the countries would be able to resolve the mistrust including the water issues.<sup>20</sup>

### **Cost Borne by Pakistan**

Pakistan, after becoming the US ally in GWOT, instantly deployed troops (150,000 in numbers) to control the movement of militants along Durand line by establishing about 1000 military check posts. Pakistan has borne \$120 billion economic cost, human loss in terms of over 60,000 civilian deaths, 5,000 of security personnel, attacks on sovereignty in terms of Abbotabad raid and Salala attacks, and drone attacks. On the other hand, US faced the loss of lives in term of 2,175 and ISAF faced 3,256. But still Pakistan is receiving the same two words from US and ISAF in return “do-more”.<sup>21</sup>

### **“Doing-More Together” instead of “Do-More” to Stabilize Afghanistan**

Following the above mentioned situation Ather Javed gave the idea of “doing –more-together” by writing that Pakistan with having lack of modern technology cannot meet the astonishing demand to create stability in Afghanistan. Do-More cannot bring the desired outcome; rather there is a need of Modern Security Strategy which expresses the appetite for,

- NATO in interest of Afghan Stability
- Strategic Partnership between Pak-US

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<sup>20</sup>IffatPervaz and Dr M Sheharyar Khan, “Brewing Conflict over Kabul River; Policy options for Legal Framework”. *ISSRA Papers 2014*.Vol VI Issue II

<sup>21</sup>Dr Raja Muhammad Khan, “ISAF, Afghanistan, and Pakistan: Challenges and Opportunities”. *Margalla Papers, 2012*.Vol XVI, Issue I

As far as the mistrust of strategic partnership is concerned that shows that there is a demand from front line ally of GWOT to create a balance in the pendulum vis-à-vis its rival in the South Asian region. Along with that there is common hypothesis directed for Pakistan that Pakistan first should deal with the terrorism within its own premises as peace in Afghanistan depends on the other way around. External factors are also contributing factors in creating instability in Afghanistan. The flow of foreign fighters from Central Asian and Arab States is creating problems for counter insurgency in Pakistan, who cross the borders, and enter into Pakistan. Indian and Bangladesh elements are also not ignorable which are posing danger to the efforts made by US and NATO for maintaining the peace, evidences are available in this context when captured Indian made weapons and communication equipment became a witness of Indian support to Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan. Most importantly there is need to address those members of Afghan police and Afghan National Army who joined the Taliban and now are source of further instability in Afghanistan.<sup>22</sup>

#### **SEGMENT 4**

### **Afghans' Desires and Miseries**

#### **What Do Afghans Want?**

Afshan Sajid brings into light the desires of Afghan masses. Afghanistan currently is struggling to have a modern administrative system, as the prevailing one is not up to the mark. Fragile economy is prevalent. Due to destroyed educational infrastructure, there are few people who have educational background to run the country.

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<sup>22</sup> Muhammad AtharJaved, "Doing More Together: Stabilizing Afghanistan and Beyond" *Margalla Paper 2010. Page 112*

There is need for Afghanistan to have good governance. There must be participation of “moderate Taliban” in political development of the country. The desire of Afghan people is to have a model of governance like:-

- That model is based on devolution of power and decentralization with having the foreign policy and internal security under the umbrella of central government. This is the way which can prevent the de-stabilization of Afghanistan.
- Next model is good governance.
- Mix bag of efforts like local bodies and international communities should unite for stability.
- Regional integration. Government should be in favor of Afghans and must bring regional integration. Because stable Afghanistan then can provide the gas and hydro power on reasonable rates.<sup>23</sup>

### **What is happening to Afghans’ Desires?**

The forces who are sitting in Afghanistan, will they let Afghans to fulfill their desires? Khan has provided answer to this question by making a linkage with the below mentioned narrative about what US wants from this decade long war. “Can we win the war?” is a basic assessment based question which every war engaged nation/state is required to raise. In terms of Afghan war when this question was asked to Robert Gates (US former Secretary of Defense) he replied

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<sup>23</sup>Afshan Sajid, “Stable Afghanistan: suggested government models for Afghanistan in post Afghan War Scenario” *ISSRA PAPERS*. 2012. Vol III, Issue II

“Modern wars rarely end in decisive victories and that they are usually concluded through negotiated settlements. We have not had a declared victory in a war, with the possible exception of the first Gulf War, since World War II. It is the phenomenon of modern conflict. The key is, are our interests protected? Is the security of United States protected? Are Americans safer at the end because of the sacrifice these soldiers have made? That’s the real question”.

If wining of war does means the above mentioned statement then what about the Afghans and Afghanistan? What about their security, peace and stability which is mentioned in the mandate of ISAF? Does “Operation Enduring Freedom” is only supposed to deal with the US interest and not to address the situation in Afghanistan?<sup>24</sup>

## **SEGMENT 5**

### **Recommendations**

The purpose of this segment is to deal with the recommendations and way forward suggested by ISSRA concerning with the above mentioned 4 segments from 2009-2014.

#### **Segment 1 Recommendations**

- Good Governance and justice in Afghanistan should be listed as top priorities.
- For the sake of halting the funding of terrorism, there is a need to bring some upgraded measures dealing with the anti-narcotics so that drug money would not reach to militants.

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<sup>24</sup>Dr Raja Muhammad Khan, “ISAF, Afghanistan, and Pakistan: Challenges and Oppertunities”. Margalla Papers 2012.Vol XVI, Issue I

- Understanding of Islamic-Tribal Afghan society along with the creating the balance in the region specially Pak vs. India.
- To bring Pashtun community into educational main stream.<sup>25</sup>
- Identification of “stake holders” and address them is very necessary for conflict resolution. In case of Afghanistan with “gradual evolution” of conflict, number of stake holders has increased.
- To deal with stake holders not in the conventional conflict resolution methods. There is need to deal with them tactically.
- Young Afghan community should be provided with opportunities which may not let them to join either Taliban’s Army or drug chain.
- Narco/Drug traders should be taken into boat when conflict resolution process is started as their isolation from Afghan insurgency cannot bring any fruitful results.<sup>26</sup>
- There is strong need to address the ethnic imbalances in ANA.
- Development of a proper government which deals with civil military relation.<sup>27</sup>

### **Segment 2 Recommendations**

- Pakistan should promote the public diplomacy in Afghanistan through like sending of Pakistani doctors,

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<sup>25</sup> Muhammad AtharJaved, “Doing More Together: Stabilizing Afghanistan and Beyond” *Margalla Papers 2010. Page 112*

<sup>26</sup>MehwishNigarQureshi, “Narco-Trade and conflict resolution: a case study of Afghanistan”. *ISSRA Papers, 2012.Vol IV, issue I*

<sup>27</sup> Lieutenant colonel Raza Ali Khan, “Afghan National Army-An Assessment of Promises and Dangers”. *Margalla Papers. 2009.*

teachers, and other professionals to Afghanistan can be of great outcome.

- Pakistan should positively think about “Trans-Afghan Pipeline”.<sup>28</sup>

### **Segment 3 Recommendations**

- Need to create balance in the region especially between Pak and India.<sup>29</sup>

### **Segment 4 Recommendations**

- The requirement for stable Afghanistan is that its masses should show complete trust in the legitimacy of government which can be achieved if central government addresses the issues of public.
- Capable ANSF.<sup>30</sup>
- Reasonable end to Afghan conflict through proper political process can lead Afghanistan on the path of durable peace and stability in the country.
- Stability and security in Afghanistan will not let Afghanistan to become the hub of “international terrorism” and “Jihadist operations” once again. To create such environment is not impossible for US.
- Constitutional reforms which should be acceptable for all stake holders.

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<sup>28</sup>AfifaKiran, “Indian Quest for Strategic Ingress in Afghanistan, and its Implications for Pakistan”.ISSRA Papers. 2009. Vol I

<sup>29</sup> Muhammad AtharJaved, “Doing More Together: Stabilizing Afghanistan and Beyond” *Margalla Paper 2010. Page 112*

<sup>30</sup>AfshanSajid, “Stable Afghanistan:suggested government models for Afghanistan in post Afghan War Scenario” *ISSRA Papers. 2012. Vol III, Issue II*

- Governance and security reforms.
- One of the striking options is complete drawdown of ISAF which Taliban and other stake holders appetite for. But here comes the need to maintain peace before leaving of ISAF.

