

Editor's Note

The ISSRA Papers (The Journal of Governance and Public Policy) 1st Half 2016 is being published. Selected Papers pertaining to various domains of policy, governance and other relevant subjects are part of this issue of the Journal. Substantial support in terms of papers and reviews has been received from all the departments of Faculty of Contemporary Studies, NDU. ISSRA faculty has also contributed a number of worthwhile papers. A brief summary of papers and their contributors is given in the succeeding paragraphs.

The first paper 'Political Skills and Learning Organizations – Analyzing the Dynamics' has been contributed by Mr. Farid Ahmed, Dr. Muhammad Zia-ur-Rehman and Ms. Sonia Mushtaq. This study explores the influence of political skills of employees of a learning organisation among employees employed in financial sector of Pakistan.

The second paper 'Strategic communication in 21st century: Understanding new evolving concept and its relevance for Pakistan' is contributed by Ms. Afifa Kiran. This paper provides an understanding of strategic communication in the age of information warfare, and explores its relevance in Pakistan's context.

'E-Governance Practices and Models; Options for Pakistan', written by Muhammad Ilyas, is the third paper. This study highlights various e-governance practices, models and theories, arriving at options for Pakistan.

The fourth paper, 'On the Debate on Footprints of ISIS in Pakistan – Possibilities and Challenges' is written by Ms. Mahroona Hussain Syed. This article analyzes the ISIS's ideological foundations and strategic designs and links them to the updates and evidence provided by media on IS presence in Pakistan.

Next paper, titled 'Leader's Sense-Making During Crisis: Moving Forward towards Prescriptive & Descriptive Mental Models', is written by Dr. Muhammad Zia-ur-Rehman and Ms. Yasmine Muhammad Javaid Iqbal. Being a crucial topic in today's business world, this paper explores role of leader's sense making in facing unanticipated crisis now and then. A strong relation has been found in crisis resolution and leader's sense making.

The Sixth paper 'Enduring Peace in Afghanistan; Finding Role for UN', has been contributed by Muhammad Hassan Javaid Khan and Ms. Iffat Pervaz. This study, while exploring causes of unrest in Afghanistan, aims at finding the grounds for UN in Afghanistan in terms of 'enduring peace in Afghanistan'.

The seventh paper 'Mobilization Enablers for Religious Non-State Actors in Pakistan' is authored by Mr. Abdul Rauf Iqbal and Muhammad Ahsan. This paper explores the enablers that contribute towards the mobilization capacity of religious non-state actors in Pakistan. It further tests the theory that the legitimacy earned by these elements is an outcome of the environment shaped during Afghan War of 1980s.

The last paper 'Transition from Unipolar to a Multipolar World: Implications for Pakistan's Foreign Policy' is written by Ms. Sidra Khan and Ms. Qurat-ul-Ain. The authors hold the view that we are living in

the realm of transition. It was declared at the end the Cold War that unipolarity would not stay for long. The theories explaining transition are significant for the time period we live in. The paper is an attempt to discuss the foreign policy of Pakistan in this changing scenario.

At the end, the Editor extends his profound gratitude to all the writers and readers for pre-posing their trust in ISSRA Papers. It is worth mentioning here that ISSRA Papers has been recognized by HEC in its 'Z' Category. However we are committed to continue striving for further improvement. Wish you all the best of luck and an intellectually rewarding reading.

POLITICAL SKILLS AND LEARNING ORGANIZATIONS – ANALYZING THE DYNAMICS

(Mr. Farid Ahmed, Dr. Muhammad Zia-ur-Rehman and
Ms. Sonia Mushtaq)*

Abstract

The purpose of this empirical study is to explore the influence of political skills of employees on levels of a Learning organization among employees employed in financial sector of Pakistan. Statistical Population for the study includes employees of banks and audit firms of Punjab in Pakistan. Sample of 143 valid questionnaires was received out of 300 distributed questionnaires. Regression was used to explore impact of Political skill of employee on levels of learning organization. Results of the study showed that politically skilled employee provide impetus that enhances learning in the organization because statistics showed strong impact of political skill on levels and dimensions of learning organization. Main Hypothesis and sub- hypothesis are statistically supported. Our sample size was limited to just 143; a future research should be carried out with larger sample size by targeting different public and private sector organizations. Organizations should consider political skill while induction and a Learning organization should nurture this skill to attain utmost level of learning.

Key Words: *political skill, learning organization, individual level learning, group level learning, organization level learning*

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Introduction

Seeking knowledge from cradle to grave is valid for organizations as well, because they have to survive in a dynamic environment and need to inculcate learning at every stage of organizational life cycle. A learning organization is described as a strategy for improving to get competitive advantage and improve organizational performance (Weldy and Gillis, 2010). In 21st century organizations are witnessing more and more complexity, technological changes, more competition so to survive in competitive environment an organization needs to be prepared more vigorously for learning than ever before and every organization should become a learning organization. Learning organization has emerged as an important concept in Management sciences for Organizational development (Song *et al.*, 2008). The subject of organizational learning was stimulated by Peter Senge in his book “The Fifth Discipline”. He identified five skills needed for organizational learning which are system thinking, personal mastery, mental model, shared vision and team learning. Learning organizations have got importance in the management sciences because it improves performance of organizations (Wong *et al.*, 2012).

Organizational politics are ever-present in the organizations and have extensive effect on different organizational processes (Kacmar & Baron, 1999). Employees of an organization may engage in different political activities. For example, managers who have large social capital are likely to manipulate and influence the resources of organization (Treadway *et al.*, 2004). Many employees are engaged in a number of unlawful political activities such as political grouping, pay and promotion decisions on the base of favoritism

and adoption of specific behavior that are deliberately adopted to secure and protect self-interests, mostly these activities are not intended for the welfare of their organization. Extensive literature has been found in the area of organizational politics because it is an integral part of an organization, and because resources are scarce and conflict of interests has made organizational politics unavoidable. Most of the literature reveals negativity of organizational politics (Buchanan and Huczynski 2004; Cropanzano, Pfeffer 1981) but some positive dimensions of politics have also been explored by some researchers Butcher and Clarke 2002; Hartley and Branicki, 2006; and it is known as political skill. Political skill for this research could be defined as the ability to understand others at work and use that knowledge to influence others to act in a way that enhances one's personal and organizational output (Ahearn, 2004).

Management scholars have recognized the importance of learning organizations and doing research in its different dimensions, for example pedagogical challenges in learning organization (Olsson, 2014), understanding employee knowledge (Dunham and Burt, 2011), scaffolding in organizational transition (Johana, 2014), organizational learning and work place spirituality (Sorakraikitikul and Siengthai, 2014), organization learning through participative practices (Cooper,2014), learning organization and innovative behavior (Park,2013), the influences of learning organization culture, organizational commitment, and organizational citizenship behaviors (Jo and Joo,2011), organizational learning research: past, present and future (Argote, 2011), learning organization and organizational performance with mediating role of innovation and knowledge transfer (Ali pour and

Karimi,2011); Plazas (2011) explored tacit knowledge in organization. Kenny (2006) explored a link between strategy and learning organization; Fisher and White (2000) worked on downsizing in a learning organization; Tsang (1997) explored dichotomy of organizational learning and the learning organization. Coopey (1995) worked on the learning organization, power, politics and ideology. In 2005, Lawrence et al., suggested that organizational learning and organizational politics are not antithetical and managers should recognize the importance of organizational politics to foster learning culture in the organization. So to the best of my knowledge there is no such study in which political skill and learning organization have been examined empirically.

Organizational politics

Organizational politics are those activities in the organization intended to get and manipulate organizational resources in a way that lead to desired benefits (Pfeffer, 1981). Literature of organizational politics reveals three dimensions: General political behavior, pay and promotion policies and “Go along to Get ahead” (Ferris, 1999). General political behavior refers to the behavior of individuals who behave in order to gain benefits for themselves. ‘Go along to get ahead’ means go along with trends in the organization and do not take actions, and pay and promotion policies refer to political behavior of organizations in pay and promotions. Organizational politics is basically perception of individuals that impedes the process to achieve organizational goal (Ferris et al. 2002).

There are number of studies that revealed negative relationship of organizational politics with attitudes and behaviors at work. And

performance measures; such as satisfaction at work place, commitment with organization and positive relationship with job disengagement, stress at work, turnover intentions, and negligent behavior (Chang et al., 2009; Miller et al., 2008; Vigoda, 2000, 2001).

Gray and Ariss (1985) suggested that organizational politics is basically intentional act of individuals or groups to gain maximum output in conflicting situations. All definitions in the literature of politics revealed influence processes on organizations at macro or micro level. There are several dimensions of organization politics. First dimension regards organizational politics as general social behaviors that play an important role in the performance of organizations (Pfeffer, 1981). Organizational politics could be assessed through influence tactics used by employees at different occasions that are aimed, self-focused and sometimes focus is on organization (Kipnis et al., 1980, p. 440). There are different studies on organizational politics in this regard but the Kipnis et al.'s study has got major importance in this literature because it contributed theoretically and empirically. Kipnis et al. (1980) suggested that organizational politics is the way in which people at work influence other organization members such as their colleagues, subordinates, and their objective is sometimes to satisfy themselves and sometimes to achieve organizational outputs. The work of Kipnis et al focuses on moderate aspect of organizational politics (Drory, 1993). The major contribution of this study was the identification of different dimensions of tactics that people use to influence others in an organization such as (1) assertiveness of employees, (2) employees ingratiate with colleagues, (3) rational exchange of words and dealing, (4) sanctions in doing certain acts, (5) exchange

of ideas, (6) appeal to superiors, (7) blocking, and (8) coalition among organizational members.

Gazndz and Murray (1980) identified organizational politics as a state of mind. Zhou and Ferris (1995) argued that this notion does not reflect objective reality but based on a subjective perception. The perception of organizational politics was explored by Ferris et al. (1989) at length, who based his theoretical model of perception of organization politics on Lewin's (1936) argument that people respond what they perceive and not according actuality. More recently, Kacmar and Ferris (1991) and Kacmar and Carlson (1994) developed a scale of perceptions of politics to measure Perception of politics perceived by employees in the organization.

Learning Organizations

In Management Sciences the concept of the learning organizations is being discussed since three decades. The publication of four books provided major impetus to the perspective of learning organizations: *Organizational learning: Theory, Method and Practice* (Argyris & Schön, 1978), *The Fifth Discipline: the Art And Practice of the Learning Organization* (Senge, 1990), *Learning Company Model: A Strategy For Sustainable Development* (Pedler et al, 1991) and *Sculpting the Learning Organization: The Art and Science of Systematic Change* (Watkins & Marsick, 1993). According to Watkins and Marsick (1993), the concept of the learning organization is defined as an "Organization that strives for learning continuously and transforms itself; learning also enhanced organizational capacity for innovation and growth. A learning organization has embedded systems to capture and share learning".

A learning organization is dynamic and flexible organization capable to survive in critical situations, and deals in changing and

complex environment (Al-adaileh *et al.*, 2012). Inkpen and Crossman (1995) explored that learning organization incorporates effective learning in the organization and performs better among competitors. To anticipate future environment and adopt measures accordingly is distinctive feature of learning organization (Ghorbanizadeh and Baeidi Mofradnia, 2012). A learning Organization is a big source of competitive advantage that helps organization to compete vigorously in the industry (Shahabi, 2007).

Slater and Narver (1994) defined a learning organization in more realistic way as the organization that continuously acquires and communicates knowledge about market, products, technologies, and business processes, and this knowledge is often based on experience, experimentation, and information provided by customers, suppliers, competitors, and other sources.

Jensen (2005) defined learning organization as “an organization involved in continuous scanning of environment to elicit and creating information and induce individuals to convert information into knowledge and manage this knowledge between the individuals so that new insight is obtained”. Song, Kim & Kim (2007) described the learning organization as structure-based learning environment which induces individuals to learn and transform knowledge for enhancement of organizational learning process. The institution of learning oriented culture is of grave importance to boost learning – based performance improvement in the organization (Ellinger, Ellinger, Yang & Howton, 2002). Khadra and Rawabdeh (2006) argued that a philosophy of learning organization gives rapid response to changing environment. Garvin (1993) described the characteristics of a learning organization as a smart organization

that is adept to acquire, create and communicate knowledge (Song *et al.*, 2011). Senge *et al.* (1994) in his book identified five skills for learning which he called disciplines of a learning organization as personal mastery, mental scheme, shared vision, team learning and systematic thinking (Youzbashi and Mohammadi, 2012). Watkins and Marsick (1996) defined learning organization as an organization which strives for continuous learning and improvement and always ready for change (Awasthy and Gupta, 2012).

Marsick and Watkins (2003) further identified three levels of learning such as individual level, group level and organizational level. They further identified dimensions of learning organization:

- Continuous learning; learning is designed in a way that individuals learn by working; opportunities are provided for growth and education.
- Inquiry and dialogue; individuals obtain skills to express their vision and capacity to listen to others' vision; culture is changed to support questioning, feedback and experimentation.
- Collaboration and team learning; tasks are conceived so that teams present different ways of thinking; it is expected that teams learn to work together; collaboration is culturally valued and recognized.
- People empowerment for the people dimension; individuals are involved in establishing and implementing the vision; the decision process is decentralized and the responsibility is

distributed in order to stimulate individuals to own the change.

- Embedded systems: Technology systems are created and integrated to tasks, systems are maintained and its access is provided.
- Environmental connection; individuals are helped to see the effect of their job in the organization as a whole; the organization is connected to its community.
- Strategic leadership for the structure dimension. Leadership uses learning in a strategic way to generate results to the business.

In learning subsystem the levels of learning are three: individual level learning, team level learning and organizational level learning. Learning of individual is part of organizational learning but it is the responsibility of organization to incorporate that learning into the organization. Line managers and HRD professionals can enhance knowledge of individuals by informal learning methodologies (Argyris and Schön 1999). Method of formal learning is different from informal learning because formal learning is structured and control way of learning (Marsick and Watkins 2001).

Senge (1997) explained that team learning is possible when individuals collectively learn as a team, and through team learning performance of an organization is improved. “An organization is said to be a learning oriented organization where people acquire, generate knowledge and obtain knowledge and disseminate that obtained knowledge and continuously adapt and change their behavior to explore more knowledge and innovation” (Garvin 1985).

Relationship between Political skill and Learning Organization

Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1977) supports model of the study and provides bases for the relationship of organizational politics and learning organization because social learning theory describes individual learning and suggests how individuals establish their values, attitudes and behaviors because of role models. In organizational context role models are superiors, who have more authority and decision powers to give and control rewards to their subordinates. Role models become more effective if they get legitimacy and credibility (Brown et al., 2005). Social learning theory describes two method of learning: learning from one's personal experiences and vicarious learning that is learning from observing and analyzing experiences of others. For example when an individual learns networking with others. It helps him in getting work done and feel comfortable to discuss mistakes with socially astute superiors; they learn in the process of feedback and inquiry. Once learning occurs, reinforcement in the environment maintains that behavior (Davis and Luthans 1980).

Many researchers marked organizational politics as positive skill needed in organization functioning Pfeffer 1981). Ferris et al. (2005) reported that politically skilled employees are present at all levels throughout the organization, and are capable to influence others in order to get things done (Andrews et al. 2009; Harris et al. 2007).

Some researchers pointed out some positive outcomes of OP, Ferris et al. (1989) found that Perception of organizational politics increase job involvement of employees, the stress may act as an opportunity for employees and make them gain something from the state of affairs. Employees tend to respond in such circumstances by putting more time and effort (LePine, Podsakoff, & LePine, 2005; Schuler, 1980). These desirable outcomes of organizational politics

decreases the strain among employee (Ferris et al., 1993), and increases their job involvement (Ferris & Kacmar, 1992) and performance in the organization (Rosen, Levy, & Hall, 2006). Employee perceptions of self-serving, illegitimate political activities at work have consistently negative relationships with employee attitudes and behaviors (Chang et al., 2009). Literature reveals that the high degree of Machiavellianism leads individual to emotionally disconnect in their connections with other employees (Christie and Geis, 1970).

Hence, hypotheses are formulated as follows:-


H1. Organizational politics has a positive impact on a learning organization.

H1a: Organizational politics has a positive impact on individual level learning.

H1b: Organizational politics has a positive impact on group level learning.

H1c: Organizational politics has a positive impact on organizational level learning.

