EXAMINATION OF THE IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT OF TRANSFORMATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN PUBLIC SECTOR AND GOVERNANCE

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Abstract

Impression management is the process of influencing perceptions by molding one's behavioral patterns in front of the target audience. The major postulate of the study was to determine impression management practices of transformational leaders and examine individual variances in the facets of both the variables. Data was collected from 183 participants working in education and corporate sectors. MLQ by Avolio, Bass and a 22-item instrument developed by Bolino and Turnley was used to measure transformational leadership and impression management. Correlations and simple linear regression were used to examine the relationships among the variables. The findings suggest that those who adopted the exemplification, ingratiation and supplication tactics, had high transformational leadership behavior. Conversely, leaders who employed self-promoting and intimidating impressions had low transformational leadership behavior. The study provides extensive literature review as well as future directions for further research.

Key Words: Impression Management, Transformational Leadership, Self-Promotion, Ingratiation, Exemplification.

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Introduction

For decades, researchers have been interested in social conduct of human beings. Whether personal, or organizational life, social behavior of individuals has a profound impact on major variables. This research also aims at studying one of the most interesting phenomenon of social interaction, i.e. impression management. The study would not only highlight its various dimensions but also examine its association with four facets of transformational leadership.

Human beings are always conscious of their social conduct and how they are perceived by others in society. This behavior is derived from the very basic instinct of self-acceptance as well as social acceptance (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). Goffman (1959) defines impression management as the process where individuals try to present themselves in the most desirable fashion towards others. "*Impression management refers to the behavioral strategies that people use to create desired social images or identities.*" (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985 p.59). It has also been termed as a tool to control the reactions of others to one's image or personality in society (Hall, 2009).

Also known as self-presentation, the process of impression management involves two steps, impression motivation and impression construction. The former is where an individual realises the discrepancies between his current and desired self-image. Impression motivation is not only a desire to control how others perceive one but also entails action taken on the part of the actor. Such action or thrust is triggered by private goals (high self-esteem

and self-respect) or public goals (recognition) a person seeks to attain through impressions (Leary & Kowalski, 1990). Although many antecedents of impression management have been defined, there is no way to determine any absolute behavior for a particular situation (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985).

The later stage is impression construction where the individual builds a desirable self-concept by embracing values which are possessed by those whose image matches the individual's desirable self-image. People are motivated to construct such impressions that are consistent with their desired image. Moreover, impressions are also determined by people's need to have consistency with their future self-image. A person who wants to attain a particular social image in future will project the impressions that are most consistent with his future self. (Jones & Jones, 1964: Leary & Kowalski, 1990: Mori et al, 1987). Impression construction process can sometimes be perceived as unnatural or fictitious since the impressions could be in conflict with one's actual personality (Buss & Briggs, 1984). Interestingly, individuals managing impressions can no longer be aware of such bias since they may believe what they project because of excessive use of the same impressions time and again (Jones & Pittman 1982, Schlenker 1980). However, research has shown that people form impressions keeping in mind their true self concept. Furthermore, image misrepresentation becomes improbable where a person knows that his personality is highly incompatible with the one he is projecting. (Leary & Kowalski, 1990: Jones and Pittman, 1982: Schlenker, 1980).

Impression management is usually driven by motives (Davies & Brennan, 2011). Defensive motives arise from negative affective

states. Such motives compel a person to create impressions when he/she faces a threat to his / her already established desired self-image. On the other hand, assertive motives originate from positive affective state of praise and acceptance that induces the individual to transform his / her self-image to have positive impressions on others (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). According to Schlenker (1986), people might be internally encouraged to create impressions in order to satisfy their own self-concept. This is termed as "self as audience approach." Moreover, people are sometimes externally motivated to project impressions thereby adopting "others as audience approach". People are not only interested in projecting desired images but sometimes also undesired images to others (Jones & Pittman, 1982). It has been found that people create unfavorable impressions in order to avoid unpleasant workplace tasks and responsibilities (Becker & Martin, 1995).

The motivation leading to the overall process of impression projection and management is based on self-identification (Schlenker, 1986). Schlenker defines self-identification as a process of knowing own identity and fitting it in an appropriate social setup. Individuals define their identity in terms of situations they find themselves in as well as their desirable self-image which they want to project on the significant others (Schlenker et al, 1986).

Impression Management Tactics

In order to further enhance knowledge on impression management, several facets of impression management behavior have been studied. Bolino et al (2008) has mentioned some of the most widely discussed behaviors. Self-enhancement, self-

promotion, assertive, job focused, intimidation, defensive, demonstrative etc. are examples of certain impressions that are used to either alter one's own image or that of others. For instance, boasting and self-promotion impressions are employed to maximize one's positive attributes (Bolino, Kacmar, Turnley & Gilstrap, 2008).

Jones and Pittman (1982) identified five tactics of impression management most commonly used by people. The first Impression Management (IM) style is *Self-Promotion* which refers to highlighting one's qualities to be perceived as competent and capable by others. However, self-promotion can have adverse effects on impressions if used excessively. (Godfrey et al, 1986: Rudman, 1998). Self-promoters are found to be good speakers rather than listeners since they have to make use of verbal methods in order to display their competence. According to Godfrey et al (1986), proving oneself as competent is more difficult than proving to be likable. Furthermore, people can also prove their competence nonverbally by making others observe their performance at work (Uitdewilligen, 2005).

Another attribute of self-promotion is exaggeration. People often accentuate their role in a success and let the audience believe the twisted truth about their actual competence (Goffman, 1959: Schlenker, 1975). However, most of the times, self-promoters are perceived negatively by the audience. In the audience's mind, if a person actually possesses particular skills, then he does not have to brag about it time and again, rather his actions speak louder than words. This concept is coined as "Self-Promoter's Paradox" according to which a truly competent individual has more of a

modest conduct when it comes to discussing his potential. Thus, the more a self-promoter highlights his competence, more doubtful the audience becomes about his actual competence (Jones & Pittman, 1982).

Ingratiation involves giving in to others' demands to acquire their approval. It entails extending favors towards others. It usually takes four forms as stated by Jones (1964), namely *Complimentary Other Enhancement* is where the actor compliments the audience by highlighting their positive characteristics, *Conformity* enables the actor to conform to the standards of audience by agreeing with them and supporting their viewpoints. *Self-Presentation* is helpful in showing a desirable image that is favorable and ingratiating, and *Rendering Favors* simply mean doing favors without the other person asking so that a likeable impression can be built.

Exemplification entails sacrifice of self-interests in order to win loyalty from others. Here the individual is willing to set aside his personal interests and exemplifies himself as highly committed and loyal. This kind of impression is appropriate when the target audience perceives ethical norms of integrity and honesty as highly favorable. *Intimidation* is exercising and showing off power to prove oneself as dominant in the group. It includes coercion and forceful behavior towards others so that a stronger and powerful image is maintained. And last, through *Supplication, people* expose their weaknesses and vulnerabilities to attain others' sympathetic support and likeability (Jones and Pittman, 1982).

Researchers suggest that self-promotion, exemplification and ingratiation styles of impression management are positive in nature

since the actor tries to create a positive image through pleasing others or getting in their good books. On the other hand, intimidation and supplication tactics generate negative impressions by appearing domineering or obnoxiously needy on others, ultimately hindering a person's image. Furthermore, people using self-promotion and exemplification aim to impress the general audience. Whereas, with ingratiation and intimidation, the target audience is usually specific entity or a person (Uitdewilligen, 2005).

Transformational Leadership

James McGregor Burns (1978) studied two leadership behaviors in the domain of political leadership. First is transactional leadership which is an exchange process between leader and the followers. The two way process enables both the leader and followers to play their respective roles, while fulfilling each other's needs. Transactional leadership involves a transaction where leader motivates the followers through rewards in return of which followers feel obliged to abide by leader's directives. Burns (1978) stated that the relationship is reciprocal on the part of both leader and followers since both are interdependent. On the other hand, transforming leadership goes beyond a mere transaction process. A transformational leader inspires and motivates his followers through his character and morality. According to Burns, transactional and transforming leadership styles are two ends of a continuum.

Burns (1978) further states that transforming leaders influence their followers such that both exercise modal values and end values. Modal values refer to extrinsic and intrinsic rewards and benefits

that followers attain by complying by leader's set standards. These rewards can be promotion, perks, accolades and recognition etc. Modal values are possessed by transactional leader in the exchange relationship between him and his followers in order to keep the followers motivated and aligned with leader's mission. End values are possessed by transformational leaders. Such values include selflessness, service, integrity, honesty and character. A leader having these end values puts his followers' interests first, ultimately wining their respect and commitment (Burns, 1978: Kuhnert & Lewis, 1987).

Bernard Bass took the work of Burns and explained them within the domains of an organization. Unlike Burns, Bass (1985) stated that transactional and transformational leadership styles are two separate constructs and are not part of the same continuum. According to Bass (1999), both dimensions are present in every leader's personality in varying degrees. Furthermore, transformational leadership can follow transactional leadership but not the other way round (Bass, 1985: Bass, 1999). Bass (1997) also stated that transactional leadership usually exists in mechanistic organizations with closed systems, conversely in organic organizations with open systems, transformational leadership style prevails. Both Burns and Bass stated that emotional content is necessary for transformational leaders to exercise end values. Covey (1992) defines a transformational leader as a person who has ethical and moral considerations and high character traits. He is more concerned about long term goals rather than daily business. He utilizes the potential of his workforce in the best possible way.

Simply put, transformational leadership is a process where a leader is able to raise followers' confidence, motivation, and expectations. It enables the followers to set new goals for personal growth and achievement. Bass defines it as a process that *"occurs when leaders broaden and elevate the interests of their employees, when they generate awareness and acceptance of the purposes and mission of the group."* (Bass, 1990 p.21). It refers to *"leader behaviors that transform and inspire followers to perform beyond expectations while transcending self-interest for the good of the organization"* (Avolio, Walumbwa & Weber, 2009). A transformational leader is able to set aside his self-interests in order to promote the interests of the followers. The most significant characteristic of a transformational leader is that he can transform individuals as well as organizations through an effective vision (DuBrin, 1998: Bass, 1999).

Transformational leadership plays an indispensable role especially in organizations which are going through change processes. As compared to other leaders, transformational leaders are more effective in elevating the followers' expectations with respect to change processes and outcomes. Moreover, transformational leadership is more focused on leader-follower relationship. It not only aims to bring improvement in individuals' goal setting and attainment process, but also results in tremendous organizational performance, ultimately beneficial for both followers and the organization as a whole (Lievens, Geit & Coetsier, 1997).

There are four dimensions of a transformational leader identified by Bass. He stated, *"They may be charismatic to their followers and thus inspire them; they may meet the emotional*

needs of each employee; and/or they may intellectually stimulate employees." (Bass, 1990-p.21). Transformational leaders create a vision for the followers. They are able to inspire them to reach new heights rather than fulfilling leaders' own personal endeavors. A transformational leader exercises his power through *Idealized Influence, Intellectual Stimulation, Inspirational Motivation* and *Individualized Consideration* (Bass, 1985). Idealized influence refers to the leader's ability to transform follower's interests, goals and deep seated norms by communicating a clear, unambiguous and compelling vision in order to lead them towards leader's desired destination. The followers view their leader as a role model whose behavior they seek to emulate. This elevates their trust and loyalty towards the leader (Bass, 1990: Bass, 1999: DuBrin, 1998: Gill, Levine & Pitt, 1998). Furthermore, transformational leaders possess high moral standards which further enhance their image in the minds of followers (Popper, Mayseless & Castlenovo, 2000).

Coming towards intellectual stimulation, it is ability of transformational leader to make his followers believe in their potential and capabilities. The leader encourages followers to think out of the box and rather than following conventional methods of performing a task, motivates them towards creativity and innovation (Bass, 1999: Popper, Mayseless & Castlenovo, 2000). Intellectual stimulation satisfies both leaders as well as followers' need for acquiring knowledge so that they can perform their particular roles with a spark of newness and novelty in them (Bass, 1990: Gill, Levine & Pitt, 1998). The third dimension of transformational leadership is inspirational motivation. One of the most important tasks of a leader is to motivate the followers so that

both can work towards the fulfillment of mutual goals. Inspirational motivation entails taking steps to increase follower's morale through leader's persuasive communication skills and assigning them with invigorating and challenging tasks (Bass, 1985: Popper, Mayseless & Castlenovo, 2000). Inspirational motivation increases followers' commitment and satisfaction at work. Through increased morale, followers start to identify themselves with the leader and organizational mission (Gill, Levine & Pitt, 1998). Research also suggests that a leader needs to have affective feelings while developing and communicating vision to the followers in order to motivate and inspire them (DuBrin, 1998).

Idealized influence is defined as personally attending to the problems and concerns of people, listening to them intently and paying consideration to their individual problems in order to rectify them (Bass, 1985: Bass, 1990; Bass, 1999; Stewart, 2006). A leader must be aware of his followers' individual problems. He must be able to identify the wide array of followers' backgrounds, mindsets, cultures and values in order to understand their issues and to determine the most suitable position for them in the organization (Bass, 1990). Effective listening is the hallmark of individualized consideration. A leader who maintains an effective reciprocity of listening and speaking wins the followers' trust. Individual consideration is not only solving individual problems of the followers but also to provide them with timely guidance about their career growth and potential areas where they can make a difference (DuBrin, 1998: Bass, 1999).

Impression Management and Transformational Leadership

Effective impression management or self-presentation is one of the traits of leadership (Uitdewilligen, 2005). Very limited research has been conducted taking into consideration the relationships between impression management and transformational leadership. However, the importance of impression management in leadership has been greatly emphasized. In order to exercise control and influence over followers, leaders must create a persuasive image in the minds of the followers (Bass, 1985: Conger, 1988) Research states that there are numerous elements that define a leader's impression management behavior. For instance, his physical appearance or personality, (Jones and Wortman, 1973: Kleinke, 1975) self-concept, position power or authority (Schlenker, 1980), cognitive state (Tedeschi, 1981), as well as his emotional mood and behavior (Jones & Pittman, 1982). Furthermore, the ambiguous or unfamiliar situational factors also affect impression management behavior of the leader. In a favorable situation, the leader tends to adopt impressions that are confident and firm. Conversely, in an unfavorable situation, he employs defensive and self-protective impressions. Characteristics of audience also affect leader's impressions. They build a positive image of the leader if they positively perceive leader's self-presentation and behavioral congruence (Gardner & Martinko, 1988). Hence impression management process depends on the actor projecting the impressions, the audience and the situation (Gardner & Martinko, 1988: Gardner & Avolio, 1998).

Uitdewilligen (2005) states that leaders must project impressions that highlight their overall personality, integrity and interpersonal skills. For that, leader must be proficient in sociability and communication. A leader successfully impression-manages if his communication is perceived as genuine, friendly and warm by the audience. Pin and Turndorg (2009) points out the importance of first impressions by stating that people usually stick to them while forming perceptions. Another study also advocated this idea by stating that first impressions last longer and are hard to amend in the short run. Only, long-term interaction can change them (Lim, Chidambaram & Carte, 2008). Moreover, customizing conversation according to the audience (Ligon, Hunter, & Mumford, 2008), using verbal (Jones, 1964: Wood & Mitchell, 1981) and non-verbal communication (Schlenker, 1980) plays a significant role in forming impressions. Studying the nature of non-verbal impression management, Remland (1984) stated that leaders who are proficient in non-verbal communication tend to project positive impressions rather than those who do not.

Charismatic leadership has been widely examined in relationship with impression management. Gardner and Avolio (1998) state that leaders create charisma by employing impressions that regard them as highly credible, honest and trustworthy. Moreover, impression management of charismatic leaders is a step by step process that includes *Framing* an enlarged vision, *Scripting* that entails defining roles and communicating them to followers through effective dialogue, *staging* refers to physical attractiveness including leader's personality, dress and environmental appearance; lastly, *performing* means actually managing

impressions through self-promotion, ingratiation, exemplification, intimidation and supplication (Gardner & Avolio, 1998). Building on the literary foundations of Gardner and Avolio (1998), another study empirically supported the relationship between impression management and charismatic leadership as significant and positive (Sosik, Avolio & Jung, 2002).

Greenberg (1990) shares an interesting insight in his study that followers/audience are more concerned about the actor/leader's apparent impressions than actual ones, i.e. leaders ought to project impressions of honesty and fairness whether or not they possess them.

Hypotheses

Based on the above arguments, since it can be assumed that leaders promote their positive image through impressions (self-promotion) in building and communicating vision (idealized influence), the first hypothesis of this study is:-

H1: There exists a significant and positive relationship between self-promotion and idealized Influence.

Coming towards the specific impression management tactics, Gardner & Cleavenger (1998) examined the association between impression management tactics with the facets of transformational leadership. The results of the study suggested, that exemplification was the most widely used tactic adopted by leaders and it was also found to have positive relationship with dimensions of idealized influence, intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration. The reason was that followers admire the leader's actions more than

his words and therefore, believe in his competence. Supplication was found to have positive relation with intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration. Ingratiation was also found to be strongly related to individualized consideration because of leader's warm and ingratiating behavior towards the followers. Self-promotion was negatively associated with transformational leadership, since it results in hindering leader's modest image and make the followers doubt his capabilities because of excessive vanity. Intimidation was also found to have negative relations with idealized influence, intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration. The reason is that intimidation is not the style of transformational leaders since they prefer more of a cooperative and participative behavior towards followers rather than coercion or intimidation. Lastly, inspirational motivation was not found to have significant relationship with any of the impression management tactics.

H2: There exists a significant and negative relationship between self-promotion and individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation and Inspirational Motivation.

H3: There exists a significant and negative relationship between Intimidation and all the dimensions of Transformational Leadership.

Ingratiation style has a positive association with leader's perception about the followers. The more the followers are high in position and power, more ingratiating leader's impression management style would be. Same is the case with self-promotion. Moreover, followers who have high need for approval are more

likely to prefer a leader who exercises ingratiating behavior (Gardner & Martinko, 1988). It is also suggested that despite the apparent discrepancy between ingratiation and transformational leadership, its negative effects have not surfaced (Gardner & Cleavenger, 1998).

H4: There exists a significant and positive relationship between Ingratiation and Individualized Consideration.

Although self-promotion had negative relationship with dimensions of transformational leadership because of the self-promotion paradox, it is still strongly associated to charismatic leadership behaviors. For instance, Gardner & Cleavenger (1998) state that charismatic leaders tend to portray themselves as visionary, competent and trustworthy towards the followers and therefore, both self-promotion and exemplification tactics further elevate their image in the minds of the followers. Moreover, leaders who adopt exemplary impressions make followers believe in the leader's effectiveness and his ability to satisfy their interests. In order to maintain a charismatic image, leaders strongly prefer exemplary impressions since they seem to be credible, trustworthy and competent to their followers (House & Aditya, 1997). Gardner (2003) also asserts that exemplary impressions are highly correlated with leader's integrity and effectiveness.

H5: There exists a significant and positive relationship between exemplification and Idealized Influence (a), Intellectual Stimulation (b), Inspirational Motivation (c) and Individualized Consideration (d).

H6: There exists a significant and positive relationship between Supplication and Intellectual Stimulation (a) and Individualized Consideration (b).

Research Model

Following is the theoretical framework depicting the positively hypothesized relationships. The negative hypotheses, i.e. H2 and H3 are not shown in model.

Methodology

Impression management was measured using the instrument developed by Bolino & Turnley (1999). The instrument consists of 22 items measuring five dimensions of impression management namely self-promotion, supplication, intimidation, ingratiation and exemplification. An itemized rating scale was used with anchors from being "never behave this way" to "often behave this way." A higher score represents higher use of a particular impression. Reliability for the instrument was measured through Cronbach alpha at 0.812.

Transformational leadership was measured using MLQ developed by Avolio & Bass (1995). 10 items measuring itemized influence, individualized consideration, inspirational motivation and intellectual stimulation were measured on itemized rating scale ranging from 1 (Not at all) to 5 (Frequently, if not always). Cronbach alpha for the instrument was 0.816. Missing values were filled with imputations in the SPSS.

Data was collected from 183 people working mainly in corporate and education sectors. Sampling technique used was non-probability judgment sampling.

Correlations

		SP	EX	INT	ING	SUPP	II	IC	IS	IM
SP	R	1								
EX	R	.024	1							
INT	R	.322**	.159*	1						
ING	R	-.021	.341**	-.049	1					
SUPP	R	-.203**	.228**	.176*	.449**	1				
II	R	-.245**	.354**	-.204**	.259**	.212**	1			
IC	R	-.340**	.268**	-.203**	.399**	.293**	.569**	1		
IS	R	-.179*	.258**	-.064	.315**	.385**	.531**	.568**	1	
IM	R	-.031	.151*	-.164*	.207**	.159*	.334**	.334**	.588**	1

**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

In order to observe one to one relationships between the variables, Pearson's correlations have been calculated in the above table. According to the results, self-promotion is found to be significant but negatively associated with idealized influence. Thus, the first hypothesis (H1) of the study is rejected. However, self-promotion was hypothesized to have negative relationship with other dimensions of transformational leadership, therefore, the negative association of self-promotion with individualized consideration and intellectual stimulation partially supports H2 since no significant correlation was found between self-promotion and inspirational motivation (p-value=.681). Intimidation has negative and significant relations with all the facets of transformational leadership except intellectual stimulation, hence partially proving the third hypothesis (H3).

On the other hand, exemplification has the strongest relationship with idealized influence depicting 35% correlation as well as with individualized consideration, intellectual stimulation and inspirational motivation. Similarly, ingratiation and supplication are also positively and significantly related to all the dimensions of transformational leadership. Ingratiation has highest correlation with individualized consideration whereas supplication style is highly correlated to intellectual stimulation thereby supporting H4 and H6 respectively. Overall, all the relationships are positive and significant.

Since the objective of the research was to determine the relationships existing between individual dimensions of impression management and transformational leadership, therefore, simple linear regression was calculated. Firstly, 6 % change in idealized

influence is caused by self-promotion (R=.06: p-value=.001). Similarly, exemplification brings 12.6% (R=0.126: p-value= 0.000), ingratiation brings 6.7% (R=.067: p-value=.000), intimidation brings 4.2% (R=0.042: p-value= 0.006) and supplication causes 4.5% (R=0.045: p-value=0.004) change in idealized influence. Following are the values of R-Square and respective p-values representing change in each dependent variable as a result of change in the independent variables.

Variables	II		IC		IS		IM	
	R^2	Sig	R^2	Sig	R^2	Sig	R^2	Sig
SP	.006	.001	.116	.000	.032	.015	.001	.681
EX	.126	.000	.072	.000	.066	.000	.023	.041
INT	.042	.006	.041	.006	.004	.387	.027	.026
ING	.067	.000	.159	.000	.099	.000	.043	.005
SUPP	.045	.004	.086	.000	.148	.000	.025	.032

The next table depicts individual coefficients of variation showing the magnitude as well as direction of relationships among the variables. Respective significance levels are also shown.