### **Analysis and Concluding Remarks**

Below mentioned table depicts all about the discourse used by ISSRA. We have chosen some words and check their number of repetition.


**Table 1. Repeated Words**

<b>Words</b>	<b>Number of Accrue</b>
Night Raids	2
Do more	2
Doing more tighter	3
Sustainable peace	1
Geneses of opium trade	1
Afghanistan	550
Strategic goals	1
Afghan government	14
Indian interest	4
Cultural intelligence	4
Disintegrate Pakistan	1
US	184
Pakistan Nukes	3
Pakistan	289
India	117
Stability and Peace	44
Operation Enduring Freedom	2
Strategic depth	3
Strategic confusion	3
Hate syndrome	3
Modern security strategy	2
Stability strategy	2
Af-pak strategic co-operation	1

Close door policy	1
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
**Graph 1. Frequency of Repeated Words**

Below mentioned graph illustrates the frequency of repeated words mentioned in above table.




**Pie Chart 1 Frequency of Repeated Words**

This pie chart is divided into parts showing the frequency



### Graph lane 1 Frequency of Repeated Words

Lanes drawn below are illustrating the level of frequency of repeated words.



Conclusions are very obvious after going through the above mentioned segments and statistical view of discourse. Observations show that the work on Afghanistan which has been done from 2009 to 2014 is more focused on apprehensions for Pakistan although the repetition of words shows (Afghanistan repeated for 550 times) that focal point is Afghanistan but very less has been discussed, analysed and proposed for Afghanistan. Every writer, according to his/her own background and biases discussed Pakistan, its opportunities and challenges, its interests and apprehensions, its security and peace. For Pakistan Afghanistan is strategic depth. For India it is a good market for business, for US it is good place to keep an eye on Pakistani Nukes and Growing trends in China. 'Where do Afghanistan, Afghans, and their future stand in discourse' is limited

to find out. India doesn't want presence of Pakistan in Afghanistan, Pakistan also do not want to have India in Afghanistan, both are questing for their position in Afghanistan, both want to have government of their choice in Afghanistan. Besides all that, for US it is game which she won in terms of safety of her people. Afghans, still are struggling to have a proper administration in their war beaten country.

## **Drug Trafficking: A Non-Traditional Security Threat to National Security of Pakistan**

(Ms. Tehmina Maqbool)\*

### ***Abstract***

*Drug trafficking is a prosperous deviance common to most of the modernized societies. It can be defined as production or movement of banned drugs at the international or intra-national level, the city level, or direct selling to users. Distribution systems of drugs are typically set in hierarchical systems. The non-traditional security issues are called dissimilar to traditional security threats and refer to factors other than armed and political conflicts , but can claim a threat to the sustainability and growth of an independent state and the human race in entirety. The drug problem in the world is mainly three fold, production, trafficking and abuse and it becomes more complicated when the three come together to form a deadly composition, which is what happened in the case of Pakistan. Today drug trafficking in the world is considered as the most lucrative business in which profits are much higher than the oil industry together and second only to the arms trade.*

**Key Words:** *Drug trafficking, hierarchical, non-traditional, Sustainability, composition*

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## **Introduction**

Security is a perception that changes with the period, responding to total changes in human domination, priorities, skill, financial system as well as sociology. According to Barry Buzan, the notion of security is in much of its established usage, so slightly developed as to be scarce for the task. Barry Buzan suggests five capable explanations for what he calls the insistent underdevelopment of idea about security. Four explanations are of fastidious interest for current purposes. The first clarification is that the concept of security has simply proved complex to attract analysts, and has therefore been deserted in favor of more submissive concepts. A second, and in Buzan's view more persuasive explanation lies in the real scope for overlap between it and the concept of power as developed by realists. Security was often viewed as a derivative of power, particularly military power. A third reason for the conceptual underdevelopment of security concerns the nature of a variety of objections to the realist model up to the late 1970s. Rejecting the realist model as precariously self-fulfilling and too war prone, many critics turned instead to the grand concept of peace. A fourth elucidation for the underdevelopment of the concept of security is that, for the practitioners of state policy, persuasive reasons exist for maintaining its representative uncertainty. The highlighted aspect of national security as a validation for proceedings and policies which would otherwise have to be explained is a supporting tool of gigantic expediency for a large assortment of sectional wellbeing in all types of state. For example, many interests in the United States and the Soviet Union took benefit from amplifying the level of threat which each posed to the other. Promotion of antagonistic

images overseas can authenticate intensified political surveillance, shifts of possessions to the armed, economic protectionism and other policies with deep implications for familial political life.

The sense of security has been generating an enormous source of contemplation among scholars in current time. The understanding of the world in recent time emphasizes a paradigm shift in security discourse. Traditionally, the State is the custodian and eventual beneficiary of the dominant use of violence as advocated by Max Weber. Any internal or external threat to demanding the authority of the State in monopolizing violence was measured as a security threat.

Drug trafficking and drug addiction are both growing problems in Pakistan and the rate is increasing day by day. Especially its rise is among young people and women. The threat of drug trafficking has been identified globally and especially in Pakistan and it is a major destabilizing factor in the security parameter. Poverty, illiteracy, corruption, weak institutions/law enforcement agencies and the lack of funding for enforcement agencies contribute towards increasing trends of drug trafficking in Pakistan. It is therefore urgent to evaluate the nature and extent of the impact of drug trafficking on the national security of Pakistan.

### **Changing Paradigms of Security Concept**

The international system based on state authority has undergone sea changes. Sovereignty as restricted jurisdiction over a piece of territory is no more to be seen anywhere. Along with this, the notion of security is also undergoing transformation. Traditional security alerts securing state territory exclusively from any outside interference, the most important being from military threats by foreign states. National interest was cleared as national security

interest. There was a compact division or separation between domestic and non-domestic issues.

The nature of the threats and security discourses are often changing, and dynamic security pattern has disappeared from the state security and military designs. In this new environment of security and in particular in the light of changing global realities observed at the end of the Cold War, globalization, global violence and climate change around the world, are needed to be defined as non-traditional security threats in an inclusive manner. However increasingly used in education and political practice, the concept is still far from being commonly accepted, or being authority in political science. While the realm of traditional security concerns is quite accurate and ardently protected, no agreement exists as to what non-traditional security is and what it includes and what remains prohibited. However, according to Mely Caballero Anthony, Non-traditional security threats may be termed as challenges to the survival and well-being of peoples and states that arise first and lead out of nonmilitary sources, such as climate change, cross-border environmental dreadful conditions and resource depletion, transferable diseases, natural disasters, uneven migration, food shortages, people smuggling, drug trafficking, and other forms of transnational crime.

### **Focusing on Non-Traditional Security Threats**

Non-traditional security threats have some general characteristics. They are generally not of a military nature, scope, or transnational - completely internal or purely interstate, and are transmitted rapidly due to the revolution of globalization and communication. This implies that these non-traditional threats are much more intimidating than traditional because they require

national leadership to not only look outward to promote international cooperation, but also inwardly, in an open run social reform perspective, internal and economic policies. The manner, in which these transnational threats are increasingly discussed, not only in academia, but also by policy makers in almost all regions of the world, clearly reflects the enormity of the importance of these issues in the contemporary world. However, military deterrence, diplomatic maneuvers and political short-term arrangements are insufficient to solve non-traditional problems and therefore require non-military as well as the overall political, economic and social responses to resolve them.

V. R. Raghavan rightly observes that the state-centered approach accessible to national security, limited to the strength of a country against the territorial violence was extended to the idea of the overall security of a larger set of intimidation in the population of the state. It is therefore becoming increasingly critical to examine how non-traditional security threats are reshaping the international institutional order.