Based on theoretical background following conceptual model is developed (Figure 1)



Methodology

As the study is empirical research and thus to test the research hypotheses, questionnaire survey method was used. Convenient sampling technique is used for sample selection. Questionnaire was distributed randomly among employees of different private sector banks and audit firms through some contact persons, personal distribution, and emails. Organizational politics was measured using 18- items developed instrument of Ferris et al., (2005). People marked their agreement/ disagreement to each question (e.g., I spend a lot of time and effort at work networking with others.” on a five-point Likert Scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” (1) to “Strongly Agree” (5). Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .86.

Continuous learning variable was assessed using 28- items developed instrument of Watkins and Marsicks (1996). Continuous learning and dialogue and inquiry are considered as individual level learning. Its Cronbach’s alpha was .78. Team learning is categorized into group level learning and its Cronbach’s alpha was .79. Remaining four dimensions are included in organizational level learning (embedded system, empowerment, system connection and leadership) and its Cronbach alpha was .70. People marked their agreement/ disagreement to each question (e.g. In my organization, people openly discuss mistakes in order to learn from them.) on a five-point Likert Scale ranging from “Strongly Disagree” (1) to “Strongly Agree” (5).

Face and content validity was done by the supervisor and other academicians in the field of organizational learning and knowledge management. Pilot testing was done using samples of 50 employees. After pilot testing it was realized that some people perceived

learning organizations incorrectly, so definition of Learning Organization was included on top of the questionnaire for later survey. Moreover confirmatory factor analysis was used to construct validity and results of CFA confirmed valid construct. SPSS version 20 was used to analyze the collected data of the study. Firstly data was analyzed through descriptive statistics (Mean, standard deviation and skewness). Correlation and regression analyses were done to determine impact of Organizational Politics on Learning Organization.

Inter correlations for employee job outcomes and predictor variables (N=143)

Variables	OP	ILL	GLL	OLL
OP	1			
ILL	.77**	1		
GLL	.85**	.63**	1	
OLL	.59**	.69**	.50**	1

Note. * $p < 0.01$;

OP: Organizational Politics, ILL: Individual Level Learning, GLL: Group Level Learning, OLL: Organizational Level Learning.

Table 5 presents bivariate correlations among the variables. According to Cohen and Cohen (1988) $r^2 = .10$ indicates small effect size, $r^2 = .30$ shows medium effect size and $r^2 = .50$ large effect size. All the variables have significant correlation with each other. Organizational politics have strong relationship with individual level learning and group level learning, its correlation is .77 and .85 respectively.

Regression results of hypothesis H1a, H1b & H1c: Organizational Politics predicting Individual level learning (ILL),

group level learning (GLL) and Organizational Level learning (OLL).

<i>Variables</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SEB</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>R2</i>	<i>Adj-R2</i>	<i>t-statistics</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
<i>ILL</i>	.75	.051	.77	.604	.603	14.70	216.33	.000
<i>GLL</i>	1.02	.053	.850	.723	.721	4.60	368.1888	.000
<i>OLL</i>	.65	.110	.594	.35	.34	8.77	77	.000

IV: Organizational politics, DV1: individual level learning, DV2: group level learning, DV3: Organizational Level Learning, $P < 0.01$.

Hypothesis 1a stated that Perceived Organizational (OP) would be positively related to individual level learning. Results of the table indicated that Organizational Politics are positively related to Individual Level Learning ($\beta = 0.77$, $p < 0.01$), providing support for H1b, R^2 indicate over all fitness of model, $R^2 = .60$ and it represent that Organizational Politics could bring 60 percent change in Individual Level Learning. Hypothesis 1b stated that OP would be positively related to group level learning. Results of the table indicated that Organizational Politics has positively related to group Level Learning ($\beta = 0.85$, $p < 0.01$), providing support for H1b, R^2 indicate over all fitness of model, $R^2 = .72$ and it represent that Organizational Politics could bring 72 percent change in group Level Learning. Hypothesis 1c stated that OP would be positively related to Organizational Level Learning. Results indicated that Organizational Politics has positively related to Organizational Level Learning ($\beta = 0.59$, $p < 0.01$), providing support for H1c, R^2 indicate over all fitness of model, $R^2 = .35$ and it represent that

Organizational Politics could bring 35 percent change in organizational Level Learning.

Discussion

This study contributes to the literature of organizational Politics. First, its findings enrich the scope through which relationship between organizational politics and dimensions of learning organization is viewed. To the best of my knowledge this study is the first that worked on this model. Second, findings of the study also demonstrate Organizational Politics and its impact on different levels of Learning Organization.

Political skill significantly enhances predictive ability of employees and they understand organization's processes more accurately. Political skill significantly impacts individual level learning, group level learning and organizational level learning as Ahearn et al. (2004) state that a leader needs to be effective in political skill if they want smooth functioning in the team work and collaboration among team members. The study contributes to usefulness of political skill and marked it as one of the antecedents of a learning organization because politically skilled employees are smart and adapt according to the needs of their surroundings (Ferris et al. 2007). Further, these individuals are able to show their behavior compatible to those working around them and assure their sincerity and genuine disposition and this particular characteristic made them to work well in group.

One of the important definitions of Learning Organization is "The ability of organization being flexible and capable to cope with changing environment", so obviously less uncertainty enhances capability of organization to deal with change and Political skill enables individuals to make their environment more certain and

reduce the negativity as much as possible. Some researchers also noticed that individuals with high political skill do not get disturb because of perception of organizational politics (Mintzberg 1983) because such individual have grip on their environment and have less issue.

Besides contributing in the field of organizational politics, this study also offers insight into the field of Learning Organization. Surprisingly, no research has explored the relationship of learning organization and politics. At work place people acquire financial benefits, companionship, and social relationships (Cropanzano, Kacmar and Bozeman, 1995). In acquiring these benefits individuals have to put their effort, time and energy. Organization can be compared with markets where one individual pays something and in return takes something so employees in organization also need favorable environmental factors to invest their skills, talent and more specifically their motivation (Rusbult and Farrell, 1983; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers and Mainous, 1988).

Managerial and academic Implication

This research paper is the first empirical and quantitative attempt in the domain of Organizational support, political skill and Learning Organization so it paves the way for other academicians to consider this topic for future researches and further extend this work. It is suggested to organizations to consider political skill while inducting people in the organization (Ferris et al. 2005a, b) because politically skilled individual make people to better find their way in the organizational processes.

Recommendations

The main thesis of this research work was to highlight importance of Organizational Politics and its impact on different

level of learning in the organization. Results are in line with the previous literature that political skill includes social capital, good gestures, connections, friendships, ability to appear sincere, and show genuine concern and interest in others and necessary for employees in the organization. (e.g. Pfeffer, 1981, 1992). Bacharach and Lawler suggested that to incorporate organizational politics, alignment among members in the organization is prerequisite. In addition, Pfeffer also suggested that to influence others, connections and networking is important.

We can deduce from results of our model that political skill in organizations is not anathema that needs to be settled down but it is something that should be nurtured in the organization. Pfeffer (1981) identified positive political perspective organization politics. He argued that political skill is needed to flourish in the organization context and offered more research in this dimension of organizational politics. Mintzberg (1983) also seconded him and referred to political skill as positive tactics in the organization such as persuasion, manipulation, and negotiation. In this study positive result of organizational politics and Learning organization shows that organizational politics play an important role in organization learning.

Politically skilled individuals convey a secure and calm disposition that attracts other people in the organization and they feel comfortable and this relaxed environment creates conducive environment for continuous learning, people help each other learn, they confidently identify skills they need for future work tasks, People discuss their mistakes without any reluctance in order to learn from them, people give open and honest feedback to each other People who are good in Political skill are more outgoing

people and do not show haughty attitude rather they are more humble and modest because they give more attention and respect to others.

The study revealed that people good in political skills not only accurately behave in different social situations at work but they have also good tact to put away their self interest and show genuine sincerity and get things done from others for example strategic leadership is important dimension of organizational level learning and if leadership is politically skilled it will impact employees of the organization and keep them in the way of learning skillfully.

Employees especially group leaders should have this political skill for example managers or group leaders should be good at using their connections and networks to make things happen at work, good at building relationships with influential people at work, they should have a good idea about important people in the organization and have sound relationship with them. Superiors should adapt to behave friendly and show genuine interest in others. Similarly employees should be capable to build good rapport with colleagues and influential people in the organization, they should be able to talk so effectively with others, and be adept at getting favor of people and getting people to praise them, able to make people feel relaxed and happy in their companionship. Leaders should assess hidden agendas of others by concentrating on people's appearances and also understand people deeply in a smart way. So Organizations could develop supportive culture in the organization and nurture political skill (Ferris, Anthony, Kolodinsky, Gilmore, & Harvey, 2002).

Thus politics in the learning organization is not unconstructive but has many positive aspects in learning organizations (Lawrence

et al., 2005) but it should be appreciated and incorporated in the organizational processes and leverage by managers and employees. Future research should be done by incorporating personal factor as mediator and organizational factors as a moderator in this theoretical frame work. In personal factor personality could be the most important variable that should be checked in this theoretical framework. Our sample size was limited to just 143 a future research should be carried out with larger sample size and greater response rate by targeting different public and private sector organizations of Pakistan, so large sample from multiple cities is recommended. Research was limited to only ten different banks so more organizations should be considered in the future study.

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**STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN 21ST CENTURY:
UNDERSTANDING NEW EVOLVING CONCEPT AND ITS
RELEVANCE FOR PAKISTAN**

(Ms. Afifa Kiran)*

Abstract

In today's contemporary conflicts, both of interstate and intra state nature, there are often multiple threats from non state actors working within a state. The nature of war in the new world order has changed from direct to indirect, i.e. emergence of 4th and 5th generation warfare, and a major shift in security paradigm from traditional to nontraditional security. Media has come up as another very powerful and vibrant player. In this backdrop, it can be stated that there is a need to harness the potential of Pakistan media. To that end, few years back, the concept of Strategic Communication (SC) evolved in the West “to understand and engage key audiences for the advancement of national interests, policies, and objectives in conflict prone areas with the actions of all instruments of national power. In Pakistan’s case, SC is more than disseminating of information but the active solicitation of stakeholders’ perspectives. This paper seeks to provide an understanding of what SC is in the age of information warfare, and see its relevance in Pakistan’s context.

Key Words: *traditional, solicitation, strategic communication, synchronized, psychology, sociology*

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“To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”

Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*.¹

Introduction

New paradigms of 21st century conflicts demand novel approaches from concerned governments to deal with multifarious instabilities within states, particularly involving non-state actors. Unlike the past, conflicts are now more information – based. Actors involved in conflicts have embraced modern communication technologies to influence minds of people more effectively than anything seen previously. Resultantly, states in present security scenarios are more vulnerable and are involved in multidimensional and transnational threats than ever before. In such security settings, states in general and armed forces in particular are bound to carry out novel and diverse tasks, such as post conflict reconstruction, capacity building of affected populace and civilian institutions, and security sector reform to further their interests in any particular way.

In today's contemporary conflicts, both of interstate and intra state nature, such as in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the threat is more difficult to define; in fact, there are often multiple threats from non state actors working within a state. The nature of war in the new world order has changed from direct to indirect, i.e. emergence of 4th and 5th generation warfare, and a major shift in security paradigm from traditional to nontraditional security. Another very powerful and vibrant player in the shape of media has come up and has direct bearing on all national and international issues. In this backdrop, it can be stated that there is a need to

harness the potential of Pakistan media which is very vocal however acts in limbo over critical security issues. Lethality of social media can be judged by the Tunisian and Libyan revolution. To that end, few years back, the concept of Strategic Communication (SC) evolved in the West “to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favourable for the advancement of national interests, policies, and objectives with coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized in conflict prone areas with the actions of all instruments of national power”.² Although in our part of the region this is a relatively new term among the defence and civil policy makers. It has been coined to achieve desired ends/objectives particularly in post armed operations but the formulation of strategic communication within the very framework of national security strategy would help governments to mobilize people in support of major policy initiatives in post-armed operations scenario. For states, strategic communication serves as an instrument of statecraft to facilitate governments involved in counter insurgency operations (COIN) or armed conflicts, so as to influence perceptions, attitudes, beliefs and behaviors of stakeholders, non-state groups, neutrals, competitors, and adversaries in support of national security policies. Presently, Department of Defense (DOD), US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and other US government agencies are struggling with the concept of strategic communication.³ However, in 2001 Defence Science Board (DSB) USA Task Force on Strategic Communication published a report and suggested actionable recommendations for Strategic Communication in the 21st century. According to the report reviewed by Policy Coordinating Committee

of US in April 2006, concept of “strategic communication deals with the challenge of convincing others to think and act in ways compatible with their objectives”.⁴ As Sun Tzu once stated, “War is at heart the art of deception”, likewise, hard information operations, such as electronic warfare, computer network operations, and military deception all have their place in preparing for and conducting active warfare to gain advantages required to win victory.⁵ In such scenario, strategic communication helps to form perspective and increase interaction which gives eventual achievement of national interests.

This paper seeks to provide an understanding of what Strategic Communication (SC) is in the age of information warfare, and see its relevance in Pakistan’s context while keeping in view the complex volatile security situation of our part of the region.

What is Strategic Communication (SC)?


To understand the concept of SC, one has to see it as an instrument of national power beside others elements: Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economy (DIME) to accomplish the national objective in post conflict/insurgency scenario.

According to the DSB USA report, SC is an interactive process and coherent set of activities which include;-

- **Understanding** identities, attitudes, behaviors and cultures; media trends and information flows; social and other influential networks; political, social, economic and religious motivations.
- **Advising** policymakers, diplomats, and military leaders on public opinion and implications of policy choices.

- **Engaging** in a dialogue of ideas between people and institutions through programs that support the national interest,
- **Influencing** attitudes and behavior through communication strategies supported by a broad range of government and civil society activities.
- **Measuring** the impact of activities.

As Newt Gingrich, student of strategic communication has



written, “Strategic Communication in a real-time worldwide information system is a branch of the art of war comparable to logistics or intelligence”.⁶ It will require staffing, educating and practicing at about the same level of resources as intelligence or logistics to be successful.⁷ Public Affairs Operations USA explains it in these words, Western scholars claim that during times of major conflict, strategic communication has a crucial role. Some military experts argue that strategic communication, in irregular warfare, is

the campaign rather than an aspect of it.⁸ Colonel T.X. Hammes, a retired from Marine Corps, suggests that modern insurgencies have become a strategic communication campaign supported by military action.⁹ This is a paradigm shift from the traditionally accepted method of conducting operations, which employs public diplomacy and other related instruments in support of military operations. Strategic Communication, which is both message and action, provides the means to harness the elements of national power in an effective manner. The above-mentioned orchestra helps us to understand strategic communication as coordination of statecraft, Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy (Military), Information Operations and other activities, reinforced by political, economic and military actions, in a synchronized and coordinated manner.¹⁰

Evolution of Term SC

Evolution of this term is linked with number of factors. Effective communication must build and maintain credibility and trust with friends and foes alike, through an emphasis on consistency, veracity and transparency both in words and deeds. Such credibility is essential to building trusted networks that counter ideological support for terrorism.¹¹ The need for this concept emerged when it was felt that conventional separating lines between public affairs, public diplomacy, and military information operations are blurred in operational environment because of immediate access to information. The current information revolution in military affairs is part of a broader revolution with political, economic and social dimensions. SC is being shaped by profound changes in technology, perhaps most notably in the area of information technology.¹² However, to deal with future complex social communication systems, SC is still in the process and under intense debate among

policy makers. Some military analysts argue that although, the phrase “Strategic Communication” has gotten very popular lately. Specifically it was mentioned in 1957 by Dyer in his book titled, *Political Communication as an Instrument of State*. In 1964 social science luminaries Morton Deutsch, John C. Harsanyi, Harold H. Kelley, Anatol Rapoport, and Thomas Schelling edited a volume called *Strategic Interaction and Conflict: Original Papers and Discussion*.¹³ Basing on the discussion carried out in preceding para, we can sum up the evolution of SC concepts over the years as under:-

- Enemy or combat propaganda (WW1)
- Political Warfare (UK)
- Psychological Warfare (US, WW2)
- Psychological Operations (1950s onwards)
- Information Warfare (1991-6)
- Information Operations (1996 to present)
- Perception Management (post 9/11)
- Strategic Communication (SC) (2004-)

Components of Strategic Communication

To comprehend and develop further clarity on the subject and its



Source: “Charles S. Gramaglia, Lieutenant Commander, Strategic Communication: Distortion and White Noise, (US Army Iosphere Papers, Winter 2008)”

role in post conflict or armed operation, it is important to differentiate SC from other similar concepts of communication strategies and psychological operations in warfare. Most scholars merge this term with Public diplomacy and see it in the prism of information operations. There are “five primary supporting capabilities”¹⁴ for SC -

- Public Affairs (PA)
- Information Operations (IO)
- PSYOP;
- Visual Information (VI),
- Military Diplomacy (MD)
- Defense support to Public Diplomacy.