Variables	II		IC		IS		IM	
	B	**Sig**	**B**	**Sig**	**B**	**Sig**	**B**	**Sig**
SP	-.208	.001	-.380	.000	-.196	.015	.028	.681
EX	.258	.000	.256	.000	.242	.000	.118	.041
INT	-.155	.006	-.202	.006	-.063	.387	-.133	.026
ING	.179	.000	.361	.000	.280	.000	.153	.005
SUPP	.156	.004	.284	.000	.365	.000	.126	.032

Discussions

According to the literature survey, exemplification, ingratiation and supplication are regarded to have positive essence when it comes to their relationship with leadership behavior. On the other hand, self-promotion leaves a negative impression on the audience because of the self-promotion paradox. Similarly, intimidation is also a negative predictor of transformational leadership. Results obtained in this research are compatible with the study of Gardner & Cleavenger (1998).

Exemplification has the closest association with the facets of transformational leadership. The reason is that transformational leaders usually exemplify their commands and thus they are able to communicate a positive image. Giving a hardworking, committed and dedicated impression creates guilt in the minds of the followers that further incites action and mobility among them. Results of our study also show that exemplification is closely related to all four dimensions of transformational leadership. Taking a look at the

values of R^2 above, it is clear that exemplification is the strongest predictor of transformational leadership dimensions particularly idealized influence. The reason is that leader is not only the one who develops a vision and sets the ground rules, but he is also able to create an invigorating and motivating environment for the followers by actually playing his part thereby motivating the followers to play theirs.

Although, it was found to be significantly related to all the elements of transformational leadership, ingratiation was found to have highest correlation with individualized consideration. The reason is that ingratiating impressions of the leaders highly appeal to the followers who want their voice and concerns heard by the leader. Since individualized consideration is the ability of the leader to listen and address the followers' individual problems and issues, therefore a leader who practices ingratiation is desirable for them. Furthermore, leaders with ingratiating impressions tend to develop a bond with the followers that keep them motivated.

Supplication was also found to have positive and significant association with transformational leadership. Giving in to others' wishes does win their trust and approval. However, it has also been regarded as an inappropriate tactic to get others to approve oneself. When a leader uses supplication tactic, he usually highlights his followers' competencies in order to not only win their approval but also delegate them part of a job. Supplication enables the followers to think themselves as indispensable to attain the leader's mission. This technique can be useful where extra cohesive team effort is needed to accomplish the goals. Leaders' supplicating impressions are perceived positively by the followers who have high need for

motivation and individual attention from their leader. This research also shows that supplication style is the strongest predictor of intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration.

And last, keeping in view the historical relationship between charismatic leadership and self-promotion, the latter was hypothesized to possess positive relation with idealized influence because of its similarities with charisma. However, results suggest that due to the presence of self-promotion paradox, it has negative impact on idealized influence as well as other transformational leadership dimensions. Leaders who are boastful and highly concerned about proving their own competence cannot effectively develop and communicate a joint vision for the group. Furthermore, such leaders seldom appeal to audiences' intellect and are not able to inspire them or redress their individual grievances. Same is the case with intimidation. A leader with an intimidating style probably exercises an autocratic or dictatorial behavior with his followers. Such leaders, usually, have high concern for maintaining status quo and getting the job done through conventional methods. Conversely, transformational leaders motivate their followers to create and innovate by thinking outside the box. As mentioned earlier, transformational leaders bring about change by transforming the followers' needs, eventually turning them into leaders. Consequently, intimidating impressions have an inverse correlation with idealized influence, inspirational motivation and individualized consideration.

Apart from the above findings, a multiple linear regression analysis provided some interesting insights. Several relationships became insignificant when the impression management model was

tested as a whole variable against each dimension of transformational leadership. For instance, all the impression management styles except intimidating were insignificantly related to inspirational motivation. However, the overall model had significant results. This could imply that in presence of each other, each impression management tactic tends to affect another's impact on the dependent variable. However, this study was designed to examine one - on - one rather than 'whole model relationships', therefore, these results were not included.

Conclusion

Every leader has to learn to project impressions that best describe his personality and ideal social self-image. Several researches have explained the possible motivation behind showing particular type of impressions. A leader must be aware of his own self-concept in order to decide what impressions he can employ. Impression management is not only triggered by its antecedents but also certain favorable outcomes. For a leader in particular, positive impressions win him followers' respect and approval. Negative impressions can also be beneficial where coercion seems inevitable to fulfill goals. It must be noted here that to manage impression does not mean to pretend to embrace values and beliefs contradictory to one's own. It simply entails defining personality in public perspective, keeping in view one's own standpoints on various issues.

This study also aimed to determine what kind of impressions best suit the conduct of transformational leaders. According to our results, leaders who practice exemplification, ingratiation and

supplication styles would probably be more transformational than those who do not. Whereas, leaders who prefer self-promoting and intimidating impression management styles are likely to be very low on transformational leadership behavior. These findings are compatible with previous studies conducted in the same domain.

There are several potential areas for further research in the field of impression management. Firstly, role of organizational culture should be taken as moderator towards impression management in order to comprehend possible variations in peoples' impressions in different cultures. Moreover, individual's attitude towards change should be studied in an organizational setting that is going through restructuring or reengineering. Since impressions are triggered by situational factors, future researches should take into consideration the impact of certain situational factors as antecedents of impression management process and whether or not they mediate. Finally, impression management should also be examined against other leadership behaviors besides transformational leadership.

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PUBLIC HEALTH REGULATIONS: RISKS AND SNAGS

(Mr. Tahir Ul Mulk Kahlon & Ms. Saher Tanvir)[*]

Abstract

Contemporary health administration relies heavily on multiple investigative procedures that play a crucial role in treatment of diseases and the patient cure. Most medical practitioners seek multiple types of reports on the inner body conditions of patients to determine the nature and severity of sickness, without cutting the flesh. In past few decades this trend has increased, as have the nature and complexities of diseases. This study provides empirical evidence of various investigative procedures carried out at health facilities. It identifies hazards of such procedures on human health to discern shortcomings and gaps in policy and suggest remedial measures. The study evaluates current regulatory structures, policies and procedures of sampled hospitals in Islamabad and Rawalpindi. Data was collected by observing the structure of the facilities, functional methods of employees and patient behavior. The study finds extensive deviation of prescribed procedures, public health laws and policies. It concludes with recommendations on remedial measures for policy implementation and compliance including regulatory enforcement, licensing and gender sensitive treatments.

Key Words: *administration, practitioners, determine, complexities, deviation*

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Introduction

Public health protection against sickness, disease and injury arising out of contact or employment in health facilities is an important issue in any national health policy. Governments have to be keenly engaged in making and implementing policies for the perfection of healthy environment and working conditions especially for health facilities. In this globalized world, the state is also mandated to draw on and adhere to international standards, conventions, practices and technical acquiescence. Regulators must encourage and promote involvement of employers and workers in the development of standards on public health protection and in the implementation of occupational standards at both the national and creativity levels.

Modern medicine depends on multiple investigative procedures to identify pathologies and manage treatment. However it can put public health at risk by their detrimental effects. Inadequate protection practices and lack of awareness in general public raises grave concerns for the public at large. Studies in different regions of the world have discussed harmful effects of diagnostic procedures and overexposure of the human body to electro magmatic waves. Government agencies including International Atomic Energy Commission (IAEA) have formulated policies for public safety during medical treatment. It is thus crucial to know the prevailing system, policies and their implementation in Pakistan where medical facilities especially in private sector are mushrooming. There is generally dearth of studies in Pakistan that empirically review such policies and procedures. It is doubtful whether medical services are provided in prescribed and appropriate manner and

also if public policies and regulatory requirements are effectively implemented in Pakistan.

The objective of this study is to bring forth information on current human protection policies and practices in medical facilities. It aims to identify shortcomings and gaps so as to make recommendations for improvement. The study is directly relevant to a wider audience of practitioners, employers, policy makers and more importantly the general public because it focuses on a key issue of governance. It seeks to raise awareness of current regulatory regime to usher in best practices and thus contribute to the health and well-being of public at large.

Public Health Risks

Public health is defined by World Health Organization (WHO) as "organized measures to prevent disease", promote health, and prolong life of the population as a whole.[1] William Roentgen created amazing history with the discovery of X-ray. Modern medicine now cannot be imagined without it since it has become one of the most critical tools in treatment of sickness and hence in promotion of public health. The development has a flip side, however. Roentgen's wife died from radiation, many researchers developed radiation burns/ cancer and some expired.[2] Thomas Edison's assistant died of tumor due to overexposure to X-rays.[3] Meanwhile technology has progressed significantly to new modalities such as Digital Imaging, Computed Radiography (CT), Ultrasonography, Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI), Radionuclide Imaging (RNI), Positron Emission Computed Tomography etc and continues to grow making tremendous contribution to human health. Most of these tools use

electromagnetic waves which are hazardous for humans and its effects depend on the dosage as well as the targeted body organ. Overexposure can stimulate hereditary defects, tumors and pregnancy complications with pronounced effect on the children and the aged. Developing cancerous tumors in children is two to four times higher than that in adults.[4] These catastrophes drew attention towards the need to educate people about the hazards and leading to development of regulations and guidelines for public safety.

The use of medical imaging has greatly expanded world over. In United States, it increased from 26 million in 1998 to more than 70 million in 2008.[5] In Pakistan, according to Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) radiotherapy forms the largest share - 48.63% (Figure below) of radiation exposure to public[6]. At the same time it is alarming that radiation induced during diagnostic procedures are third highest on the top ten list of medical and technology hazards.[7]


Figure: PNRA Data

From this it can be inferred that the rise in the use of this technology will also increase hazards for people. Such hazards are of three types. One that become apparent only above a certain threshold level and increase with the level of dosage; like skin burns, cataracts, infertility etc. Secondly, those without a threshold level but directly related to level of dosage; like genetic and hereditary effects and tumors. Thirdly, those whose latent period can range from years to decades. Latency period for leukemia is 2-5 years whereas genetic damages become evident only in the future offspring.[8] Experiments have also discovered a direct dose-response relationship and even the lowest doses are hazardous. Thus no dose can be considered absolutely safe.[9]

There are challenges in collecting evidences of exposure - induced injuries. Firstly, because it is difficult to prove this scientifically. Secondly, because cancer and tumor occurs after years and it is difficult to distinguish whether these develop from exposure or other factors. Thirdly, because most such incidents go unreported. Several studies have been undertaken to determine public health issues related to medical diagnostic procedures. Most have found a deviation in practice from the policy in a variety of examinations and their negative consequences for public health. A summary of such studies is as under:

- Penelope Engels-Hiils[10] and Eugene C. Lin[11] have just given an overview of risks in medical imaging and radiation protection.

- Ezo et al reported a high level of knowledge by radiographers about human protection but a lack of conformance in practices.[12]

- Hendee & Edwards reported that number of radiation workers have multiplied but their collective dose has steadily declined over the years due to the increase in use of personal protective equipment efficiently and regularly.[13]

- Simon et al used radiation measurements of workers, their work history information and the radiation protection practices to estimate occupational doses and cumulative organ doses to workers.[14]

- Shah found that medical technologists' knowledge falls short of the globally embraced guidelines.[15] The study focus however was on education and qualification of technologists than on safety practices.

- Famurewa et al measured awareness amongst doctors and concluded that awareness is inadequate amongst doctors generally but radiology doctors are better informed.[16] A study by Soye and Paterson gave similar results.[17]

- James et al verified impact on pregnant females. They identified lack of knowledge in technologist, noncompliance of regulations and need of a pre – test to determine pregnancy status.[18] According to International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), radiation is injurious to developing human embryo.[19] Applegate emphasized the need of national guidelines for screening pregnancy to improve public safety.[20] Schreiner Karoussou European level study discerned violation of guidelines on pregnancy verification.[21] American College of Radiology (ACR) established 'Guideline for Imaging Pregnant or Potentially Pregnant Adolescents and Women with Ionizing Radiation'.[22]

- Children are vulnerable to radiation and exposure can be controlled by reducing the area of test.[23] According to ICRP guidelines, organ shielding can effectively cut down the radiation dose and is strongly recommended in national and international polices.[24] Warlow et al revealed that gonad shielding is ineffectively and incorrectly applied.[25]

- Protection can be provided through dose monitoring in hospitals. Giri and Murthy reported X-ray dose exposure is higher in radiation workers. The automatic techniques have decreased the repeat rates of examinations, thereby reducing exposure to patients.[26]

- OECD Nuclear Energy Agency identified the merits and shortcomings of the current protection system and found incoherence.[27] In Iran, a study was conducted on reject/repeat rate of medical imaging procedure.[28] The underlying reason for conducting this study was to address the issue of extra radiation exposure.

Regulation and Governance

With growth of knowledge about this issue, various policies and governing structures were created. International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) was established in 1928 as an international advisory body for safety standards, legislation, and practices.[29] Radiation protection came to prominence only after the 1940's atomic bomb.[30] United Nations Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) was created in 1955 as an authority on the levels and effects of ionizing radiation.[31] In 1957, International Atomic Energy Agency was made to promote safe and peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In 1970, US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) made a Radiation Protection Division

(RPD) to be responsible for protection of public.[32] Likewise in UK, National Radiological Protection Board (NRPB) was created in 1970. The ALARP (As Low As Reasonably Practicable) and ALARA (As Low As Reasonably Achievable) principles were given out in UK/USA, which legally bind the practitioners to administer doses as low as reasonably possible to minimize the harmful effects. Ionising Radiation (Medical Exposure) Regulations 2000 (IRMER) of UK lay down fundamental procedures for the protection of individuals' health during exposure to medical examinations.[33] Complying with the principles of ALARA/ALARP and IRMER regulations have espoused for cost-benefit analysis in the optimization of protection where comparison between costs of radiation protection and benefits of reduced radiation exposure is made before executing any medical radiation exposure.[34] Several countries have now created professional bodies such as Society of Radiographers UK, Indian Society of Radiographers and Technologists, Singapore Society of Radiographers, Australian Institute of Radiography, Swedish Society of Radiographers and Canadian Association of Medical Radiation Technologists. These professional bodies play a pivotal role in developing professional code of ethics, conducting research studies and professional meetings for practitioners in diagnostic radiography.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published a policy which envisages its member countries to conform national legislation to the provisions of its Basic Safety Standards. Member country should have a regulatory body to formulate regulations and have an inspection system.[35] Pakistan became a member of IAEA in 1956 and established Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC). PNRA was created later in 2001 as an autonomous body for safety

of public from radiation hazards. Initially, Pakistan had a department within PAEC for the same purpose. PNRA laid down its policies in PNRA Regulations on Radiation Protection-PAK/904 published in 2004 which serves as the national regulatory policy and guidelines.[36] In Pakistan, PNRA is the regulator for patient care and safety against hazards of medical radiation.

Most of PNRA regulations are informed by IAEA. The table below compares salients of protection policies between PNRA regulations and IAEA's guidelines.

IAEA	PNRA
A warning light should be placed at the entrance. The light should be illuminated when the X ray beam is energized.	No explicit provision for warning light outside the room, however a blinking light or a sound alarm to indicate the operation of the X-ray machine.
Numerous safety measures are listed for exposure of pregnant patients.	No clauses for verification of females of reproductive capacity.
Personal monitoring badges should be issued every four weeks. The RPO should inform the staff of radiation monitoring results. This should be posted on the staff notice board.	Explicitly mentioned that personal dosimeter must be carried. However, PNRA regulations have not indicated the monitoring mechanism to ensure its implementation.
Restraining of patients should not be done by radiographers and, if possible, not by people at all. Immobilizing devices should be used, whenever possible to minimize exposure to the patient, staff or helper/comforter.	The regulations and guidelines do not indicate the necessity to use immobilizers to restrain patients.

Investigation of accidental medical exposure, equipment failure, accident, error, mishap or other unusual occurrence. Provision for follow-up of patients who received high exposure procedures with the potential for deterministic effects.	Same as IAEA
Availability of lead aprons; Availability of other devices, such as thyroid protection, protective eye wear and gloves for fluoroscopy, protective curtains.	Ensure that workers are provided with suitable and adequate personal protective equipment, including an appropriate protective clothing, protective aprons, gloves and organ shields.

Research Findings and Conclusions

A cross sectional survey was done to obtain information about the current protection practices in Pakistan. Sampling was drawn from estimated population size of 15000. The margin of error was taken as 5% with 95% confidence level. 375 X-Ray examinations were observed in five hospitals of Rawalpindi and Islamabad, i.e. Pakistan Institute of Medical Sciences (PIMS), Capital Hospital (CDA), Rawalpindi General Hospital (RGH), Holy Family and Razi Hospital. Complex procedures such as fluoroscopy, barium procedures, Mammography, computed tomography, PET-CT, MRI, and Ultrasound were excluded. 'Justification' of diagnostic requests was also excluded. Permission from Ethical Review Committee was not required because it did not involve use and collection of human tissue.[37] An informed consent was sought from the managers of the Radiology Departments. 1397 observations were included on the

basis of applicability of procedures. In these, 635 observations complied with the standards and 760 deviated.


The radiographers wore protective lead shielding only in 15% procedures and remained exposed in 85%.


In 162 examinations that required lead apron to be worn by the attendants accompanying the patients, only 25 attendants wore them and 137 did not.

The radiographer protective lead shielding was worn in only 12 procedures (15%) and not in the remaining 68 (85%).


In 46 diagnostic examinations, protective shielding was worn in only 2 cases and not in the remaining 44 (95%).

Lead apron was not even issued to attendants. In keeping door closed, Razi Hospital had highest compliance at 89% while BBH had the lowest at 26%.

In Beam Collimation, Capital Hospital performed best with 74% compliance and Benazir Bhutto Hospital the worst with only 23%. Comparative hospital compliance in % is in figure below.

Verification of pregnancy status in females is a pre- test. Hospital compliance is in figure below.

In most of the hospitals, PNRA was carrying out monitoring, quality assurance and assessment of equipment etc once a year as stipulated in its Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). However hospitals did not have their own auditing, monitoring and evaluation systems as mandated in PNRA regulations. Clause 38(c) of PNRA regulations also demands a report of summary of the monitoring results at least annually from hospitals.[38] Most hospitals do not even have a Radiation Protection Officer (RPO) which is mandatory under PNRA regulations. PNRA shares its inspection reports with hospitals, but has a lax follow-up and accountability

system. For example BBH was directed to rectify its lapses and improve its protection mechanism. The hospital never complied and PNRA did not follow it up. Secondly, every year PNRA reports highlight violations of regulations which are downrightly ignored. PNRA did not share record of any action against non-compliers. It instead continues to renew their licenses to operate. The loose implementation of regulations could be due to public awareness about the hazards and government apathy towards such subtle issues.

 Medical technologists were also indifferent to public as well as personal safety. Most radiographers were not cognizant of PNRA policies and simply did not consider this a public health issue. They did not trust accuracy and reliability of the monitoring safety gadgets. They showed inability to keep the non-patients out due to high workload and cultural reasons. Some alleged that doctors unnecessarily advise procedures due to their material interests.

IAEA explicitly states that regulatory bodies of all countries should impose or recommend penalties.[39] It is also an ethical duty as mentioned in the 'Statements for Professional Conduct.'[40] License to practice must be given after verification of structural and functional practices, which does not appear to be happening in Pakistan. PNRA does not have a record of punishments. Tribunals can award stipulated punishments such as, a fine of 2-4 million rupees, suspension or cancellation of license, locking and sealing the premises. Compliance is considered more of an ethical issue than legal. There are no penalties for doctors and technicians for exposing patients. PNRA recognized monitoring and implementation gaps. They apprehended that any coercive action will lead to closure of hospitals, leave patients helpless and provoke

public protests. PNRA is planning for training sessions for practitioners and radiation awareness workshops to inform public about the health threats and protection methods.

Policy Recommendations

Public policy is a cyclical process. Monitoring and evaluation provides an important input in policy formulation. Existing policy has snags as it has not been improved through a feedback from implementation experiences. There has never been an evaluation exercise, as well. Practically it has become a linear process with no policy learning. This is amply depicted by the fact that since its creation in 2004, there has not been a single amendment in regulatory policies. This policy is thus not robust and needs to be revised keeping in view the implementation experience and induction of new technologies.

Public health and safety is low key issue and hence there is noncompliance of national policies and guidelines. Every noncompliance adds to the exposure of patients, occupational workers and visitors. This problem of public health must be addressed jointly by the regulator and legislators. Regulators need to be proactive to implement its policies. There is a dire need of public awareness programs, not only in cities but down to villages. Media will be very influential in bringing changes in public attitudes.

Health practitioners lack concern for public safety and thus neglect regulations. Public health concern should not remain confined to ethical responsibility of practitioners but made a legal responsibility with a compensatory and accountability system. Harms of exposure do not always manifest themselves immediately thus making it difficult to link exposure to disease. Therefore PNRA

should strengthen its regulatory and enforcement actions. It should increase monitoring of hospitals and punish violators. For instance, it should suspend licenses until all structural radiation requirements are met.

A vital step for accountability and responsibility is the licensure of professionals. According to Weimer and Vinning, occupational licensure makes the worker legally responsible for his/her actions.[41] It will provide legal remedies to public and patients who could sue professionals for non-compliance. In Pakistan, only doctors are licensed and registered while technicians are not. The regulatory regime of PNRA should thus be expanded to include technicians and doctors.

Female operators should be trained and employed to overcome the problem of attendants with female patients. They can provide a greater level of comfort in asking intimate questions of female patients which will ultimately help to bring consistency in practice of verification of pregnancy status.

Conclusion

Protection and safety of public health is a core function of any national health policy. The state structure that provides healthcare to people should by itself not become a threat to their health. Pakistan suffers from a very low level of awareness about the hazards of visiting health facilities. People thus get innocently exposed to diseases from the source that they think is meant to provide health. The existing regulatory structure and laws are barely satisfactory, even if implemented. However the situation has become critical due to inappropriate legal regime and lax implementation of health standards. There is an urgent need to take cognizance of the prevailing situation, before it becomes tragic. A

meek attitude towards correction will be extremely hazardous, because the impact of exposure does not necessarily become visible in the short term. A forceful governmental connection and action is needed to protect public interest; otherwise business interests will reign supreme creating severe human health issues and harmful deterministic effects.

End Notes

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AFGHAN ETHNIC PATCHWORK: A BRIDGE OR BARRIER FOR GOVERNANCE?

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Abstract

Afghanistan is inhabited by 32.006 million people who are as per Afghan national anthem divided into 14 ethnic groups. These groups co-existed in history. Unlike the generic hypothesis prevailing since last three decades, ethnic patchwork of Afghanistan has all the potential to act as a bridge to good governance. It is a fact that ethnicity is an unavoidable aspect in Afghan society, but it has not trickled down to Afghan masses. The aspirations of Afghan population as a conflict ridden society are to get good governance followed by peace. Neither they have separatist aspirations nor do they have contention over resources. Taking this position in this paper, it is established that there are couple of uniting factors in Afghan society which can pose as contributing factors to convert Afghan ethnic patchwork to good governance in Afghanistan. The conversion accentuates upon moving the policy from paper to practice which is very vital to create a Pan-Afghan vision. This would ultimately lead to rejection of politicization of ethnicity and will address the local concerns and linguistic issues in Afghan fragile democracy.