The non-traditional security issues have also been defined as those which are called 'unlike traditional security threats' and refer to factors other than armed, political and political conflicts, but can claim a threat to the sustainability and expansion of a sovereign state and the human race as a whole. From this point of view as a particular definition, one can control more than a few uniqueness of non-traditional security threats, combined with traditional security threats.

First of all these issues can influence government institutions and national populations and these can trigger from a multiplicity of non-state human and natural causes, where threats can be

upshots of certain acts by people or social groups. Thus one can observe that the eruption of non-traditional problems is more irregular, and mobility and the expansion of people allow their impacts to disseminate and spread far more rapidly in today's world. Second, the effects of these diverted problems can result in economic losses in any region of the world. Conversely, the main inclusive explanation of the notion of non-traditional security was provided by Richard H. Ullman<sup>1</sup> in his deep-seated critique of 1983 titled "Redefining security".<sup>2</sup> According to him national security should not be perceived in the 'narrow' sense of protecting the state from military attacks from across the territorial borders. Such a recognition was, for him, doubly deceptive and hence doubly unsafe. In light of the fact that it draws consideration far from the non-military dangers that guarantee to debilitate the steadiness of numerous countries amid the years ahead and it presuppose that dangers emerging from outside a state are somehow more dangerous to its security than dangers that emerge inside it. Richard H. Ullman vaguely preferred to demarcate a peril to national security as a feat or progression of archives that impends radically and over a relatively terse period of time to demean the eminence of life for the population of a state. It may also threaten inappreciably to slender the assortment of policy choices available to the government of a state or to secretive, nongovernmental entities

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<sup>1</sup> Richard H. Ullman, Professor of International Affairs at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, spent the 1982-83 academic year as a visiting member of the Institute for Advanced Study.

<sup>2</sup> Richard H. Ullman. – *Redefining Security*, *International Security*, Vol. 8, No. 1. (Summer, 1983), pp. 129-153. At [http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/political\\_science/shared/political\\_science/9957/Ullman%201983.pdf](http://graduateinstitute.ch/webdav/site/political_science/shared/political_science/9957/Ullman%201983.pdf) (Accessed on May 1st, 2013)

(persons, groups, corporations) contained by the state. For the motive of comprehensive analysis, one can distinguish six broad branches of non-traditional security, specifically, International Terrorism, Transnational Organized Crime, Environmental Security, Illegal Migration, Energy Security, and Human Security.<sup>3</sup>

### **Drug Trafficking and National Security of Pakistan**

Peace, security, stability, and economic development are some of the celebrated and undisputed objectives of the states, existing in international system, which every state wants to realise internally as well as externally. The world in which we live has been dominated since very early in the realist school of thought and is more concerned to face security threats rather than traditional and non-traditional. But in recent years, there has been a change that also focuses on both traditional and non-traditional security threats and entered the domain of realism. The idea was that states will no longer be able to maintain that difference between traditional and non-traditional security threats. Threat of drugs is one of the non-traditional threats to security which is on the way to merge with terrorism, the traditional one, and if that happens it will become a deadly mixture, too deadly to be defeated. The drug problem in the world is mainly three fold, the production, trafficking and abuse and it becomes more complicated when the three come together to form a deadly composition, which is what happened with the case of Pakistan. Drug trafficking in the world today is considered the mainly beneficial trade in which income is much more than the oil business jointly and second only to the arms trade. Golden Crescent

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<sup>3</sup>Mr. Saurabh Chaudhuri "Defining Non-Traditional Security Threats| at <http://www.globalindiafoundation.org/nontraditionalsecurity.htm>  
Accessed on 26th feb2013

(Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) and the Golden Triangle (Burma, Thailand, Laos) have traditionally been responsible for the world's heroin supply. 'Golden' here does not reflect the economic conditions in the region especially under the opium growing tribes. But it is "gold" because of the money earned by international traffickers involved in the illicit trade in the region. Illicit drugs, particularly the opium, are formed in efficiently disadvantaged and politically tumultuous areas of the world where it offers an inimitable and rewarding chance in the absence of some attractive options. In Pakistan, the solitude of manufacturing areas united with feeble management has provided valuable impression to drug traffickers.<sup>4</sup>

A report on heroin, published in 1998, said that heroin is increasingly the life blood of the economy of Pakistan and the political system. The appraisal proved accurate eventually and in recent times World Drug Report 2010 has claimed, on the basis of latest assessment (2006), that there are 628,000 constant opiate users of which 500,000 are heroin uses.<sup>5</sup> Musa Khan also suggests that Pakistan is a victim of the drug culture which emerged after 1979 and from almost zero it marched to a considerable amount (500,000) of heroin addicts.<sup>6</sup> The large amount of opiates consumed in Pakistan is the story itself that the domestic market of

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<sup>4</sup>D. Suba Chandran (1998), "Drug Trafficking and the Security of the State: A Case Study of Pakistan", *Strategic Analysis*, 22(6): 903-922.

<sup>5</sup>UNODC (2010), *World Drug Report 2010*, United Nations Office on Drug and Crime, New York.

<sup>6</sup>Musa Khan Jalalzai (2005), *Silent Killer: Drug Trafficking in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia*, Lahore: Institute of Advance and Strategic Studies.

Pakistan has become a determining factor in the conduct of opium production in the region.

### **Trafficking Routes**

Pakistan has a long coastal belt and porous borders with Iran and Afghanistan that makes the country vulnerable or an ideal place for drug trafficking in the major consumer markets. Pakistan shares a long border 2430 km with its neighbour Afghanistan, chief illicit drug producer in the world, with three official crossing points (Torkham in Nangarhar, Khostin Ghulam Khan and Spin Boldak in Kandahar province). The topography of the bordering areas includes frequent north-south mountain ranges, which create natural smuggling routes across the border. Besides this, there are a number of natural passes, mountain trails, and desert roads, most of which are unmanned and unsupervised. During 1990s, Khyber Pass emerged as a vital highway in international drugs trade due to its proximity to the poppy growing areas of Afghanistan's eastern provinces. Though, there are various routes for Afghan heroin to the world but many of the law enforcement officials are of the view that most of the heroin produced in Afghanistan is still trafficked through the traditional routes rather than north via the Central Asian republics and Russia.

A UNODC report, published in 2008, had rightly said that detailed and accurate information on the routes of drug trafficking is widely available, but drug traffickers basically rely on three major axes across the region of Western Europe and other destinations:

- The western route via Iran
- The southern route through Pakistan, and
- The northern route through Central Asian States

World Drug Report 2010 has acknowledged the fact that Pakistan is geographically vulnerable to opiate trafficking and approximately 40% of Afghanistan's heroin/morphine transits or is consumed in Pakistan. The report also stated that it has become a daily affair where Afghanistan's refined heroin, unrefined heroin, and semi-refined morphine are smuggled into Pakistan using multiple methods of transportation, including the wide usages of camels and pack animals.

UNODC 2008 report has claimed that international airports were a significant conduit for narcotics smuggling as over 37 percent of Pakistan's total heroin seizures in 2006 took place at airports. Outside conceal drugs on their person or in their luggage, traffickers are also used to send letters and parcels drugs to minimize the risk of being caught, the quantities involved tend to be much lower. Inside of Pakistan there are several routes that are easy to work for traffickers transporting drugs to various destinations throughout the world, some important needed a brief discussion here.

Usually, vessels carrying drugs leave Karachi port for Yemen and southern Europe through Red Sea or sometimes they follow a different one, the African route which goes via Somalia and Ethiopia to Kenya and onwards. However, in recent years the Makran coast, due to its long and virtually unguarded coastline, has become popular where drug consignments are loaded on small launches and are carried from coastal areas to high seas to be transferred to ships.

Long and rugged roads of Baluchistan are the most preferred routes for traffickers because of its difficult terrain, passing through this road carries a low risk of being intercepted by the implementing agencies of Pakistan. Another important way is by Quetta or

Hyderabad to Lahore, where it was smuggled to the West directly or sometimes indirectly by various Indian states such as Punjab, Rajasthan (especially Jaisalmer districts and Balmer), Delhi, Mumbai and Gujarat.