The military uses *SC* as an integrating term for above-mentioned capabilities. These qualifications are different from Information operations (IO) capabilities that consist of, military deception, computer network operations, electronic warfare, covert psychological operations and operational security. IO is a term to include Computer Network Operations (Computer Network Attack and Defense), Electronic Warfare, Operational Security, Military Deception, and PSYOP.¹⁵

In IO, those capabilities are often non-kinetic, sometimes non-lethal, and often aimed at processes within systems that is, behavioral effects aimed at cognitive processes. Often networked globally, SC both informs and influences, synchronizing and deconflicting PA and IO themes and messages.¹⁶ In the other words, strategic communication focuses on the cognitive dimension of the information environment.¹⁷ Communication, which is both message and action, provides the means to harness the elements of national

power in an effective manner however, strategic communication processes and supporting capabilities must be included in all aspects of the federal government's activities and synchronized vertically and horizontally.¹⁸

Strategic Communication Process

Effective application of SC does not simply involve a source transmitting to an audience, but rather active engagement between



Model by Col Laura Berry, Lt Col Tadd Sholtis, Communication Planning From the Wing to the Air Staff, (USA Air force March 2009)

parties. These engagement modes are derivative from the policy, strategic vision, campaign plan and operational design. Strategic Communication as a process is continuous.¹⁹ This involves research, planning, execution, monitoring and assessing the effects on targeted population and involves coordination at two ends:-

- **Horizontal coordination.** Among Government agencies

- **Vertical coordination.** (Up and down the chain of command).

This process will ensure the following:-

- Policy planning, while keeping in view the cultural, informational, and communication considerations.
- “Potential communication impacts of both kinetic and non-kinetic actions – their likely perception effects are assessed and planned for *before* the actions are taken”.
- Soft power" options with capabilities are given equal priority and considered in coordination with hard power alternatives.

Targeted population/ audience include friendly elements, stakeholders, non-state groups, neutrals, competitors, and adversaries. In sum, SC process involves actors including army, Government communication agencies, local media, and Law enforcement agencies. This enhances targeted population support for major military operations, shapes the environment to prevent conflict through influencing the minds of neutrals, stake holders, locals, and to some extent miscreants, and during armed operation , SC will ensure favorable environment for the realization of national security interests of the state.

Role of SC in Post Armed Operations

Classic counterinsurgency (COIN) theorists agree, “real fight is for the support of the population, and that communication is essential for victory”.²⁰ SC is comprised by everything, kinetic and non-kinetic, that is done on the battlefield and throughout the Area of Operation (AO) and Area of Interest (AI) to achieve an information effect.²¹ For a combat commander, the place to organize strategic communication at the operational level is the population.²² In order to separate the population from insurgents’ influence, “strategic communication should be made a priority by making it a line of operation on equal footing with security, governance, and

development within the counterinsurgency spectrum. This will ensure state authority with population support and enhance the effectiveness of information that is disseminated to the public”.²³

Impending Threat Spectrum for Pakistan

Pakistan’s threat perception in relation to the country’s security essentially relates to the interplay of external and internal factors, sharpened due to the country’s critical geopolitical location. Terrorism and proxy wars from external roots intermingle here with extremism, and sectarian manifestations from within, and thus, carry destabilization potential in the way of the nation’s progress. The interplay also provides fertile ground for organized crime in the form of smuggling, drug mafia, dacoits and kidnappers. This unfolds a threat to the very base of society and poses a great challenge to the writ of the state. The challenges facing Pakistan today are multidimensional and so is the need for equal preparedness and response. Various dimensions of the challenges ought to be viewed in relation to the following listing.

- Spill over of the Afghan Situation
- Proxy wars amidst unresolved issues with the eastern neighbor
- Internal threat

On the external front, Afghan factor is critical for the Country’s security because of its spill over affect. Afghanistan, more than any other neighbor, has a 2600 KMs long common border with Pakistan. A considerable population on either side of the border has common culture, ethnicity and language. They have hundreds of tribes along genealogical charter which they use as a basis of unity and solidarity as well as fission and conflict. Their common culture and values facilitate them to move freely across the border and any disastrous situation in one country affects the people of the other country. With the U.S invasion of Afghanistan, the remnants of Al-Qaeda and

Taliban took refuge in inaccessible and hostile terrain of Pakistan's Western borders. They expanded their destructive activities to the urban areas of Pakistan and started targeting government installations and security forces. To tackle the menace, a significant number of Pakistani Armed Forces have been deployed to the border region. The second grave issue is drug trafficking. "Afghanistan produces 90% of the world's opium supply, a third of which is transited through Pakistan. Opium is not the only illicit trade in the Pakistan and Afghanistan border regions, however, Afghanistan is also now the second-largest 'cannabis resin' producer in the world. There is also significant illicit trade in timber, antiques, and cigarettes in the border areas. The drug trade across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border is not only weakening state control but also cementing linkages among drug traffickers throughout the larger region, Taliban, insurgents, and criminal groups. In turn, this nexus of drugs, crime, and insurgents threatens NATO supply routes and offers resistance to ongoing military operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas".²⁴ Moreover, Pakistan's relations with its eastern neighbor, India are embroiled with unresolved political issues (e.g Kashmir, Sir Creek and Water issues) and therefore remain a subject of trust deficit that runs counter to normalization. Blame game from both sides and history of proxy wars further adds fuel to the bitterness. Pakistan permanently keeps a significant number of troops to watch the border and avoid any misadventurism. Internal threat confronting Pakistan have assumed greater significance for the country's institutions in view of its linkages with the external factors who may have limited-purpose alliances with Al-Qaeda and Taliban. The militancy is expressed in tools such as suicide bombings, target killings and civilian losses.

Does Pakistan Need Strategic Communication in Existing Threat Gamut?

International security environment has witnessed a paradigm shift from traditional threats to non-traditional threat spectrum. This is compelled by the emergence of new forces in the international political system which can be listed as quest to capture natural resources, economic integration, technological prowess, globalization, dissemination of sensitive information through rapidly growing media industry, and asymmetric warfare. These forces have driven international relations in a specific direction where strategic locations of Pakistan and Afghanistan in South Asia, Iran in the Middle East and Central Asian Republics and Russia and China have become the chess board of New Great Game for political and economic gains. With this paradigm shift of threat, the strategy of external factors against Pakistan can be summarized as to exploit Pakistan's vulnerabilities on psychological, economic, social, cultural, and political planes and bleed it militarily through a proxy war, without direct engagement, a manifestation of the modern concept of hybrid war. It also aims to involve Pakistan into an arms race forcing a reactive strategy to further accentuate force imbalances and target people's resolve so as to create conditions for social, political and ideological degradation. Moreover, through exterior maneuver and propaganda campaign, it aims to force sanctions and embargos from the donor countries and agencies to steer Pakistan towards diplomatic marginalization thus rendering it irrelevant to the regional equation, and force it to accept *fait accompli* and cut its stature, prestige, size and ability to exert influence in geo-economic calculus.

In the background of this strategy the threat spectrum of Pakistan ranges from insurgencies, ideological conflicts, economic espionage, religious extremism, sabotage and subversion, cultural vulnerabilities, gangs and turf wars, criminal enterprises, terrorism, ethnic conflicts, drug wars and information wars. There is a need for

Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR) in which the principle role of the military forces is to set security conditions for performance by civil authorities. The proportion of offensive, defensive and stability operations varies through various stages to enable civil authorities to function effectively to counter irregular and unconventional warfare and effect based operations. In reaction to specific security scenario, in last few years, Pakistan has developed comprehensive counter terrorism policies aimed at “clear, control and build to deal with terrorists/ extremists within the country”. Since then armed forces are conducting successful armed operations against the militants. However, Pakistan government is far behind in handling the post-armed operations situation effectively. Use of force against militancy within the country is a difficult task particularly when it has some ideological basis. Such operations have always some risk of locals’ support to extremist’s ideology against the government besides other social-economic reasons. For Pakistan, SC can be used to mobilize masses in support of major policy initiatives and to support objectives before, during, and after a conflict. “Forces fighting on the front-line in the tribal regions are now being trained according to requirements of sub-conventional warfare”.²⁵ Preparation of the new doctrine started a year ago and has been adopted successfully by Pakistan Army. The Army is now prepared for all forms of threats in current times. Sub-conventional threat is a reality and is a part of the threat matrix faced by our country. Critical thinking is a necessary attribute in today’s soldier in such a resource constrained environment. But critical thinking alone can never be sufficient for him to exercise his duties to deal with today’s threats. A comprehensive training and knowledge of fighting grounds to deal with non state actors enables him to win the national support at an acceptable cost. New British Army unit 'Brigade 77' is authorized to

use Facebook and Twitter in psychological warfare.²⁶ They will specialize in "non-lethal" forms of psychological warfare, using social media including Facebook and Twitter to "fight in the information age". In future, it would be harder to know who or what we are dealing with unless we learn to fight war on planned strategic communication.

Recommended Strategic Communication Plan for Pakistan

Strategic communication is a vital tool in the 21st century information environment. One can say that it is expansion of IO. As Pakistan faces many violent situations arising in its fight against terrorism and uses force to curb the menace. In such unpredictable environment, it is necessary to maintain popular support and insurgent-population isolation. At present, communication dominance is a prerequisite for accomplishment in asymmetric warfare. It is time to admit that Pakistan has been unsuccessful in the SC drive to gain support of our own people, to fade the force of our enemies, and get the support of international community. In the current battle of wills, strategic communication is the center of gravity. This conflict is not to be won through economic, diplomatic, and military means. SC is a prerequisite for any successful counterinsurgency. Therefore, it should be the top priority of the Pakistan Government to achieve its objectives in such undesired situations. An effective strategic communication plan requires continued population support for the government in its armed operations against the militants and isolate themselves from the insurgents' cause and activities. The nine fundamental tenets for Pakistan's SC plan should be based on principles identified by Naval War College USA in 2008;

- **Leadership-driven:** Leaders must decisively engage and drive SC processes
- **Credible:** Perception of truthfulness and respect between all parties
- **Dialogue:** Multi-faceted exchange of ideas to promote understanding and build relationships
- **Unity of Effort:** Integrated and coordinated, vertically and horizontally.
- **Responsive:** Right audience, right message, right time, and right place
- **Understanding:** Deep comprehension of attitudes, cultures, identities, behavior, history, perspectives and social systems. What we say, do, or show may not be what others hear or see
- **Pervasive:** Every action, image or word sends a message
- **Results-Based:** Actions to achieve specific outcomes in pursuit of a well-articulated end-state.
- **Continuous:** Diligent ongoing research, analysis, planning, execution, and assessment that feeds planning and action.²⁷

Conclusion

Strategic communication is not the silver bullet, but it does present the possibility of a more tightly focused informational contribution to the strength of the other instruments of national power to achieve aims of national strategies.²⁸ Today, Pakistan is facing intensified conflict within the country and increasingly complex regional security situation. It is safe to say that in the war against violent extremism, SC is all about engaging the enemy in the battle of ideas. There is need to understand that SC is increasingly important in asymmetrical fighting, because SC focuses on selected peoples beyond the local population. Consequently, it is decisive

across the range of military operations. Our government and military efforts are marred by a lack of resources, interagency cooperation, and coordinated strategy. Pakistan public diplomacy is much weaker in identifying the mission and the strategy, and it fails to address the crucial function of public diplomacy in armed conflict. In Pakistan's case, Strategic Communication is more than disseminating of information but the active solicitation of stakeholders' perspectives. By making SC centre of future strategies against militancy, would facilitate the government and military to address human factors such as sociology, psychology, culture, behavior, and politics, and help building consensus and partnerships for national policy particularly in post operation scenario.

End Notes

¹ Six Principles of Sun Tzu, Art of war <http://www.suntzustrategies.com/resources/six-principles-of-sun-tzu-the-art-of-business>

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- ²² Ibid.
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E-GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND MODELS; OPTIONS FOR PAKISTAN

*(Muhammad Ilyas)**

Abstract

E-government strategies are defined as the employment of the Internet and the world-wide-web for delivering government information and services to the citizens. E-government has become one of the prerequisites of good governance and is an important milestone in this globalised world. Various models of it have been devised by scholars consisting of stages from 2 to 6, e.g. Layne and Lee Maturity Model in United States, Andersen and Henriksen Maturity Model in Denmark. Irrespective of different e-governance models, main aim and purpose is to enhance government efficiency and outreach in all private and government sectors. E-governance has evolved through four stages, i.e. presence, interaction, transaction and transformation. A state like Pakistan has to go through its fully developed stage, Transformation. So where e-government has huge benefits there at same time it exposes governments and all other linked stake holders to these systems to many perilous consequences as well. Many issues related to privacy of data, network security, Government IT management are attached with E-government.

Key Words: *e-government, prerequisite, transformation, presence, transaction*

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What is e- governance?

Governance, the act of governing, is a routine occurrence, with decision making and its implementations as integral parts of it.¹ The World Bank in its PRSP Handbook terms governance as ‘the way power is exercised through a country’s economic, political, and social institutions’. It comprises strategies, actions and processes through which citizens and institutions meet their obligations and talk over their differences. An efficient form of governance has always been a search for the stakeholders. E-governance is an important step in the evolutionary process towards this end. Electronic means are employed in mutual interaction of government and citizens and government and businesses, as well as in internal functioning of government offices. The major intent is to make things easier and simpler, and to improve multiple aspects of governance.

E-governance may be defined as ‘delivery of government services and information to the public using electronic means’.² Commonly, these means of delivering information are termed as Information Technology or ‘IT’. Use of IT is made in government facilities with a purpose to generate a process which is efficient in working, speedy in response and transparent in outlook. This process is intended to make information available to the public and other concerned institutions, and to carry out government administrative activities. By making the use of e-governance, and by employing information technology, especially the Internet, the government services are delivered to citizens, businesses, and other government agencies efficiently. This form of delivering government services is vibrant enough to connect more directly the government tiers with the citizens of the country. E-governance could enable

citizens to, round the clock, interact with and avail services of the governments at different levels, thus the society progresses dynamically.³ On the other hand, it not only opens new vistas and opportunities, but has to confront new challenges as well.

In the process of e-governance, the proactively evolving Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) define the nature and extent of the interactions among the institutions like state organs, commercial/ business communities and civil society. These dynamics keep evolving; various manifestations of these are exemplified by various scenarios: certain info are provided, e.g. electoral details, tax information, bank transactions etc; enhanced and sophisticated mobile telephony and digitized mobile access of world wide web are widespread; extensive use of social media by civil society, public and private institutions etc to mobilize or generate opinion and influence decision-making process and dissemination of certain public info messages.

Scope of E-Governance

E-governance is not simply presenting or using certain technological tools, rather it is basically related to bringing change in the mindset and work culture in order to integrate government processes and functions to serve the citizens better.⁴ The Commonwealth Network of Information Technology for Development (COMNET-IT), studied impacts of e-governance in different professional and government sectors, with primary focus on certain government initiatives.

The governments profess to bring in transparency,⁵ knowledge exchange and its creation within its institutions,⁶ but towards this end, effectiveness of ICT is to be enhanced alongside the governments may bring a culture of change through integrating

their functions. The government departments can make their hierarchical structures more pragmatic and effective. Researchers have found that levels of social security, political well-being, infrastructure development, and pledge to the principles of good governance have close connection with the level and quality of e-Governance. If this co-relation is established, it will result into commoners' convenience, more transparent and corruption free environment, revenue generation, efficient working and reduced costs.

Concept of e-governance can well be understood by having a fair idea of the concepts of e-democracy and e-government. ***E-democracy*** refers to all forms of electronic interaction between the elected component of any government and the citizens or electorate.⁷

E-Government

E-government is a form of governance which comprises of processes and structures required to deliver electronic services to the public (citizens and businesses),⁸ liaise with commercial entities and to conduct electronic transactions within an organisational entity.⁹ E-government is a broad ranging concept, defined differently not just semantically but reflects priorities in a government's strategies.¹⁰ It means many things to different people depending upon intended focus. In its broader sense it can be defined as a system to improve organizational performance; it is an efficient way through which governments assist and communicate with citizens through ICTs.¹¹ Communication in e-governance is carried out in different directions with varying degrees: *government*

to government, government to citizens, government to commercial and business organisations, government to civil societal organizations and citizen to citizen.