Key Words*: ethnic discord, ethnic patchwork, ethnic trap, Afghanistan, Pan-Afghan vision, Politicization of Ethnicity*

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Introduction

The fact hampering the nation building process of Afghanistan is that neither it is an ethnic unit nor it has a uniform national culture. It is patchwork of ethnicity. Afghan ethnic groups were living together for 5000 years and they were united against any foreign invasion whether it was Great Britain or Soviet Union. And there was no conflict over resources or representation amongst them. As far as the term "ethnic group" is concerned, it was first used as a *Groupe Ethnique* by a French anthropologist DOLLOT. Till 19th century the term ethnic group was non-existent. Credit goes to international academicians who started dividing the Afghans in their narratives on the bases of their sect, language, culture and, geography etc. Developments in Afghanistan in 20th century depicts that that the script of Afghan nationalism is based on Pashtunwali code, that is the reason that the pashtun used to identified themselves with Afghan nationalism.[1]

Afghanistan National Anthem recognized 14 ethnic groups. Historically, these groups have got the environment of co-existence, but the afghan conflict followed by soviet invasion got labeled as 'ethnic'. A narrative of 'ethnicized conflict' was produced, accentuating upon ethnicity as a major problem in multiethnic societies, and Afghanistan is no exception to it. As per this narrative the script of Afghanistan is written by the majority ethnic group (Pasthun), so it is a bone of contention/barrier in Afghanistan. It illustrated that producers of this narrative have bought into an 'ethnic trap'. Having said so, a conflict marked as ethnic one demands ethnic solutions, which is suggested in Bonn Conference

in which a multi ethnic representative government was proposed as the solution to Afghan conflict.

After going through existing literature, the research undertaken is built on hypothesis that ethnic patchwork of Afghanistan is a bridge rather than a barrier to good governance, while seeking the answer of few questions:-

- What is the ontological positioning of ethnicity in Afghanistan?
- How ethnic cards have been played out in politics of Afghanistan?
- How and why interactive structure of ethnicity and afghan masses is to be delinked with ethnic trap?
- What is the way forward to convert ethnic patchwork as bridge to good governance?

While seeking answers to above questions, the position taken in the study in hand is ethnicity is an unavoidable factor in Afghanistan, but the common variable amongst the ethnic groups is; they are looking for security, and governance. These factors can prove to be a strength for Afghanistan as Afghan ethnic patchwork has all the potential to act as a bridge to governance, for that matter de-politicization of ethnicity is a first ladder to come out of narrative of ethnic trap while moving the policies from paper to practice. This in return will create a pan-Afghan vision, and will address the question of rational ethnic representation in fragile democracy along with addressing the local concerns.

Ontological position of Ethnicity in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is landlocked and has a wide range of ethnic groups with diverse languages, religious and ethnic characteristics. Every ethnic grouping does constitute the dominant part in one or a greater amount of Afghan locales: Pashtuns in the south and east, Tajiks in the upper east and west, Hazaras in the middle, and Uzbeks and Tajiks in the northwest. Afghanistan's national anthem perceives 14 ethnic groupings among the nation's 27 million individuals: Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, Balochis, Turkmens, Nooristanis, Pamiris, Arabs, Gujars, Brahuis, Qizilbash, Aimaq and Pashai. As individuals, Afghans have a feeling of nationhood in spite of their absence of uniform national society. Without precise evaluation of information, deciding the genuine rates of different ethnic gatherings is hazardous and can be combative. Afghanistan's anthropology has added to keep individuals and groups separated from one another. Over the span of the twentieth century, contact between distinctive groups expanded, with improvement of the nation's correspondence and communication and combination of state force. This contact proceeded after the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, in spite of the fact that the nation's advancement stagnated and violence resulted.[2]

Despite being multiethnic in nature, Afghan multi ethnicity does not pose any challenge to process of state formation but ethnic diversity creates difficulties in developing the sentiment of nationhood. One of the important and interesting aspects regarding ethnicity in Afghanistan is that it is divided between north and south of Afghanistan. North is linked with Central Asia; southwestern characteristics are similar to NWFP and Balochistan

of Pakistan. No complete population census has been conducted in Afghanistan so it is difficult to identify which group constitutes how much ethnic inhabitant in the country. It is deplorable for Afghans that Afghan kings did not accentuate throughout the twentieth century to take some steps for the sake of formulating the national identity inclusive of ethnic culture, folk lore and modern literary expressions.[3] Despite that, there is one common factor in the ethnic groups, they want to feel safe in their daily routine matters, whoever provides them security, and they are not much concerned about it as they have clashes neither based on religion nor on resources.[4]

Source: https://www.google.com.pk

Pashtuns

Pashtuns are the biggest ethnic group in Afghanistan. As indicated by the World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous

Peoples, they are politically, the most persuasive ethnic group and are seen as the noteworthy originators of the Afghan government in 1747. They live mainly in the south and the eastern areas of the country. Pashtuns are fundamentally Sunni Muslims. Amongst five sub types of Pashtuns, Durrani and Ghilzai are thought to be the most persuasive Afghan rulers. Former Afghan president, Hamid Karzai, is a Durrani. [5]

Afghan *loya jirga* is adaptation of Pashtun culture to govern the tribes - men called *jirga* where they represent their extended families. Despite having a western style of democracy, Afghanistan is still following the traditional method of justice traced from major ethnic group.[6]

Kuchis

Kuchis are ethnic Pashtuns who hail from the southern and eastern areas of Afghanistan. Afghan Independent Directorate of Kuchi Affairs (IDKA) assessed the quantity of Kuchi at 2 to 3 million. Kuchis are Afghan nomads, generally wanderers, which mean they have no settled homes. They move for sustenance, and water in adjacent areas. The biggest settled Kuchi populace can be found in northwest Afghanistan.

Tajiks

Tajiks originated from Central Asian region. They keep up a family relationship with the four million ethnic Tajiks in the neighboring country, Tajikistan. Tajiks, these days, can be found throughout Afghanistan but are chiefly amassed in northern, north-eastern and western Afghanistan. Tajiks are the second largest

ethnic group after the Pashtuns. Rulers of Tajik ethnicity ruled Afghanistan in two brief periods: (i) for nine months in 1929 under Habibullah Khan and (ii) from 1992 to 1996 under President Burhanuddin Rabbani. The Tajik resistance contenders were exceptionally persuasive in the purported Northern Alliance that chipped in with US and coalition strengths to remove the Taliban.

Hazaras

The greater part of Hazaras lives in the Hazarajat, in the rugged focal regions of Afghanistan. Hazaras were the biggest ethnic grouping in Afghanistan, almost 67% of the total population, preceding the nineteenth century. A large portion of the Hazara populace is thought to have been slaughtered in 1893 under the rule of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan. Today, the Hazaras constitute around 9% of the Afghan populace.

Uzbeks and Turkmen

Uzbeks and Turkmen both live predominantly in the northern territories of Afghanistan. Together they embody approximately 12% of the Afghan populace. The Uzbeks are likewise Turkic-speaking ethnic group, they are additionally said to be ethnically identified with the Iranians. Uzbeks and Turkmen are, for the most part, grain and vegetable agriculturists, and they occupy the best share of Afghanistan's arable area in the North.

Aimaq

The Aimaq make up more or less 4% of the Afghan populace and live essentially on the steppe land in northwestern Afghanistan.

Baluchis

Baluchis in Afghanistan are assessed to constitute a populace of 500,000, as indicated by counts in light of the 2008 appraisal of the aggregate Afghan populace. They are part of a bigger, cross-outskirt Baluchi group of almost 8 million, 70% of whom live in Pakistan and the rest in Iran. The Afghan Baluchis live predominately in the southwest and in south of Helmand and Faryab territories.[7]

Munoz states that the "first references to Afghans in recorded writing are in reference to Pashtun tribes." It was likewise a Pashtun, Ahmed Shah Durrani, who is recognized for first uniting the country of Afghanistan in 1747. From then onwards, ethnic Pashtuns have governed the nation.[8]

Interactive Structure of Ethnicity and Governance

The inquiry rings a bell as to why ethnic groups rose to political and administrative pertinence in Afghanistan. To answer this question one needs to look back in history. The Afghan state was made by the opponent pioneer powers; British- India and Russia towards the end of the nineteenth century. The decisive group of the Pashtuns, enthroned by British India, favored Pashtun tribes in their idea of the country state. That is the motivation behind why "Afghan" is the Persian equivalent word for Pashtun, Pashtu was the Afghan national dialect. The legislative issues of the decision family utilized the ethnic examples to manage access to open merchandise and workplaces. Pashtuns were prominent in all regions and commanded the military. Tajiks were left with the financial segment and the instructive organizations, while the Hazaras were

disregarded in general. The distinctive treatment of the individuals obliged the shaping of ethnic generalizations: Pashtuns were viewed as 'belligerent', Tajiks were said to be 'thrifty', Uzbeks were known as 'ruthless' and the Hazaras as 'unskilled' and 'poor'. Despite the fact that legislative issues of the country, along these lines, made an important ethnic chain, but couple of ethnic clashes were also observed. The principle explanation behind these contentions was the tremendous differentiation between the rural and urban regions. Governmental issues in the capital of Afghanistan were of minimal interest for rural Afghanistan. In this manner the ethnic groups stayed with obscure ideas for the Afghan populace and were not regarded as structures for aggregate activities. In like manner the common Afghan did not explain a political will to conquer the ethnic pecking order stipulated by the state. Moreover Afghans perceived the country as an unfriendly variable which mediated by power into their social life and not as a key to the entrance of assets (for example, offices and land rights) which they want to take control of.

Ethnicity as a Political force

Ethnicity turned into a political-military power when the Afghan war was less severe in 1979. Despite the fact that the war was ruled by the threat of socialism versus Islam with respect to the ideal models of the Cold War, the hawkish gatherings progressively upgraded the ethnic energy to reinforce their positions. The comrade rulers would have liked to tie certain ethnic groups closer to them by raising them to the status of nationalities. Significantly more vital was the production of state armies that depended on ethnic connection; mainly the Uzbek civilian army of Rashid

Dostum. On the grounds of Shiite loyalties, Iran built up Hizb-i-Wahdat, which was strong amongst the Shiite Hazaras. Amid the 1980s the Jamiat-i-Islami, the strongest resistance, formed to represent Tajiks. Each of the four warring groups, which ruled the military and political activities in the most recent decade, was pretty much bolstered by individuals from one of the four noteworthy ethnic groups. The political developments utilized ethnicity as a basic contention for the authenticity of their political presence, on the grounds that every single ideology – Islamic, socialistic or royalist – lost ground as a premise for activation of the masses and as instrument of political requests. The pioneers of the warring groups made their supporters mindful of their social and financial hardships on the premise of their ethnic place at various times. They asserted in every event that the survival of the 'own ethnic groups' was imperiled through the forceful conduct of 'other ethnic groups'. Likewise, the gatherings requested monetary and political assets of the state and society for the sake of their ethnic group. Besides, every single warring group legitimized their political requests alluding to the extent of their ethnic groups and their regional roots. In these endeavors they lost their feeling of reality.[9]

The Risk of Ethnic Trap…?

To add to a peace game plan for Afghanistan, the United Nations has also entered the 'ethnic trap'. A contention marked as an "ethnic" one can be conveyed to an end by an 'ethnic arrangement'. There is a wide accord amongst strategy creators that the Afghan government ought not to be just multi-ethnic. Additionally, it should mirror the ethnic organization of the Afghan culture precisely. The force sharing course of action ordered at the

Petersberg Conference was in view of the accompanying standard of pastors: 11 Pashtuns, 8 Tajiks, 5 Hazaras, 3 Uzbeks (and none of the Uzbeks were appointed against the slots). Despite the fact that an 'ethnic arrangement' sounds suitable in perceiving the mindset of different ethnic groups, it offers enormous deterrents, for example, which ethnic group and what developments ought to be incorporated. Another danger is that this ethnic arrangement produces disappointments if the ethnic portion is not perceived accordingly. Likewise, this methodology disregards the productive character of ethnicity and expects that an administration, in which every single ethnic group is represented, would apparently suffice to mirror all aspects of the Afghan populace. A decent case for this misconception is Hamid Karzai. [10] Afghanistan was pulled in to an exceptional worldwide consideration after September 11, 2001 assaults in New York and Washington. A quick American–led military triumph steered the Taliban and a much slower - and defective - political mediation concentrated on conveying a "wide based and multi-ethnic" government. Hamid Karzai, a Durrani Pashtun from Kandahar, was picked to lead the first transitional organization. [11] The Pashtun alliance was one of the most grounded contentions to delegate Hamid Karzai as president of the previous government; it needs to consider that the world class and political pioneers of the Pashtuns did not perceive Karzai as their agent. In this way Karzai acquired no fortress inside the Pashtun populace.[12] The key fault in the course of action was that, it organized the determination of the ethnicized Afghan strife. As a general rule, that ethnicization did not channel Afghanistan's Ethnic Divides down to the masses. [13]

Existing Uniting Factors in Afghanistan

➢ **Non Separatists Aspirations**

Afghanistan is a patchwork of ethnicities much like bright Afghan carpet, which makes it hard to see its governmental issues absolutely through an ethnic crystal. It makes regional ethno-patriotism unreasonable. "Afghan ethnic groups have never seen themselves as settled nationalities with an overriding shared trait and history that would require political solidarity or a country state," stated by American anthropologist Thomas Barfield. "Rather, ethnicity in Afghanistan is basically pre-nationalist, with ethnic gatherings holding comparative monetary and political hobbies however no normal belief system or separatist goals."[14]

➢ **Co-operation rather than Conflict**

If contention happened there, it did not set diverse ethnic groups against each other: Pashtun lords and Communists contradicted provincial Pashtun mullahs and tribal khans; a dynamic Persian-speaking intellectual elite in Kabul restricted progressive Persian-speaking villagers. In 1929 and 1978, radicals partnered crosswise over ethnic and provincial lines, referring to the regular risk to their conventional lifestyles and translations of Islam. (In spite of the fact that the present uprising in Afghanistan reflects comparative ideological and social lines, the Taliban have thought that it was harder to rise above their provincial Pashtun ethnic base.) In Afghanistan, such ideological clashes are connected with restriction to build up

administrations, while ethnic and territorial clashes develop in the vacuum after a state breakdown. After a decade Taliban were driven from authority. Afghanistan, in any political event, still stays in this post-breakdown time of uncertainty. The fall of the Taliban left a power vacuum at the national level and restored clout to territorial pioneers. Be that as it may, none of them restricted the foundation of another unitary government or looked to split far from it once it had been made. After many years of U.S. intrusion, the dialogues about Afghanistan's future and the construction modeling of its political framework - the 2001 Bonn Conference, the 2002 national loyajirga (council of elders), and the 2003 sacred tradition - were proven more by co-operation than by conflict.[15]

At the beginning of 21st century, the contention in Afghanistan was seen most importantly as an ethnic battle. Most United Nations Security Council resolutions bolstered "the endeavors of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan to propel a peace process through political arrangements between the Afghan groups for the foundation of a wide based, multiethnic, and completely illustrative government."[16]

Preceding the war imperative political positions were conveyed similarly among ethnic groups. This kept ethnic strains and brutality at a base; however, the Pashtuns in Kabul were the politically predominant groups. In the mid-1990s endeavors were made to restore shared guideline; notwithstanding, a hefty portion of the ethnic gatherings have looked for a more noteworthy offer of force than they

had before the war, and viciousness is a typical consequence of the debate.[17]

➢ **Religious Tolerance**

Afghan culture incorporates various ethnicities. Sub-ethnic elements at regional level, for example, tribes and groups, frame the establishment of the Afghan political and social scene reflected through brutal clashes over force and assets. The civil war of 1992-1996 spun around ethnic force motion. The Afghan populace consisted of 99 percent Muslims and 1 percent other minority groups whom the delegates chose by the larger part not to welcome or oblige. Any intercession in Afghanistan should hence be considered part of religion and nearby elucidations of religion as a premise for seeing usually watched practices, for example, misogyny. Afghanistan is not a post-strife nation. This mixed up supposition has prompted the genuine disregard of the war torn parts of Afghanistan, influencing the economy, guideline of law, equity and open administration delivery. The 2010 report of the World Bank positioned Afghanistan's ability to secure its investors as one of the most minimal on the planet.[18]

➢ **Ethnicity and Afghan Masses**

The key defect in the course of action was that it organized the determination of the ethnicized Afghan struggle. In actuality, that ethnicization did not channel Afghanistan's Ethnic Divides down to the masses. Most, if not all, Afghans basically needed security, effective administration, and transitional equity. On the other hand, the procurement of

these essential requests was consigned to optional hugeness.[19]

Verifiably, the Afghans themselves, in any case, were less worried about their nation separating. Considering all things, Afghanistan has been a solitary state for over 250 years. If the nation was going to part, it would have been done so in the 1990s, amid its extended civil war. But it didn't. No Afghan of any political stripe or ethnicity supported severance in the most recent century. Nor it was happened in the beginning of this century. In spite of the fact that Afghanistan's different ethnic groups differ on how the nation's new government ought to be sorted out and who might wield power inside of it, they all broadcast their backing for a unitary state. There is a need to determine the predicament how to make space for managing extremists whose concerns are local instead of national or universal.

Above that, the distinctive ethnic groups in the same towns regularly show more solidarity with each other than they do with their ethnic countrymen from different parts of the country. Thus, Afghan ethnic groups have never seen themselves as altered nationalities with an overriding shared trait and history that would require political solidarity or a country state. Rather, ethnicity in Afghanistan is basically pre-nationalist, with ethnic groups holding comparable monetary and political hobbies, without, basic separatist yearnings. Besides, the multiethnic state had long been the acknowledged standard in Afghanistan; it was not some peculiarity that required correction. Ethnic clashes in Afghanistan generally focused on which gathering would

rule the state and subordinate others, not over which gathering would have selective control of a domain. Albeit ethnic clash assumed a part in Afghan legislative issues in the twentieth century, it was never the purpose behind state breakdown.

In 2001, Afghans from each district and ethnic grouping were so anxious for peace that they acknowledged the reclamation of an imperfect central government. Today, the mood is very distinctive. Unless the United States and its associates go up against and resolve the issue of political authenticity before remote powers leave the nation, the West's endeavors to make a stable Afghanistan will fizzle out. [20]

The above mentioned facts show that ethnicity in Afghanistan has a potential to bridge governance, for that matter there is a dire need to take several steps mentioned below.

Policy Options to convert Ethnic Patchwork into Good Governance in Afghanistan

> **Administration Move from Paper to Practice**

As Afghanistan is a multiethnic society, for that matter there is a dire need of integrative, culturally sensitive and politically participatory policies, expanded spotlight on keen monetary advancement and expanded engagement with activation of the provincial populace and standard administration structures can enhance governance and administration. Exact comprehension of Afghanistan's multifaceted nature, a genuine duty to on-spending plan,

checked financing to the Afghan government, regarding change execution as a long haul process and building common society's ability to become both the individual's companion and the administration's accomplice can bolster administration change usage. In any case, the Afghan administration's move from paper to practice will take more than this. It will take solid political authority and status with respect to the overall population to endure misfortune, as Afghanistan walks towards characterizing her needs and takes responsibility to encourage their usage.[21]

> **Need of Pan-Afghanistan Policies**

The fall of the Taliban showed open doors for the nation's world class - of any district or ethnicity - to add to the establishments of a country state and recuperate from the nation's political fracture.

Afghanistan today has few establishments that can claim to be national, yet a pan-Afghan, national governmental issue is still missing. Cementing a national personality is essential to stay away from pressures between ethnic groups. The legislative issues of co-alternative support won't help Afghanistan decrease its security issues or make improvements. There should be a perfect measure of responsibility taken for conveyance of national assets. Compromise ought not to be in view of tight ethnic governmental issues or apprehension on a pan-Afghan vision.[22]

➢ **Reject politicization of Ethnicity**

From the observation, that ethnicity is the dominating contention in the Afghan War, the peace preparation that was started at the Petersburg Conference at the end of November 2001 is in search of an ethnic agent government. In this manner, in these days, it is almost difficult to overcome the ethnic alliance of any political on-screen characters. It is strongly recommended that the remaking of political organizations ought to lessen the impact of ethnicity in the political circle. The usage of ethno-federalism and the presentation of an ethnic shared framework would probably increase clashes as opposed to add to a steady peace.[23]

Rejecting the politicization of ethnicity as a rule. While it is, obviously, not to advance the thought that Afghan government ought to be mono-ethnic, the urgent issue gets from the reality to forced ethnicity to the fundamentals of political authenticity. Afghans will reach political and managerial positions with respect to their ethnicity and not their capabilities, and this oppositely contradicts the idea of a just society as proliferated by the West.

➢ **A Rational Ethnic representation**

It must be exhibited that individuals from diverse ethnic groups have co-existed previously. Likewise it has been made clear that there is nothing wrong in relating to an ethnic gathering. It is honest to recognize oneself as a

Pashtun, a Tajik and so on. Hence an ethnic compromise ought not to attempt to reduce or pulverize ethnic personalities.

> **Multi party system not based on ethnic premise**

A contention marked as an "ethnic" one can be conveyed to an end by an 'ethnic arrangement'. There is a wide accord amongst strategists that the Afghan government should not be just multi-ethnic. Additionally, it ought to precisely mirror the ethnic organization of the Afghan culture. [24]

The setting up of a multi-party framework on common basis and not on ethnic premise is the most essential point in guaranteeing a persisting peace in Afghanistan. However the political and social preconditions for a majority rule in Afghanistan are somewhat unfavorable.

> **Dealing with local concerns**

There is a need to determine the predicament how to make space for managing extremists whose concerns are local instead of national. [25] As far as hostilities amongst tribes are concerned, it is purely localized and not nationalized. [26]

> **Linguistic Issues**

Today, about 50 million Pashtuns consider the two nations (Afghanistan and Pakistan) as their home. Approximately 15 million Pashtuns live in Afghanistan, while the rest of 30 to 35 million live in Pakistan. Afghanistan needs to adjust a more businesslike and adaptable type of administration. The

nation brought together constitution of locale shuras, or committees, which never appeared. Kabul should invest more in protecting Afghanistan's different social and ethnic societies. The advancement of territorial dialects is firmly related. Take the example of South Asia; Afghanistan can continuously embrace English as an official language. It will be basic to conclude the contention between Pashto and Dari to modernize Afghan education.[27]

> ➢ **Addressing Fragile Democracy**

Democratization in states of common social orders and feeble institutions limit conflict determination can prompt a honing and heightening of tensions. As effectively said, Afghanistan has no society custom and barely any experience of equitable control of government. On the off chance that the focal point of political force in Kabul is presently getting significance because of universal authenticity and backing of it, control of this middle will accept existential criticalness. Decisions produce failures and may prompt their lasting rejection from force if institutional systems for circulating and dissolving force are not settled in the meantime. The battle for accomplishment at the polling station turns into a battle for political and material survival, and methods for winning are picked according to the needs.