### **Opiate Seizures in Pakistan**

Pakistan is a chief and a foremost transport state for opiates produced in Afghanistan and to some extent also in Pakistan. Illicit drug in the world involves a relatively small number of countries and the only manifestation of which is the amount of illicit drugs seized in the country by law enforcement and anti-drug agencies. However, it requires a careful interpretation because seizure can be driven by production, local consumption, and transshipment to other nations that experiences large seizures but are neither producers nor major consumers are likely to be involved in trafficking to other countries.<sup>7</sup>

Morphine is a short state before the manufacture of heroin and requires acetic anhydride to the final conversion into heroin. It is important to note that trafficking of opiates into and throughout Pakistan has heightened during the 2001-2006 period, approximately parallel to the boost in opium manufacture in Afghanistan from 185 tonnes in 2001 to 6,100 tons in 2006. In 2005, Pakistan had apprehended nearly 2144 kg of heroin, but the amount increased significantly next year to 2819 kg.

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<sup>7</sup>Peter Reuter (2010), "Can Production and Trafficking of Illicit Drugs be Reduced or Only Shifted?", in Philip Keefer and Norman Loayza (eds.) *Innocent Bystanders: Developing countries and the War on Drugs*, Washington: World Bank and Palgrave Macmillan.

## **Appealing Factors for Drug Production and Drug Trafficking**

A UN study on Narcotics claims that factors like falling commodity prices, debt problem and poverty contributed to the drug trafficking in Pakistan in 1980s. In support of the claim the report states that “the decline of prices for commodities like sugar (64%), coffee (30%), cotton (32%), and wheat (17%), between 1980 and 1988, motivated farmers to turn to cash crops like coca bush and opium poppy to avoid economic ruin.” There is no doubt that the above conditions facilitated drug production and trafficking in Pakistan but there were also some other more influential factors such as political and regional instability, ineffective control, growing and sophisticated network of drug syndicates which had greater role.

- **Legal Prohibition:** Under Islamization programme, Government promulgated the *Hudood Ordinance* in February 1979 to satisfy longstanding demand. It was intended to clarify that the laws of the drugs in Pakistan had to comply with the requirements of acceptable Islamic moral behaviour and therefore widely propagated and presented as an Islamic provision applied a total ban on opium production and abolished the centuries old system of selling. Pakistan effectively finished the endorsed and synchronized manufacture, transaction, and spending of not merely the opium, nevertheless alcohol furthermore chars also.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, the law had not offered anything explicitly about

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<sup>8</sup> David Macdonald (2007), *Drugs in Afghanistan: Opium, Outlaws, and Scorpion Tales*, London: Pluto Press.

poppy cultivation or trafficking but it was interpreted by the bureaucracy as doing so until, in 1995, a Presidential Ordinance clarified the situation.<sup>9</sup>

The timing of the introduction of the ordinance was as such that it left the farmers with huge stockpile (estimated around 800 tons of opium poppy) and Musa Khan suggests that it was diverted to international market.<sup>10</sup> It is said that at this crucial juncture, some of the western experts taught Pakistani farmers the technique of converting poppy into heroin<sup>11</sup> which for the first time introduced heroin into Pakistan. Thus, the ordinance theoretically banned the poppy cultivation, possession, and trafficking, however, on the ground the situation became more complicated as this ban triggered the illegal drug business and industry in Pakistan.<sup>12</sup>

- **Iranian Revolution:** Under Reza Shah Pahlavi<sup>13</sup> regime, Iran had been a producer of illicit opium both for domestic consumption and international market but following the 1979 revolution Ayatollah Khomeini adopted stern measures against drug traffickers and declared them a memorial of

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<sup>9</sup> Amir Zada Asad and Robert Harris (2003), *The Politics and Economics of Drug Production on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border: Implications for a Globalized World*, Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

<sup>10</sup> Musa Khan Jalalzai (2005), *Silent Killer: Drug Trafficking in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia*, Lahore: Institute of Advance and Strategic Studies.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>12</sup> R.C Dikshit and Giriraj Shah, (1996), *Narco Terrorism*, New Delhi: Sindhi Books.

<sup>13</sup> Reza Shāh Pahlavi (15 March 1878 – 26 July 1944), was the Shah of the Imperial State of Iran from 15 December 1925 until he was forced to abdicate by the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran on 16 September 1941.<sup>1</sup>

colonialism.<sup>14</sup> The death penalty has been imposed on traffickers with more than 30 grams of heroin and five kilograms of opium. Earlier deserts railways in central Iran were used as a corridor by drug traffickers to Pakistan through Afghanistan to reach Turkey, and from Turkey to Italy and North America. Khomeini, after assuming rule blocked the road which also coincided with the production of bumper opium in the Pakistani tribal areas.

- **Mujahedeen's Holy War:** Although Khyber Pakhtun Kha is known as a paradise for smugglers, where poor farmers grew poppies for centuries, but they never converted it into heroin. Then occurred the Soviet invasion of neighbouring Afghanistan which led a large number of Afghan refugees into Pakistan's tribal areas and the Afghans came with their home laboratories to convert opium into heroin.<sup>15</sup> Spaced out from conventional factories, there exists a flaxen amount of mobile factories, encompassing two or three trucks, overloaded with slams, haven, plus rudimentary equipment.<sup>16</sup> Once processing opium into heroin is complete, the drugs spread within the coastal and border areas of Pakistan, where it is intended to further high-priced markets in Europe and the United States. Thus, the drug has gained ground in Pakistan after the Soviet invasion of

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<sup>14</sup>Haq, Emdad-ul (2000), *Drugs in South Asia: From the Opium Trade to Present Day*, London: Macmillan.

<sup>15</sup>, Musa Khan Jalalzai (2005), *Silent Killer: Drug Trafficking in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia*, Lahore: Institute of Advance and Strategic Studies.

<sup>16</sup>D. Suba Chandran (1998), "Drug Trafficking and the Security of the State: A Case Study of Pakistan", *Strategic Analysis*, 22(6): 903-922.

Afghanistan and in a very short time, it took almost all sectors of Pakistani society. Heroin had become almost a commodity for "ordinary everyday use" and was sold openly and inexpensively market as Jamrud, Bara and Landi Kotal, with free samples distributed to potential users.<sup>17</sup> In this way, Pakistan produced opium largely for domestic consumption in the early stages changed its course considerably in the late 1970s and arose as a major factor in the international drug market. During this period, farmers were secretly encouraged by businessmen, smugglers and a part of the policy elements.<sup>18</sup> Presumably the importance of Pakistan in the drug market with the fact that in mid-1983 the U.S. narcotics officials said that about 85-90% of the heroin reached the east coast of the United States and the countries of Western Europe by Pakistan.

- **Flawed State Policies:** Policies adopted by states and their implementation on the ground has always played an important role in the treatment of complex problems such as drug trafficking and production. In Pakistan, however, the policy of drug production and trafficking has been dominated by external factors, but internal factors also contributed. The most important internal factor in the spread of drug trafficking in Pakistan was the inefficacy of the writ of government in all spheres of the state. For

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<sup>17</sup>Amir Zada Asad, and Robbert Harris (2003), *The Politics and Economics of Drug Production on the Pakistan- Afghanistan Border: Implications for a Globalized World* , Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited.