Sometimes, e-government is linked with provision of certain specific services: establishment of some sort of kiosk for postal services or money transfers/ receiving, access to some SMS based information like electoral info, tax-paying status or CNIC validations. Other observers define e-government more generally as automating the delivery of government services.¹² So, a whole range of perceptions of e-government exists.¹³ The Gartner Group describes e-government as “the continuous optimization of service delivery, constituency participation, and governance by transforming internal and external relationships through technology, the Internet, and new media.” Earlier, Jane E. Fountain had envisioned ‘building the virtual state’ in early 2000s.¹⁴

E-government is itself a process still in the early stages of development. Initial forays into e government initiatives have focused mostly on providing enhanced access to information and basic services. Although the full transformative effects of e-government remain largely unrealized at this time, the rapid growth in interest and resources dedicated to e-government initiatives may contribute to swifter changes. E-Government provides opportunity for the realization of those set agendas. Thus, it is not an end in itself. Rather it can be a strong contributor to the achievement of government’s policy outcomes.¹⁵

Use of ICT in Government Organizations

Information and Communication Technologies are the tools for promoting in our society a knowledge based environment where the interactions between a citizen and government officials take place

electronically.¹⁶ Being an orthodoxly working environment like ours, such interactions takes place in government offices, and are mostly time and space bound. Now that these are times of emerging ICTs, service centers can easily be traced closer to the users. Lot of ingenuity may take place in these domains.¹⁷ For example, government services, as mentioned above, could be provided through automated kiosk located close to the clients especially the urban ones, or the use of a personal computer at home or office, with dominant desire for quality, relevance and efficiency. But in our state institutions, in most of the conditions, e-Governance lags behind in understanding the needs of stake holders in wholesome perspective. Such perspective of e-Governance includes: Publicizing, Interaction and Transaction.¹⁸

Through these activities, the aim of enhancing access to government information such as laws and regulations; data relevant to particular individuals; increasing public participation in decision-making can effectively be enhanced and ensured. Through, for example the publishing of e-mail addresses of government officials and on-line forms, the government services more readily available to the public through e-filing of tax returns, online applications for driving or weapon licenses, lot of ease can be generated for the general public. Unfortunately, to date, in e-Governance domain, our major efforts are centered on publicizing of information, and no concrete steps have been taken to move towards ensuing phases of interaction and transaction. Automation pertains both in the domains of internal operations of the government and its external interactions with citizens and other agencies. When internal operations are automated, it will reduce the recurring expenses and at the same time will improve the response time to various

emerging situations. In this way, the government processes will be more elaborate and enhanced in effectiveness.¹⁹ By automating the interactions, the costs will be reduced and processes will become cost-effective.

Sectors of E-Governance

Although e-governance encompasses a wide range of activities and actors, three distinct sectors can be identified to shortly describe their mutual interaction.²⁰ These include between/ among government agencies (G2G) – the interaction includes both inter- and intra- domains; government – to – business/ commercial community (G2B); and government – to-citizens (G2C).

- **Government-to-Government (G2G)**

This interaction forms the backbone of any form of e-governance.²¹ Need arises that governments at all tiers must work to strengthen and consolidate their own internal workings and operating procedures before they could embark on successful electronic interaction with other stake holders of the society. G2G e-governance involves sharing data and conducting exchanges based on their electronic systems, both upwards and downwards, between governmental actors. This involves well-disciplined and updated intra- and inter-agency exchanges at different levels.

- **Government-to-Business/ Commercial Sector (G2B)**

The mainstay of e-governance in a country like Pakistan is interaction between government agencies and business and corporate communities, i.e., Government-to-Business sector (G2B). Here the business sector is basically the corporate or commercial sector. This interaction has the potential for


reducing costs through improved procurement practices²² and increased competition.²³ The G2B sector includes commercial interaction in terms of sale of products from state-owned units to the public, as well as the disbursement of services. Keeping in view the nature of the society and the orthodox practices being practiced at massive scale, not all transactions/ interactions are directly based on the use of information technology, but still diversified and innovative methods can be employed in relation to the G2B sector.

- **Government-to-Citizen (G2C)**

The third e-governance sector is Government-to-Citizen (G2C) interaction. In this initiative citizens are facilitated while interacting with government. It has been termed as 'citizen-centric form'²⁴ which, for some observers, is to be the primary goal of e-governance. G2C initiatives use dissemination tools, such as web sites and/or kiosks²⁵ to enhance public access to certain information. This purported feature of e-governance is basically a focused effort to provide hassle free, near the door step and timely access to some government functions. E-governance experts suggest that one of the goals of implementing these initiatives should be to create a wholesome website where citizens can handle a variety of tasks, especially those that involve interaction with multiple agencies, without requiring the citizen to initiate contacts with each agency individually. This form of e-governance if matured and developed in the right direction will override geographical and time constraints, thus will facilitate citizens, by increasing citizen participation in governance.

Phases/ Stages of E-Governance (E-Governance Models)

From the above discussion it can be brought out that the three groups that stand out in e-governance concepts are government (including wide array of government agencies), citizens and businesses/ commercial interest elements. Viewed in terms of interests involved, the external relationships are mainly focused on citizens and commercial elements and other minor interest groups, the internal focus is mainly on functioning and interactions between various government organs. There are some most occurring group interactions in e-governance which are presented in Figure 1 below.



As mentioned before, e-governance is more than a government website on the Internet. Question arises where we stand now in terms of services delivered and what are the opportunities and possibilities of e-governance in the future? Basing on varying degrees of interaction between multifarious elements of e-governance, some models have been devised by the scholars. These models consisted of varying stages from model to model (from 2 Stage models to 6 Stage models);various models include:²⁶ Layne

and Lee Maturity Model in United States, Andersen and Henriksen Maturity Model in Denmark, United Nations Maturity Model, Hiller and Belanger Maturity Model, Alhomod Maturity Model, Almazan and Gil-Garcia Maturity Model, Cisco Maturity Model, Gartner Group Open Government Maturity Model, West Maturity Model, Moon Maturity Model, World Bank Maturity Model, Deloitte and Touche Maturity Model, Howard Maturity Model, Shahkooh Maturity Model, Lee and Kwak Maturity Model, Siau and Long Maturity Model, Wescott Maturity Model, Chandler and Emanuel Maturity Model, Kim and Grant Maturity Model, Chen Maturity Model, Windley Maturity Model, Reddick Maturity Model, Accenture Maturity Model, UK Maturity Model and Netchaeva Maturity Model.

E-Governance Maturity Model (Gartner)

Gartner, an international e-business research consultancy firm, has formulated a four-phase e-governance model. This model has been designed to study government sectors, and is used to categorize projects according to their development level or stage. Organisations at governmental and non-governmental level have used this e-governance model while evaluating an e-governance strategy. While using this model, the user can review strategy after each phase, and can, within bounds of time and resources, provides chances to retrace steps if required. Governments normally initiate their process of e-governance with the delivery of online information, and gradually turn towards more complex services, in the face of rising quest for convenience and efficiency. Because some services prove to be easier to be made available than the others so it is gradually that these changes will take effect; sometimes growing public demand becomes a driving force; and in some cases pressing need of cost-effectiveness drives the process.

Gartner considers that e-governance will mature itself according to a four-phase e-governance maturity model.




Figure 2: E-Governance Maturity Model (Gartner, 2000)

Stages of E-Government

It is a matter of fact that diverse e-government enterprises are meant to undertake different goals. Amongst these perceived objectives, one dominant expectation from e-governance is to take full stock of the capabilities of available information technology, and to transform government from a limited scope-operation and physically restricted set-up into an automated machinery. Such it based government structure would be greatly citizen-centric, and will effectively deliver all required government services to all, with a 24/7 approach. However, the objective seems requiring time to grow into full potential, owing to many economic, technical, and political reasons. Basing on this premise, experts of the field have evolved stages of e-governance projects. This pattern is based on the degree of information technology utilization to enable the delivery of services electronically. Thus, the four stages of evolution; presence, interaction, transaction, and transformation have come up.²⁷ It is not imperative for a project to follow the sequential order of these stages, for its optimal completion. Instead, a project can

skip levels,²⁸ either from its inception or through its way to development.

- **Presence**

During the first phase, the web is used to make the intentions and objectives of the government known to all stake holders. An all - inclusive comprehensive government website, or a network of sites belonging to various departments and ministries are developed during this primary stage. Their purpose would be to let the public know about various initiatives taken by the government in solution of general problems. Loads of information such as official addresses, working hours, as well as forms and applications to the public, judicial opinions,²⁹ economic reviews, corporate regulations for business and budgetary allocations and spending as a reference for government agencies, are also publicised through these websites.³⁰ Such basic Web sites, as a passive presentation of general information, list cursory information about an agency, and have no interactive capabilities. During this first phase, very basic need of building the telecommunication infrastructure is met.

- **Interaction**

The second stage is interaction. At this stage, there is limited ability to streamline and automate government functions. Although interactive Web-based initiatives possess extended potentials yet the interactions are relatively simple and generally relate to providing information. By using these sorts of initiatives the customer can avoid a trip to an office or make a phone call by making commonly requested information and forms available around the clock. These resources may include instructions for obtaining services,

downloadable forms to be printed and mailed back to an agency, or perhaps e-mail contact to respond to simple questions. The task handling here is enabled through building the underlying processes; it allows for rapid implementation of advanced applications as requisitioned by the consequent phases.³¹

- **Transaction**

The third stage in the evolution of e-governance initiatives is transaction. Now it is possible that direct interaction/connection between the government and relevant quarters will be made. Because the complete infrastructure has already been laid, thus wide-ranging online service can be initiated to suit the needs. Services for the public such as utility bills and fine payments, license renewals, online tax returns etc for individuals and corporate sectors, tax records viewings etc for governmental agencies can be carried out there.³² At this stage, the electronic responses are generally predictable and comprehensively predictable. Although the level of interactivity is quite greater than second stage initiatives, the activities still involve primarily one-way³³ flow of information (either to government or to the client, depending on the activity).

- **Transformation**

E-governance initiative evolves at its highest order, and that is complete transformation. At this stage initiatives of the technology are utilized to transform how government functions are conceived, organized, and executed.³⁴ With such use of technology, sound customer relationship and management capabilities are built up, it has a capacity to address complete range of needs, issues and questions. Such transformation faces multitude of administrative, technical,

and fiscal constraints, so in our country, quite few organisations, mostly in private sector, have currently employed this type of initiative. Very conveniently, it can be asserted that transformative e-government initiatives aim at and complete transition from agency-centric solutions to customer-centric solutions. Thus, this stage turns out to be 'characterized by redefined relationships'³⁵ between various segments, leading towards most advanced level where e-governance could institute virtual establishments at various tiers.

Potential Challenges to E-Governance

E-Governance initiatives, once implemented, would be a source of potential opportunities. But there are a number of challenges that are usually faced in the realization of these predicted benefits. While e-governance is being implemented following potential challenges may be faced:-

- **Issues Related to Privacy of Data/ Info.** Serious concerns related to privacy of information and data pose strong challenge to the implementation and acceptance of e-governance initiatives.³⁶ At times, private information is disclosed or mishandled; hazardous sharing information between agencies is the points of serious concern.³⁷ If we wish to safeguard privacy needs then both policy responses and technical actions would be needed in the context of e-governance.³⁸
- **Network Security.** E-governance faces very potent threat - a significant challenge in the form of network security. These networking and database security issues are related to: potency of security software, network access management, loopholes in software development, operating systems controls, and service continuity.³⁹ E-governance

functionality depends on and is also directly linked to build citizen confidence and trust. However, the looming risks of fraud and misuse of sensitive data are persistent.

- **Government IT Management and Funding.** A complex challenge for the development of e-governance is how the government manages information technology management⁴⁰ and to what extent requisite funds are provided.⁴¹
- **Imbalances in Access to Computer.** In Pakistan, great disparity prevails in the domain of computer access. There are two policy concerns for e-governance: the “digital divide” and accessibility issue for people with disabilities.⁴² When we talk about the digital divide, it is evident that not all citizens or large populace does not have equal access to computers, whether due to resource constraints or owing to lack of necessary skills. ‘The poor, the elderly, language-limited persons, and the less-well-educated are likely to have limited access’.⁴³ Similarly, the blind or physically impaired require expensive computer apparatus (hardware or software), such as screen readers or oral controls; they cannot access online information and services.

Few more challenges to the implementation of e-governance include: Lack of clear vision drive to address workable development issues, absence of coherent organizational structure, issues related to gender,⁴⁴ level of trust in government departments and lack of confidence in the IT infrastructure.⁴⁵

E-Governance and Pakistan

With this change and the fast growth of ICT, the paradigm has shifted from traditional government to electronic government. The same is relevant for Pakistan as well. In case of Pakistan, it can be said that E-government is a relatively new concept. The Country’s

IT policy named as *IT Policy and Action Plan 2000* was introduced not earlier than August 2000. This is how the Government's attention was drawn to the deployment of IT in state functionaries and technology was attributed as an important tool for sustainable development.⁴⁶ This policy embarked on an aggressive approach to induct IT at all levels of government.

In Pakistan, the Electronic Government Directorate (EGD) was established as a unit within the Ministry of Science and Technology in order to employ different projects correlated to e-government, to make available technical recommendations and guidelines for the implementation of e-government projects, and to set standards for software and infrastructure in the field of e-government.⁴⁷ In June 2005, the National E-Government Council (NEGC) accepted the "E-Government Strategy Five Year Plan," which was designed to offer basic infrastructure to all government agencies, design and develop common applications for all government divisions, provide e-services to citizens, and establish standards for e-government projects (Pak e-government strategy, 2005).⁴⁸ The plan also raises awareness, attracts more citizens to make use of e-government services, and facilitates better understanding and delivery. The goals of the e-government of Pakistan are to increase efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, and accountability in decision making in addition to enhancing delivery of public services to its citizens both efficiently and cost effectively (Pak e-government strategy, 2005). According to an official report Pakistan Telecommunication Authority – 2010, teledensity had reached 65.4%, and at the end of 2010, the growth of broadband was outstanding at over 100% from the previous year 2008-09.⁴⁹

It is required to be understood, it is far more essential to consider E-Governance as an intrinsic and indispensable value to good governance. Ministry of Information Technology arranged an

“e-Office Forum-2014” in Pakistan with the slogan “e-Governance for Good Governance” in May, 2014.⁵⁰ The purpose of the forum was to share experiences regarding e-Governance initiative of ‘e-office/e-Filing System’ to sensitize all the stakeholders about its importance, and ask them for their active support in its implementation and to highlight their key roles and responsibilities.

In 2008 and 2010, UN e-government world surveys ranked Pakistan 131st and 146th, respectively. However, the South Asian region regressed in the 2010 survey and remains far below the world average. Pakistan scored 27.55 and Maldives 43.92 on a scale of 100. Maldives showed the highest ranking in the region.⁵¹ The 2014 UN survey termed Pakistan as ‘trailing among the bottom 30 countries globally’.⁵²

In developing countries, one of the most important reasons for the low-level adoption of e-government services is that the needs and requirements of citizens are ignored. These findings show that like other South Asian countries, Pakistani e-government services are still in the developing stage. The government needs to improve its various instruments to attract potential users and determine the influential factors in existing e-government services.

Following underlying principles have been used in the formulation of Pakistan’s revised E-government strategy:⁵³

Human Resource: The right quality and quantity of dedicated human resource and their long term retention is the most critical factor in the implementation of E-Governance Program.

Top-level Ownership: Without it, a fast-paced and successful implementation of E-Government may not be possible.

Requirement of a Comprehensive Plan: It is required that different areas of E-Governance are to be defined along with their priorities and integration. This is aimed towards implementing projects as part of an integrated approach.

Priority on High-Impact Application: The E-Government program should focus its resources on high-impact applications which mostly relate to providing seamless and uninterrupted citizen services.

Interoperability of Applications: There should be standardized interfaces and similar architecture for similar functionality. Wherever possible, applications should be replicated.

Security of Government Information: In view of Pakistan's strategic location, its participation in war on terror, the threat from hostile elements, sensitive security situation and considerably weak I.T. security infrastructure and arrangements, the Government information and data needs to be securely stored in a dedicated data centre at EGD, without any access to the internet. For hosting Government of Pakistan's Portal and for providing e-services to citizens over the internet, separate arrangement may be made for storing the non-sensitive information.

Software Development: A combination of in-house software development and outsourcing model will be implemented.