Conclusion

This is a right moment for Afghanistan to come out of the narrative of "ethnic trap". There is a need to win the battle of narratives, so that ethnic discord can be seen through lens of ethnic patchwork. The position taken in the paper suggests that despite the fact that ethnicity is an unavoidable factor in Afghan society; it is not trickled down to Afghan masses who are seeking good governance, justice and peace in their home land, rather to project their interests in prism of ethnic discord. The ethnic patchwork in Afghanistan can pose a bridge to good governance and pan-Afghan sentiment while adopting several measures, for that matter moving the policy from paper to practice is a pre-requisite. Once it is accomplished, it will open up doors to the elements which ultimately bring epistemological solutions to the ethnicity and governance issues in Afghanistan. Having said that, the hypothesis of study in hand is not nullified which says, "Ethnic patchwork of Afghanistan is a bridge rather than a barrier to good governance".

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EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY DURING DIFFERENT EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES AND ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH EXPORTS OF PAKISTAN

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Abstract

The underlying objective of this study is to examine volatility found during the implementation time period of three exchange rate policies (fixed, managed floating and floating) in Pakistan and its relationship with the exports of the country. It examines the exports variability during the time periods of these exchange rate policies. The volatility in exchange rate has been calculated by employing GARCH models. Quarterly data has been used in the study and it spans from 1972:1 to 2013:4. The dataset has been obtained from International Financial Statistics released by IMF. Results reveal that floating exchange rate regime (2000:2 -2013:4) has shown higher exchange rate volatility. However, variability in real export has been found during the fixed (pegged) exchange rate regime. The correlation results show that these two variables are negatively associated with each during all three exchange rate regimes time periods.

Key Words: *Exchange rate, Volatility, Exports, implementation, associated*

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Introduction

Exchange rate has an important role in shaping macroeconomic policies in developing as well as developed economies. It is one of the policy variables as its regimes (fixed or floating) are chosen by central banks or governments.[1] Definition of exchange rate is "the price of one currency in terms of another currency". Its influence on the economy has been the topic of many discussions among policymakers, academics and researchers since 1970s throughout the world. The issue was extensively debated during the period to determine whether to have a fixed, pegged or floating exchange rate regime. The Bretton-Woods international monetary collapsed in 1973, and with that the era of fixed exchange rate regime ended. Countries started following floating exchange rate policies. This floating exchange rate regime brought some advancement in the economy but it also increased the risk of international trade.[2] Many countries adopted the flexible exchange rate system which in turn created uncertainty and volatility in exchange rates. After that debate, researchers and policy makers have started to study the impact of exchange rate volatility on international trade. Volatility can be defined as latent or unobservable, stochastic or deterministic variable. There are however studies which have tried to make the exchange rate volatility variable as an observable variable.[3]

As many countries started following floating exchange rate, it provided policy practitioners an opportunity to examine the relationship between currencies and volume of trade. Despite the fact that, numerous studies have been conducted on the issue both theoretical as well as empirical studies demonstrate unclear impacts of exchange rate volatility on exports. However, no consensus is

available in theoretical or empirical literature on the effect of exchange rate on international trade flows.[4] An exhaustive survey of both theoretical and empirical literature was carried in studies.[5,6,7,8,9] Generally, it is an accepted view that volatility in exchange rate hampers international trade. Because trade contracts are mostly signed for delivery of goods in future and in terms of currency, these are denominated either from buyer or seller; therefore, the risk involved in international transactions increases from unanticipated fluctuations in exchange and it may lead to reduced trade for those who are risk averse traders.[10] However, both empirical and theoretical literature does not support this viewpoint conclusively. There are a few theoretical studies which support a negative hypothesis. It states that exchange rate volatility dissuades trade.[11,12,13]Yet, other studies are in favour of positive hypothesis that trade may be fostered by exchange rate volatility.[14,15,16] Similarly, empirical evidence is also inconsistent as results of empirical work have been contradictory with a mix of significant, insignificant, little or no effect. The dominant view in literature shows that volatility of exchange rate depresses exports (volatility of exchange rate has negative relationship). For example, studies[17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24] explore statistically significant negative effect of exchange rate volatility on exports. On the contrary, less dominant view, studies[25,26,27] report a significant positive impact of volatile exchange rate on exports. Moreover, there are studies[28,29] that find insignificant, weak or no effect. These mixed results in empirical literature may be because of different time period covered, model specifications, proxies used for volatility of exchange rate and the countries included (developing or developed) in the studies.[30] This mixed trend in empirical literature

has motivated us to conduct this present study with reference to Pakistan.

Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has adopted different exchange rate systems at different points of time. A Fixed Exchange Rate system has been upheld from 1947 to 1982. The Managed-Floating Exchange Rate system was adopted on January 8, 1982 with the particular objective to keep up the intensity of exports in international markets as the dollar showed appreciation against other currencies.[31] The Pakistan rupee was attached to a basket of currencies. Changes in the exchange rate were made by the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), keeping in view the objective of protecting Pakistan's balance of payments positions from unwanted and unsustainable imbalances.[32] The SBP supplanted the Managed-Floating Exchange Rate system with the New Exchange Rate Mechanism (NERM) on July 22, 1998, as a procedure to face economic sanctions imposed by international financial institutions and donors after Pakistan conducted atomic tests in May 28, 1998. The reason of the dual exchange rate was to transfer the benefits of currency devaluation to exporters, Pakistanis residing abroad who remit money, and to reduce import of unnecessary goods. It was moreover thought to limit the cost of devaluation as far as containing cost heightening of key imports, repayments of foreign debt by limiting the effect of inflation and overall government's budget deficit are concerned. The selection of NERM was aligned with multiple currency practices. This multiple exchange rate system had badly impacted country's output and growth as it discriminated among importers and exporters. Moreover, as per the IMF's Articles of Agreement, a country is also not permitted to have

different currency practices except for short period of time. Subsequently, the two-tier exchange rate system was supplanted with a market-based unified exchange rate system in May 19, 1999. Under this framework, a floating inter-bank rate was used for all foreign exchange receipts and payments both for private and public sectors. Then again, the SBP could intervene in the private sector for the purpose of selling and buying of foreign exchange at its own rates and choice of timings as well. Finally, Pakistan adopted the policy of free float on July 20, 2000.[33]

In a nutshell, Pakistan has experienced different exchange rate regimes after the separation of East Pakistan, fixed exchange rate policy (FY1973-FY1981), managed-float (FY1982-FY1999), multiple exchange rates policy remained functional for a brief time period after nuclear tests in May 28, 1998, dirty float[34] (FY1999) and finally floating exchange rate policy (since July 20, 2000).[35] That is the reason, it is among the most critically viewed, examined and governmentally manipulated countries. With this setting, the point of this study is to look at the volatility of exchange rate witnessed during different regimes and variability exhibited by exports during different exchange rate regimes in Pakistan. The study has been delimited to only three exchange rate policies namely fixed, managed-float and floating. The remaining two policies have been excluded from the analysis due to their shorter time period.

The remaining paper is structured in following manner: Section II gives theoretical understanding and literature review. Section III presents research method and description of the data and sources. Section IV discusses the results, and lastly in Section V conclusion is drawn.

Theoretical Understanding and Review of Literature

Exchange rate volatility has certain implications for the exports volume. Hooper and Kohlhagen (1978) did a theoretical examination of the association between greater volatility of exchange rate and transactions in international trade.[36] Their argument is that higher volatile exchange rate results in higher costs for traders who have to lower foreign trade in order to avoid risks. The reason is that the exchange rates are usually concurred when business contracts are signed. But the payments are not made until delivery of goods actually happens. In this event the changes in exchange rates have got to be erratic, this generates uncertainty about the profits to accrue, and in this way, it lessens the advantages of international trade. Contrary to that, De Grauwe (1988)[37] suggests that there are some situations where you might expect that volatility in exchange rates may negatively or positively impact trade volume. Dominance of income effects over substitution effects can prompt a positive association between fluctuations of exchange rate and trade. The reason is, if exporters are adequately risk averse, the increased volatility of exchange rates increases the anticipated marginal utility of export earnings and thus enhances exports. Effects, therefore, must be dependent on the level of risk aversion of uncertainty in the exchange rate on exports.

From the theoretical perspective, the effect of fluctuations in the exchange rate on trade volume is uncertain. The standard theoretical viewpoint on the volatility of the exchange rate is that it impedes the flow of international trade. The point is that the fluctuation in exchange rate characterizes uncertainty and it inflicts costs on commodity traders who are averse to risk. However, it is

opined that high exchange rate risk can have a positive, negative or neutral effect on trade. This impact is subject to risk aversion elasticity. Domestic prices can be affected by exchange rate change through both direct and indirect ways. Through direct way, a decrease in the exchange rate may lead to increased import prices of finished products and raw materials in local currency. While through indirect way, devaluation of the exchange rate would lead to reduction in prices of local products for foreign purchasers. Afterwards, there is an increase in demands for exports which leads to escalation of prices of local goods if there is limited surplus of exports. As nominal wage contracts are fixed in the short term, real wages decrease thereafter. However, when real wages reach their original position with the passage of time, costs of production escalates and the general price level rises.[38]

Besides theoretical literature, empirical studies have noticed opposing results about the effect of volatility of exchange rate on exports. The studies[39,40] empirically examined the link between exchange rate and exports and found that exchange rate volatility has negative effect on the volume of exports. The study[41] has also analyzed this relationship during the period 1989-1999 for Taiwan exports to the United States and found that agriculture sector has shown significant impact of fluctuations in exchange rate while other sectors have shown insignificant impact. Similarly, the study[42] examined the impact of exchange rate volatility on exports for fourteen countries belonging to the Asia-Pacific region and found that instability of exchange rate causes adverse effect on exports. Likewise, the study[43] examined the impact of exchange rate volatility on the exports of three developing countries (South Korea,

India and Malaysia) by employing GARCH model and reckoned that volatility has significant negative effect on the trade of these countries. Similar study conducted for the economy of China and results obtained again reported that the relationship was significantly negative in the long run.[44] This association has also been analyzed for exports from Mauritius and empirical findings showed that the volatility of exchange rate has favorable impact on trade in short run while it projects negative effect in long run.[45]

Besides the foregoing dominant view on the link between volatility of exchange rate and exports, there are studies which found positive relationship.[46,47,48] While examining the effect of exchange rate volatility for two small countries, Croatia and Cyprus, on aggregate exports, the study[49] finds positive effect of volatility on exports.

There are also some studies[50,51,52] whose evidence suggests the existence of an insignificant relationship or no effect between the exchange rate volatility and exports. Uncertainty in exchange rate has no impact on the exports from UK to the European Union states.[53] Similar results were also found while investigating the impact of existing volatility in the exchange rate on the exports from Ireland to Britain. There are a few studies in which researchers have found no significant relationship between volatility of exchange rate and exports.[54]

In case of Pakistan, the study[55] observes fluctuations in exports resulting from the exchange rate volatility while trading with major partner countries (UAE, UK and USA). It uses monthly time series data from 1988:8 to 2011:6. It found that exchange rate volatility

showed significant negative effect on trade with two countries, UK and UAE but the relationship has been found insignificant in the case of USA. The study[56] empirically investigates the effect of volatility of exchange rate on the volume of exports between Pakistan and its major trading partners. It employs quarterly data ranging 1991:3 to 2004:2.employing co - integration and by using Error Correction model, the study has found negative and significant effects of the exchange rate volatility on exports both in the short as well as the long run.

The foregoing review of empirical literature leads us to the contradicting views with respect to the relationship between exchange rate volatility and exports. The relationship is varied for different countries and the possible reasons could be attributed to different economic level, structure and trade policies employed. As the exchange rate is economic policy variable sufficiently controlled by the central bank or the government, the novelty of this present study is that it calculates volatility of exchange rate during three different exchange rate policy regimes in Pakistan and examines the relationship with exports.

Research Method and Data Description

As defined earlier, volatility of exchange rate is a tool that is used to highlight the uncertainty due to unpredictable fluctuations in the exchange rates being faced by exporters. Obviously, this is a variable that cannot be observed directly and therefore its quantification is a serious issue. Accordingly, there is no agreement in literature about the measure which is most appropriate. In many empirical studies, the moving average of the exchange rate variance,

moving average of the exchange rate standard deviation, and the absolute value of volatility of exchange rate have been used.[57,58,59,60,61,62,63] These measures, however, have been criticised on the point that they lack a parametric model for the time varying variance of exchange rates. Moreover, they may face some measurement error issues[64]. Other empirical studies have used GARCH type models, using the conditional mean and conditional variance instead.[65,66]

The measure utilized in the present study is the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH). The ARCH and GARCH models have been talked about generally in the literature and esteemed more effective in creating proxies for unstable variables due to their capacity to catch perseverance in "shocks" or "news" segments, which are watched predominantly in financial time series. These models are additionally more solid and versatile than others when they are connected to long time series data since they permit more exact appraisals of the parameters utilized.[67] Therefore, these models are extensively used in financial time-series analysis.[68]

To calculate volatility, the data of nominal exchange rate, Consumer Price Index (CPI) of USA and CPI of Pakistan have been obtained in order to get variable of real exchange rate. The nominal exchange rate (NER) is converted into real exchange rate (RER) through the following formula:

$$RER_{PAK} = NER_{PAK}\left(\frac{CPI_{USA}}{CPI_{PAK}}\right)$$

Where CPI$_{USA}$ is the price level in USA, CPI$_{PAK}$ is price level in Pakistan; NER is the nominal exchange rate while RER is the real exchange rate. After getting variable of real exchange rate, volatility has been estimated by applying ARCH and GARCH (1, 1) technique.

The sample of the study consists of quarterly data for the period 1972:1 to 2013:4 on the real value of Pakistani exports and a measure of Pakistan exchange rate volatility. All the data for the study have been extracted from International Financial Statistics in electronic form (CD-ROM). To have the uniform data, nominal exports have been converted into real exports.

Results and Discussion

Exchange rate volatility has been calculated according to three different exchange rate regimes. Table (1) below depicts the volatility during these regimes. Descriptive Statistics of exchange rate volatility of three different exchange rate regimes at Annex A.

Table 1: Volatility during Exchange rate Regimes in Pakistan

| Exchange Rate Policy	Time Period	No. of Observations	Mean Value	Volatility (Standard Deviation)
Fixed (pegged)	1972:1-1981:4	39	-0.104999	0.904817
Managed Floating	1982:1-1998:2	65	0.100122	1.238576
Floating	2000:2-2013:4	54	3.039283	8.383011

Standard deviation from the exchange rate volatility obtained through GARCH models shows the variability in data. A large value of standard deviation shows that data points in data - set are widely dispersed and they are at a distance from the mean, while a small value of the standard deviation points out that the data-points are grouped nearly around the mean. The results of standard deviations reveal that exchange rate during Floating exchange rate regime has shown higher volatility with 8.38311. Figure (1) depicts the exchange rate volatility during the floating exchange rate regime.

Figure (1): Volatility of Exchange Rate (2000:Q2-2013:Q4)


Exchange rate volatility experienced during managed-floating exchange rate regime shows standard deviation 1.238576. Figure (2) depicts the exchange rate volatility during the managed-floating exchange rate regime.

Figure (3): Volatility of Exchange Rate (1982:Q1-1998:Q2)

Exchange rate during the Fixed (Pegged) exchange rate regimes has shown low volatility with standard deviation 0.904817. Figure (3) depicts the exchange rate volatility during the fixed exchange rate regime.

Figure (3): Volatility of Exchange Rate (1972:Q1-1981:Q4)

The results are in line with theoretical and empirical literature. Pakistan followed fixed exchange rate system from 1947 to 1981. Initially Pakistan fixed its currency with the Pound Sterling, but as the USA emerged as the economic power, the currency was linked to US dollar in 1971. As the currency is tied to another country's currency, central bank (SBP in case of Pakistan) has the mandate to maintain the value of the currency. Therefore, exchange rate shows less volatility.

Under the system of floating exchange rate, currency's value is permitted to fluctuate in response to foreign-exchange market mechanisms. Since July 20, 2000, Pakistan has been following full flexible exchange rate policy. Results (Table 1) show higher volatility during this regime period. Now there is criticism that in practice Pakistan does not follow floating exchange rate system. The de jure and de facto position of the country on the policy of exchange rate are different. The former points out that the Government of Pakistan follows floating exchange rate system but the latter points out that managed floating regime also exists. Having said that SBP's interventions in the market are limited to moderating and they are aimed at preventing excessive fluctuations in exchange rate. Now Pakistan witnesses minimum level of foreign exchange controls and restriction. Current account transactions are now unrestricted except for occasionally imposed limits on advance payments for some imports. Foreign investors can now freely bring in and take out their capital, profits, dividends, royalties etc.[69]

The variability in real exports of Pakistan during their respective exchange rate regimes has been obtained. The values of standard deviation, a measure of variability, during three different exchange

rate regimes are 39.98214, 22.45136 and 9.037625 respectively. Real export growth has shown highest variability during the sample period of fixed exchange rate. Descriptive Statistics of real export growth are available at **Annex B.**

Table 2: Variability in Exports during Exchange rate Regimes in Pakistan

Exchange Rate Policy	Time Period	No. of Observations	Mean Value	Volatility (Standard Deviation)
Fixed (pegged)	1972:1-1981:4	40	15.31509	39.98214
Managed Floating	1982:1-1998:2	66	7.642057	22.45136
Floating	2000:2 - 2013:4	55	4.180067	9.037625

As the results of exchange rate and exports have shown variability, it was now appropriate to calculate the correlation between these two variables. The results of correlation as shown in Table (3) reveal the negative relationship between exchange rate volatility and real export growth during three sample periods. The negative sign shows that real export growth decreases with the increase in exchange rate volatility.

Table 3:   Correlation

		Real Exchange Rate (RER)	Real Export (REXP)
Sample: 1972:1 1981:4	RER		-0.290829
	REXP	-0.290829	
Sample: 1982:1-1998:2	RER		-0.050428
	REXP	-0.050428	
Sample: 2000:2-2013:4	RER		-0.138955
	REXP	-0.138955	

Conclusion

The paper measures the volatility of exchange rate exhibited during three different exchange rate systems adopted by the State Bank of Pakistan. Further it also measures the variability in the real growth of exports during the same time periods. The underlying purpose was to establish a linkage between exchange rate volatility and export variability in Pakistan.

Exchange rate volatility was measured during three different exchange rate regimes, fixed exchange rate regime (1972:1 to 1981:4), managed floating (1982:1 to 1998:2) and floating (2000:2 to 2013:4) in Pakistan by using the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity method. The results reveal that exchange rate during the Floating exchange rate regime (2000:2 to 2013:4) has shown higher volatility with 8.38311 while it has exhibited volatility with 1,238576 during the Managed Floating exchange rate regime. Exchange rate during the Fixed (Pegged) exchange rate regimes has shown low volatility with standard deviation 0.904817.

Variability in the real exports growth during the sample period of fixed exchange rate regime has been found to be the highest in comparison to other time periods. As the results of exchange rate and exports have shown fluctuations, the strength of their relationship was calculated through correlation. Results reveal negative relationship between exchange rate volatility and real export growth during three sample periods. The real export growth decrease with the increase in exchange rate volatility. The present study has found that the volatility of exchange rate has caused

variability in the export of the country. It shows that exports of the country are sensitive to the volatility of the currency.

The study has some limitations. It has rounded the dates of different exchange rate regimes for the sake of convenience in analysis. Secondly, the study does not cover the time period ranging from 1998:3 to 2000:1. During this period, SBP introduced multiple exchange rate and dirty float. As the regimes' implementation time period were very shorter, so they have been excluded from the analysis.

The association between exchange rate volatility and exports is weak as shown in the correlation analysis. Secondly, this relationship does not give the extent of variability in exports caused by the exchange rate volatility. Therefore, the subject needs further investigation. It is suggested here that researchers may get more robust analysis of exchange rate volatility and exports by applying appropriate econometric regression models.

Annex A

Descriptive Statistics (Exchange Rate Volatility)			
Sample: 1972:1- 1981:4		Sample: 1982:1-1998:2	Sample: 2000:2 -2013:4
Mean	-0.104999	0.100122	3.039283
Median	-0.231480	-0.192238	1.928261
Maximum	5.146174	6.149896	33.33576
Minimum	-0.703577	-2.487009	-9.269370
Std. Dev.	0.904817	1.238576	8.383011
Skewness	5.170325	2.652547	1.807614
Kurtosis	30.66955	12.38365	6.838331
Jarque-Bera	1417.866	314.7000	62.55596
Probability	0.000000	0.000000	0.000000
Sum	-4.094942	6.507932	164.1213
Sum Sq. Dev.	31.11039	98.18047	3724.568
Observations	39	65	54

Annex B

Descriptive Statistics (Real Export Growth)			
Sample: 1972:1 1981:4		Sample: 1982:1-1998:2	Sample: 2000:2- 2013:4
Mean	15.31509	7.642057	4.180067
Median	14.14223	9.045449	0.637876
Maximum	173.4702	65.56545	30.83841
Minimum	-35.95465	-42.55623	-9.819028
Std. Dev.	39.98214	22.45136	9.037625
Skewness	1.879916	-0.041641	0.949656
Kurtosis	8.344580	3.017759	3.448025
Jarque-Bera	71.16812	0.019941	8.568260
Probability	0.000000	0.990079	0.013786
Sum	612.6037	504.3758	225.7236
Sum Sq. Dev.	62344.30	32764.14	4328.969
Observations	40	66	54

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End Notes

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THE RISE OF ISLAMIC STATE (IS) PHENOMENON-
LESSONS FOR COIN PRACTITIONERS AT HOME

(Ms. Mahroona Hussain Syed)[*]

Abstract

The blitzkrieg - style advance of the Islamic State (ISIS) sweeping through vast swathes of land have stunned the world. Classical and neo-classical notions of insurgencies seem to have further morphed into a new brand of jihadist's insurgency which boasts of a transnational portfolio. This in itself requires a thorough research on how modern insurgencies are developing, since most are invariably attributed to the Muslim Jihadists. Amidst inflow of information it will be interesting to analyze the tactics of this new insurgency with a view to finding out new trends in guerrilla warfare. However, in the light of related studies, this article concludes that a passive approach to foresee impending evil, will have far - reaching consequences on future scenarios for states which, like Pakistan, must preemptively prepare themselves against threats to national security. For this purpose, delivering good governance will always be the only solution which will preclude the rise and spread of more insurgencies through blatant use of such battle tactics and having an easy access to resources for sustaining insurgency.

Key Words: *insurgencies, portfolio, consequences, sustaining, scenario*

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Prelude

Well-known now for frequently changing its nomenclature, ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) or ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and Levant), or simply IS (Islamic State)[1] has indeed acquired a curious acronym that itself sounds like Isis, the ancient Egyptian deity for fertility and magic. The almost magical rise of this Al-Qaeda franchise while sweeping across the areas of Iraq and Syria does tell a lot about the fertility of minds working behind it.

The success of IS has many lessons for contemporary COIN (counterinsurgency) theorists and states threatened by insurgents sharing IS ideology, especially the fact that identification of the cause of an insurgency is the most important factor for COIN practitioners for strategizing any COIN operation. However, the classical COIN approaches originating from Western literature whether based on Galula or latest COIN models of US/NATO invasion in Afghanistan and Iraq are found lacking in anticipating the cause of ISIS rise. The major reason could be a lack of understanding or wilful disregard of the local causes for an insurgency preferably due to most of the COIN literature being based on experience on foreign soil. But more surprising is a similar apathy displayed by Syrian and Iraqi governments in what may be called 'fiddling while Rome burns,'-style and attitude adopted by these governments by not addressing governance issues faced by their public. It may be argued in fact that the negation of population-centric approach by these states might have forced the population to look towards IS as a *Messiah* and saviour at times. Therefore, the reason for phenomenal rise of IS will be approached from the perspective of governance, one of the more important

component of COIN, which was found lacking in the above-mentioned Middle - Eastern states.