<sup>18</sup> Musa Khan Jalalzai (2005), *Silent Killer: Drug Trafficking in Pakistan Afghanistan and Central Asia* , Lahore: Institute of Advance and Strategic Studies.

example, the government control in tribal areas is almost negligible. Hassan Abbas comments that the calamity status quo in the Khyber Pakhtoon Kha did not materialise instantaneous; the corrosion was a product of years of deprived authority, local tautness, and fiscal anguish.<sup>19</sup> There was some indication of the decline in the production scenario and in 1995, the area of poppy cultivation in Pakistan was reduced to 5215 hectares as compared to 32,000 hectares in 1978 and resulted positively in the substantial decline in production of poppy which had reached the level of near zero in 1999 -2000. UNDCP in its annual report (2000-01) declared Pakistan a "poppy free" country. But Pakistan, due to inherent contradictions and absence of a unified effort on part of the government, could not maintain the poppy free status and cultivation again emerged in the areas along the Afghan border at about the same relatively low level of about 2,000 hectares.<sup>20</sup>

### **Illicit Trafficking of Drug and Dynamics of Societal Security**

Drug trafficking affects the societal security of the state over twofold forms:

- **Drug Abuse:** Drug agriculture and drug trafficking affects the societal security generally on three aspects. First, the prevalent drug abuse. Drug abuse in Pakistan, has been

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<sup>19</sup>Hassan Abbas (2010), "Inside Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province: The Political Landscape of the Insurgency", Online: web Accessed 25 July 2010

URL:[http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NAF\\_InsidePakistanNorthwestFrontierProvince.pdf](http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/NAF_InsidePakistanNorthwestFrontierProvince.pdf).

<sup>20</sup>Dawn, Drug Trafficking Continues to Plague Pakistan, 27 June 2009.

escalating ever since 1979. Before 1979, there were no heroin addicts in Pakistan. Today the drug addicts in Pakistan are approximately four million. According to the up-to-the-minute National Survey on Drug Abuse, 72% of the drug abusers are under the age of 35 years. Within this, the majority of the drug abusers fit in to the 26-30 age brackets. The typical monthly expense of one drug abuser is expected to be Rs 1,259. Punjab has the maximum of drug abusers in Pakistan with a populace of 1.5 million, followed by Sindh (0.8 million), Khyber Pakhtoon Kha (0.4 million) and Baluchistan (0.3 million). Drug addiction leads to additional unsympathetic effects: (a) it affects the physical health of the individuals; (b) it ruins the economic structure of the families, which has further implications for the economic structure of the society; (c) the male addicts indulge in crimes from trivial to major ones and the female addicts get to prostitution to reimburse for their drugs. Other than bringing on social and monetary issues for the individual and the general public, drugs misuse influences even the economy of the state, which might be talked about later.

- **Organized Crime:** Drug trafficking fallout in the growth of "organized crime" further affects the societal security. Organized crime is different from usual, traditional crimes such as murder, burglary, kidnapping, etc. "An organized crime group constitutes a state within the state, running a full-fledged parallel economy." Organized crime associates drug trafficking with bribery (known as white-collar crime), money laundering, narco-terrorism, etc.

Drug trafficking is correspondingly revealed in amassed viciousness which takes two forms: first among the altered officialdoms of the drug, and the another largest among drug establishments and the government. Forfeiture of lives and assets on the government flank is mammoth in the combat against drug trafficking. In Colombia, between 1985 and 1990 alone, more than 2100 people from the police and other enforcement agencies were killed.

Violence related to drug sometimes takes ethnic dimensions. Violence takes on an ethnic color, also undermine the institutional basis for good governance also requires the government to be inefficient to take countermeasures against drug trafficking. To quote a senior officer of the Border Constabulary, "Every action is bound to create a real insurrection as the lords of the drug war are not only rich, their populations are armed to the teeth. In these state of affairs, even the government prefers not to take any anti-measures, because that would lead to ethnic turbulence. In that case, the government loses its effective control over assured areas.

### **Drug Trafficking and Economic Threat to Security of the State**

Drug trafficking is a serious state economic dilemma. On the one hand, drug trafficking is a serious threat to the economic stability of the state threat, since the drug money is laundered and smuggled into the state. Under these conditions, it gives rise to inflation. In addition, the state must spend more on social measures to eradicate drug abuse. "Drug abuse contributes to the loss of output due to addiction, rehabilitation, etc. It rises the cost of health

care." In addition, the state should spend more on cons-measures to control and eradicate poppy cultivation and drug trafficking. This means diverting more funds for the creation or maintenance of the application of the organizations that involves programs and anti-narcotics operations. For example, in the Bahamas<sup>21</sup> in 1990, 85 percent of the defense budget had to be diverted to operations against drugs. The drug money is invested in small and large industries, transport, real estate, film production, etc. However, the drug money used in these measures itself constitutes a serious threat in the sense that it legalizes drug money. The economic well-being of a state can be calculated in terms of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP), national and international liability, etc. In Pakistan, the drug wages are larger than the finances of the government, and form one-fourth of Pakistan's GDP. However, it is this phase that poses the utmost security threat to Pakistan. It makes the state reliant treacherously for its economic stability on drug money, which has implications for the societal, political and corporal security of the state in the long term.

### **Drug Cultivation and Environmental Security**

There are no records to find how drug cultivation has affected the environment in Pakistan. However, in other areas, where drug cultivation has been going for years, studies have been made which clearly say, "Narcotics producers are wreaking environmental havoc."<sup>22</sup> According to Hector Moreno, "The war against illegal drugs would be completely justified on environmental grounds

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<sup>21</sup>The Bahamas, officially the Commonwealth of The Bahamas, consisting of more than 700 islands, cays, and islets in the Atlantic Ocean.

<sup>22</sup>Juanita Darling, "Drug Corps are Ravaging Columbian Farmland," Pioneer, September 10, 1997.

alone."<sup>23</sup> Firstly, the poppy growers clear the land in the mountains, leaving no plants that will hold soil during rains. In certain cases, the erosion because of poppy cultivation has even caused landslides in Columbia.<sup>24</sup> The poppy and coca producers also do not allow other plants to grow near the poppy plants and coca plants, since narcotics will not produce their maximum if other nearby plants compete for nutrients. Secondly, farmers use large amounts of fertilizer drugs to obtain higher yields. After a period, the land becomes barren and therefore the grass grows on the earth. Thirdly, drug producers use chemicals to convert coca and poppy in cocaine and heroin. The washings are discharged into the nearest river, causing new disasters for species living in the water and people whose livelihoods depend. Thus, by changing the climate and poisoning the rivers, drug lords have not only made the people leave their legal occupations but also have made them join the illegal production. Drug trafficking poses serious challenges to social security, political, economic, physical and environmental state. Furthermore, it also threatens the security of other states both inside and outside the region.

**Recommendations:**

Although a number of counter measures are already in practice at various levels to reduce supply and demand, yet these measures need to be executed in more effectual way to offset this menace. Few recommended measures are as follows: -

**International Cooperation:** Pakistan while, continuing to work closely with international organizations and other countries against

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<sup>23</sup> ibid

<sup>24</sup> ibid

the drug menace, must raise its security concern, and ask international community for full support to stabilize Afghanistan as early as possible to diminish the drug trafficking.

**ANF Capabilities:** ANF (Anti Narcotics Force) should be provided with more manpower, better equipment and weapons. Similarly, assisting forces, especially deployed in the fields should be equipped with better weapons in order to keep them more effective. Customs departments should be provided with modern scanning and detection equipment for drug examination and trained dogs for drug checking.

**Corruption in Drug Trade:** Government should endeavor to eradicate corruption, especially involved in drugs trade and strict actions should be taken against the corrupt. In addition, head of police stations of the area should be held accountable if continued drugs sales are reported.

**Awareness campaign through Media:** The media should be tasked by Government to focus more on drug related problems. The Pakistan Arts Council should be asked to criticise drug use as a regular feature.

**Awareness Campaign through Mosques and Religion:** Sermons in Mosques may be used as a measure to counter this threat. People could be motivated on account of their strong religious leanings. Education by religious leaders on drug being a sin can be the keystone of anti-drug strategy.

**Awareness Campaign through Education:** Collective lectures in the schools and colleges should be conducted by teachers on regular basis to enhance the awareness of youngsters on ill effects of drug use. Renowned artists may be invited whom youngsters would like to listen and follow due to their attraction and fame.

**Development and Strengthening of Drug & Law Enforcement Agencies and Institutions:**

Government must strengthen the agency by providing modern investigation and enforcement equipments, additional funding, manning and ensuring appropriate training for drugs law enforcement agents.