Conclusion

The key characteristics of e-governance have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. Since Internet Technology has progressed rapidly in the last few years, and the need to align ourselves strategically about our future course has pressed hard. With the passage of time, and with the emergence of new technologies at a faster pace, the need arises to adopt a flexible approach for right and timely response to the technology explosion. The Government agencies and private/ public sectors have initiated various steps in this regard which are likely to raise Pakistan's standing at international forums. While evaluating e-governance, domains of e-services and delivery of e-services, e-democracy and e-commerce will remain in prime focus. Participation factor should be

held most important, but unfortunately many decision-makers and researchers concentrate more and unevenly on the provision of electronic services. Consideration should be paid to enhance effectiveness of Internet based technologies. Stress should be laid on people's use of the Internet; awareness should be spread that common citizens use internet not only for their private tasks but should also involve them in public affairs.

Immediate measures will be needed to be taken at Government level before launching the online government. The states which adopted the technology have started securing the paybacks already. Our government managers should quickly capitulate upon the use of e-governance components and use them for convenience to the citizens. To make the futuristic vision work, there is a need for collaboration among e-Governance linked departments and institutions. It demands more political and organizational will to take hard decisions, change ourselves and learn to build e-Governance. Procedures are to be realigned and regulations reframed to embark upon new realities of e-governance. The above challenges and difficulties are to be surmounted to move ahead with the project, through our resolve and immediate attention.

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**ON THE DEBATE ON FOOTPRINTS OF ISIS IN PAKISTAN
– POSSIBILITIES AND CHALLENGES**

(Ms Mahroona Hussain Syed)*

Abstract

Sporadic incidents of terrorism that were claimed by Islamic State/ affiliated groups in Pakistan have turned the issue of their presence or otherwise in Pakistan into a constantly asked question in the local and international media. The fear raised by journalists, academicians and even speculators, especially in the international media, is that ISIS has managed to create a strong presence in Pakistan, even after Pakistan has dealt an effective blow to C in the country through military operation in FATA. At this point in time, as Pakistan fast moves toward successful culmination of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, this debate and line of argumentation will have far reaching impact on Pakistan's future. This article analyzes the IS's own declared ideological foundations, followed by its grand strategic designs for the region; and links it to the updates and evidence provided by media on ISIS's presence in Pakistan by the year 2016 to see the viability and probability of replication of this phenomenon in the Pakistan of today and point at future challenges for the country.

Key Words: *terrorism, phenomenon, culmination, academicians, affiliated*

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Prelude: ISIS-K

Despite some major territorial gains achieved by forces opposed to ISIS (alternatively ISIL or Daesh) in 2016, mainly on the outskirts of ISIS (or Daesh)-controlled areas, fears of ISIS's growing footprints in Pakistan are expressed ad nauseam. Daesh's ambitions for Afghanistan seem focused on setting up what it calls "Khorasan Province," taking the name of an ancient province of the former Persian Empire comprising territories in today's Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and some Central Asian states. The ISIS idea of Khorasan is purportedly attributed to a saying of the Holy Prophet (SAWW), quoted in 'Al -Nasai' which prophesizes about a Ghazwa-e-Hind (Battle of Hind) to be carried out by an army from 'Khorasan' carrying black flags which will help establish writ of Islam in the world.¹

Following declaration by ISIS, an official acknowledgement of ISIS's grand design confirmed in December 2015 by US Gen John F. Campbell, Commander of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan, about ISIS's attempts at establishing Jalalabad as 'the base of the Khorasan Province'.²



Source: Map as quoted in What ISIS and the 'caliphate' mean for Pakistan

Muhammad Amir Rana – Updated Jul 03, 2014. Available at:
<http://www.dawn.com/news/1116799>

This article analyzes the prospects of an ISIS foothold in Pakistan through the prism of some key factors which may influence establishment or otherwise of an ISIS foothold in Pakistan, using data from secondary open sources available online and through news reported in local and international media. These factors include ISIS's own current global outreach and its current capabilities, evidence of ISIS presence in South Asia – in particular in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the global response against ISIS and Pakistan's own response and internal dynamics etc.

The ISIS in 2016

First factor that influences any analysis of likelihood of ISIS foothold in Pakistan must take into account the current situation regarding ISIS and its capabilities. There are conflicting accounts of how actually ISIS is faring in terms of areas within its control. Not so surprisingly, since most dissemination of news and ensuing perception management is being spearheaded by western media, which naturally pursues respective governments' agendas; very few independent accounts, excluding IS's own media campaigns, are there to make an independent analysis. The lines between pack of myths and reality-on-ground are actually quite blurred. However, one can make a few deductions from the news bombarded across the world on this issue.

Sifting through the information available on open sources, ISIS seems to be increasingly able to sell the brand name 'IS' to a wide variety of youth, for recruitment from all corners of the world, without discrimination on the basis of education, profession, family background, wealth, class, ethnicity or gender. This is happening

despite its brutal tactics and a narrow and too-strict-an-interpretation of Islam which does not even match with the actual medieval Islam's traditions according to many analysts on Islamic civilization. The basic attractions adding to its mass appeal are namely: the idea of a universal Islamic caliphate, successful battle outcomes with the ability to hold on to the 'conquered' battlegrounds for past many years. As the international narrative would portray that populations living under IS-controlled areas are living in fear, one would see such narrative with relative skepticism since 'fear' alone cannot hold a population of two countries hostage for so many years. Without support of population, it is very difficult to hold ground for such a long period of time. There is a need to bring evidence on how ISIS is delivering governance and related services to the population in areas under its control, in order to ascertain facts in this regard.

Otherwise, everything about IS, especially in terms of strategy, is thoroughly modern, highly efficient and organized in its campaign. Initially funded through donations from wealthy supporters, IS has rapidly expanded into a self-financing and self-sustaining business. Their financial success model is based on siphoning of large quantities of oil from the conquered territories, kidnapping, extortion, selling antiquities and artifacts stolen from museums and art galleries, confiscating gold bullion during organized bank heists and of course, acquiring military equipment and hardware during their advances in various areas, leading to an asset build up of, reportedly, up to \$2 billion.

Within its own structure, IS is highly organized, maintains an element of independence and self-determination, remarkable internal cohesion which is strong enough to offset and insulate itself

against any counterterrorism-related efforts. The pyramidal style of leadership under Dr Abu Bakar Al Baghdadi, a highly professional use of social media ranging from issuing tutorials on assembling bombs to showing gory videos of killings and giving detailed accounts of operations and acquisitions in the form of annual reports has made them more popular among the youth. This attention to details does not depict an impulsive or hurriedly made strategy but a rather cold, well – calculated and effective one made by some battle-hardened strategists.

As far as ideological narrative is concerned, ISIS is far ahead and known to keeping on modernizing themselves in every possible respect. To increase their sustainability and their mass appeal, already there are reports that they have started to expand their ideological frontiers to include all four schools of Islamic thought. The ISIS narrative is becoming more appealing to the youth as it talks of revival of past glory, West’s conspiracies and puppet regimes in Muslim countries, governance failures, justice and shunning away nationalistic ideals to form ‘a universal caliphate’ which not only are perfectly saleable concepts but also suit the grand strategic design of international powers of subdividing Middle East region.

ISIS’s Global Outreach by 2016

ISIS can be credited for expanding its global outreach quite consistently as more militant-terrorist groups like Philippines’ Abu Sayyaf, Jordan’s Sons of the Call for Tawhid and Jihad and the Algerian Soldiers of the Caliphate pledge allegiance,³ whether or not they agree with the ISIS’s interpretation of Islam.⁴ The sites selected as targets for terrorist activities include France, Libya, Sinai Peninsula. Networks and cells have been uncovered in Morocco,

Israel, Palestine, Belgium and UK etc. Although as far as IS Caliphate map is concerned, quite curiously it does not cover entire Europe, on the pretext that those areas were never formerly under Muslim control but nonetheless, IS has carried out activities in many European countries. The November 2015 Paris attacks and Brussels attacks in 2016 are latest additions to their profile.

ISIS in South Asia

Within South Asia, an Indian Home Ministry report of July 2015 talks of evolving a national plan of action against ISIS⁵ as the Indian intelligence agencies had raised fears of a 'silent threat' due to increasing ISIS influence in at least a dozen states, including especially Jammu & Kashmir, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh.⁶ According to an estimate, 100 – 300 Muslims from India have reached Syria including those Indian Muslims engaged in fighting in Afghanistan, alongside youth of Indian origin from the UK, South Africa etc. However, Lt Gen D. S. Hooda, the Chief of Indian Army's Northern Command, is reported to have said that the ISIS was "creeping towards this side" in India from Pakistan.⁷ An article by Iftekhharul Bashar similarly states concerns about rising militant activism in Bangladesh and Myanmar, especially after the rise of ISIS.⁸

ISIS in Afghanistan

Next, the ISIS presence in Pakistan's next door neighbor Afghanistan which is stuck in a quagmire of instability and unrest may have impact on ISIS's attempts for setting foot on Pakistan's soil. Year 2015 broke the news of an ISIS presence in Helmand Province of Afghanistan when ISIS recruiters were reportedly killed in a US drone strike.⁹ Later, similar reports came from Nangarhar, and four districts namely Achin, Nazyan, Bati Kot and Spin Gar

were captured by ISIS, according to Gen. John F. Campbell, the US Commander of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan.¹⁰ Afghan Government was particularly alarmed by a pro-ISIS protest that took place at Nangarhar University in 2015. The Afghan chapter of ISIS also followed ISIS tactics in Iraq by setting up 'Radio Caliphate' to attract Afghan youth into its folds.

Most media reports however, state that Afghan Taliban clearly outnumber the ISIS fighters. The Afghan Taliban had sent a formal letter to Al-Baghdadi to stop recruiting in Afghanistan, saying there is room for only "one flag, one leadership" in their fight to re-establish Islamist rule. Though Michael Ryan considers the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda as "tactical twins and strategic enemies"¹¹ but even Al Qaeda has shown its disdain for ISIS and clashes with ISIS have been reported in Afghanistan many times. In 2016, IS launched a suicide attack on Pakistan's consulate in Jalalabad. However, soon Afghan government announced uprooting of ISIS grip in Afghanistan, with the Afghan President Mr Ashraf Ghani saying: "We can say with pride that today Afghanistan is the only nation where Daesh is on the run. They are on the run in Nangarhar, and Afghanistan will be their graveyard,"¹² Considering that Kabul government controls little part of Afghanistan beyond Kabul, one wonders how seriously such an assertion can be taken.

Global Response against ISIS: From Operation Timber Sycamore to Operation Inherent Resolve

Analysis of global response against ISIS needs to take into account Timber Sycamore Program of USA since 2012 in sending indiscriminate lethal and nonlethal assistance to arm favored rebel groups, even al-Qaeda affiliates, against Syrian government,¹³ duly funded by KSA, Qatar and Turkey.¹⁴ Brad Hoff's May 2015 account in *The Levant Report*, states that on August 12, 2012, the Defense

Intelligence Agency (DIA) of USA warned in a memo that “If the situation unravels, there is the possibility of establishing a declared or undeclared *Salafist* principality in eastern Syria (Hasaka and Der Zor), ...and this is exactly what the supporting powers to the opposition want, in order to isolate the Syrian regime,” including “The West, Gulf countries, and Turkey”.¹⁵ According to Brad Hoff, the same report revealed that ‘US had been helping to *organize* the flow of arms’. U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter stated at the World Economic Forum in Davos that the United States is “looking for opportunities to do more, and there will be boots on the ground.”

As far as UN is concerned, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon talked of threats posed by the Tehreek-e-Khilafat in Pakistan and affiliates of ISIL in South. In his report given to the UNSC in February 2016, stating that till the middle of December 2015, 34 groups had reportedly pledged allegiance to Daesh. "In view of its territorial claims of more 'provinces,' it is expected that Daesh affiliates will increase in number and that its membership will grow in 2016".¹⁶

Nonetheless, a 66-nation Global Coalition to counter ISIL with the motto ‘One Mission-Many Nations’ had been launched since September 2014. The statistics available on anti-IS Operation Inherent Resolve show 12685 strikes by US and coalition; to be 8661 in Iraq and 4024 in Syria till 1 June 2016. While the cost of these operations is totalled at \$ 7.4 billion with the average daily cost being \$11.8 million ever since kinetic operations started in August 2014, about 26000 targets have been destroyed so far in different areas.¹⁷ However, Pentagon Chief Ash Carter was said that members of the pre-dominantly US-led anti-ISIS coalition are

‘Doing nothing at all’.¹⁸ US White House on its part declares its strategy against ISIS to ‘defeat ISIL and eliminate the threat of terrorism’,¹⁹ meaning that elimination of target, i.e. ISIL is not the goal as theoretically should have been in a counterterrorism effort. This point is important since the US clarified that to them, when making comparison between Afghan Taliban and ISIL, "the Taliban is an armed insurgency, ISIL is a terrorist group,"²⁰

As far as ISIS ideology is concerned, internationally, although ISIS is able to attract educated youth even from the western world, societies especially Muslim world have rejected ISIS ideology and methods. ²¹ Pew Global Attitudes Survey (2015) reveals that views about ISIS are overwhelmingly negative²² in many parts of the world. However, one does find opposing accounts too. According to some independent researchers, “attitudes towards (the Islamic State) are often more favorable than outsiders commonly assume,” opines Mara Rivkin.²³ This is another indicator that Western narrative may or may not be bought by the population living in IS-controlled areas since they may choose a known governance structure than a life of uncertainty and unknown alternatives as given by western powers as observed after their invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan.

Analyzing the above, a few things are obvious. In any case, current strategy made by global powers to deal with ISIS is still more enemy-centric, based on counterterrorism-related notions and certainly not looking for long term solutions. US especially, as the coalition leader, is not looking to deliver governance²⁴ neither complete elimination of ISIS is a goal at the moment. The strategy to launch sporadic air strikes on ISIS footholds at places of choice

while providing arms at other, will, as desired by western powers, make the phenomenon last longer.

Also, some experts believe that the possibility of IS spreading its roots over most of North and central Africa, Middle East and the Indian subcontinent is preposterous. It is hard to ignore that the Russians have stepped up support to the Syrian government and soon Turkey will turn her army towards IS too. On the other hand, Coalition airstrikes, no matter how half-hearted and ineffective they may be but are still a hindrance for IS. With this, thinking of any aggression against Iran by IS will only make Iranians join the party.

Overall, seeing the broader picture, it would hardly be a surprise if out of all the parties to the conflict in this arena, the only grand winner turns out to be the Kurds,²⁵ as the idea from the very beginning seems to create a Pro-West 'Kurdistan' in the heart of Middle East..

However, how ISIS manages and maintains relationship with Sunni world is also an issue critical to its sustenance because IS's small outreach to non-Arab Sunni support does limit its base to quite an extent. On the other hand, ISIS still faces a divided opposition and the mutual hatreds of its enemies remain IS's strongest card.²⁶ Also, emerging nationalistic and patriotic tendencies in majority Muslim states while carefully avoiding ethnic and sectarian undertones, may offer one alternative to tendencies towards idealizing a transnational Islamic State Caliphate. However, the frightening ability of IS to maintain hold on vast territory cannot be ignored which gives a boost to their portfolio. Despite these setbacks in Iraq and Syria, the ISIS's slogan *baqiyya wa tatamaddad* ("remaining and expanding") seems to be a self-fulfilling prophecy for the time being.

Evidence from Within Pakistan

Interestingly, consistent orchestrated attempts are regularly made to blame Pakistan for every ill in the world, even if it is the emergence of ISIS in Middle East. For example, a New York Times article chose to find Pakistan's hand even in the birth of the IS phenomenon.²⁷ The allegation was taken so seriously by the Government of Pakistan as to invite a formal response from MoFA²⁸. Another article from Hudson Institute goes on to ascribe origins of ISIS to Pakistan due to its founding members (e.g Abu Musab Al Zarqawi) or at least the ideological alignment of its founding members (e.g Abu Muhammad Al Maqdisi), former Afghan Jihad veterans' use of this part of the region as a base or transit area during America's war against Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan.²⁹

However, within Pakistan, nothing substantial has come out in concrete till date, apart from very occasional incidents of purported signs of ISIS presence in Pakistan. The official statements coming from higher authorities state clearly that ISIS has 'no organized presence in Pakistan.'³⁰

Nevertheless, provincial ministers^{31 32}, politicians and provincial government officials belonging to police department have been giving statements from time to time about arrests made and presence found of ISIS or at least their affiliates. Balochistan's Home and Tribal Affairs department officials have been quoted in newspapers on reported recruitment of anti-Shia elements of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jammah by Daesh³³ and formation of ISIS's 10-member Strategic Planning Wing. The

Balochistan government³⁴ in a secret report has reportedly warned Federal government about attacks in KPK also. In KPK and Balochistan pro-ISIS graffiti, wall chalking incidents, pamphlets and black flags have been found while ISIS has even claimed to have recruited about 10000-12000 from Hangu and Kurram districts.³⁵ News of ISIS plans to attack government buildings, military installations, members of Shia community, religious minorities have also come in newspapers.³⁶ A number of arrests of people claiming to be ISIS operatives were made, including the suspects of Safoora Goth massacre and their female aides in Karachi³⁷ who were running Idara al Zakra Academy to generate funds from the wealthy for their cause.³⁸ Although government keeps on denying presence of ISIS on Pakistani soil, DG IB testified before a committee of the Senate on IS being a 'serious' threat to Pakistan.³⁹

Curiously, urban educated youth from settled areas which have observed considerable economic development in comparison with rest of the country have responded to the call of ISIS — a trend mirroring global trends in this regards. For example, most of the arrests have been made in Punjab and Sindh, and from cities of Lahore, Karachi, Sialkot etc.