This study uses open sources for gathering data on the issue, mostly news reports coming from all over the world through multiple news channels; the official websites of the non - state and state actors involved in the situation; and analytical articles and news reports published in local Pakistani and international newspapers enjoying wider circulation. However, admittedly the analysis is limited by lack of direct access to battle theatres due to which only available information was relied upon for conducting an analysis. The phenomena of victorious advances of ISIS are very new to the international political scene, although very swift, therefore, some room for unforeseen surprises and circumstances should be accounted for in a scenario which may generate entirely new dynamics in future.

History and ideological roots of IS

Capitalism generated a world system that has favoured the rich at the expense of the poor. The time-tested compliance of rulers in Muslim countries achieved through the carrot-and- stick policies of the West, have created serious class divides among Muslims, based on socio - economic deprivation, denying the masses their life chances to progress productively in the world. Earlier it was the Marxist theory which sought to redress these failures, now it is the Islamic World which is seeing revivalist trends through the Arab Spring, Taliban, Al Qaeda and now the IS. It is not only a regime change which is the ultimate objective of the jihadists, it is the systemic changes which are sought by them, change in status quo to restoration of past glory and an equitable distribution of resources, at least as the narrative goes.

IS areas of influence

- ■ Dominant as of April 2015
- ■ Territorial losses since August 2014

Key locations - dominant group

- ■ IS ■ Syrian Kurds ■ Contested city
- ■ Iraqi government ■ Syrian government
- ■ Iraqi Kurdish security forces

Source: US Department of Defense. Tikrit was retaken from IS in April 2015   BBC

Another prominent factor that played a part in their origin is the colonial masters' demarcation of boundaries with an utter disregard to local ethnic distributions, cultural affiliations which sowed the seeds of disaster not in one but many parts of the world.[2] The division of Middle East under Sykes-Picot Agreement in the aftermath of the WW II[3] resulted in the same troubles that the Subcontinent is cursed with. What Pakistan faced on its Eastern and Western borders as a result of its inception, is now replicating and spreading its ugly tentacles in the Middle East through the rise of IS.

Of what is known about its history, it is an off-shoot of Al Qaeda. Its origin is found in the void created due to the melting of Iraqi Army and Saddam's rule, where Sunni Muslims were marginalized and excluded from the US - sponsored Shi'ite government. The resistance movement soon turned into a central force against the

occupation forces in Iraq.[4] Sunni hardliners - iconoclastic, Salafi militants - self-styled jihadists who have strong anti - Shia bias, but in fact, who do not accept anyone not adhering to their sort of interpretation of Islam[5] jumped into the fray.

Although it boasts of ideological roots connecting to Al Qaeda, owing to a staunch belief in Salafi - jihadist conceptions of Islam, it refused to accept the Al Qaeda leader Ayman Al Zawahiri's authority once he asked Abu Bakar Al Baghdadi and his men to stop meddling in Syrian unrest. IS claimed to achieve geographical boundaries from Iraq's Diyala province to Aleppo province in Syria.[6] CIA estimates total numbers are approximately between 20,000 to 31500,[7] whereas others indicate numbers likely to be near 100,000.[8] According to estimates, around 15,000 fighters are foreigners but IS is mostly composed of Iraqi and Syrian fighters, who are not mainly ideologically driven people but a mix of young people striving to get out of an uncertain situation prevailing in Iraq and Syria. These are Sunnis with Salafi - Jihadist mind-set[9] having no political affiliations with the purpose to throw out regimes at Baghdad and Damascus.[10]

Nurturing Base for IS - Using the Lens of COIN

Insurgency nurtures under conditions, where some kind of political, social or economic deprivation, corruption and injustices exist. As in the case of Iraq and Syria, both regimes are characterized by sheer mal - governance and affected by sectarian and ethnic division. Coupled with this, socio - economic disparity among certain classes and external powers' intervention and involvement in these states have provided sufficient bedrock for IS to flourish and destabilise the region. However, besides mis -

governance by states, there are other reasons too, which act as conduit for the success of IS as discussed below.

Non-Representative Regimes as a cause of Mis-Governance

According to Lahoud,[11] in the history of Islamic movements, those groups which resorted to use of radicalism and violence for furtherance of their political objectives could not sustain their mass appeal in the long run, even if it was gained temporarily by them. Deviation from the major Islamic schools of thought could not attract long term public support for these violent groups. However, it is hard to deny that in recent times, Al - Qaeda through its leader Osama Bin Laden was able to win over some mass appeal among average population. The overwhelmingly moderate Muslim populations certainly did not subscribe to the use of violence but they did have sympathy for their cause which was seen to be a retaliatory effort to fight endless atrocities committed against weakened Muslim nations. At the moment, it is difficult to say whether nationalistic trends found in Arab Muslims would transcend the love for whole Muslim *Ummah* or not, but it is certain that the decades of silent servitude to puppet governments is no more being accepted by increasing number of people. Usurpation of rights, invasion of Muslim territories under false pretexts and imposing local puppet regimes is no longer acceptable to the public.

Examples from Iraq. Iraq provided ideal breeding ground for the success of IS, which lies in its history, mis-governance and the role played by regional and international actors. The mis - governance and the brutal regime of Saddam Hussain and the

invasion of Iraq by USA notwithstanding, the present Shia regime in Iraq has also done no good to bring the required cohesion in the state.[12] The schism has further widened between the Shia and Sunni population. According to Hunter:-[13]

> The beleaguered Prime Minister of Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki, is the latest in the long list of the West's favourite political leaders turned into pariahs. Conventional wisdom now is that Maliki's flaws and wrong policies, especially his alienation of the Sunnis and dictatorial style of governance, are at the root of Iraq's problems, including its latest troubles with extremist Islamic militants.

Sunni population, who have long governed Iraq are feeling deprived of their just role in the government. Particularly, younger generation of Sunnis has no place to look for addressing deprivation and reviving their glory unless IS stays there. Few of the key statistics on socio-economic conditions of Iraq (Table 1) will also help in identifying the role these may play in luring the population towards IS.

Table 1: Key Socio-Economic Indicators of Iraq

GDP Growth Rate	4.2%
HDI Ranking*[14]	120
Urban Population(as a percentage of total population)*[15]	66.4%
Intensity of Deprivation[16]	39.4

The total population of Iraq is 33.42 million (2013)[17] and rated as Upper Middle Income level country by the World Bank till 2013. With about 41% of the Population aged less than 15 years, according to the World Bank, representing the high youth bulge, most living in Urban areas, it is not difficult to imagine that the strength of the IS lies in the youth of the areas. Dr. Al Baghdadi himself was 39 - years old when he started the insurgency. Whatever growth rate observed in Iraq prior to this situation was not an inclusive growth at all, even by World Bank estimates. With an oil sector-dependent economy that left less room for other sectors' growth, was a fit recipe for disaster. Once a government which employs about half the total labour force of the country, loses its control over public sector franchises due to poor governance (which is the case in Iraq), the situation in itself incentivizes the prospects of instituting an insurgency by disgruntled elements of the society.

Adding to the mix, the strong sectarian bias of the Leadership of the day in favour of one sect, and the minority sect which previously enjoyed elite perks and privileges under past governments, all will have interests linking at the right places. Quite naturally then, a majority of ISIS fighters are urban, educated, Sunni youth. This shows that the nature of conflict is multi-dimensional. It is elite vs. masses, rich vs. poor, Shia vs. Sunni, youth vs. traditional leadership etc.

The unrest in Syria is similarly the result of continuous mis - governance and a political mess caused by Bashar's government which ultimately morphed into a civil war. The unrest started with peaceful protests against Al-Bashar's government around 2011, which was quelled by heavy-handed government forces.[18] The

indiscriminate use of force resulted in further violence and grievances against Bashar's government. This set the stage for a proxy and sectarian war and IS having found its successes in Iraq, was more than eager to exploit this opportunity. Syrian Free Army, Hezbollah, Al Nusr and the neighbouring states of Iran, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and most importantly US and now Russia all have stakes in this muddle.

On the other hand, IS has presented itself as an alternative to the present regime of Bashar, whose continuous mis - governance has alienated the population particularly Sunnis. Amidst controversial Syrian elections, the continued civil war-like situation in Syria and complex but nonetheless fierce and highly questionable intervention by great powers, IS ensured governance in the field of police, education, Islamic outreach, aid and health, and security to all, including minorities, in areas under their control, thus started filling the vacuum created by the recognized regimes in Syria and Iraq.[19] Such measures when successfully implemented after the capture of Mosul by IS have brought desired stability to the city; a fruit denied to the populations by regimes in the rest of Iraq and Syria.

De-Statization of War. As per Munkler, these states have lost control over wars and different type of actors have appeared, who wage war with far less weapons and resources as compared to conventional wars, and use civilians as a target of their battle tactics.[20] He refers to such wars as new wars, although this is a debatable term; but the fact of the matter is that IS and Taliban are representing similar trends. Seen objectively Iraq and Syria provide a space for IS to provide an ideological appeal particularly in the

regional context for Muslims of Sunni sect. Though ordinary Muslims are opposed to killing of innocent people but seemingly they have no place to look for and found the narrative of IS as alluring. This brings the conflict in Iraq and Syria to de-statization and lending of the space to IS. According to Lister, the Iraq-Syria "border has increasingly become immaterial and conflict on both sides of the border has become interconnected."[21]

Enemy-Centric Approach. According to Kilcullen, "the enemy-centric approach basically understands counter-insurgency as a variant of conventional warfare. It sees counterinsurgency as a contest with an organized enemy, and believes that we defeating the enemy as their primary task."[22]In Syria, the Bashar government's brutal response to peaceful protestors has brought the day where he has lost bulk of the state to IS. The US on the other side handed over a similar legacy to Iraq's marionette government, which is unable to extend any relief to the people standing on the other side of the fence.

Role of External/Regional Powers. West has tried to legitimize intervention in Iraq by using some bogey pretexts like presence of nuclear weapons in Iraq.[23]In order to further legitimize their intervention, a puppet government is emplaced in Iraq, which is non-representative of all factions. The removal of legitimate government through an intervention by US and its allies has sown seeds of internal strife, which cannot be removed through cosmetic measures like installing a host government composed of mostly Shia sect. On the other hand, the involvement of USA, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Iran, Al-Nasr and Kurds in Syria too has created a mess, where it has become difficult to hold a thread for

finding a solution to the problem. Intervention in Syria is considered both by the government and anti-government forces alike; as an effort to eliminate them. U.S. and Russia have contradicting interests in Syria,[24] where US efforts are taken as anti-government and Russia's as trying to prop up Bashar.[25] The self-interests of external players in case of Iraq and Syria have become the major cause for the successes of IS.

Sectarian Conflict

The Pew survey suggests that approximately 45-55% of the population in Iraq is Shias as compared to 42% Sunnis, whereas in Syria 15-20% are Shias out of total 93% Muslim population.[26]According to the survey, there is a significant ratio among Shias and Sunnis, who do not consider each other as Muslims.[27] The clutching of power by a fraction of Alawites in Syria and denying the same by Shias in Iraq to Sunnis is at the expense of sectarian division, which is expanding with every passing day. Some eighty years ago, Britain placed Hashmites on the throne of Iraq and USA also committed the same mistake by replacing the Sunni government after Iraq invasion in 2003.[28] In Syria, Alawis, a sub-section of Shia has risen to power through a gimmick,[29] thereby, denying the legitimate ratio of Sunni population in the governance of the country. The British, USA and Alawites have equal contribution in turning the region to bedrock of mis-governance exasperated by sectarian conflict to the point of cul-de-sac.

IS War Economy. IS has so far managed available resources very well to include taxation(including extortion), oil and gas resources, other natural resources, agriculture and funding from external resources to run its war economy. The range of authority it exerts over large swathes of Iraq and Syria permits IS to accrue US $ 2.9

billion per year, as suggested by Brisard and Martinez.[30]The asset count of IS amounts to US $ 2 trillion.[31]In addition, control of water resources to include upper reaches of Tigris and Euphrates and dams like Samarra barrage, Nuaimiyah Dam etc,[32] gives strategic advantage to IS in these conflict-ridden areas. In August 2014 capture of Mosul dam by IS raised a serious concern among Iraq government, Kurds and US, who took immediate action to re-take it. Water resources are being used as a military tool to degrade each others' forces and therefore will remain the area of interests for IS.

Lessons for COIN Forces in Pakistan

The internal security situation of Pakistan cannot be compared with IS successes in Iraq and Syria. In Pakistan, Taliban are on the run, almost defeated and state machinery is pursuing them and combing to clear every part of the state. There are many reasons for the success of state against non-state actors and foremost among them is the presence of democratically elected government. Presence of legitimate democratic government is endorsement by the public that they support democracy and are willing to resist any undemocratic route to power. The basic advantage of democratic government is the negation of any fascist ideas and beliefs. The people of Pakistan have rejected the extremist ideas of Taliban and non-democratic ways to topple democratic government. Taliban are losing space and the respect of 1980s in the eyes of people of Pakistan primarily due to adoption of brutal tactics and targeting of civilians, armed forces and state infrastructure. On the other hand, Iraq and Syria both do not have the legitimate democratic governments which are representative of all factions of society.

In Iraq and Syria, the national armed forces are unable to stand the rising IS, therefore, external forces particularly US, Russia,

Middle Eastern countries and other groups continue to play pivotal role in supporting or opposing the state's forces. Pakistan armed forces are the centre of gravity of the state and enjoy the backing of government and public alike. Particularly, after Pakistan army decided to give way to democracy, not only its status has risen in the eyes of public but they are able to focus towards their primary tasks. The people of Pakistan have never compromised on this one area - their armed forces - and they have protected it, stood behind it, believed in this institution like an article of faith. Despite, what are perceived by some as, turbulent elite civil- military relations, the armed forces have enjoyed deeply embedded social legitimacy in the eyes of society, therefore, the threat of an IS like insurgency rising in Pakistan has little chances to succeed. Terrorists in Pakistan have been able to attack installations like airports and air bases, but never were able to take hold of any of the vital installations in Pakistan, a fact in contrast with the IS successes in Iraq and Syria.

But having strong armed forces is only one way of seeing the problem. It only shows that we are judging the problem through our war fighting capability and not by the emergence and recurrence of causes of emergence of terrorism and insurgency in a state. We have successfully bombed the terrorist safe havens, and wiped them out but can we deny that it is only a short term solution to the issue? The long term solution to militancy and terrorism is only possible by adopting a comprehensive approach, where good governance is the foundation of all. So far, the Government of Pakistan seems to have adopted a state - centric approach to the problem of terrorism, as apparent by the overwhelmingly counterterrorism- based strategy. The world is attempting to deal with merely the consequences rather than addressing the causes of international

terrorism and is focusing its energies and resources towards coping with the reactions instead of the grievances of the developing world which will prove to be another failed strategy. If Counter - terrorism strategy addresses phenomena only and not the causes of it, it will not obtain desired results. The global scenario, world politics and the internal situation in Pakistan all present one fact - the threats to internal security will not be alleviated that easily in Pakistan. The nation is transitioning from a docile passive recipient public into an increasingly self - aware, vocal and well - informed public. As literacy rates rise and youth becomes more proactive, it will become difficult for the state to carry on with the pro - elite policies and state - centric approaches to deal with internal threats. The government needs to sit down and adopt people - centric approach to the issues. Not only the phenomena but also the cause needs to be eliminated in case future germination of seeds of insurgency is to be avoided.

Pakistan's armed forces have made the nation proud through their relentless fight against militants; it is now the duty of the ruling leadership to consolidate the gains made by the armed forces.

However, a critical issue faced by Pakistan is that of sectarian division. As a map prepared by Spearhead Research shows, that majority of population in Pakistan is Sunni, out of whom, about 76.3% follow Hanafi school of thought. Along with that, there are about 19.1% Shias. According to this source, Salafi / Wahabi school of thought forms just a segment of many minorities in Pakistan, totalling 1.7% of the total population, including Sikhism, Buddhism, Judaism, ahmadis etc. In fact the population of Christians and Hindus, according to the same map, exceeds the population of Salafis in Pakistan being 1.5% and 1.4% of the total population

respectively.[33] Although based on 2012 estimates, this shows the trends in population in terms of sectarian distribution that Salafi Islam is not being followed by the majority of the population, however, one must point out that the mainstay of the militants in North Waziristan and Al Qaeda elements that were residing in Pakistan was the same Salafi school of thought. Another important fact is that the majority of Madrassahs are being funded by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia which declaredly is the proponent of Salafi version of Islam. While one would like to keep most brotherly relations with all Muslim brethren all over the world, still Pakistan must make an enlightened and educated decision, whether it is ready to adopt their religious ideologies too?

Despite the above, most of the population of Pakistan is composed of religiously moderate people.[34] This is the most important part of Pakistani politics that it is all-inclusive, and ethnicity/sectarian division in the society has no bearing on the structure of polity. Although sectarian crimes have badly affected the internal security situation of Pakistan but representative government of all segments help in controlling sectarian issues. Situation in Iraq and Syria cannot be compared to Pakistan as in these states major portion of Sunnis have been denied their due right in politics. Having said the above, Pakistan has to take concrete measures to ensure security of Shias, along with minorities in the state. Any weakness in this aspect will be at the cost of causing fragility to the state and Pakistan is least prepared to afford such a cost.

Another important lesson comes home from Iraq-Syria crisis, which is about drying the source of finances to the miscreants. The world of wars and politics is a strange world. One cannot safely

assume that the enemy he knows to be his enemy will remain so forever and same goes for the friends in the international community. Every country must guard its own interests. However, given the fact that Pakistan has been used as the battleground for proxy wars between the Arab world and Iran, it is about time that we worry for our own soil and let no one use us. Whether a nation which is perpetually held hostage to its economic crises and relies on aid for even its day-to-day affairs, can take such audacious steps, is anybody's guess.

The miscreants in Pakistan have source of funding through local sources in shape of religious fund-collection whereas the major source is foreign donations or through legal business. According to Ikram, state of Pakistan passed Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2010, sections 5 and 9 of the Protection of Economic Reforms Act, 1992 and section 111(4) of Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 but gave free hand to terrorist under the legal cover to withhold information from tax authorities. In addition he points out that money launderers use *hawala* and *hundi* and also exploit legal transaction of section 111(4) of the income tax ordinance, where tax authorities cannot question them.[35] The recent recommendations for improving the existing rules and procedures for screening, regulating and monitoring international non-governmental organizations, though portrayed negatively but will definitely help in monitoring the foreign funding.[36]Efficient banking rules and regulations to monitor source of money including inflow of money will allow the state to effectively check the source of money to miscreant's organizations.

Conclusion

At the moment, Al-Qaeda affiliated TTP has been defeated in Pakistan apparently at least in terms of destruction of its nerve center, but how long will it last is not certain. Given the West's ambitions to maintain hold on the region, the dependency created by the World system and perpetuated by the local self-serving elite; the breeding grounds are ripe, should an insurgent wish to start his campaign once again. The overreliance on the current strengths and historic resilience of this nation and the valiance and professionalism of its defence forces alone will not work. The system of governance in Pakistan still does not provide for the well-being of the people. Exactly half of the population of Pakistan is poor by internationally accepted definitions.[37] The energy crisis, lack of access to basic necessities, as obvious from the HDI ranking of Pakistan, is almost an incentive for even the masses to comply. From continued deprivation and lawlessness to lack of direction for the largely unemployed youth who would be soon clueless enough to be wooed by any ideologue who assures them heaven, it is a fatal mix for the state. The threat is existential with many Governments in the West showing concerns over the rise of ISIS insurgency.[38] Nonetheless, one couldn't agree more with British Prime Minister David Cameron's assertion on not turning a blind eye towards the insurgency in ME saying it has "nothing to do with us." The news in the local and international media about militants from Pakistani soil[39] adds much more spice to what is being cooked in this area of ME. The lesson brought home from the successes of IS in Syria and Iraq for the COIN practitioners and theorists among policymakers and strategists in Pakistan, if not considered seriously will have all the chances to sway away many of the discontented towards the

militant ideologies. By far, good governance will be the only sure guarantee that the nation of 200 million will not plunge too deeply into the quagmire.

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SOCIAL MEDIA AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN PAKISTAN BEFORE AND AFTER ELECTION 2013

(Ms. Huma Javed)*

Abstract

Social media is a distinctive platform where online users can easily express and share contents, and they can build communication among themselves. It can be defined as the impending trend of communication, a countless range of internet based tools and platforms (face book, twitter, mobile apps and many other online forums), which enhance the sharing of information. The aim of this paper is to discuss and analyze the contribution of social media in the process of political transformation before and after 2013 elections. The study in hand elucidates the emergence of social media that interrupts the boundaries of one way communication where current scenarios, information, thoughts and feelings can flow, besides altering the voter's perceptions. Thus, it caused transformation before, during and after 2013 elections. In addition, its exposure is inadequate in Pakistan, but in future it will be more effective as it is connecting more and more people in the digital community and contributing in the implementation of good governance by changing and influencing the mindset of people through analyzing and evaluating certain issues.

Key Words*: communication, social media, emergence, inadequate, evaluate*

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Introduction

Over the past few years there has been a remarkable development in social transformation which has made many changes across the world. During the last decade online communication is on rise and gradually evolving the views of people. Developments in social & political transformation are the most persuasive and debated topics and have been analyzed in almost every field of life. As, 21st century is in the progressive stage, it has enhanced the approaches of people towards life. Currently, with the advancement of technology, people can save time and energy. Hence, technology is in the process of substantial growth in almost every field of life whether it is related with medical, astronomy, nuclear powers, computers, television, internet, education and so on. Among all the phases of development the most significant is the invention of computers in 1936. However, after the advancement of computers internet technology has become more useful. Among all applications and usages, social media revolution is a fundamental fragment of internet marketing where people can interact freely, discuss information and share their views regarding politics, social and other issues. In short, it is a mixture of different contents. Social media programs are the central hub to create content which attract and encourage people to share subject matter and areas of interest. The scope of this paper is limited to qualitative analysis of social media activism and political transformation with regard to the period before and after 2013 election. The study briefly explains the spirit of this non-stop train, i.e. social media communication that focuses on the elements which determine its relation to election 2013. It also highlights the

significant points with regard to electoral campaigns, events of election and social media's progression throughout the electoral processes and tries to respond by answering questions. Has social medium become a source of political pressure to change the policies of government particularly in the perspective of 2013 election? Why has social media acquired a political role? Moreover, the study relies on the literature published on the subject and availed from documents, surveys conducted on election 2013, books related to social media activism/political transformation and articles that are based on election 2013.

Social Media in Political Transformation

Social Media is an important platform that is easily available to all those having internet facility. It is an immense thrill for 21st century; it involves people in online discussions such as online technological tools, which are the broader terms to assist or portray cultural events. It has now become a powerful force for advertising, socializing and communicating. If one wants to know about someone's life one can easily access their Facebook and twitter accounts. Bryan Eisenberg (2011) characterizes social media as a platform for interaction, social relationships and social networking. He emphasized the importance of social media as it provides prospects to people to create their own content[1] according to their own knowledge. The social media revolution is one of the most significant platforms of social interactivity.