**Conclusions:**

Drug trafficking is a non-traditional security intimidation which has the potential to revamp itself into a more lethal opus by integration with the terrorism. It poses a momentous threat to the world community at two levels; first, by targeting the human resource of a country (especially youth) it paralyses the state and prevents it from realising its actual potential; second, by financing the acts of terrorism with the similar money earned circuitously from the targeted state. Pakistan's geographic locality in the expanse has made it susceptible to drug trafficking and a considerable quantity of drug still trafficked to the regional and international markets via assorted routes within the country that comprise the sea, air and the land. Before 1980, heroin use was almost unfamiliar in Pakistan. A substantial change in drug abuse patterns came in the beginning of the 80s, when the drug lords supported the fostering of heroin within Pakistan and industrialized domestic market. As a result, a large number of population has fallen victim to drug addiction. However, Pakistan's Anti-Narcotics Force, in association with the United Nations Drug Control Programme and intercontinental agencies has been able to reduce drug production and handing out to almost insignificant level yet Pakistan's society is suffering from the anguish of drug menace, HIV/AIDS and other drug connected problems.

## **APS Peshawar Incident – An Appraisal**

(Ms. Qurat ul Ain)\*

### ***Abstract***

*As one mourns and grieves over the massacre of innocent children, teachers and civilians in Peshawar, it is important to look at the hindsight to think hard about how and why Pakistan lost its way. Many failings of the state including lack of political will manifested by all concerned, poor governance and appeasing religious bigots for political mileage have created a culture of religious bullying and intolerance for tolerance. Sadly, the drift away from a modernist, democratic and secular (neutrality of state in religious matters) tendencies in Pakistan has been constant. Jinnah's vision of a secular and democratic state was actually buried with him. The pursuit of power interests by the military and political leaders set aside every good idea and principle of state and nation-building.*

**Key Words:** *manifested, governance, religious, intolerance, democratic*

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## **Introduction**

First let us establish the context of this ghastly incident. Pakistan witnessed an unprecedented act of terror on 16 December 2014. Where one continues to feel aggrieved due to this barbarism, yet it is imperative that one carries out an objective appraisal to discern our national response against the menace of terrorism. Contextually, it is felt that the incident was primarily triggered because of Zarb-e-Azb affecting terrorist safe havens and in reaction, then reaching out to the settled areas thereby evoking Urban Terrorism that aims at exerting a pull on our forces from the operations. This incident can be categorized as the Terrorists Riposte<sup>1</sup>. The increased intensity in Operation Khyber 1 resulted in diluted protective arrangements in Peshawar and that provided space for the terrorist strike. It can also be termed as an effort by the terrorists to counter the State's success in recent operations by projecting their own notion of success to exemplify their viability and resolve in achieving their goals and objectives.<sup>2</sup>

## **Causes /Reasons behind the incident**

One can concede that a great many number of socio-economic, political and other factors led to these groups taking this course of action, not the least of them being that elements within the state sponsored them at least initially for perceived geo-strategic interests.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Puri, Samir. *Pakistan's war on terrorism: Strategies for combating jihadist armed groups since 9/11*. Palgrave, 2012.

<sup>2</sup>Siddiq, Ayesha. "Pakistan's Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies.(May 7 ,2015)" Council on Foreign Relations.

<sup>3</sup>Jalazai, Musa Khan. *Sectarianism and politico-religious terrorism in Pakistan*. System books, 2000.

Yet, a state is duty-bound to bring to an end a violent revolt in which civilians are being targeted. It cannot afford to be delicate in a theatre of war, which is what parts of the tribal areas effectively are. However the visible causes or reason behind the incident are:

**Pakistan's recent military operations against the TTP**

This, so far, is the TTP's stated justification for the attack. It is also, probably, the most direct cause of the attack.

"We selected the army's school for the attack because the government is targeting our families and females," a Taliban spokesperson, Muhammad Umar Khorasani, said. "We want them to feel the pain".<sup>4</sup>

Hence Taliban wanted revenge for the deaths it had suffered at the hands of the army. It wanted to demoralize the security forces. By attacking the soldiers' own children, it was aiming to cause deep and lasting loss.

Pakistan's military has been going hard after the Taliban since June 2014, when it launched "Operation Zarb-e-Azb," a major assault in North Waziristan, the mountainous region on the border of Afghanistan that has become a TTP stronghold and a safe haven for several other militant groups, such as the TTP-allied Haqqani Network.<sup>5</sup> The United States had been pressuring Pakistan to launch this type of operation ever since Al Qaeda militants slipped across the border and set up camps in the region at the beginning of

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<sup>4</sup>Sophia, S & Greg, B "Taliban School Attack: 145 Killed in Pakistan Siege .com." CNN. Accessed May 7, 2015. <http://edition.cnn.com/2014/12/16/world/asia/pakistan-peshawar-school-attack/>.

<sup>5</sup>Devjot, Ghoshal "Shoot the Older Students"—The Pakistani Taliban's Barbaric Message – Quartz."Quartz. Accessed May 7, 2015. <http://qz.com/313270/a-horrific-attack-at-a-peshawar-school-shows-where-the-heaviest-burden-of-terrorism-lies/>.

the US war in Afghanistan in 2001. As the US has drawn down its military operations in Afghanistan, some Pakistani authorities have looked to the border region with growing anxiety about the future, and a wave of TTP attacks in early June 2014, including an assault on the Jinnah International Airport in Karachi, confirmed that something needed to happen. The operation had displaced hundreds of thousands of people and destroyed entire towns.

An army-administered school allowed the TTP to launch a symbolic attack on the military without a direct engagement. The TTP is struggling, according to the Guardian, and ‘it could be trying to use a large-scale, shocking attack to shore up support and prove that it's still a major threat to the Pakistani government’. It is not just the Pakistani military offensive, which has killed around 1,600 militants, that's hurt the group – it is internal division.

Hence the school's over 100 dead children might have also been the victims of something else: power struggles within the Taliban.<sup>6</sup>

### **Taliban's Struggle for Power**

The TTP has split into multiple factions in recent months. A number of moderate factions have made peace with the government, so that what is left behind is an increasingly radical core that is splintering into different groups. That process was accelerated when Maulana Fazlullah, an outsider who formerly headed a group of militants in Pakistan's Swat district, took command last year. He has been a divisive leader, causing the powerful Messud family to leave and form its own organization.

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<sup>6</sup>Laub, Zcahry. "CFR's Daniel Markey on the Peshawar School Attack and the Pakistani Taliban." (May 10, 2015) Council on Foreign Relations

Competition for power within an armed group or between different splintering factions often leads to increased violence, as leaders jockey to prove their authority and improve their reputations by carrying out ever more audacious or brutal attacks.<sup>7</sup>

**Impacts of the Incident: Short Term and Long Term**

The first question that we need to address is that what were the main short term and long term effects of the incidents that the terrorists achieved:

➤ **Short Term Effects**

- Gripping the entire Country in state of shock and awe through their spectacular attack.
- Creating a sense of insecurity in the general populace, inspite of Government's claim of success in combating terrorism.
- Re-crafting their space in all spheres of media to remain relevant.