Infighting Amongst Splinter Groups After Operation Zarb-e-Azb Successes

On its part, the ISIS had announced its organizational structure for Pakistan and Afghanistan, formally accepting the allegiance of Hafez Saeed Khan, a former leader of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) from Orakzai Agency, and appointing a former Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim as his deputy.⁴⁰

Mullah Fazlullah of Swat was inspired by the notion and considered himself the founder of the 'Khurasan movement'. Many other groups and commanders in Pakistan and Afghanistan subscribed to the same idea, but only a few have dedicated themselves to the cause of establishment of the Islamic state of Khurasan.⁴¹

Nevertheless, the leadership of Pakistani Taliban had earlier issued a statement of rejection soon after a rejection issued by the Afghan Taliban against IS, when pledges of allegiance started pouring in from low-level commanders of both Islamist movements to the Islamic State (ISIS).⁴² So entry of ISIS into the arena would be largely unwelcome as it adds to the number of competing powers in the ongoing turf war. TTP has already been dismantled in Pakistan after Operation Zarb-i-Azb and for its left over elements, if any, ISIS may or may not be a lucrative undertaking. Especially, in the long run, whether the local militant groups will be able to adapt according to the ISIS framework, after the successes achieved through Operation Zarb-e-Azb is yet to be seen. A violent confrontation between ISIS affiliates and other major groups in the region, such as, Al Qaeda, the TTP, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar and the Afghan Taliban however, may remain a possibility since TTP leadership had given statements against it.⁴³ Another impact has been, as some reports suggest, that owing to the increasing influence of ISIS over Pakistani and Afghan terrorist groups, Al Qaeda has changed its approach to become more inclusive in recruiting local militants instead of its old policy of maintaining the group's core as 'an exclusive club of Arab militants'.

Analyzing for Future

Various aspects have come up through analysis. At the moment, ISIS phenomenon is being seen as a transnational terrorist network and the question of granting it legitimacy of a state is not being discussed, and is still an embryonic idea, although it holds command over a large tract of land for quite a longer time period now.

While analyzing about future prospects of ISIS, the great geostrategic game being played in this arena should be kept in mind. The infamous PNAC map is one idea worth considering while strategizing for the future of Pakistan.⁴⁴ The melting down of borders in the Middle East and spillover effects on surrounding areas, emergence of ISIS-K in Afghanistan could be, in a worst case scenario, possible precursors to an attempt at balkanization of Pakistan. While officially and diplomatically staying neutral, Pakistan needs to spruce up its own intelligence base on the dynamics of Middle East and make preemptive strategies, instead of the traditional reactionary approaches.

One cannot deny that, in a way, ISIS proffers an opportunity to some global powers as a proxy to attack Iran in future. Pakistan will need to stand guard against this proxy war being played on Pakistani soil under a new bandwagon because within Pakistan, the existence of sectarianism - a proxy war tool – has been overly amplified. Contrary to the way the narrative is shown on media, one may find almost only seasonal episodes of violence attributable to sectarian issues, if any. That too coincides with the time when the government is trying to maintain tight control on outlaws and

terrorist activities and movements. Even within the region, the Afghan Taliban are known to abstain from anti-Shia violence. Thus, stakeholders in Middle East and elsewhere need to be advised that harping on old divisive sectarian themes will do no good to anyone, especially since Shias and Sunnis are not inherently confrontational.⁴⁵ It is not a sustainable theme for this region of moderate people for creating a divide. Also, banking on ISIS or some elements /factions of it, for advancement of some parochial interests is a dangerous proposition for countries like KSA because ISIS targets even Sunni youth and youth of other religions too. Considering that, just like an overall similar trend in entire Muslim *Ummah*, 70% of Saudi population is under 30⁴⁶, allowing youth to fall prey to such sectarianism-based enterprises to cut down influence of some other nations will be counterproductive for regional peace.

As far as ISIS-K is concerned, Afghan Taliban and US, even some remnants of Al Qaeda strike apparently a unique commonality of interests against ISIS as the combined outcome of the recent offensives of all these parties, including especially the US drone strikes, have led to one outcome—decimation of ISIS-K forces in Afghanistan. Since any emerging security-related scenario has an impact on Pakistan, this one aspect may seem to augur well for the time being viv-a-vis presence of Daesh in Pakistan. This article supports the view that at the moment, due to turf wars, leadership issues and inability to make any territorial gains is one manifestation of IS less likely to stand ground in Pakistan.⁴⁷ But ISIS's territorial successes in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan may

influence the ISIS's ability to influence outcomes of its efforts in Pakistan.

In terms of warfare, given the military capabilities and equipment, guerilla warfare suits ISIS more but within the region comprising Afghanistan and Pakistan, unless some massive support comes from a conventional army, ISIS on its own does not have the capacity to fight a conventional, highly professional army like that of Pakistan, now well-trained in asymmetric warfare. In the sense of scope of terrorist attacks, IS differs from TTP; contrary to ISIS, TTP could not even attempt to lay its hands on any of the state's strategic assets. ISIS is controlling areas in Iraq and Syria where the government armies were weakened and governance had failed miserably leading to a loss of writ of state over the entire territory but for TTP, and for that matter ISIS, Pakistan is no Iraq or Syria. Besides the above, the people of this society have not lent support to the ISIS or any other outfits setting up of Khilafat as per their understanding of the one that existed in early days of Islam during the reign of Four Righteous Caliphs (introduction and later outcomes of *Shariah nizam* in Swat point in this direction).

However, a question may arise, that the occasionally seen ethnicity-based violence may open another fault line to be exploited by ISIS-K and like entities. So would it be possibility that nationalist forces in Pakistan will join ISIS as for example what happened in the case of Mali⁴⁸. Muhammad Amir Rana is of the opinion that internal group dynamics, inspiration from ISIS because of its consistent successes elsewhere and presence of 200-plus religious seminaries may be a likely factor contributing to a possible rise of

ISIS in Pakistan. One would argue, considering that 90% of religious seminaries have nothing to do with terror and violence⁴⁹ and are more of welfare organizations, taking care of poor and neglected segments of society without much support from the government, such an idea seems to have been overrated by the media.

Nonetheless, Pakistan needs to deny any social and virtual space to ISIS-K. The State and Government need to look better and enjoy social legitimacy to ward off anti-state activities since the enemy is well aware of our internal fault lines. For this effective establishment of rule of law, justice and good governance are the basic deterrents required so that massive following does not automatically come IS's way in Pakistan. Also, Pakistan needs to carve out a policy to check recidivism amongst militant groups laying arms after Operation Zarb-e-Azb. At the same time, civilian law enforcement infrastructure needs to be developed and equipped enough to deal with emerging challenges. The currently observed over enthusiasm on raising special forces in Pakistan should not come at the cost of normal policing and intelligence gathering. The image of police also requires an overhauling to develop mutual trust between the police and the communities they are entrusted by the state to protect. There is also a need to bring into scrutiny female educational institutions especially *madressas* for females preemptively as there are increasing reports of women ISIS recruiters being arrested in urban cities as Lahore, Karachi etc.⁵⁰

Pakistan also needs to bring unmanned spaces into the folds of its governance structures. FATA's integration into the political

system of the country is immediately required. There is also a need to study all aspects of ISIS's grand design and possibilities in terms of Pakistan's Kashmir cause.

One cannot ignore the challenge that ISIS movement could at some point in time be exploited as a good proxy for destabilizing CPEC and Pakistan's desire for regional economic integration. Any terrorist attacks by, or in the name of ISIS, will create massive economic impact in terms of FDI, Stock markets, tourism, human capital and real estate. Regional economic integration is beneficial indeed but Pakistan needs to guard against likely domino impact of terrorist incidents in the region on its economy and projects with international community. There is a need to see, given our security concerns, that amidst the current emphasis to introduce an FDI-led economic growth, this FDI can also create economic and financial dependency on foreign capital for Pakistan and any terrorism-related incidents can make Pakistan vulnerable to flight of capital, jeopardizing its economy to a standstill. To deal with future challenges, domestic resource mobilization through increased involvement of private enterprises is the need of the hour.

Analyzing the current discourse on the issue, conspiracy theories against Pakistan persist abundantly. From the idea that Pakistan had sent Sunni militants to Syrian war zone even before Operation Zarb-e-Azb started, to the idea that Pakistan is training and even giving Pakistani passports to Chinese Uighurs, and militants going to Bosnia, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Chechnya etc⁵¹, the theories know no limits. The implications of such narratives are many. For example, finding a new pretext, although USA's combat

missions are officially over but America is reportedly thinking of potentially expanding military footprint in south-central Asia, the Middle East and Africa for the 'fight against the Islamic State'.⁵² Curiously, Tora bora near Pakistan's border has received most of the recent strikes by US against ISIS. Pakistan would do well to not allow US to raise another bogey and keep the Sword of Damocles hanging over us. Drone attacks, OBL case and ideas like hot pursuit must be kept in mind in this regard. Pakistan should continue to officially deny the existence of IS in Pakistan and handle the matter diplomatically. Since such discourses often are made to create hue and cry over Pakistan's nuclear program. To quote one such article citing multiple sources from within Pakistan stated that ISIS may get a hold of Pakistan's nuclear assets to make a 'dirty bomb'⁵³ as "The mounting concern of an Islamic State presence in Pakistan has put the spotlight on the security of the country's nuclear arsenal."

Conclusion

The challenges and possibilities are many for Pakistan but overall, there is a need for a whole-of-the-nation approach to deal with emerging challenges. Equally important it is that the current disjointed government narrative needs to be streamlined into one coherent whole in order to avoid giving mixed messages to the public and international community. The currently ambiguous and too often contradictory federal; and provincial narratives should be done away with and a strong state-sponsored narrative of a moderate Islam and positive future outlook of the country is required.

End Notes

¹ See Haqqani's article 'Prophecy & the Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent' published on 27 March 2015 at Hudson Institute. While the subject requires great deal of research but nonetheless this article discusses various aspects regarding this saying in terms of its usage as narrative by different Islamist organizations from time to time. Available at: <http://www.hudson.org/research/11167-prophecy-the-jihad-in-the-indian-subcontinent>

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⁶ Ibid . Aman Sharma in *The Economic Times*, published on 21 July 2015.

⁷ ibid

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¹¹ Michael W S Ryan, "ISIS and al-Qaeda: Tactical Twins, Strategic Enemies", *Terrorism Monitor*, Volume 13, Issue 24, December 17, 2015, Jamestown Foundation, . Available at: [http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=44915&cHash=114c5e6a13cef6305265a476c5dc4e09#.V1UYyuzU1JE](http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=44915&cHash=114c5e6a13cef6305265a476c5dc4e09#.V1UYyuzU1JE)

¹² See 'Ghani: IS Loyalists Uprooted in Afghanistan' by Ayaz Gul . Published on March 06, 2016 . Available at: <http://www.voanews.com/content/ghani-says-is-loyalists-uprooted-in-afghanistan/3221720.html>

¹³ How the CIA Helped Fuel the Rise of ISIS By Jeremy R. Hammond, published on January 31, 2016 "Information Clearing House". Avail at: <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article44091.htm>

¹⁴ In fact the arms funneling Op is run through Turkey

¹⁵ How the CIA Helped Fuel the Rise of ISIS : Information Clearing House... <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article44091.htm>
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¹⁶ See 'Warning of Daesh's tentacles spreading to South Asia :UN chief calls for international action against the grave threat' in the Gulf News. Published on 12 February 2016. Available at: <http://gulfnnews.com/news/americas/usa/warning-of-daesh-s-tentacles-spreading-to-south-asia-1.1670962>

¹⁷ See details at US Department of Defense account of Operation Inherent Resolve. Available at: http://www.defense.gov/News/Special-Reports/0814_Inherent-Resolve

¹⁸ See Anti-Daesh coalition members doing 'nothing at all': Pentagon chief . New report by AFP/Washington in The Khaleej Times .Published on January 22, 2016 . Available at: <http://www.khaleejtimes.com/international/americas/anti-daesh-coalition-members-doing-nothing-at-all-pentagon-chief>

¹⁹ See ISIL Strategy :The U.S. Strategy To Defeat ISIL and Combat the Terrorist Threat. Available at: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/isil-strategy>

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²² Views of ISIS Overwhelmingly Negative', Spring 2015 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, Pew Research Center.

²³ *ibid*

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³² 'About 100 Pakistanis fled to Syria and Iraq to join Islamic State' published on Jan 5, 2016 in Times of India. Available at:

³³ Available at: <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/ISIS-spreading-tentacles-in-Pakistan-Report/articleshow/45085103.cms>

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³⁵ The Dawn newspaper website stated the 'secret information report' dated 31 October 2015.

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<http://www.deccanchronicle.com/150209/commentary-columnists/article/view-pakistan-how-serious-threat-isis>

⁴¹MUHAMMAD AMIR RANA, "What ISIS and the 'caliphate' mean for Pakistan", dawn, July 3, 2014, accessed on January 20, 2016, <http://www.dawn.com/news/1116799>

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⁴⁴ For reference, the map was published in *Armed Forces Journal* in USA. It subdivided Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and envisioned Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite republics emerging from a no-longer-united Iraq. Two years later, *The Atlantic's* Jeffrey Goldberg imagined similar partings-of-the-ways, with new microstates — an Alawite Republic, an Islamic Emirate of Gaza — taking shape and Afghanistan splitting up as well. Another revision came last year suggested by Robin Wright in the same newspaper, in a map that (keeping up with events) subdivided Libya as well.

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⁴⁶ *ibid*

⁴⁷ The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Assessing the Threat. Published on April 7, 2016

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⁴⁹ See 'Disrespecting others' religion is not 'freedom of speech': Ch Nisar, (Interior Minister of Pakistan). Published in The Dawn newspaper on Jan 17, 2015. Available at: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1157633>

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⁵¹ 'Pakistan's Hand in the Rise of International Jihad' by Carlotta Gall in Sunday Review | News Analysis, The New York Times. Published on 6 Feb. 2016. Available at:

<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/07/opinion/sunday/pakistans-hand-in-the-rise-of-international-jihad.html?version=meter+at+1&module=meter-Links&pgtype=article&contentId=&mediaId=&referrer=&priority=true&action=click&contentCollection=meter-links-click>

⁵² U.S. Broadens Fight Against ISIS With Attacks in Afghanistan By MICHAEL S. SCHMIDT and ERIC SCHMITT JAN. 31, 2016. International New York Times. Available at: <http://nyti.ms/23Cqp7H>

⁵³ Islamic State could steal Pakistan's nuclear weapons and make 'dirty bomb', defence analysts warn
By Ashraf Ali. Updated 20 Apr 2016, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-20/growing-concerns-is-could-steal-nuclear-weapons/7342722>

**LEADER'S SENSE-MAKING DURING CRISIS: MOVING
FORWARD TOWARDS PRESCRIPTIVE &
DESCRIPTIVE MENTAL MODELS**

*(Dr. Muhammad Zia-Ur-Rehman & Ms. Yasmine Javaid Iqbal)**

Abstract

Leader's sense making and its relationship with crisis management is a crucial topic these days in the business world. Because of the current scenario of our country, most of the business ventures are struggling their way up on the road towards development while facing unanticipated crisis now and then. Similarly the organizations working within such a paradigm are also juggling their way for survival and growth, and development sector is one of them. Senior officials from 4 leading international NGOs (INGOs) are probed, and discussion sessions divulged the information about possible strategic decisions to be taken for the survival of the organization during crisis situation. The research design is qualitative; the data is collected cross-sectionally via Delphi technique and force field analysis. The leader's sense making process is visualized by Stella charts. The findings revealed a strong association of the role of leader's sense making in resolving crisis.