Social media as it is today, has passed through different stages of transformation. In this process many social media apps become obsolete and new social networking sites were introduced. This

paper is not only focusing on few famous social networking websites like Facebook, Twitter, Orkut and some mobile apps but it will also discuss some old social media websites, which are an important part of this study because it will describe what actually social media was and how it transformed to facilitate a new mode of connection, online communication and set a tone for future events. Generally, the social media websites include Usenet newsgroup, Bulletin Board Systems (BBSs), Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and Instant messengers, Friendster and Live Journal, Forums, LinkedIn, MySpace, Facebook, Orkut and Twitter. These are different online forums that allowed sharing of information and interchanging of articles[2]. Most of them were used for communication and message sharing[3]. These websites were developed in the 1970s or 1980s connecting more than 110 million users, i.e. Facebook has 90 million enlisted users and 60 plus million visitors.[4] In addition, the social forum profiles are widespread and has unlimited usages.[5]

Similarly, online forums provides a place to online users to share or post something related with a specific subject and come up with more sociable interface.[6] Moreover, LinkedIn, MySpace and Facebook are the most popular social interacting forums and are used for professional networking such as for job searching, professional information and help in creating Curriculum Vitae.[7] While Facebook is considered as a platform not an application as its purpose is to help people to communicate online. There are 900 million Facebook users whereas 161 Million LinkedIn users[8] and these have succeeded more as compared to other social networking sites.[9] Other websites such as Orkut and Twitter are used for video and photo sharing. Twitter is recognized as a micro-blogging

network and allows users to post approximately 140-character text messages, which are called "Tweets".[10] So the digital age has transformed the world towards interesting behavioral observations and has gained momentum. Henceforth, it offers variety of digital communication technologies and every platform has its own importance. Similarly, Snapshot is popular among youngsters. From 2002-2004, social networking channels and applications like Friendster, Hi5, LinkedIn, My space, Orkut, Facebook, Live Spaces and Reuion.com were released and they were actively sponsored and became prominent. But, Social media in 21st century is performing variety of jobs like LinkedIn that is created for young professionals in their job hunting.

These social websites provide complete connectivity, but, there are two sides to every coin, such as lack of emotional connection. It permits people to be insensitive, it reduces face-to-face interaction, users convey bogus expressions or feelings, and foremost it shrinks family closeness that causes distraction. There is a need that people distinguish between right and wrong. On the other hand, social media has the power to democratize news reporting. People who can access online forums can create conversations that make news. Social media is also changing the mode of traditional news sources. Many have an objection that posting an article on the web naturally decreases the value of their own news. So, the transformation of news from print newspapers to the web is another trend. Just like, before 2013 elections there have been premature half-stories about the elections but during election process media transformed, particularly in 2013 election. The conquest of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf on social forums has opened new spaces as it proved a

persuasive example of engagement through social online forums. Much of the election scenario or we should call it a battle of perceptions was fought on social networking. According to election commission of Pakistan, there were approximately, 87,540,873 [11] registered voters. Hence, this made digital online platforms the largest canvassing or engagement tool for parties. So, this was certainly a game-changer. The average voter, rooting for freedom of expression offline, has experienced democratization of expression through Facebook, Twitter and online blogs – even trolls. The canvassing loudspeakers, battling it out at high levels in each *mohalla*, were hijacked, by hashtag wars fought by party followers on social media platforms. And political leaders, candidates, party workers were all active on social forums. The political establishment promoted its street power through social media campaigning. Political parties are stuck to their conventional and enormous rallies and advertising, but also entered the social media battlefield. The essential factor which increased the power of social media towards democratic norms is an attention grabber.

Social Media as an Attention Grabber

Social platforms are the great way of social transformation and connect millions of people online where online users can share personal content, opinions and experiences. Currently, Social platforms have different factors with regard to its commercialism and technological integration. So factually, social media is continuously propagating and flourishing. It has instantly stimulated itself as a campaigning tool. It has changed the real face of politics not only in Pakistan in 2013 elections but also in the case of Obama's presidency nomination in the US. Bambi Turner

explained in her writings that it was not easy for Obama to win without the social media.[12] Internet has presented a foremost outlook for public. In the viewpoint of election strategy it truly played a great role.

There is no doubt that trending, fascinating topics, and debates are very helpful for followers because it supports in finding conversations in which they can argue and get the required information. Hence, it reveals political candidate's record online and is accessible to common people so that followers can easily see their record and take decisions accordingly. Jennifer Aaker and Andy Smith in their book have mentioned that internet, now - a - days, is going towards the era of political transparency. Its insightful information, either specific or common, generated on the web sites, blogs and social sites.[13] Basically, Social media maintains and enhances democratic participation by providing two-way interaction among users. Social media is the rising phenomena, giving voice to marginalized groups and allowing for the articulation of alternative political communications to wider audiences than ever before. It has definitely emerged as a new trend in Indian politics too. Hence, it offered great opportunities to participate in interactive political social media campaigns in 2014 Indian general election. Currently, social media is providing new paradigms for political mobilization and participation before, during and after, in Pakistan as well as in Indian general elections. In reality, it has transformed a lot of things for both leaders as well as for voters.[14] For instance, the role of social media in Arab spring, its role in supporting anti-corruption movement in Pakistan, the dissemination of information through social media in governance,

political reforms, building public awareness and developing political interests among youngsters who brought a new wave of ideas.

Political Communication and Political Culture

Political communication and political structures are other interactive processes that are associated with social transformation among followers, politicians and the general public. Political communications are a central drift that are adopted by many politicians for the sake of electoral and policy-making developments. Politics is considered as incomplete without the proper organization of information; it is basically a social structure to run a government or the state.

In terms of social factors these two formats are notable features to confront political processes. With regard to internet and social media, the political culture pursues the attention and provides spaces for significant information. It is defined as a set of attitudes and practices apprehended by people that figure out political behavior. In addition, it contains proper judgments, political myths, beliefs, and ideas that are essential to understand which attitude and behavior make a good society. Political culture is a reflection of a government, and it integrates the factors of history that may predate the current government. It may differ significantly from state to state and sometimes even within a state. However, political culture remains more or less the same over time. Presently, political parties are looking to stimulate the efforts of inevitable flow of electoral mobilization and information influences. Political parties (i.e. PTI, PML (N), MQM, and PPP) have played an important role in spreading of information through political communication by

enhancing social media with the support of developing proper political culture environment. In 2010, the Arab Spring has changed political scenarios in many countries. The involvement of social media in Arab spring has led to the initiative to open up new trends of free internet and social media usages for developing political communication. Hence, it rapidly reached to the masses and allowed them to share and broaden the contents which resulted in the rapid spread of Arab spring.

In Pakistan, the significance of social media was highlighted in an important way about the politicians and their presence on social forums in order to encourage youngsters. Thus, social media acquired a political role in order to maintain its credibility and the transition of power as the most significant aspect. For instance, the shift of power in Egypt was the most noteworthy change in the Arab Spring – occurred in a large, populated and traditionally Arab state. The chain of events leading up to it was quite powerful, and social media played a central role.[15] Similarly, in Pakistan it has become an important political communication channel that allows political institutions and voters to work together. Therefore, political activities might gain more transparency and citizens might be able to involve more in political processes. However, until now the possibilities of political discussions on social media involving political institutions could not be subjugated sufficiently. One reason is a lack of understanding of politicians about the existing topics and discussions on different social media platforms that are based on an extensive literature review.

The Transformation of Campaigning Styles and Voting Patterns

The standards of democracy are associated with the veracities of voting patterns and elections. Elections, on the other hand, are the most acknowledged and powerful feature of democracy. They are important in democratic country for selecting the governments by the people. In election 2013, new dynamic doors of campaigning styles were presented. While, social media recaps that election is the fundamental ritual of democracy. In the illustrations of 2013 elections, there were large number of volunteers and paid campaign workers who expended time and energy on campaigning style strategies for instance going door-to-door, guiding voters about the significance of voting, appealing for vote etc. These tactics were transformed and publicized on social sites in order to facilitate online users. Similarly, political parties encourage audiences, the efforts of generating strong layers of voting patterns are perceived comprehensively. The election process in Pakistan is irregular and unpredictable. This unpredictable environment develops uncertainty that never supports the political procedure of progress.

The fact is that, Pakistan has a multi-party system with different party agendas. In this structure of politics every party and politician tries to maintain its own party dominion. For instance, Pakistan's People's Party (PPP), Mutehada Qomi Movement (MQM), Pakistan Tahreek-e-Insaf (PTI), Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) are the parties that have separate agendas but in some situations, when one party does not get an absolute majority, they form coalition governments. This wave of association has gained momentum in 2013 elections via

social media where parties came up with the political agendas and boosted voter participation. As compared to previous elections, social media participation is a vibrant idea as it launched an election campaign for political parties to create political awareness among people via social media and tried to modify the mind-set of people by posting videos, and captivating pictures of politicians through emotional speeches. In all these activities party agendas and manifestoes are the most escalating phenomena. Hence, the Power of social media indulges in the lives of people like the role of oxygen in the human body[16]. One cannot deny its credibility without using it.

In Pakistan, people are much aware of social media websites like Facebook, Twitter, Forums, online social sites etc. And spread messages related with the political chores especially in election days. The main essence behind all these activities is to get maximum support. Moreover, Political agents convey messages and upload pictures which comprise fake posters of politicians, video clips, edited pictures with perceptible captions, newspaper ads, funny cartoons etc. These all are posted by hired IT experts. According to Muhammad Aatif, election campaigning through social media is inexpensive. And the fact is that mostly political parties started targeting social media for political purposes.[17] Another reason for using social media by political actors is that there were approximately 400 million voters who registered[18] themselves for voting. Arfan Jafar, an IT expert, clarifies that Short Messaging Services (SMS) also engaged masses into an important role in order to fill the gap among people and shaping opinions

regarding political parties, campaign strategies, political agendas and manifestoes.[19]

Election 2013 is dissimilar to previous general elections that were held in 2008. Certainly, the 2013 election has created a lot of eagerness among masses. Similarly, party manifestoes also played a domineering role. The word "Manifesto" means the announcement of the policy or its aims and objectives. According to Omer Siddique, Ali kemal and Mahmood Khalid, the party manifesto is an outline of the required aims that are verbally professed or intended, promises are made or the line of actions are prepared that are declared by political parties during the election times.[20] Manifestos are the foremost and competitive electoral process, which provides a bird's eye view of electoral development to the masses and the reasons are to educate and inform people about their decisions regarding voting process. Moreover, this strategy assists before casting votes. The manifestoes of major political parties are an important part of this paper. Party manifesto activities are to appraise the general masses about the alternative choices for different parties. On the other hand, political parties have made coherent efforts to formulate manifestoes and slogans in order to get attention. Hence, detailed analyses of party's manifestoes are not possible to deliberate but short reviews are explained below.

Let's start with PPPP; party manifesto approach is to build various dams across the country. Since this Party was founded by Zulfiqar Ali Bhuto, it has adopted social, a broad - minded and democratic approach; assurances are to increase the management of the energy sector.[21] Similarly, the present PML-N government has proclaimed different wide-ranging reforms that will help people in

different sectors. In addition, PML-N has also worked on different projects related to transportation, Yellow cab scheme and Metro Bus Scheme etc.[22] Whereas PTI stance is to create "Naya Pakistan" by giving impartiality in judicial system and eradicate unemployment by developing 150,000 call centers that will help in generating 250,000 new jobs.[23] Moreover, the impression of PTI is totally new and no other party has ever made such policies which PTI made. ANP on the other hand came up with the manifesto to develop reconciliation and harmony and stand against the violent behaviors. Party views are that the discussions and negotiations are the best way to solve all matters.[24] Since the emergence of Pakistan, it has been surrounded by uncountable problems like energy crises, terrorism, unemployment, inflation, suicide bombing, water crises, lawlessness, illiteracy, poverty and injustice. In short, Pakistan at present is facing numerous challenges. Various political parties have made promises to resolve these issues and circulated different catchy slogans to develop peace in the country. Slogans, at present time, are not so popular because political parties have adopted many other methods to attract people. But, Party manifestos are working in this regard. Different political parties have formed various slogans about political perception that were prominent on social forums they are mentioned below.

PTI slogan is "Naya Pakistan", **PML-N** motto is that "Pakistan Bachayengay"; another slogan is "Qadam bharao Nawaz Sharif, Hum tumharay sath hain",[25] **PPPP** slogan is "Roti, Kapra our Makan" and another popular slogan is "Bhutto family hero hero, Baqi saray zero zero", Whereas **ANP** catchy words are "Peaceful Pakistan" .

MQM slogan is "Hum ko manzil nahi rahnuma chahya". These slogans are a part of electoral processes and are attractive for voters.[26] Besides, they cover the gap between voters and political candidates. However, slogans were more widespread in 2013 election because of the fluctuation of campaigning electoral process on social media. The emergence of internet-based social media made it feasible to communicate with numerous people at a time to share the ideas with each other and develop cordial relations.

Mary Joyce, has mentioned in her book *"Digital Activism Decoded",* that the digital technologies such as mobile phones, iPad and internet-based technologies are quickly becoming popular in spreading awareness. [27]Digital activism represents the social and political changes which are uninterruptedly changing. The framework of digital activism can also be defined in terms of the activism campaign where economic, social and political perspectives transpire. The internet and social media are dominant channels for learning about the different facets of social, political, cultural, technological, economical and psychological change. Due to this reason digital activism is vital for a variety of factors. The notion of digital activism with regard to politics can be described as a new political movement where activism largely takes interest so that political movement that revolves around the emerging dynamics of social media and political ideology. In the perspective of politics, there are different factors which are important for the political ideology. The factors include the manifesto and party leadership, electoral campaign, electoral strategy, campaign staff, campaign strategy and workers. Social media, in all these factors, has contributed a lot to provoke the citizens by providing awareness of

political education which encourages citizens. However, it is now become a strong agent of socialization. In today's political scenario it demands public attention, participation, mobilization, involvement, socialization, contribution and patience in order to generate a better political awareness with the contribution of digital activism i.e. social media.

Social Media in 2013 Election

The history of Pakistan's electoral process is surrounded by many incidents and tragedies. Both dictatorial and democratic regimes have subsisted steadily for a long period of time but democratic regimes corroborated to be short-lived. Since, change is an important element of Pakistan's politics because different political actors are major characters that make up the country's political scenarios. Hence, it shouldn't be ignored that whichever party is elected, the political system will never change and that it will remain the same as it was. The fact is that the current political system is the continuation of the British rule which somehow eliminated Islamic rule. Alternatively, the politics of Pakistan have its own standards, and values according to which different events take place.

The paper however, presents a conceptual model of elections that how quickly social media developed in the ways of political activism. The election tactics reshaped structures and methods that impact on the politicians or voters. In addition, there is a comparison between (pre) social media and (post) social media of election with regard to different electoral events. The 2013 election were held on 11th May, 2013. The circumstances of the country were

not passive since, violent incidents and deaths that occurred during the election campaign had created an insecure environment which resultantly cast negative impact but political activists and voters were unafraid and participated with full enthusiasm.

The 2013 elections created a chaotic environment and offered many choices along with the emergence of Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf as an admirable political force. It caught public attention enormously because of its strong agenda. Hence, electoral politics were dominated by the six competing players, *[Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), Awami National Party(ANP), Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI), Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Group (PML-N) and Pakistan Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam Group (PML-Q)]* that came up with different political models.

The overall turnout of the election position stood highest as compared to previous elections. Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) got maximum seats whereas Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaaf (PTI) got second and third majority seats.[28] The scenario after the results was not conducive and favorable because of rigging that was observed in most parts of Punjab, Sindh and other parts of the country.[29] This rigging protest, however, created political disorder for the time being but later it was decided that these cases should be taken to court.

It is interesting to mention here that social media in the entire situation has played an overwhelming role because citizens including (youngsters, middle and old aged people) all those who can access social media have updated their statuses with pictures of

stained thumb videos after casting votes. Citizens came out for casting votes in full strength and courage. The fascinating part of this process is that youth was found lined up at polling booths and women in far flung areas of Baluchistan voted for the first time. Hence, it seemed that Pakistanis first time recognized the importance of vote and the right of national duty.

Comparison Between (pre) Social Media and (post) Social Media

There are several elements that determine the dynamics of electoral and political activities. In every election, the personal influence of candidates, their past achievements, and performances in social and political activities are factors which impact on ethics and enlighten about right and wrong, provoke citizens to vote for country, grant power to those who are sincere for prosperity of a country. Similarly, there are a number of techniques and strategies which are followed by different candidates to influence voters by developing electoral campaigns including rallies, chanting slogans, corner meetings, canvassing, opinion of the leaders, voter cards, mohalla meetings, pamphlets with party symbols, distribution of party's manifestos, leaflets, posters, songs of political campaign, hand - bills, social media polling, videos sharing, voice recording, addressing the citizens of various areas and then split the edited videos/pictures on social media. These all tactics are adopted in order to influence the mind-sets of voters. These techniques manipulate voter's mentality.

In the past electioneering strategy was limited to print & electronic media but after the advancements of technology the

perception has changed. Now, people are more aware about political environment and can share the ideas without hesitation and get immediate feedback. Elections, therefore, act as a bridge between political actors, common citizens, individuals, state, political affairs and between the affairs of the state.[30] However, they are the agents of socialization while electoral activities are the organized program that plays a role of popular interest. There are various strategies which are followed by different political parties to grab the attention of the voters. These are as follows:

Poster/Leaflet:

Poster/leaflet highlights the importance of vote, used in 1993 election campaign and had the information regarding the rights of women.[31] In 1997, 2002 and 2008 elections same policies were used which tinted the rights of women regarding votes by using poster/leaflet.[32]

Political Campaign Songs:-
Political campaign songs are the central part of the election; songs are used to express the positive message about party plans. The first ever song was recorded by PPP during 1988 election. And in 1993, PPP and MQM have recorded several songs that were based on party's motto. MQM came up with the song *Mazloomo ka Saathi hai Altaf Hussain,* this was sung to give tribute to Altaf Hussain.[33] In the same way, *Bijja teer Bijja,* was released in 1987 and was, used in 1988 general election.[34] PML-N also presented some catchy songs in Punjabi and with the rise of Imran Khan's Tehreek-i- Insaf, the party came up with trendy songs and adopted famous pop songs in order to grasp youth feelings. Some songs lyrics are: *Dil mai ho*

Insaf and secondly *mai tou dekho ga*[35]. This approach has increased in 2013 election where PML-N and PTI were the real competitors.

Door to Door Campaigning and Brochures Distribution:

Activists, Supporters, and Followers of various political parties roamed around the streets while carrying flags of their party and voluntarily visit nearby houses of their locality and encouraged people to vote. Similarly, advertising through social, print and electronic media are the prevailing means of conveying messages.

Advertising via Social Media, Print & Electronic Media, and Mobile Messaging:

Since, many believe that media is the dominant mean of conveying messages. According to Ranney, the significance of media via electoral coverage cannot be ignored because it plays an important role for political modernization as (print and electronic media) are the important tools of spreading messages.[36]Interviews/talk shows are the focal determinants of electoral strategies and address procedures, the ground realities which are associated with elections. Since, elections are the only system of power, where all political parties in the world work for the betterment of the country and to establish a democratic system. The phenomenon of this political transformation has modified the contents and spread a wide mechanism. The emergence of social media activism and political transformation has made communication easier and created realistic leading tools for politics. As information technology remarkably assists the trend of online communication and massively empowered people, Peter Benjamin believes that in most of the situations media mingle new configurations which already existed but were not used before.[37] Hence, media sensationalized

new ideas. And, people keenly participate and debate on various topics. Therefore, Public assessments are improving which are associated with election and helpful in developing relationship with political activities. Opinions, judgments, thoughts and feelings are widely expressed. People can read others views as well so that their own perceptions develop on certain issues. In addition, both electronic and print media were sharing the feedback of viewers and readers, through the prism of integration of user-generated content into mainstream content. Or, in other words, people say it the way it is, mostly without filtering or moderation; apart from checks for swear words and personal attacks. Hence, the television, print, digital news has been cemented and covered with user-generated contents through tweets, Facebook posts and statuses blogs, videos, Instagram photos and much more. Media has changed from being a monologue to a dialogue – or even more, an open debate, with personal opinions that are highlighting in mainstream media, opinions that are unregulated and uncensored, regulated only by norms of civic decency. In that way, social media is a natural progression for a democracy such as Pakistan as well as in India. The intent has always been the same, but the tools have only now come into being. With social media platforms, Pakistanis are voicing their opinions. In all this, online platforms such as Facebook,Twitter, WhatsApp and Instagram seem to have emerged and are being accepted as the fourth pillar of media after print, TV, and radio. So, this has made social platforms a powerful and intimidating tool for public encouragement where general masses can easily float their ideas. For the very first time, news is getting high proportion over the medium used to convey it. An average citizen has come to have the power to turn the tide through public

deliberations and social media platforms. The good news about social media is that, finally, the message has become more important than the messenger. It has assumed that it may mean empowerment for all who engage with it.

Conclusion

The transition of power with regard to political influence in 2013 election was the major change that occurred at a large scale. Many citizens voted for the first time, on these social platforms, political candidates, political parties and general people convinced each other to vote rather than to waste their votes. This chain of political transformation leads them towards democratic right to make the country peaceful and stable. It is recognized that traditional media with their television broadcasting, newspapers etc are still playing an important role but is supplemented by online activism and in future its impacts are sky-scraping. These new premises distinguish present social media trends from the past traditional media. Media before 2000 was totally state-owned in Pakistan. It had limited outreach but with the passage of time many private channels were introduced. In this political world, people's assessment holds great importance; their views, opinions are shared on different online social sites. So it can be said that social medium is the main platform to disseminate and address political chores and agendas of political parties on election days as well as in normal days. Changing trends of political dynamics with regard to social media are the most confronting processes.

Social media in Pakistan is a platform for communication as it emphasizes and discusses those stories in the form of (status updates, tweets, tagging and sharing of contents) which are to some extent disregarded by traditional media. It is however, playing a

mobilizing role by disseminating information. It will certainly bring further political change in the future, public perception and progressive political communication will also develop. Hence, social media emergence helped people to identify with their national rights and duties. Moreover, it is concluded here that social media and political transformation changed the people's perception and created a mobilizing society.

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STUDY ON SUPPORTIVE DISLOYAL, DESTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP AND ITS IMPACT ON SUSCEPTIBLE FOLLOWERS AND ORGANIZATION

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Abstract

In this article, the researchers have proposed actions for elimination of destructive leadership behavior by identifying the anti-organization and pro-subordinate behavior of leaders. Besides, there is a summarization of the existing destructive leadership researches that take a new direction. The study explores basic features and mechanisms that define destructive leadership. Identifying each type of destructive leadership currently studied (e.g. supportive disloyal, constructive, derailed and tyrannical leadership) shows different aspects. This study focuses on supportive disloyal leadership, and addresses some related issues. Then there is an explanation of some of the characteristics of pro-subordinate destructive leadership that set it apart from other forms of leadership, and consolidate this thinking into a theoretical model which helps us understand indicators of destructive leadership, and their background and impact on followers and organization.