➤ **Long-term impacts of the incident**

- **Psychological Impacts:** When terrorists act like this people generally face acute stress and trauma. Such disasters evoke a fundamental fear of helplessness. The violent actions are random, unprovoked, and intentional, and often are targeted at defenseless citizens. Trying to cope with the irrational information that is beyond normal comprehension can set off a chain of psychological events culminating in feelings of fear, helplessness, vulnerability and grief. The psychological

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<sup>7</sup> ibid

effects that are caused by these attacks include recurring thoughts of the incident.<sup>8</sup>

- **Economic Impacts:** Peshawar school massacre has turned a new chapter in this American started war on terror. It is now closer to home and has turned into a war for the survival of Pakistan. It is an established fact that no country can thrive economically without peace. Therefore the deteriorating law and order situation in Pakistan has a huge economic cost and is burdening an already shaky economy guided by a policy based on failed measures from the past.<sup>9</sup>

The fact of the matter is that there isn't a sector left in Pakistan which has not been affected by terrorism, either directly or indirectly. But even worse than all this, culminating from the Peshawar school attack, is the wide-spread panic with resulting shockwaves across all segments of the society as well as the economy. If not checked the ramifications of this can be much more than what we have already faced.<sup>10</sup> While the economic impact briefly outlined is important, the immeasurable cost of the lost lives and the related potential can never be monetized.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, now that the American started war on terror has turned into the foreign-sponsored TTP

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<sup>8</sup> Markey, Daniel S. "The National Security Implications of Pakistan's Latest Political Crisis." (May 18, 2015) Council on Foreign Relations

<sup>9</sup> Abbas, Hassan. Pakistan's drift into extremism: Allah, the army and America's war on terror. M.E.Sharpe, 2005.

<sup>10</sup> *ibid*

<sup>11</sup> Puri, Samir. Pakistan's war on terrorism: Strategies for combating jihadist armed groups since 9/11. Palgrave, 2012.

menace engulfing Pakistan, we are faced with a problem we have to resolve ourselves. The benefits of resolving this amicably will not just be economic but the social positives from such a strategy can be manifold. Though for such a drastic step to succeed we would need to rid ourselves of the American interferences and subjugation too.

- **Religious impacts:** The menace of terrorism engulfing Pakistan culminated in the worst tragedy in recent history with the barbarian killing of children in the Army Public School Peshawar. While Pakistan was dragged in this quagmire by a dictator searching for the legitimacy of his rule, the complicated regional “grand game” has now reached the stage where the country is tearing itself from within, something the enemies always desired.<sup>12</sup>

Leaving aside all other complicacies and debates, killing children can never be condoned no matter what the reason. Islam’s fundamental war principle barring one unique incident has been the strict instruction to not harm the children, women, elderly and even the non-combatant men of the non-believing enemy let alone the Muslims. The massacre in Peshawar was therefore anything but Islam. It was in fact an effort to tarnish the image of Islam and a direct assault not just on Pakistan or Islam but entire humanity. Like Jinnah stated in his speech to constitution assembly 1947:

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<sup>12</sup>Murphy, Eamon. *The making of terrorism in Pakistan: Historical and social roots of extremism*. Routledge, 2013.

*“Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the state”.*<sup>13</sup>

Hence, there is political and religious space in Pakistan for groups like the Taliban to operate unharmed, the result of decades of government financing and exporting of terrorism abroad and aggressive Islamization at home. The country’s moment of reckoning has arrived, and both the political and religious establishment will now need to confront the conditions that allowed the Taliban to enter a school and murder children.<sup>14</sup>

#### **National Action Plan: A way forward**

The National Action plan had been drafted in the wake of the APS Peshawar attack on 16th December, 2014 to chalk out a comprehensive strategy to combat terrorism. A parliamentary committee had been formed in this regard which evaluated the post-Peshawar tragedy scenario and discussed necessary laws and amendments in relation to terrorism. The 21st Amendment to the Constitution gave us the twenty-point National Action Plan to root out terrorism from Pakistan.<sup>15</sup> Extraordinary situation and circumstances exist that demand special measures for speedy trial

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<sup>13</sup> Speeches and writings of Mr.Jinnah (1947)-vol 1

<sup>14</sup>"Research Society of International Law – Ahmer Bilal Soofi."Research Society of International Law.Accessed April 22, 2015. <http://rsilpak.org/author/ahmerbilalsoofi/>.

<sup>15</sup> ibid

of certain offences relating to terrorism, waging of war or insurrection against Pakistan and for prevention of acts threatening the security of Pakistan by the terrorist groups formed in the name of religion or a sect and also by the members of any private armies, armed groups, wings and militia. The people of Pakistan have expressed their firm resolve through their chosen representatives in the All Parties Conference held in aftermath of awful terrorist attack on the Army Public School at Peshawar to permanently wipe out and eradicate terrorists from Pakistan.<sup>16</sup>

**National Action Plan: A Policy overview**

As far as practical implementation of NAP is concerned, it is necessary to redefine the nature of state first to reach towards a policy outcome. For this it is very important to look at the hindsight to think hard about how and why Pakistan lost its way. Till the time, government does not identify the mistakes and follies Pakistan will not be able to move forward for a better future with peaceful environments. Eventually, many failing of the state including lack of political will manifested by leaders, poor governance and appeasing religious bigots for political mileage has created a culture of religious bullying intolerance for tolerance. Sadly the drift away from modernist, democratic and secular tendencies in Pakistan has been constant. Jinnah's vision of a secular, democratic state was actually buried with him. As he stated in his address to National Assembly in 1947:

“In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-

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<sup>16</sup> Markey, Daniel S. "The National Security Implications of Pakistan's Latest Political Crisis(May 18, 2015)." Council on Foreign Relations

Muslims-Hindus, Christians, and Parsis - but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan”.<sup>17</sup>

The pursuit of power interests by the military and political leaders set aside every good idea and principle of state and nation-building. It is also an established fact that no country can thrive economically without peace.<sup>18</sup> Therefore the deteriorating law and order situation in Pakistan has a huge economic cost and is burdening an already shaky economy. The fact of the matter is that there is not a sector left in Pakistan which has not been affected by terrorism, either directly or indirectly.

On external front, Pakistan inherently enjoys premier geo-strategic positions as it borders three major strategic regions; South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, and its geographical proximity to Afghanistan made it an important partner of the coalition forces after 9/11 incident.<sup>19</sup> Pakistan played a significant role, both during the Cold War and as a non-NATO member in the US-led “War on Terror” against al Qaeda and the Taliban. Despite Coalition’s support, Pakistan has suffered in terms of loss of lives and economic downturn. Despite being the victim of terrorism, Pakistan has remained determined to eliminate the menace of

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<sup>17</sup> Speeches and writings of Jinnah (1947)-vol1

<sup>18</sup>“Pakistan's Counterterrorism Challenge.”Georgetown University Press.Accessed April 22, 2015.  
<http://press.georgetown.edu/book/georgetown/pakistans-counterterrorism-challenge>.

<sup>19</sup> Peshawar School Massacre: 'This is Pakistan's 9/11 – Now is the Time to Act' | World News | The Guardian." The Guardian.Accessed May 7, 2015.  
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/19/peshawar-school-massacre-pakistans-911>.

terrorism. In June last year, Pakistan army started comprehensive military operation in NWA with the strength of over 30000 troops to eliminate terrorists from all affected areas of the country.<sup>20</sup>

The military operation was long-overdue against militants in North Waziristan. Public support for the Operation Zarb-e-Azb, remains considerably high. If the perception is to be believed, the military offensive in North Waziristan has been a strong blow against militants operating in the region, particularly the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its foreign allies such as al Qaeda and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The ground phase of the operation in North Waziristan with air support is progressing towards culmination phase. We have learnt from the lessons of previous military operations and are prepared to do what was necessary in North Waziristan for the greater interest of Pakistan and global security.<sup>21</sup> A peculiar aspect relating to this operation is that there is no discrimination in good/bad or Haqqani/Non Haqqani groups of the militants and the operation is continuing across the board against the militancy and terrorism. Almost, 90 percent of North Waziristan has been cleared and the return of TDPs to their native home towns has been initiated as the suitable conditions in their areas for their returns are being created. This time, the government is determined, to tackle this challenge amicably.