Key Words: *sense making, descriptive and prescriptive mental model, cognitive filters, crisis management, leadership*

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Introduction

Leader's sense making is defined as the thought process of a leader wherein ideas evolve, mental models are framed, de-framed and re-framed until a concise mental model is coined that is the requisite of crisis resolution. As business environment grows so does its complexities, it is reckoned that the rate at which the enterprises learn, decides their ability to adapt and survive (Schwandt, 2000). In this context, decisive decision making with sensible learning has become a necessity for business leaders rather than an option for long term organizational viability (Barnett & Pratt, 2000). Leaders are characterized as figureheads in resolving a critical situation; they are the ones with a vision to overcome a crisis situation based on their progressive mental template. Leaders are vitally important when organizations undergo a crisis situation. They are the key figures to look for answers and to make some sense out of what is happening during crisis (Weick, 2005). Sensible thinking in taking strategic decisions during crisis situations brings out an unanticipated leader from chaos. It is that mind set which is required in such uncertain business environment.

Research on the emergence of cognitive mental models over time when a leader deals with a crisis situation is lacking. This gap limits a detailed understanding of how leaders within an organization respond to a challenging situation. The studies on the mental models that originate, deform and reemerge within the mind of a leader during time of crisis management are lacking. This mental model later formulates into a strategy and later on; implementation. Understanding this mental model of the leader in the contemporary context of Pakistan is the main theme of this article. Leadership tangling through critical law and order situations

restricting business operations in certain geographical locations in Pakistan generates a variety of mental models which is the focus of this study.

The current study addresses the question that how a leader's sense making adapts, frames and reframes during crisis management process. What is the contribution of cognitive filters of a leader during crisis management? The current investigation is designed to understand how crisis management and leader's sense making are related and how leader's mental model undergoes descriptive and prescriptive sense making during crisis management.

Study Background

In the 21st century, enterprises are working in an uncertain environment where there is economic turbulence, political instability and natural and unnatural disasters. Organizations are bound to maintain their operations effectively, coping up with such scenarios implying headship responsibilities upon leaders to survive with such unanticipated crisis. In order to minimize the impact, leadership bodies require effective crisis management skills and significant situational learning. Within a crisis situation risk is inevitable. Risk is an undeniable fact; every crisis situation involves an amount of it. It is the ability of the leader to identify measures and control the risk involved within the crisis situation. Risk identification, crisis management and the cognitive ability to adapt to new states of meeting business challenges falls under the leadership quality of a leader's sense making.

This research article is designed to understand how the variation in leader's thinking patterns takes place during crisis management and how a leader resolves a crisis via a series of

diversified sense making patterns. The study is a qualitative research where Delphi technique is used to extract a series of opinions via brainstorming and later these opinions are rated and ranked accordingly, on the basis of importance via force field analysis. The population of this research is the leaders, CEOs, Country Directors and Top management officials who are responsible for framing conceptual mental models to take the ship out of crisis. Due to tight governmental policies of operations for them, it is a critical situation for the very existence of all INGOs.

Sneaking into the minds of senior management and analyzing their cognition during sense making process is the main theme in this article. The data is collected from 4 internationally funded NGOs. As mentioned earlier the problem or crisis situation is 'the battle for existence of INGOs in Pakistan'. The thought process of senior management during sense making is analyzed thoroughly.

- The data is collected via Delphi technique that is brainstorming sessions conducted in a series of meetings taken place during the crisis management sessions of all the four INGOs.
- Leader's prescriptive and descriptive sense making patterns are analyzed.
- The top stances are rated and ranked on the basis of force field analysis.
- The top stances are processed to reach to the final conclusions.
- The conclusion is the decision point made by leaders for the operational existence/ future of the organization hence, crisis management.

The leader's thought process and sense making is represented by a creative visual model formulated by using Stella software. During crisis situation, information processing within senior management takes a considerable amount of time. The temporary dynamic mental models within the working memory of leaders evolve over time due to the dynamic working of cognitive filter of sense making. Hence, vision formulation for crisis management takes place.

Terminologies Explained

- **Crisis Management.** Alan Hilburg, the pioneer of organizational crisis management explains it as a potential threat to financial wellbeing, survival and reputation of an organization. He further classifies it as a sudden or smoldering crisis but the only way to manage it is to react towards it and be prepared positively (HILBURG, 1982). The prevailing culture of unanticipated crises, continuous uncertainty, technological advancements and environmental risks have far reaching impact on organizational advancement (Mitroff, 1998). To avoid and reduce this impact, proactive crisis management practices must be applied. As the challenging environment grows only those organizations survive whose leadership is preemptive (Pearson & Clair, 1998).
- **Sense Making.** The growing series of research in the field of management cognition (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991) researchers have duly recognized the importance of sense making when an incident of change is encountered (Hodgkinson, Bown, Maule, Glaister, &

Pearman, 1999). Leadership is a complicated field where the dynamics of a leader's mind remains the focus of study during challenging times of 21st century. The idea defines the cognitive filters of leaders/ top management, understanding of their dynamics and studying what they include and what they exclude.

While working in a leadership role, leaders are more likely to share a variety of perceptions which create meanings through discussion, brainstorming sessions and cross understanding (knowledge of diverse views). This understanding of cross (divergent) ideas of others in a leadership role leads to a stretched change in the mental model of the leader himself because some leaders get convinced and adopt the ideas of others (Lewis & G.P. Huber, 2010). In the social behavior stream the sense making perspective hallmarks the environment with which the leader deals (Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008). Such researchers focus on this concept as a cognitive process of an individual (Sensemaking in Organizations: Taking Stock and Moving Forward, 2014), where other literature dimensions debate sense making as a collaborative effort (Combe & Carrington, 2015). This difference of opinion in sense making gives rise to a distributive set related to this concept, i.e. descriptive and prescriptive mental models. Each includes some prior knowledge, based on individual experience and conceived knowledge which is further based on networking, communication and discussions.

- **Descriptive Sense Making.** Based on the cognitive vision formulation theory (Mumford, Campion, & Morgeson, 2007) the most important element for the activation of sense making in a leader is descriptive sense making. This concept is used to translate a change that is led externally. It is these external changes that initiate crisis and makes managers adopt a leadership role. It is noticed that even within a similar organization, change and crisis is perceived and interpreted differently by different members. Therefore it is deduced that descriptive sense making is the interpretation of an incidence based on prior knowledge and experience (Yang, Yang, Zhou, & Zomaya, 2010).
- **Prescriptive Sense Making.** The second most important element for the activation of sense making in a leader is the prescriptive sense making, which is the development of a mental model based on the consequences and causes of a performance in respect to a crisis situation (Mumford, Campion, & Morgeson, 2007). Contemporary theories imply that at the start of a crisis, leaders draw a different analysis based on prior knowledge. However with passage of time, through discussions and exchange of ideas, an adaptive cognitive mental model originates among leaders and senior management (Combe & Carrington, 2015). This concept describes cycles of information processing, problem solving, decision making and communication. These are likely to be understood with action, in order to make sense and give a retrospective meaning to an event

(Combe & Carrington, 2015). On account of minimal empirical data on mental model of sense making and the understanding of development of cognitive making of sense in a leader in the scenario of Pakistan, this research helps in locating the dynamics of leader's sense making during crisis management in the development sector of Pakistan.

Variables Defined

Crisis management refers to organizational crisis including operational crisis and strategic crisis. The inception and interpretation of a situation based on prior knowledge and similar experience is defined as descriptive sense making. The received information is processed by a leader and a scheme is devised accordingly. Mental model describing causes and consequences of events/ scenarios based on the education, communications and networking within business hubs is known as prescriptive sense making – deep insight and understanding of a situations and generating a solution product.

Discussion

At the start of this crisis situation, the leader's mental model is analyzed. The analysis is done on the basis of proposed suggestions that are made by a group of leaders within the organization. Similar practice is followed in all of the four organizations. Leader's sense making is observed; the mode of thinking among leaders at the start of the crisis is different where the leader's vision is restricted to a limited number of options. During the course of resolving the crisis leader's mental model frames and reframes. The manner in which the leader's sense making evolved during critical time is gauged. Main themes are identified on the basis of frequency of similar

opinions received via brainstorming during the 1st stage of Delphi technique. These themes are then given points on the basis of importance at the contemporary situation and then ranked accordingly via force field analysis in the second stage of data collection.

The results obtained showed a variation in the mental model of similar leaders in 2 stages. The themes which were given more importance in the second stage were not even discussed in the 1st stage. Similarly the themes which were ranked high in the first stage showed variation in importance when discussed in the second stage and ranked low or even not listed in the second stage. This trend showed that during the course of resolving a crisis a leader's sense making diversifies its horizon. New ideas are conceived, opinions progress and diversity is created. This diversity is not restricted to two different individuals rather the same leader may possess a varied mental model at later stages of crisis management compared to the mental model at the start of the scenario. Due to the change in the political policies of the government in the regulation of INGOs in Pakistan a crisis situation emerges and calls for top management of such INGOs to take necessary steps to meet the criteria of the state. The crisis situation of study is the formal approval from the government of Pakistan to all major INGOs in the development sector to continue their operations within the country.

Stella software is used to visually depict the process flow of sense making of a leader during crisis management. A leader's sense making is oriented with a combination of Descriptive and Prescriptive sense making, where the crisis is orientated of operational and strategic crisis the organization faces. The initial model depiction is presented below:-




Figure 1: Initial model depiction

Stage – 1

In the first round of interview and data collection, top themes are identified by Delphi technique and are ranked in order of their preference and suitability by using force field analysis technique. The accumulated ranked order scores of stages 1 are as follows;

Sr. #	Themes Identified
1	Getting registered with the government.
2.	Sharing all the employee details with Interior Ministry
3.	Sharing funding records and donor details with the Ministry
4.	Helping beneficiaries and not compromising on the vision
5.	Planning ahead
6.	Competitive analysis
7.	Breaching local barriers to reach beneficiaries
8.	Control company's cost
9.	Capacity building of staff
10.	Maintaining motivation within staff
11.	Decentralization of operations
12.	Targeting new donors and funds providers.

Table: 1: Top themes identified during the 1st phase of data collection.

The mental mapping of themes identified during the first stage of data collection, are depicted below to have a visual understanding for readers.




Figure 2: Mental mapping of themes identified during the 1st phase of data collection

The above listed themes are the ones which are identified during the brainstorming session. The above list does not contain all of the identified themes, and only those themes are selected which are rated positive and are ranked highest. The themes which were rated negative and ranked lowest during the course of Delphi technique are not included in the list. The idea is to make the research comprehensive and to the point.

Leader's descriptive sense making is a thought process that is based on prior available knowledge with the leader. Main themes that are deduced based on prior knowledge are looped with descriptive sense making. These include breaching local barriers to reach beneficiaries, helping beneficiaries and not compromising on the vision, getting registered with the government and planning

ahead, and these all are positively looped with descriptive sense making. Leader's prescriptive sense making is a thought process that is based on education, networking and consensus. Top themes identified during the 1st stage of data collection based on prescriptive sense making are looped with it. Competitive analysis, sharing all the employee details with ministry of internal affairs, funding records and donor details with ministry all are positively looped with prescriptive sense making.

Staff capacity building is required to train them for multi-tasking; more of the official tasks can be accomplished with a less number of work-force. Therefore the theme is not to elevate the financial cost and is positively looped to operational crisis. Where the organizational cost is increasing by accommodating same staff with decreased fundings and grants availability this loop is linked negatively with operational crisis. Sub headings focusing on targeting new donors and decentralizing the operations are strategic attributes. Targeting new donors will help secure funding and elevate the organization's capital portfolio. Similarly decentralization of some tasks helps the staff members of field offices to increase capacity and the sense of ownership and leadership. Based on the above discussion and data available these themes are positively looped with strategic crisis. Keeping staff motivated during the crisis situation is a challenge and therefore it is negatively looped with strategic crisis.

Stage II

In the second round of interviews and data collection, the accumulated ranked order scores of stage 2 are as follows. It is noticeable that few of the themes identified in the second stage were not found even with the lowest ranking in the 1st phase. A simple

scoring system is used for the comparison from the highest to the lowest ranked factors between Stage 1 and Stage 2. A change in the ranking is assumed to indicate a change in the importance of a particular factor as the crisis developed.

Sr. #	Themes Identified
1.	Competitive analysis
2.	Fulfill Government requirements
3.	Save the organizational existence by sacrificing disputed projects
4.	Operational activities closure in two provinces
5.	Employee retrenchment
6.	Change agent
7.	New organizational structure proposal
8.	Retrenched staff database
9.	Maintain employee morale
10.	Explore alternate channels for MOU registration

Table: 2: Top themes identified during the 2nd phase of data collection.

The mental mapping of themes identifies during the second stage of data collection are depicted below to have a visual understanding of readers.




Figure 3: Mental mapping of themes identified during the 2nd phase of data collection.

The above listed themes are the ones which are identified during the brainstorming session. The above list doesn't contain all of the identified themes, only those themes are selected which are rated positive and are ranked highest. Those themes are not included and are not part of the list which are rated negative and ranked lowest during the course of Delphi technique. A change in the orientations in the 2nd stage of data collection is assumed to indicate a change in the importance of a particular factor as the crisis developed, hence variation in leader's sense making. Along with planning a course of action and getting the organization registered with the government, employees' morale is looped to descriptive sense making with a positive impact.

As the crisis develops, a leader's prescriptive sense making matures new themes are highlighted. Identifying alternate ways for crisis resolution are identified and are positively looped to prescriptive sense making. Referring to Figure – 3, while planning the course of action to resolve operational crisis, leader's sense making evolves and new points are discovered. Partially closure of nominated projects at an opportunity cost of sustainable profitable projects, this may help reducing organizational cost for operational crisis management. Partial closure is looped negatively with operational crisis because of its direct financial impact on the organization. Similarly staff retrenchment identified in the 2nd stage of data collection is negatively looped to operational crisis. Retrenched staff is looped positively with operational crisis, reason being all retrenched staff will remain in the main recruitment server of the organization and will be given preferences in case of future hiring.

Leader's sense making evolves as the crisis develops over time. Organizational reorientation and decentralization of operations and change agent are positively looped to strategic crisis. The significant change in the mental map depicted in the figure 3 shows the process of leader's sense making. The themes that were important initially were less important in the second stage of data collection. Similarly referring to Figure 3, new themes are identified and are related to the model, depicting the leader's sense making process.




Figure 4: Final mental model depiction after Leader's sense making process.

The final model identified by a comprehensive process of sense making explains the leader's sense making process during crisis resolution. The model is divided into two stages, 1st strategy planning and 2nd implementation. The process of leader's sense making here is supported by descriptive and prescriptive sense making.

Stage 1: Strategy Planning

The model developed to resolve the current crisis situation explains that proper planning and competitive analysis help resolve

the current operational crisis. The leader's systematic approach to fulfill governmental requirements and also at the same time considering other INGOs' plan of action to meet crisis situation all linked positively to leader's sense making. Decrease in funding negatively impacts staff financial requirements, and staff right sizing is done to meet the negative impact of operational crisis. The crisis is impacting the INGOs strategically. A few of them have decided to completely wind up their operations from Pakistan, where few have decided to limit their scope of operations and continue working. Therefore the start is looped negatively and the later stage positively with strategic crisis.

Stage 2: Implementation

The second stage of leader's sense making model is implementation, where the strategic crisis is looped positively with solutions identified after the comprehensive process of sense making. To get out of the crisis situation leaders have decided to strategically reorient each organization in terms of processes, procedures and operational costs. They opted to fulfill governmental requirements, get registered with the government and sustain their respective existence to continue the operations in the country. Because of the supporting nature of the identified solutions all three options are looped positively to each other.

Conclusion

It is difficult to extract a resolution strategy right at the start of a crisis. Leader's cognitive filters include and exclude a series of remedial solutions during the course of crisis management. Leader's sense making is a continuous process that evolves as the crisis matures therefore significant variations are observed in the sense making model during the resolution of crisis situation.

Recommendations

Leader's sense making process is observed during strategy planning stage and recommended solution stage. It is recommended for future researchers to observe leader's sense making in the later stages as well where the strategy is implemented and results are obtained. The limitation of the research is that leaders from development sector are observed to measure the sense making trends in a challenging situation. A leader's sense making may differ if chosen from another industry or professional sector depending upon the situation in hand, time constraints and level of stress involved. It is recommended for future researchers to investigate trends of sense making within leaders from rest of the professional industries apart from development sector which includes challenging political and economic trends of investments and business within the country.