Key Words: *destructive leadership, destructive goals, influence, pro-subordinate behavior, susceptible followers*

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Introduction

Leadership is a vast and significant concept in leadership studies and social sciences. Concept of leadership is generally associated with team work, high performances of leader, team and organizations; effective leadership leads towards effective performances of teams and ultimately, the lack of it will slow down growth of organizations. While destructive leadership mortifies the overall performances and growth of organizations, the study to identifying the aversive or destructive behaviors and styles of leadership can help organizations amend attitudes and behavior of their leaders (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005). Usually, leaders are studied as admirable and appreciable persons, by distinguishing them for their significant capabilities to encourage followers and motivate constructive transformation of organizations. This "laudable conceptualization" of leadership, does not think about the situations in which leadership has adverse impact on followers and organizations (Hunter et al., 2007). To emphasize this aversive side of leaders, researchers have agreed that leadership occasionally takes decision which can be harmful for the subordinates or followers, which in turn can bring deterioration of long-term organizational performance (Mumford et al., 1993; Bedell-Avers, Hunter, & Mumford, in press). We can describe destructive leaders by personalized needs for power, charisma, narcissism, negative life history, and an ideology of hate. In many circumstances, in combination with particular followers, potentially destructive leaders can achieve power and their destructive objectives by pro-subordinate behavior. A single definition is inadequate to explain this phenomenon: individuals with destructive nature, driven by a

selfish need for power but missing oratory skills and strengths might not achieve substantial power. Similarly, skilled public speakers with a compassionate image and mixed motives are less likely to be destructive. Although these features might be necessary for destructive leadership, but they are not enough, combination of wickedness and destructiveness makes toxic leaders powerful. This paper is based on descriptive study on how destructive leadership encourages followers to pursue their destructive goals and how followers respond to manifestation of destructive leadership. By observing the toxic triangle concept of "Padilla et al 2007", which describes convergence of leader, follower, and environmental factors mainly lead towards the possibility of destructive leadership activities. This study explains how business environment is being contaminated by destructive leadership as, once destructive behavior occurs in the company, the entire system becomes "alienated" and starts destabilizing. The best way to erase destructive behavior within an organization is to be first aware of its root. Destructive leadership often destroys many organizations resulting in immense economic and social losses, and these losses have a tendency to spread outside the boundaries of affected organizations. It has been observed that for their own destructive anti organization goals destructive leadership exploits susceptible followers by influencing them through pro-subordinate behavior.

Objectives and Purposes

- To study and explain how destructive leadership through pro subordinate behavior encourages the followers to pursue their destructive goals.

- To observe the followers responses towards this manifestation and anti-organization behavior of destructive leadership.
- To propose measures to erase destructive behavior within the organization.

Work & Methodology:

Secondary sources of data are used for this study. Data was collected through observation, case-studies, books, journals, periodicals, abstracts, indexes, and research reports. This research is a case study based on qualitative research techniques and grounded theories to reach conclusions. Available literature has been analyzed critically and contextually to study the impact of destructive and dark side of leadership.

Literature Review

Research studies have found that leadership is not always involved in bringing positive changes in the organizations and for the wellbeing of workers, but to a certain extent leadership is motivated for own personal benefits (O'Connor et al., 1995). House and Howell (1992) while studying leadership, it is anticipated that leadership and its effective capabilities are actually based on their feeling of individual supremacy, authoritative conducts, personality exaggeration, utilization of others, and egocentric enthusiasm. Based on the studies of House and Howell (1992) many other researchers started investigating different destructive styles of leadership. But still there is a need to study various associated concepts of destructive leadership. Destructive leadership is defined

as 'hostile actions of a leader' (Schaubroeck, Walumbwa, Ganster & Kepes, 2007), and destructive leadership behavior can be defined as the organized and recurrent behavior of a leader, supervisor or manager, which spoils the working environment of the organization by damaging or impairing the organization's ultimate objectives, everyday jobs , resources, and work efficiency.

These destructive objectives can be achieved by minimizing the motivational and job satisfaction level or welfare of his/her followers. Kellerman (2004) Padilla, Hogan and Kaiser (2007), explain the relationship among destructive leaders, vulnerable followers and conducive environment. They designed a system to explain the impact of destructive leaders on vulnerable followers. This mechanism has three major components which include destructive leaders, vulnerable followers and favorable environments. And there is a link among all these three. In the first component, the authors have pointed out that some characteristics such as charisma can also lead towards destructivity. The second component explains the relationship between a destructive leader and his followers and impact of this relationship on both of them. The third part of system explains the environmental factors which influence the behavior of destructive leader. However the important point is that, even if a leader has some of these traits it is not necessary that he or she will surely become a destructive leader (Padilla, Hogan & Kaiser 2007).

Supportive - disloyal leaders are the leaders who, for the sake of accomplishment of their personal goal, show concerns for the wellbeing of their followers and, along with welfare of followers, these leaders are violating the real interest of the organization. Such

leaders may exploit the resources, material, time, or financial resources of the organization (Altheide et al., 1978; Ditton, 1977). Supportive - disloyal leaders may exploit their followers by conceding them more benefits at the cost of the organization. These leaders may also appreciate negativity in followers by overlooking their negligence or misconduct (Einarsen et al., 2002).

The strangeness in the bond of leadership and followers depends on the greater similarity between the leaders' and followers' self-concept, stronger bonding brings greater motivation to follow. Completion of this cycle is dependent on the leader's vision and the follower's self-concept and how it lifts self-esteem and self - efficacy (Shamir et al., 1993; Weierter, 1997). Followers' values and beliefs also contribute to the extent to which followers follow the destructive leaders, those individuals who are by nature greedy and selfish, are more likely to follow destructive leaders and can easily be engaged in destructive activities (Hogan, 2006). Determined, but less-socialized followers, are susceptible and whenever they are authorized or appreciated by a leader they can easily engage themselves in destructive actions (McClelland, 1975).

There are two types of followers who support destructive leadership. One is Conformers who submissively and blindly follow their leaders because of their own unsatisfied needs and immaturity that makes them vulnerable to the influence of destructive leaders. The other one is Colluders who support destructive leaders just for the sake of promoting themselves in the organization (Padilla, et al 2007).

Combination of low ethical and moral values of leaders and followers nurtures the concept of leader - centric (Kellerman, 2004, Yukl, 2005), and accentuates the dynamic relationship between the leader's destructive nature, the followers' level of vulnerability, and the ethical environment. This combination generates a collective unethical, destructive behavior in the whole organization (Brewer, 2007; Zimbardo, 2007, Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2008), and members of the organization will continue to participate in this cycle until either the organization itself finally collapses, or the individual starts re-evaluating his or her values and decides to exit (Brewer, 2007). In extreme cases, leaders place the organization at risk and can align the organization with unethical or illegal objectives and activities by influencing their followers to pursue destructive goals, (Kayes, Stirling, & Nielsen, 2007). On the other hand, sometimes it happens that followers are unaware of their leader's vision, and cannot properly judge the actual intention of their leaders in asking them to pursue destructive goals and suffer no harm from that goal pursuit or even benefit by pursuing destructive goals. Those followers who are loyal to their leader and ambitiously follow him in pursuing his or her destructive goals may get substantial rewards or favors from their leader (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005). Padilla et al 2007 developed a model of the toxic triangle; (Fig.1) the fundamentals of the model are explained as follows.

A. Padilla et al. / the Leadership Quarterly 18 (2007) 176 - 194

Destructive Leadership

Personality of destructive leadership is the first constant of the toxic triangle which can be described in five significant leadership traits: ***charisma, personalized use of power, narcissism, negative life themes, and an ideology of hate***. Only one factor probably cannot become the reason of negativity of a leader: toxic individual can be motivated by an egotistical want for authority, however, having deficient of allegorical dexterity and resilience may not enable him to achieve noteworthy supremacy. In the same way, skillful communal orator through compassionate image and social purpose are comparatively less toxic. Though the said traits may be essential for toxic leadership, still they are not

powerful alone to destroy the whole organization. Besides these destructive leadership traits, there is another important factor which supports negativity of leadership for their own benefits, and that factor is "followers". Destructive leaders become powerful with the support of followers and supportive environment. (Padilla et al 2007).

Susceptible Followers

Though followers are not studied in detail as leaders are, however the character of followers in the leadership progression is visibly essential, which raises the need of existence of followership to acknowledge the leader's power. Contemporary relational research studies (e.g., Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) identify the characteristics of followership in leadership progression. However, a question arises that why some followers are incapable or reluctant to refuse to go along with dominant and offensive, destructive leadership? Kellerman (2004) and Lipman-Blumen (2005) propose that followers want security, safety measures, group association, and inevitability in a tentative environment. Sometimes followership actually gets benefit from negative behaviors and destructive vision of the leader. They want to satisfy their own needs, identity, and harmonize group activities. There are two different types of susceptible followers. Weierter (1997) argues that the first category of followers are the one who don't have an understanding of self-concept and the other one is one who contributes towards the leader's values. Kellerman (2004, p. 26–27) defines bystander followers as those who accept the negative authority of a leader. While, acolyte followers are the "true supporter" who help in the destructive activities of toxic leaders. By

merging these two concepts together, followership is divided into two categories: conformers and colluders. Conformer followers are used to comply with destructive leadership because of fear of leaders, while colluder followers vigorously participate in the activities of destructive leadership. In both cases followers are motivated by egotism, self benefits but their concerns are diverse (Higgins, 1997). Conformer followers strive to reduce the effects of not following, whereas colluder followers search for individual benefits all the way through connecting and following a destructive leader (Higgins, 1997). The susceptibility of conformer followers ensues from the following:

- ***Unsatisfied basic needs & wants****:* In order to achieve high performances in any organization, there is a need to meet the essential wants of followers, same is for the leaders. To avoid destructive leadership, basic needs of followers and leaders must be met (Maslow, 1954; Burns, 1978). Now - a - days most poor countries have high corruption rate. As a result overall poor nations are easy to be exploited negatively in bargaining of satisfaction of their needs (Transparency International, 2005).

- ***Pessimistic self-evaluations***: Judge, Locke & Durham (1997), explain the concept of self-respect, spam of control, individual belief on his or her strength, as the most important factors for personality formation and self evaluation. It is the basic belief which one could have about oneself. This belief enhances the process of self grooming and it creates an impact on his/her performances and job satisfaction level. (Judge & Bono, 2011). Researches also

indicate that sometimes excess of self esteem and self confidence are more susceptible to destructive leadership thinking (Luthans et al, 1998).

- *Psychological immaturity*: Most research on human behavior recommends that immature persons are often more obedient to authority and engage in destructive works in obedience of their leader. Freud (1921) elaborates that immature submissiveness and obedience may support destructive leadership.

- *Ambition*: Even though destructive leaders bring harm to the organization but few affiliates of this thinking sometimes may flourish (Offer man, 2004). And some of these ambitious members, because of their affiliation with destructive leaders, may want to execute the destructive vision of their leader (Keller man, 2004; Offer man, 2004).

- *Congruent values and beliefs*: It means that beliefs are attached and depend on destructive leader's attitude, which may bring more destruction to the organization in pursuit of their own goals (Lord & Brown, 2004; Shamir et al, 1993).

- *Un-socialized Values*: Followers have different values as per their needs. Those followers who particularly have un-socialized value of self-interest, voracity may become more inclined towards destructive leaders and may bring negative behavior in organization. (Hogan, 2006)

On the other side, colluder followers are determined, self-centered and used to sharing the destructive leadership vision. Both types support toxic behavior of leadership. Conformer followers are submissively permitting toxic leadership to presume authority since

their unsatisfied needs and irresponsibility makes them susceptible to such authority. Colluder followers usually support negative leadership behavior as they desire to support their own objectives and benefits in the organization by supporting the destruction of their leaders (Padilla et al 2007).

Conducive Environments

Conducive environments are the third component of toxic triangle which surrounds leaders and followers, and the communication between them. Researchers are acquainted with the importance of "location/environment". Padilla et al 2007 proposes four environmental factors which are significant and help foster the destructive aspect of leadership. These are:

- *Instability:* When there is instability in an organization, leader has the option to increase his control by promoting essential modification to reinstate the system. (Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978; Conger & Kaungo 1987). In uncertain organizational environment, leader may get control of whole environment and he may also be granted authority in decision making to restore the organization. (Janis & Mann, 1977; Vroom & Jago, 1974). But sometimes when centralized decision making starts it will be difficult to get it back, which sometimes brings negativity in the whole process (Kipnis, 1972).

- *Perceived threat*: Perceived threat is linked with uncertainty of organization and structure, which is a clear threat to the organization towards collapse. This can be

categorized as feeling of exploitation among workers, fall of economy, loss etc.

- ***Cultural values***: Culture means predilection towards any social circumstances and it contours the leadership style (Hofstede, 1991). In 1998 Luthans et al, explained that in doubtful and selfish culture "dark leaders" are nurtured.

- ***Absence of checks, balances and institutionalization****:* Organizations need well-built foundation, well-built organizational hierarchy, and adequate check and balance system to evade the harms of supreme centralized power in organization (Hamilton, Jay & Madison, 2000). Though leaders want freedom and authority in their jobs but sometimes unchecked freedom brings destructive leaders and misuse of freedom and authority (Kaiser & Hogan, 2007).

Destructive leadership does not succeed in any established, organized, well built institution and in the presence of sufficient checks and balances on authority and control. Effectual organization, organizational constancy, and appropriate check and balance, with strong followership, make the system strong. Sometimes, conducive environments not only add towards the materialization of destructive leadership, and at occasions destructive leadership along with followership becomes capable of taking over the organization. As soon as destructive management gains control, it will start consolidating its power by discouraging existing organizational cultures and laws. Padilla et al 2007 involve both chronological dimensions and the interactions amongst the rudiments of model of a toxic triangle. They replace productive

organization with individuals intended to improve essential powers of leadership; by getting rid of adversaries and protesters; by maneuvering the medium and utilizing learning system, creating propagandas to legitimize the procedures – (Padilla et al 2007). Fig. 1 summarizes the model. In short we can say that destructive leadership is based on three fields; leadership, followership, and environment. Conger (1998) proposed that qualitative research methods may be helpful in early phases of expansion in leadership theories.

Findings:

In this study we studied destructive leadership and the effect of convergence of destructive leadership and susceptible followers in supportive organizational and cultural environment. On the basis of this study we may suggest the following:-

- There is a need of more comprehensive studies on destructive leadership to explore hidden areas of this topic.

- As a manifestation, destructive leadership starts occurring in any organization when a leader becomes supportive, disloyal, destructive leader and starts encouraging his followers to pursue their own destructive goals which are against organizational interests (Einarsen et al., 2007).

- Yet another manifestation of destructive leader occurs, when a leader starts behaving or acting negatively just to influence followers to follow him in the pursuit of organizational goals; these actions are not only harmful for the followers but for the organization as well (i.e. uses a DL

style). For example, if a leader threatens his followers to comply with procedures strictly for ensuring greater product safety, this is also considered as destructive leadership style, despite the fact that this leader was working to pursue an organizational goal. (Krasikova, Dina et al, 2013)

How to prevent disloyal destructive leadership in organizations:

In order to prevent disloyal and destructive leadership, the organizations must/should:-

- Explain their values and goals to all employees.

- Create a working environment that encourages honesty and loyalty, it will attract employees' attention and they will work and follow with loyalty and respect.

- Create a dialogue with their employees about what loyalty means to him or her. This confirms that everyone is on the same page.

- Develop clear and ethical culture. Organizations can't expect their employees to be devoted to them if organizations are not following the ethical code of conduct. Be truthful with your employees even if it hurts. Give respect and get respect. When employees know that it costs you to be honest with them, they will definitely try to be as honest and loyal as they can.

- Show care towards employees. Leaders must be connected with employees on a personal level. All employees must be treated with the respect and care that they deserve.

- Develop culture of mutual trust. Crucial information or responsibilities should not be withheld or hidden from employees. In case there is absence of mutual trust culture in an organization that will create a destructive environment. To get trust and loyalty from employees, organizations must first give it to them.

- Encourage employees to question the organization. Questioning or challenging organization is not an indication of betrayal. Rather it is an indication that employee cares enough about the organization. It will give a chance to create a dialogue with employee so that both organization and employee can discover solutions and answers for the problems.

- Encourage employees to seek out advice and assistance from other experts; it will enhance employee's professional growth because they get someone else's perspective. It will improve employee's confidence and perceptions in a positive and constructive direction.

- Reward loyalty through a reward or incentive program. Honesty and sincerity of employees cannot be earned by giving incentives on an annual basis; in fact there must be something that is unique and special for employees.

- Show concerns for their work/life conflicts. Employees are more loyal to empathetic employers especially when they know that their employer is showing genuine concern.

Conclusion

In the past few years significant research has been carried out on the diversity of concepts and behavioral descriptions of destructive leadership. But still there is a need for further extensive research in this area. This study is descriptive in nature and the researchers have tried to discuss and highlight the indicators of destructive leaders and how a destructive leader influences his followers to achieve his destructive goals. In addition, we discussed that indicators of destructive leader could happen due to various reasons and bring different consequences for the organization, followers, and destructive leader. Then, it has been discussed how a destructive leader acts in pursuit of destructive goals, and how leadership loyalty and commitment towards the organization convert it into destructive leadership. This study fills the gaps of previous research by extending the ways to prevent disloyal destructive leadership in organizations' exploration, by emphasizing on ethical culture development in the organizations. There is a hope that the proposed actions will stimulate further research and theory development in the area of destructive leadership.

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SAARC: ITS POTENTIAL AND ROLE BEYOND 2015

(RA Muhammad Shabbir)[*]

Abstract

In the three decades of its existence, SAARC has been unable to make the desired impact nor could achieve its underlying objectives. Its report card presents a contrast between rhetoric and action, and ambition and practicality. The region remains the least connected, under - developed and is unable to cash in on its geostrategic and geo-economic potential due to structural and functional issues that are causing inertia in the organization. Pakistan's geopolitical disposition at the crossroads of regions can offer opportunities to promote intra-regional connectivity and thus leverage this factor for the region's rapid transformation towards peace and progress. In this context, the study aims to analyze the SAARC potential and role beyond 2015 in light of its report card and current regional and global environment. The paper argues that to make SAARC vibrant, a qualitative change is required among SAARC members to improve the form and content of bilateral relations and to overcome long-standing political issues. Moreover, the expansion of SAARC to include China may benefit the organization.

Key Words: *geo-economic, geopolitical, intra-regional, transformation, environment*

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Introduction

Launched with much enthusiasm, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has failed to live up to its promise. During the three decades of its existence, the organization has been unable to make the desired impact nor could achieve its underlying objectives to promote the welfare of the people of South Asia, to accelerate economic growth, social progress and cultural development and to provide all individuals the opportunity to live with dignity and to realize their full potential. South Asia remains among one of the poorest and densely populated areas of the world. It is a poorly governed, hunger struck region where the gap between 'the haves and have-nots' is increasing day by day. The future of the organization hangs between its promise and reality. In order to reenergize the organization, an inclusive effort by all the member states would be required, and more so, in case of the bigger states. Pakistan carries the potential and remains ready to play a constructive role in the region.

In this context, the study aims to analyse the SAARC potential and role beyond 2015 in light of its role in current regional and global environment. The paper argues that in order to make SAARC vibrant, a qualitative change is required among SAARC members to improve the form and content of bilateral relations among member states to overcome long-standing political issues. Moreover, the expansion of SAARC to include China may benefit the organization.

The Paper provides a background of South Asia's geographic disposition and its significance in a trans-regional setting. It analyzes the SAARC's role and issues in its inertia and the

significance of the organization. The study also includes a discussion on Pakistan's role in regional integration and offers some suggestions for a way forward.

Background and Geographic Disposition

To recall, SAARC region stands today at a critical juncture; poverty, disease and illiteracy, stalk our lives. Moreover, the region remains at the lower rungs of the Human Development Index[1] with millions living below the poverty line, and many more deprived of the basic amenities of life. According to the report of HDI-UNDP, over 200 million people were affected by natural disasters and 45 million, the largest number in 18 years, were displaced by conflicts by the end of 2012. These factors contributed to denting improvement in human development. India rose to 135th out of 187 countries, Bangladesh by four steps to 142, Sri Lanka at 73, Maldives up to 103 and, at the end Pakistan retained the last year's ranking at 146.[2] Notwithstanding the above, the region is blessed with enormous human and natural resources and holds great promise in sustainable economic development if the regional actors are ready to re-prioritize their approaches.

This region is varyingly described in terms of the images that it has been transmitting.

> "Once, it was called the 'most dangerous region' in the world due to fears associated with nuclearization of South Asia (ironically, this name-tag comes in spite of nuclear responsibility demonstrated by the two nuclear powers in the region). Concurrently, our

region is often seen as the 'least integrated of all the
regions' in this era of economic advancement. The
latter though a statement in comparative terms,
provides sufficient food for thought.[3]"

Situated in the heart of Asia, the South Asian region stretches
from the Hindu Kush to the Malay Peninsula and from the Indian
Ocean to the Himalayas.[4] It is bordered by the Middle East, Central
Asia, China and South East Asia. Thus, it is located at the cross-
roads of regions on the globe. Resultantly, events and activities in
South Asia directly affect contiguous regions and indirectly affect
remaining parts of the world and vice versa.

In this context, Pakistan's geopolitical disposition at the
crossroads of regions can offer opportunities to promote intra-
regional connectivity and thus leverage the region's rapid
transformation towards peace and progress.

Report Card of SAARC

The report card of SAARC is rather disappointing. It presents a
contrast between rhetoric and action, and ambition and practicality.
At the time of its establishment, great expectations were associated
with the organization that aimed "to promote welfare economics,
collective self-reliance among the countries of South Asia and to
accelerate socio-cultural development in the region." Former
Bangladesh President, General Zia Ur Rahman, who was the
motivating force behind the formation of SAARC, had dreams of
making it an organisation (on lines which might have later helped in
evolving the concept of the European Union) with free trade, visa
free travel, common currency and, perhaps, even common defence
as some of its features. The region, however, is mired with intra and
inter - state conflicts, anti-business regulations, corruption, and a

lack of transparency. These factors not only impact the socio-economic situation of the region, but hamper SAARC processes.

SAARC member-states are home to one-fifth of the world population but generate only 6 percent of global income. In 2013, out of $46 trillion global two-way trade (exports plus imports) of goods and services, this region contributed only $1.25 trillion (three percent). With an average per capita income of only $1,400, this is one of the poorest regions in the world and 40% of the world's one billion poorest people live in this region.[5]

SAARC's report card with regards to regional integration is dismal; it remains the least integrated regional bloc. Despite its adoption of a preferential trading agreement and subsequently, a free trade area agreement in 2006 for some items with planning to cover all goods by 2016, the product market integration is abysmally low. In 2013, only six percent of SAARC trade was intra-regional, compared to 50 percent in ASEAN. The intra-regional two-way trade of $45 billion was less than half of the SAARC region's two-way trade with China (at $96 billion) and less than the $80 billion trade with the US.[6] SAARC members are so asymmetric that the second largest country, Pakistan, contributes only 11 percent to regional income, and the combined income share of other six countries is smaller than that of Pakistan (five percent by Bangladesh, 2.3 percent by Sri Lanka, 0.8 percent from Nepal and Afghanistan each). Bhutan and the Maldives contribute only eight percent while Nepal contributes only three percent. While the rest (about 81%) is contributed by India[7]

Despite these limitations and poor performance, SAARC however, remains a useful tool for smaller countries to promote understanding and cooperation at bilateral level. Its performance

has not been entirely dismal. Despite failings, a number of significant achievements such as (i) The Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (ii) SAARC Agriculture Information Centre at Dhaka (iii) SAARC audio visual exchange programme (SAVE) and (iv) Social Charter to set targets for eradication of poverty, population stabilisation and human resource development fall to its credit. After having discussed the gaps between the SAARC promise and reality, it is pertinent now to discuss the issues that cause inertia for the organization.