### **Salient Features of National Action Plan**

Now coming to National Action Plan, The Prime Minister envisaged 20 points of terrorism action plan which are:-

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<sup>20</sup> ibid

<sup>21</sup> ibid

- Implementation of death sentence of those convicted in cases of terrorism.
- Special trial courts under the supervision of Army. The duration of these courts would be two years.
- Militant outfits and armed gangs will not be allowed to operate in the country.
- NACTA, the anti-terrorism institution will be strengthened.
- Strict action against the literature, newspapers and magazines promoting hatred, decapitation, extremism, sectarianism and intolerance.
- All funding sources of terrorists and terrorist outfits will be frozen.
- The invalid outfits will not be allowed to operate under any other name.
- Establishing and deploying a dedicated counter-terrorism force.
- End to religious extremism and protection of minorities will be ensured.
- Registration and regulation of religious seminaries.
- Ban on glorification of terrorists and terrorist organisations through print and electronic media.
- Communication network of terrorists will be dismantled completely.
- Concrete measures against promotion of terrorism through internet and social media.
- No room will be left for the extremism in any part of the country.

- Ongoing operation in Karachi will be taken to its logical end.
- Balochistan government to be fully empowered for political reconciliation with complete ownership by all stakeholders.
- Action against elements spreading sectarianism.
- Formulation of a comprehensive policy to deal with the issue of Afghan refugees, beginning with registration of all refugees.
- Reforms in criminal courts system to strengthen the anti-terrorism institutions including provincial CIDs.

### **Implementation of NAP**

National Action Plan indeed covers all the important segments where we need to work but as a whole. It must emerge as a holistic Government response, in which a common platform needs to be designed for taking this effort against terrorism to its logical conclusion.<sup>22</sup> And this platform needs to be supported by all the pillars of the state, concurrently and in synergy. Employment of Governmental pillars in isolation is not likely to yield dividends. Such an approach is desired which actualizes the kinetic and non-kinetic realms synchronously and cooperatively, starting immediately with the existing wherewithal and subsequently building further capacity to mount this holistic response against terrorism and extremism to its destined end.

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<sup>22</sup> "Peshawar School Attack: Death Toll Stands at 141, PM Modi Calls Up Nawaz Sharif to Express Condolence | Latest News & Updates at Daily News & Analysis." Dna. Accessed May 7, 2015. <http://www.dnaindia.com/world/report-peshawar-school-attack-death-toll-stands-at-141-pm-modi-calls-up-nawaz-sharif-to-express-condolence-2044341>.

## **Conclusion**

To eliminate terrorism and extremism from our country whatever policy or strategy we devise, we need to create enabling environment within the country, as it may not be useful to merely look at the symptoms, like intolerance, extremism and violence as a means to political and religious ends but we must get to the roots of our current depression. There are many foundational ideas that have shaped good modern societies but two are essential to all of them, secularism and democracy. Unfortunately, both of these ideas are misunderstood, misinterpreted and misused in our social climate of religious rupture and political divisions. Secularism is not the absence or rejection of religion but it means that citizens have equal right to a religion but state does not. Likewise, democracy is not what the dynastic, personalized politics or repeated military rulers in the name of ‘guided’, ‘Islamic’ or ‘genuine’ democracy have established but it is in fact what majority of people actually wants. Democracy in essence and neutrality of state in religious matters are time tested ideas all civilizations have eventually accepted like Jinnah’s vision of secular democracy:

“In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State to be ruled by priests with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims—Hindus, Christians, and Parsis- but they are all Pakistanis. They will enjoy the same rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan”.<sup>23</sup>

Hence, Media being a very strong tool of national power can play a very dominant role in such perception building of nation.

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<sup>23</sup> Jinnah’s speeches and writings (1947)-vol1

## **Book Review**

(Dr. Muhammad Zia-ur-Rehman)\*

Title of the Book	:	The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics
Author's Name	:	Andrew Small
Publisher	:	C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd 2015, Oxford University Press
Place of Publication	:	USA
Year of Publication	:	2015
Pages	:	288
ISBN	:	1849043418

Friendship between China and Pakistan is considered strategic in the region, which is in turmoil in the current scenario. This is a very good book where the author puts the uniqueness and efficiency about the relations very elaborately. The author depicts that China has now moved ahead of its role as traditional regional power. Now it is moving towards global power and thus dealing with global issues as one of the key stakeholders in global scenario.

The book investigates one of the very significant friendships between two countries based on international aspects.

The author goes on painting the relationship from both perspectives – how China is using Pakistan and how Pakistan is using China, then it slowly moves towards how both the countries actually need each other to fulfill their objectives. This is a very interesting aspect of the friendship, stretched over decades. The

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author bluntly explores the real type relationship existing between both countries as he mentions that Beijing's secretive ties with Islamabad have run closer than most of the formal alliances.

Founded on a shared enmity with India, China's backing of Pakistan is very strong as compared to any other country of the world. During the diplomatic isolation, Pakistan supported China for many years by working as the bridge between Mao and Nixon. This time, Pakistan's support for China has been to support China to move from regional power to global power through development and constructing the roads, highways, utilizing the coal power, extension of linkage with Gulf States as well as other nations of the world. For Pakistan, on the other hand, China is working as the best friend during its instability, and weakness in economy by complementing and supporting through developmental projects when west withdrew its support to some extent. It is also very important that China has been diplomatic proctor of Pakistan since long and this relation is still growing further.

The author shed light on the Sino-Pakistan relationship in detail by discussing in the context of United States and New Delhi. The friendship between the two countries is termed as, 'All - weather friends' and 'deeper than the deepest ocean' but traditionally, the relationship are normally based on many aspects-strategic, business, policy and interests of external stakeholders. Due to recent stronger ties between New Delhi and Washington the relationship between China and Pakistan is also getting affected.

In the initial chapters, the author discussed the India centric base for the friendship of China and Pakistan. The first chapter depicts wars like: Sino-Indian war 1962, which supported strategic cooperation between Chinese and Pakistanis. The second war, Indo-

Pakistani war of 1965, China's support made "all weather friend" for Pakistan. This image developed in public as well. Then in 1971, Indo-Pakistani war where China failed to prove the friendship intensively by showing the limits of friendship. It was because of the fact that China and Pakistan perhaps had never been the treaty allies to support each other at any time.

Then China-India relationship developed and the author discussed in detail how that affected Pak-China relations. After that, there comes the Afghanistan chapter which emerged as one of the biggest issues.

In fourth and fifth chapters, the author talks about the Muslim majority in China's northwest and their role as indigenous Muslim inhabitants in China. To cope with any extremist threat, China brought strength through forces in that region. Then the author discusses about the Chinese workers attacked in Pakistan and then how Pakistani authorities faced that issue.

In sixth chapter, the author makes an argument about Pakistan, China and Afghanistan – in the context of 9/11. It seemed that China sat on the sideline neutrally, but it looked for long-term stability in Pakistan.

The last chapter discusses about the role of china and its shifting responsibilities, from just a regional or global power to a regional and global stabilizer. For Xi Jinping, China is looking for using it as a financial and economic weight to balance out the west with its neighbors. Pakistan needs development in its infrastructure and China has the best opportunity to use its investment policies for this purpose.

The author travelled to China and Pakistan for six years and then came up with sharing the experiences – that is why it makes it

unique book to be read to understand and get the real insight about the China Pakistan relation.

Conclusively, this is a comprehensive study about the true and pragmatic relationship existing between Pakistan and China. The book depicts the experiences of the author throughout the text. The book also leads towards further giving an insight to strengthen the relationship and the impact of this friendship on both economies as well as security situation in the region.

## **List of NDU Publications**

1. Armed Forces War College History
2. Pakistan – India Wars 1965 & 1971
3. Selected Reading in Military History: Napoleonic Art of Warfare, Battles of Tannenberg & Masurian Lakes – 1914
4. Evolution of Military Thought
5. Post Workshop Report on Balochistan Situation, 2012
6. World War -1: The Western Front
7. ‘Kashmir: Looking Beyond the Peril’
8. NSP: Non-Kinetic Challenges to the State of Pakistan, 2012
9. Urdu Translation of Art of War by Sun Tzu
10. Evolving Dynamics of FATA: Reflections on Transformations
11. ‘World War 1 and Its Impact on South Asia’ - 02 Dec 2014  
Post Symposium Report
12. NDU Journal (Yearly)
13. Margalla Papers (Yearly)
14. ISSRA Papers (Six-monthly)