Issues Resulting in SAARC Inertia

There are multiple issues that are responsible for barring the working of SAARC as an effective tool of increasing regional cooperation and improving its productivity. Broadly speaking, two-fold factors contribute towards SAARC's inertia: structural and functional. The structural factors relate to: the SAARC charter; agreements and conventions; and SAARC Bodies. The functional issues which have, and still are, hampering the promotion of cooperation and trust among the members include: bilateral conflicts of the regional states and demographic structure of the region.

With SAARC's inception, its charter established the organization's objectives. These objectives include[8]:-

- Promoting welfare, enhancing quality of life and providing opportunities for dignified life to the people living in member countries.

- Working for social progress and cultural exchange   among the member states.

- Promoting economic growth, cooperation and self-reliance among member states.

- For collective good, cooperation with other countries and organizations.

A careful study of the aforementioned objectives reveals that almost all the objectives focused on advancing cooperation amongst member states but this cooperation was mainly concentrating on economic, social and cultural domains. Promotion of self-reliance was mentioned but not institutionalized. The objectives appear to be catchy but are, practically, hard to achieve and even harder to operationalize; particularly in the atmosphere of hostility, suspicion, conflict and mistrust among the regional states.

Another predicament of the SAARC is that Article X of its Charter prohibits the discussion of contentious bilateral issues in its meetings.[9] Since the two giants of the region - India and Pakistan - make up around two-third of South Asia, it is argued that SAARC cannot render positive results unless both countries sort out their differences. To a large extent, New Delhi's approach visà-vis conflicts with its neighbors, particularly Pakistan, is based on a two-fold strategy. The first is to reject third-party mediation and stress on pursuing a bilateral approach to deal with contentious issues. Second, to discourage Pakistan's efforts to raise contentious issues on bilateral forums. India has consistently followed this approach during the composite dialogues between the two countries .When ever Pakistan raises the Kashmir dispute with India under the framework of composite dialogue, India refuses to give any serious consideration to the matter.

Therefore, instead of escaping from the reality of conflicts and prohibiting their discussion under its ambit, SAARC needs to delete Article X from its Charter. This requires to be done because after over 30 years of its formation, member states should now be

capable of discussing issues which are directly responsible for derailing the process of regional cooperation.

Concurrently, almost all agreements and conventions that are adopted and signed by SAARC members focus on promotion of social and economic linkages. Under the banner of SAARC there are hardly any significant efforts to promote mutual trust and resolve mutual disputes.[10] Dispute resolution has been, unfortunately, left out of the scope of SAARC; since its inception. Even "SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism" was nothing but ratification and implementation of the UN resolutions and conventions.[11] In addition to that, almost all SAARC bodies, its supplementary organizations and offices work in social domains. The enhancement of trust and promotion of cooperation amongst the regional states in political domain have unfortunately been left out of the focus.[12]

Most of the members have several conflicts amongst themselves. Any act of cooperation and interaction is seen suspiciously by almost all members. In this scenario of trust deficit, one must not forget the geographically central position reposed in India.[13] Interestingly, instead of becoming a bridge in SAARC, India has had so far conflicts with all of its neighbours. The map on next page indicates India's conflicts with its neighbours.[14]

India-China Aksai Chin dispute, India-China South Tibet/ Arunachal Pradesh dispute,[15] India-Pakistan Kashmir dispute, India-Pakistan Sir Creek dispute, India-Pakistan dispute over construction of dams by India in violation of the Indus Water Treaty, Pak-Afghan argument over cross border movement of militants, India-Bangladesh border dispute over 51 Bangladeshi enclaves and 111 Indian enclaves, India-Bangladesh sea boundary

dispute over New Moore/ South Talpatty/ Purbasha Island in the Bay of Bengal,[16] India-Bangladesh Farraka Dam dispute, India-Nepal Boundary dispute including 400 squares kilometres on the source of Kalapani River, and India's argument over militants' crossing with Bangladesh, Nepal, Burma and Bhutan. Figure below illustrates all these conflicts.[17]

The demographic distinctiveness of SAARC region is considered to be one of the major reasons for the ineffectiveness of SAARC.[18] Some consider "backwardness in education and economic system as major reasons for the failure of SAARC".[19] Some writers consider the size, influence and centralized position of India in the region, as responsible for SAARC's jeopardized position and performance.[20] In terms of territory, population, natural resources, military might and economic strength, India enjoys predominant position in the region. It owns more than 70% area of the total region, consists of around 77% of total South Asian population and its GDP is over 60% of the total GDP of SAARC countries. It shares borders with all the

member countries of SAARC except Afghanistan. Moreover, except for Pakistan and Afghanistan, all SAARC countries are geographically linked through India (shown in the map above). This peculiar geographic factor coupled with the assertive and domineering Indian policy often generates fear and tension among other regional countries.

In a nutshell, there are substantive trade barriers in the form of tariffs, non-tariffs, transportation bottlenecks, red-tapeism, transit difficulties, absence of land connectivity, complicated visa systems etc. Moreover, the asymmetric size, conflicts and the geographic location of member countries also contribute to sluggishness of the organization. This brings us to the question as to how significant is SAARC for South Asia?

Significance of SAARC

SAARC, despite all its setbacks has survived for three decades. The importance of this organization is, and has always been, undeniable. Three decades back regional countries were aware of the significance of such regional organizations when they had established it. Even today, regular participation of member states in SAARC meetings and reiteration of pledges to make it a successful and productive organization indicates its importance. Following points highlight the significance of the organization:

Firstly, South Asia is homeland to one-fifth of the global population and yet least connected region. Most of its population is illiterate, living in extreme poverty and suffering from poor health conditions. All these problems require a regional platform to discuss regional problems.

Secondly, South Asia has been suffering from constant threats to security both from internal conflicts between the regional powers

and external states trying to establish their hegemonic superiority over this region. Despite all its weaknesses, it is the only platform where South Asian countries can sit together and discuss their problems.

Thirdly, SAARC did not come into being after any role played by super powers of the world. It was not even an idea given by strong nations of the area. Rather it was an initiative taken by the smaller states of the region. Gen. Zia-ur-Rehman of Bangladesh was the first person who thought about it and persuaded other rulers in the region to unite under a regional organization. Thus, it was established by the efforts of local people to fulfil their requirements.

Fourthly, SAARC mainly emphasizes on socio-economic development. Despite all rivalries between India and Pakistan and differences between India and most of the other regional countries, SAARC was established by regional countries by themselves and was not imposed like SEATO and CENTO by any foreign power. Therefore, these countries have kept this organization alive despite all their rivalries and conflicts. The idea of keeping it related to socioeconomic aspect only was adopted so that political differences might not cause a breakdown in the working of SAARC.

Finally, SAARC was established to increase diplomatic, social and economic relations among member countries. Though practically it could not achieve its objectives yet it has survived even during the most serious political crises between India and Pakistan and between India and Sri Lanka.

Pakistan's Potential and Interests in Regional Integration

Before discussing Pakistan's interests in regional integration, it is important to recall the significance of Pakistan's geopolitical and geo-economic disposition, its historic contribution in GWOT and

the fallout on its social and economic fabric. The economic development of South Asia is closely linked to the availability of energy at an affordable price. When abundant alternate energy sources are available in the region, there is a need to collectively focus on harnessing indigenous energy production potential, such as solar, wind, bio and hydro. It should also be considered to make arrangements for trans-regional oil and gas pipelines, in which Pakistan remains a critical factor.[21] Additionally, Pakistan's geostrategic and geo-economic disposition at the crossroads of regions makes it a natural bridge between the three regions and a way for north south and east west economic corridors.

In SAARC, Pakistan has played a proactive role to make it a model of regional cooperation, based on the principles of sovereign equality. Pakistan hosted the 4th and 12th SAARC Summits in 1988 and 2004 respectively. It will also be the host for 19th SAARC Summit in 2016. It believes that SAARC can provide a conducive atmosphere to build economic synergies and transform the quality of life in South Asia. Over the years, Pakistan has taken substantial measures to advance SAARC ideals and objectives. Pakistan places poverty alleviation on top of SAARC agenda. In this context, the aspirations of the people of SAARC region should be at the centre of the Organization's processes. Due to unresolved bilateral disputes amongst the SAARC member countries, SAARC could not achieve the desired socio-economic cooperation and prosperity in the region. SAARC needs to collaborate with other major international organizations to exploit its unutilized immense potential for the benefit of the people of South Asia.

Pakistan remains ready to play its role in the peace and progress of the South Asian region alongwith regional actors. However,

further advance in the process will be contingent upon contribution of all the regional states and to activate the SAARC framework in this regard. Considering the socio-economic cost of Afghan wars for it, Pakistan, more than any other country of the region, wants peace and stability in the region.

What Next?

It was the vision of our political leadership to develop SAARC into the economic driving force that it was envisaged to be. This can only be possible in an atmosphere of mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of each other's problems and challenges. The way forward can be viewed with a six-fold focus:

- First, the gap between the promises and reality of accomplishments of SAARC needs to be bridged. We should build on convergences to minimize divergences for the greater good of the people of this region. SAARC, therefore, must be seen as a vibrant organization, responsive to the aspirations of its people. By synergizing capabilities and creating partnerships, we can effectively address the common challenges that we all face today.

- Second, the betterment of regional cooperation under the SAARC umbrella seems a challenging task in view of unresolved political issues and absence of sufficient political will to advance the process. The states need to overcome the trust deficit and to bring about a change in their respective mindsets, from security centric approaches to an economic drive that assures a win-win situation for all stakeholders. The onus to break the inertia is on all stakeholders but more pronounced in the case of bigger partners.

- Third, member countries ought to deal with the constitutional impediments that come in the way of regional integration. In this context, the SAARC charter specially its article X needs to be amended. This is also necessary because economic growth and regional integration cannot be promoted in the environment of conflict and hostility.

- Fourth, SAARC should also think of going beyond observer status and include those observers who wish to actively associate with SAARC programmes, activities, and projects in the organization. This will enhance the resource availability of SAARC. In this regard, SAARC should welcome China as an interactive partner of SAARC.

- Fifth, the efficacy of SAARC as a forum and as a process remains in the evolutionary mode. It has yet to go a long way to learn from the lessons of ASEAN and EU to serve as the engine of South Asian advancement into the Asian dawn. To make SAARC vibrant, a qualitative change is required among SAARC members to improve the form and content of bilateral relations among member states and to do their part to overcome the hotbed of conflicts that come in the way.

- Sixth, Pakistan's vibrant existence and its resilience at the trans-regional junction are crucial for trans-regional economic and energy linkages. Pakistan enjoys best geographical disposition which works as a bridge because Pakistan is the only country which helps in connectivity of South Asia to West Asia. So the South Asian development depends upon sustainable stability of Pakistan. It is, therefore, very much central to SAARC interests to

strengthen Pakistan's economy as it is a vanguard to South Asia's sustainable progress.

To sum-up, SAARC even after thirty years of its existence, remains far from achieving the objectives for which it was established. It could not lift off as a successful association mainly because of the authoritative role and attitude of India and apprehensive behaviour of small states. The member countries are not ready to accept the superiority of India and India, on the other hand, never agreed on negotiating at equal basis with its neighbours. In a nutshell, the choices before us are clear, either we can stay mired in a situation of mutual mistrust and hostility or make serious efforts to resolve disputes and differences through sustained dialogue. Regional connectivity in trade and energy can prove to be a good game changer for the economy of South Asia. But this vision of regional cooperation and regional integration requires a more positive political and security relationship among the countries of South Asia.

End Notes

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12 SAARC Recognized Bodies. available online at: http://saarc-sec.org/Apex-andRecognised-Bodies/14/

13 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "SAARC Needs Revamping", in Nancy Jetly and Eric Gonsalves edited Dynamics of South Asia Regional Cooperation and SAARC, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1999, 82-98.

14 Map taken from: Ehsan Mehmood Khan, "South Asia's Strategic Security Environment", Margala Papers, Vol-XVII, Issue-I, 2013, 21-48.

15 Ibid. "The disputed territory is located south of the famous McMahon Line agreed to between the Britain and Tibet as part of the Simla Accord signed in 1914, which China has never endorsed as the Tibetan government was not sovereign and thus did not have the power to conclude treaties with other countries. Indo-China War of 1962 took place over the same dispute."

16 Ibid. "Interestingly, some common Indians claim the Indian Ocean to be belonging to India. Likewise, common Bangladeshis too lay a complete claim on the Bay of Bengal."

17 Illustration by Ehsan Mehmood Khan.

18 QamrZaman, M. Atif, M. Farooq, "Standard of Education and Economic Conditions are the Main Causes of the Failure of SAARC: A comparative study of SAARC and EU," 2014. Accessed 30 Sep. 2015. Retrieved from: http://www.idjrb.com/articlepdf/vol1no3c.pdf

19 Ibid.

20 Mehraj Hajni, "Why SAARC has Failed", The Greater Kashmir, 11 May 2007. Accessed on 25 Aug. 2015 from: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/2007/May/11/why-saarc-has-failed-i-3.asp

21 Arif Kamal, "The current security and political situation in South Asia:", 2015.

Book Review

(Ms. Ayesha Khan)[*]

Title of the Book	:	Pakistan: Beyond the 'Crisis State'
Editor's Name	:	Ms. Maleeha Lodhi
Published by	:	Oxford University Press
Place of Publication	:	London
Year of Publication	:	2011
Pages	:	391

Maleeha Lodhi served as an Ambassador of Pakistan to the US for two terms (1993-1996 and 1999-2002) and to the UK for five years (2003-2008). She is currently serving as the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, the first ever woman of Pakistan to hold that position. She is the author of two books; first one being 'Pakistan's Encounter with Democracy and The External Challenge'. In her recent book, 'Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State', she brought seventeen Pakistani intellectuals, economists, political thinkers and military experts to discuss the themes of governance, security, economic and human development, foreign policy and various complex domestic and international factors that contributed towards determining the future of Pakistan. All the articles included in this book assert that all the problems and challenges of Pakistan can be solved and overcome.

The first chapter of the book, 'The Past as Present', written by a renowned Professor Ayesha Jalal, argues that the current problems

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of Pakistan are the outcome of its troubled history. She further elaborates that without a credible history and without delving into history with open mindedness, the people of Pakistan cannot change the course of their reason, and develop a sense of historical consciousness.

Dr Akbar S. Ahmed, author of many award-winning books, contributed a chapter 'Why Jinnah Matters' and discusses about the idea of a theocratic state and a modern state in which religion has nothing to do with the state's matters. He has included some speeches of Muhammad Ali Jinnah on the issue of Pakistan as an Islamic and secular state, and establishes that no voice is more important than Jinnah's.

The next contribution is made by an award-winning novelist Mohsin Hamid. His chapter, 'Why Pakistan will Survive', offers an optimistic view of Pakistan by highlighting its strength in diversity. He also argues that tax collection can serve better in the development sector. At the end of his chapter he says that a bright future awaits Pakistan if Pakistanis are willing to pay for it.

Maleeha Lodhi's own chapter, 'Beyond the Crisis State', is a detailed overview of internal and external factors responsible for the troubled political history of Pakistan. She discusses five fault lines of the country that must be overcome to chart a new, hopeful course. She also asserts in her chapter that dynamics of state and society have been transformed, and in order to lay strong foundations for a functional and responsive country, politics must adhere to those changes.

The next two chapters discuss the role of the Army as a central element of Pakistan's politics. Shuja Nawaz in his chapter, 'Army and Politics', argues that if Pakistan wants to survive as a successful

nation, the Army needs not to intervene in the matters of the Government. He also states that the supremacy of civil departments should be the goal. In the next chapter, 'Praetorians and the People', by Saeed Shafqat states that two paradoxical trends have been seen in the post-2008 election period: the traditional political elite continuity and the shift in the composition of civil and military bureaucracy. He also argues that civil-military relations are also improving that will eventually reduce the possibility of any military intervention.

The next chapter, 'Ideologically Adrift', is based on the role played by ideology in Pakistan's evolution. In this chapter Ziad Haider argues that Islam has been used for various purposes from nation building to security that has brought multifaceted challenges to Pakistan. He says that if Pakistan wants to overcome those challenges, a new Islamic narrative should be developed for a progressive change. A chapter entitled, 'Battling Militancy', by Zahid Hussain continues the discussion holding the view that still a number of measures and strategies are required to effectively and comprehensively battle against militancy and extremism.

The next few chapters deal with the economic policy of Pakistan. Dr Ishrat Hussain in his chapter, 'Retooling Institutions', gives a detailed account of civil services and economic reforms and establishes that any policy, no matter how well crafted, can be successful without solid institutions. Dr Meekal Ahmed, a top Pakistani economist, in his chapter 'An Economic Crisis State?' focuses on the implementation of key economic reforms to make the economic sector strong keeping in mind the country's economic potential. On the same lines, Muddassar Mazhar Malik, discusses some strategies for Pakistan as a strong and successful economic

state. In the next chapter, Ziad Alahdad, says that energy sector is the single greatest impediment in the way of Pakistan's economic recovery, and the way forward for economic revival.

The next chapter discusses another important development sector of Pakistan that is education. In this chapter Moeed Yousuf and Shanza Khan argue that education should be considered as the right of the people. The essential policies should be implemented for more accelerated and visible improvements in this important sector. Feroz Hassan Khan explains in his chapter that how the nuclear capability of Pakistan averted many wars with India and also allowed Pakistan to focus on other priority areas. Munir Akram's chapter 'Reversing Strategic Shrinking' highlights the current strategic challenges to Pakistan ranging from Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan, economic stagnation and energy crisis.

Ahmed Rashid in his chapter 'The Afghan Conundrum' highlights the problems of Afghanistan in the backdrop of NATO exit and the critical role of Pakistan for the peace talks. In the last chapter Dr Syed Riffat Hussain, talks about the troubled relations between India and Pakistan and also lists many occasions when agreements have been reached as a reminder that good relations are beneficial for both the countries.

In her concluding remarks, Maleeha Lodhi explains various policies to overcome the challenges that the country is currently facing. She further asserts that no policy could be implemented without a political will. Besides, this is a thought provoking book for those interested in various issues related to Pakistan. It is a fine piece of work, written by specialists from various fields and provides a deep analysis of many issues confronting Pakistan with different policy choices and a way forward.

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CONTENTS

Editor's Note

The ISSRA Papers (The Journal of Governance and Public Policy) 2nd Half 2015 is published biannually. Selected Papers covering various issues pertaining to domains of policy, governance and other relevant subjects, contributed by authors are a part of this issue of the Journal. Here, worth mentioning is the support received from all the departments of the Faculty of Contemporary Studies. Active support, in terms of manuscripts review and provision of guidelines by the Departments of Governance and Public Policy and Leadership and Management is duly acknowledged. A brief summary of papers and their contributors is given in the succeeding paragraphs.

The first paper 'Examination of the Impression Management of Transformational Leadership in Public Sector and Governance' has been contributed by Dr. Muhammad Zia-ur-Rehman & Ms. Saman Javed. The writers have discussed and analysed impression management processes. The main focus of the study is to determine the impression management practices of transformational leaders.

The second paper 'Public Health Regulations: Risks and Snags' is contributed by Mr. Tahir Ul Mulk Kahlon & Ms. Saher Tanvir. In this paper the investigative procedures in treatment of diseases and hazardous effects of these procedures on human health have been discussed. The authors have also made certain recommendations.

'Afghan Ethnic Patchwork: A Bridge or Barrier for Governance', written by Ms. Iffat Pervaz, is the third paper. This paper aims to discuss Afghan ethnicity as a bridge to good governance. The author

has also discussed that linguistic issues in Afghan fragile democracy are a matter of concern.

The fourth paper, 'Exchange Rate Volatility During Different Exchange Rate Regimes and its Relationship With Exports of Pakistan' is written by Dr. Syed Bashir Hussain, Dr. Shahzad Hussain & Mr. Fiaz Hussain. The study is about the volatility that is found during the implementation time period of exchange rate policies in Pakistan and its relationship with the exports. The authors have employed GARCH model to calculate the volatility.

Next paper, titled 'The Rise of Islamic State (IS) Phenomenon - Lessons for COIN Practitioners at home', fifth in line, is written by Ms. Mahroona Hussain Syed. The author has discussed and analysed the tactics of new insurgencies and trends of guerrilla warfare of the Islamic State (ISIS). The author has also discussed the consequences for Pakistan.

The Sixth paper 'Social Media and Political Transformation in Pakistan Before and after Election 2013' has been contributed by Ms. Huma Javed. The study is about the role of social media in political transformation before and after the election process. The author has taken 2013 general elections of Pakistan as a case study.

The seventh paper 'Study on Supportive Disloyal, Destructive Leadership and its Impact on the Susceptible Followers and Organization' is authored by Mr. Umer Iftikhar Malik, Ms. Areeb Masood, Ms. Beena Khurshid and Dr. G.S.K.Niazi. In this study the authors have discussed some proposed actions for elimination of

destructive leadership behaviour. It has also focused on supportive disloyal leadership.

The last paper 'SAARC: Its Potential and Role Beyond 2015' is written by Muhammad Shabbir. The author has discussed and analysed the SAARC potential and role beyond 2015 in the light of current regional environment. The author has also discussed some measures to make SAARC more vibrant.

At the end, the Editor extends his profound gratitude to all the writers and readers for pre-posing their trust in ISSRA Papers. Warm welcome is also being extended to Brigadier (Retired) Shaukat Qadir on assuming appointment of the Chief Editor, and it is hoped that the Journal will improve under his guidance. Wish you all the best of luck and an intellectually rewarding reading.

List of NDU Publications

1. Armed Forces War College History
2. Pakistan – India Wars 1965 & 1971
3. Selected Reading in Military History: Napoleonic Art of Warfare, Battles of Tannenberg & Masurian Lakes – 1914
4. Evolution of Military Thought
5. Post Workshop Report on Balochistan Situation, 2012
6. World War -1: The Western Front
7. 'Kashmir: Looking Beyond the Peril'
8. NSP: Non-Kinetic Challenges to the State of Pakistan, 2012
9. Urdu Translation of Art of War by Sun Tzu
10. Evolving Dynamics of FATA: Reflections on Transformations
11. 'World War 1 and Its Impact on South Asia' - 02 Dec 2014 Post Symposium Report
12. NDU Journal (Yearly)
13. Margalla Papers (Yearly)
14. ISSRA Papers (Six-monthly)