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ENDURING PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN; FINDING ROLE FOR UN

(Muhammand Hassan Javaid Khan and Ms Iffat Pervaz)*

Abstract

How to gain, maintain, and if disrupted, still ensure peace in Afghanistan is a topic under hot debate. But accentuation has not been given as far as 'how to make peace possible in Afghanistan' is concerned. To find out the answer of this prime question, it is important to find out the causes of absence of peace in Afghanistan. While taking this position, it is vital to address the structural and personal causes of absence of peace in Afghanistan which include addressing injustice, grievances of marginalized community and thus establishing a positive relation between state and society. For the sake of achieving such stability and enduring peace in Afghanistan, the role of UN is very important. UN has called for the ratification of the International Criminal Court verdicts, the formulation of a Post-conflict Peace building Commission and planning for an emergency peace service. In case of Afghanistan, UN is actively playing its role to bring stability. This study aims at finding the ground for UN in terms of 'Enduring Peace' in Afghanistan.

Key Words: *accentuation, marginalized, ratification, post - conflict, enduring Peace*

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Introduction

Afghanistan is facing war and violence since its inception as a distinct political entity in 1747. Taking recent history into account; after the Soviet Union's invasion, the country had fallen into civil war from 1992 to 1996. Many factors such as social divisions, cultural mores, and geographical location, among others, have been instrumental in determining the course of Afghan history and in laying the foundations for preventing the Afghans from developing the necessary attributes of a strong state with a lasting stable political order".¹ Violence in Afghanistan can be categorized into two types; both Direct and Structural violence.

Taking the above scenario into consideration, 'enduring peace' in Afghanistan is not only seeking to eliminate violence, but also to bring positive interaction between state and society, and among various segments of the society as well. This can be done by addressing both forms of violence, i.e. direct and structural. It includes bringing Taliban on the negotiation table to address the grievances of the local population. All these call for a role of UN to be played in Afghanistan to bring enduring peace there.

Role of UN in building peace in Afghanistan can be traced back to 1980s when an emergency session of UN Security Council, held between 10 and 14 January 1980 as an aftermath of USSR's Afghanistan invasion, passed the resolution ES-6/1.² There are currently 16 UN peacekeeping operations and one special political mission – the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) – led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.³ It is mentioned in the mandate of UN that UNAMA is there in Afghanistan with mission to support the aspirations of Afghan government in security, stability, and democracy. Besides its

mandate covers all aspects which are important to establish enduring peace in Afghanistan e.g. commitment to strengthen the local governments, rule of law, development, co-ordination to international civilian assistance, support for ongoing transition to Afghan security.⁴

UN has done a lot in Afghanistan to soften the grounds for enduring peace, e.g. peace keeping operation, passing resolutions, signing of Enduring Partnership agreement, advisory role to high peace council, support for survival of Afghan National Army, and efforts in countering terrorism. Afghanistan is still in need of a UN role to be played in terms of dealing with not only direct but also structural violence so that 'Enduring Peace' can be gained and maintained in Afghanistan.

Contextualizing 'Enduring Peace'

Peace is always a challenging subject. Fundamental questions regarding peace are: What causes peace? Why is it desired? What are key conditions for peace? Which condition leads to which type of peace? To answer these questions, it is vital to define the word – pair: peace and violence, this pair of words together forms 'totality' of global environment. Peace and violence both establish the structure of a comprehensive conceptual framework for a world-order. To define peace it is imperative to define factors disturbing it; violence is the state of its absence. Violence often originates from exploitation of power or marginalization of a particular group by not addressing their grievances. Power either in the form of political, economic, cultural or military, if abused, causes violence. However, grievance ranges from economic, political, developmental marginalization.

Study of peace has been neglected since ages. History demonstrates that there are various causes of peace, e.g. in religious doctrines, it is through the teaching of love and compassion. But the issues with the mentioned cause of peace were the neglect of the challenges of political realism. According to Liberals, democracy and free trade have been major causes of peace, but they overlooked the nationalism and power of imperialism. Socialists consider the issue of economic injustice and patriarchy. Due to this factor, political grievances and lack of economic development have been considered as the underpinning source of armed conflict. Since centuries, peace has been on trial, that is why Shakespeare wrote about peace as “naked, poor and mangled”.^{5 6}

As it is established earlier that to understand violence it is essential to define peace, so need is to look at the causes of war. The causes of violence have been described by various schools of thought. Realists suggest that it is power struggle which gives birth to war or violence, whereas liberals argue that lack of institutions and international organizations leads societies towards war. Democratic peace theory is an advocate of democracy and suggests that when there is the absence of democracy, then war occurs as democracies do not fight with each other and do not support the use of force. On the other hand capitalistic peace addresses economic dependencies to establish peace, so war or violence is the focal point of many studies. According to a chronology, it has been estimated that 231 armed conflicts occurred at 151 locations in the world since the end of World War II (WW-II). But number reduced to 121 at 81 locations during the 17 years since the end of Cold War. And it further declined to 31 at 22 locations till year 2005 and all the 31 conflicts are intrastate – either between the Afghan government and

Taliban or between Iraqi insurgent groups and Iraqi government, etc.⁷

Let us consider violence as a disease and peace as a therapy to cure the disease. A therapy to a disease can only be suggested once causes of disease are diagnosed. So identifying the underpinning causes of violence are important in order to suggest the peace therapy. Broadly, two types of violence are important to be identified: Direct violence, and Indirect violence. Direct violence can be observed when two parties are directly fighting against each other, whereas, indirect violence is committed by a state against its own inhabitants. The relationship of sender and receiver is very clearly identified in case of direct violence, but not in case of indirect or sometimes called as structural violence.⁸

War is often characterized as one of the biggest problem for humanity; whereas, peace is always a desired state. Peace is not a term easily definable as it goes beyond the absence of war. There is an evolutionary process involved to define peace.⁹ The function of peace goes beyond just ending of war. In real terms, the aim of peace is to establish the positive environment of harmony, freedom, and justice for mankind to live in. Peace in its real terms is achieved when violence is absent from the society with all its forms and manifestations. While having this stance, it is fair to establish that eradication of direct and structural violence leads to prevalence of Negative and Positive Peace respectively¹⁰ The concept of peace has undergone an evolutionary process, and goals of peace change with the passage of time. For example, goal of state policies was to prevent the future wars after WW1; on the other side, after WWII, aim was set to prevent and halt nuclear war and stop escalation in third world. At the end of Cold War, aim was to prevent the civil

wars, eliminate terrorism and other forms of violence. As absence of violence is called peace, it is major impediment to peace, so goal of peace is to understand the underpinning causes of violence and find the effective ways to eradicate those causes in efficient manners. But now the nature of war is not merely limited to the war between states, now it also comprises upon intra states wars, civil wars and conflicts.¹¹

Room for Enduring Peace in Afghanistan

Unfortunately, multiple factors have been instrumental in determining the course of Afghan history and in laying the foundations for preventing the Afghans from developing the necessary attributes of a strong state with a lasting stable political order”.¹² Violence in Afghanistan can be categorized both direct and structural violence.

While focusing on the strategies against pro-western elements and accentuating on making the state an Islamic state, the collapsing state and society in Afghanistan has been neglected. Besides that the one element which contributes towards the destructive phase is the internal discord which revolves around different tribes, ethnic groups, and on religious and ideological lines. There was a quest for power and struggle for autonomy which resulted in intergroup violence. A ray of optimism emerged when Taliban came into power. They were the followers of a slogan which contained the ingredients which were needed then for the recipe to make Afghanistan peaceful, stable, end warlordism and above all to create a national unity. But very soon all the ethnic minorities were unified to fight against *pakhtun* Taliban as they realized that slogan given by Taliban was deceptive and false. Despite serving the interests of Afghans the Taliban regime looked like a supportive

regime to serve the interests of foreign militant groups in their respective country. So, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and Tajiks started reclaiming their stake, their territories, and their power sharing in Afghanistan. In the aftermath of the 9/11 episode and resultant GWOT, whether effort of international community to rebuild the country through reconstruction model will be able to deal with question of regional interests and identity or not, is still an important question. For the sake of achieving stability and enduring peace in Afghanistan, the role of UN is very important.

Peace at UN Agenda

People, since the recorded human history are looking for alternatives of war. So efforts have been and are being made to find the alternative of war. These alternatives can be seen in the form of various initiatives taken by the United Nations and talked about in preceding paras. The debate of using non-violent measures to end the violence is often considered as “doing nothing”. But it is not applicable in case of UN.¹³ It has its focus from international to state, and then to individual level. To maintain peace, to protect and save the individuals is the core concern of UN. As it is stated by Kofi A. Annan (former UN Secretary General), “No shift in the way we think or act can be more critical than this: we must put people at the centre of everything we do.” International community considered the role of UN as most important. In 1999, Gallup International sponsored and conducted a Millennium Survey of 57,000 adults in 60 countries. The survey showed that most people around the globe considered the protection of human rights to be the most important task for the United Nations. The younger the respondents, the greater the importance assigned to this goal. United Nations peacekeeping and the provision of humanitarian assistance were

also stressed. Globally, less than half of those interviewed judged the performance of the United Nations to be satisfactory.¹⁴

As per United Nations Charter which came into force on 24 October 1945, and was signed on 26 June 1945, it is established as the aim “to save the succeeding generation from scourge of war”¹⁵

To achieve this aim, UN is and has been working under a particular code of conduct:-

- Dress, think, talk, act and behave in a manner befitting the dignity of a disciplined, caring, considerate, mature, respected, and trusted soldier, displaying the highest integrity and impartiality.
- Treat the inhabitants of the host country with respect, courtesy, and consideration. You are there as a guest to help them...neither solicit nor accept any material reward, honor or gift.
- Do not indulge in immoral act of sexual, physical or physiological abuse or exploitation of local population - especially women and children.
- Respect and regard human rights of all.
- Exercise the utmost discretion in handling matters of official business which can put lives in danger. ¹⁶

International community is in search of conflict management. As far as the vital components of conflict management are concerned, UN peace operations are vital for peace. They are used by Security Council whenever such climate arises which poses threat to international peace and security. Since the end of cold war the nature of conflict has changed, in response to deal with the

changing environment, operations have grown with evolving peace building agenda. For the sake of international peace and security, UN currently has deployed 115,000 uniformed and civilian personnel in conflict affected areas. Their maintenance cost is about \$7 billion per year.¹⁷

UN Accomplishments in Building Peace in Afghanistan

UNAMA is led by its Department of Peacekeeping Operations.¹⁸ It is mentioned in the mandate of UN that UNAMA is there in Afghanistan with mission to support the aspirations of Afghan government in security, stability, and democracy. Besides, the mandate covers all aspects which are important to establish enduring peace in Afghanistan.¹⁹ To accomplish the above mentioned mandate UN has done the following tasks in Afghanistan.

- **Efforts in countering terrorism.** On 1st October 2010, Former UN Secretary General Kofi A Annan said, "As we summon the will and the resources needed to succeed in the struggle against terrorism, we must also care for all the victims of terrorism, whether they are direct targets or other populations who will be affected by our common effort. That is why I have launched an alert to donors about the potential need for much more generous humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan."²⁰
- **Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA).** With signing BSA, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) are saddled with an unfinished task which they have in shape of promises to Afghan people, by fighting against heavy odds. They lack ammunition, arms, and latest technology. The role of international community is very important in this regard.

India has spent \$2 billion on various projects to strength the ANSF under strategic agreement signed between India and Afghanistan²¹. BSA was necessary in sustaining the ANSF and Afghan political system, besides it would illustrate an international presence and international financial assistance which was much needed for the government in post 2014 scenario to run the infrastructure of Afghanistan.²²

- **Law and Order.** Alain Le-Roy, former Under-Secretary General for peacekeeping, while talking about UN Police (UNPOL) once commented, “Without law and order there can be no peace, without peace there can be no law and order”²³ UN since its presence has played its role to establish law and order in Afghanistan.
- **Advisory to High Peace Council.** Besides the UN role in security sphere of Afghanistan, the role of UNAMA is vital, as it plays its role to advice the Afghan High Peace Council that an all inclusive peace process will make Afghanistan able to witness enduring peace. UNAMA can also play a key role in making the Afghans recognize that how a wide array of Afghan national leadership can play their role in strengthening the Afghan institutions, along with the role of sub national leaders in enhancing their role in arena of local governments.²⁴
- **Survival for Afghan National Army.** With the withdrawal of foreign forces, a transition of security areas has been seen from foreign to Afghan forces which are not yet in a mature form, neither in capabilities nor in numbers. So in order to transform into a cohesive force, they will need foreign support in terms of funding, mentoring, and regular

supply and maintenance of arms and equipment. International support is essential at times where state is dysfunctional and polity is fragmented; 350,000 numbers of forces by no means are able to make the country stable. So support is needed to build a professional force with sufficient troops, enough material strength, and which is ethnically balanced.²⁵

- **Collective engagement of UN and Afghanistan.** Talking about the fall of Taliban and role of UN, it is important to mention here that reports released on 6 September 2006 by UN Secretary General illustrated that one third of Afghanistan is racked by violent insurgency. So UN was required to speed up its efforts to address the situation.²⁶
- **Resolution 1386.** According to Chapter 7 of UN Charter, Security Council passed the resolution 1386 on 20th December, 2001. As per this resolution, a peace keeping force was deployed in Afghanistan in 2001. As per the Resolution, Afghans were allowed to enjoy the right of freedom. Besides, it accentuated the need to establish the government in Afghanistan according to proceedings of Bonn Conference held on 5th December 2001.²⁷
- **Resolution 1833.** UN while passing the resolution 1833 on 22 September, 2008 extended the presence of ISAF in Afghanistan till 13th October 2009. It reaffirmed the UN commitment towards Afghanistan's sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and national unity. Resolution 1833 also emphasized on not harming the Afghan civilians, as

increased violence would hamper the stabilization agenda in Afghanistan.²⁸

- **Increased boots on grounds.** President Barak Obama in his speech (made on December 1, 2009) announced to increase number of troops in Afghanistan to total 30,000²⁹.
- **Enduring Partnership Agreement.** The agreement was signed in 2012 between Afghanistan and US. It says that US will stay in Afghanistan till 2024. As a result, forces have changed the strategy to deal with the threat while moving away from counter insurgency to a counter terrorism operations with limited military capabilities and assets.³⁰
- **UNEP an NEPA.** On 21st September 2015, United Nations Environmental Program and Afghan National Environment Protection Agency (NEPA) celebrated 7th Annual 'Peace Trek' which is being celebrated globally since last seven years. Its aim was to create awareness amongst public about those aspects which are generally comprised in civil society, and are related to importance of peace and environment protection in Afghanistan. During the session, issues of natural resources, environment and depletion of resources as a cause of generating conflict came under serious discussion.³¹

Role of UN at 'enduring peace' in Afghanistan

Despite a decade long presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan, not even a single protest from masses of Afghanistan against presence of foreign forces has been seen. They are interested in stay of foreign forces after 2014 as well. Besides general public, all the eight candidates for presidential election for 2014 showed their will and wish for an extended presence of western troops on soil of

Afghanistan. In 2013, 2,500 representative of Loya Jirga from across the country discussed the possible prospects for Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). It was important as they realized to protect not only Afghan political system but also to make the country safe from the possible scenario of civil war, as there are many 'ifs' and 'buts' as far as the future scenario of Afghanistan is concerned. While taking a glance of the challenges being faced by present unitary government, it is revealed that they are not different from those faced by Karzai Government. These challenges include; managing the interest of different and diverse population, informal power structures, and sub-national level resistance from the militant groups. These are the core issues; others ranging from governance to human security demand a separate debate.³²

Development for Peace in Afghanistan

From year 2000 onwards a lot of development took place in policy reforms of United Nations. The Brahimi Report is considered the starting point of reforms since 2000. A panel on United Nations peace operations, chaired by Mr Lakhdar Brahimi, in 2012 assembled to discuss the major challenges which UN faced during peace operations. Later, Capstone doctrine came on the stage in 2008 which acknowledged that UN had been working without clear guidance on peace keeping. So it outlined core functions and strategies for UN peace keeping missions. Whereas in 2009, another initiative was taken in terms of New Horizon. Challenges were identifies as were identified in Brahimi Report and areas were suggested to improve UN peace keeping.³³

Stabilization Agenda

As per an estimate there are 40 to 60 fragile states in the world. In this regard, the role of United Nation is very important, which,

through, rule of law, preventive diplomacy, peace keeping, and peace building strategies tries to manage stabilization projects in fragile states. Owing to this aspect, there are two viewpoints available, where, first, is in favor of a 'military' style of operations, whereas second accentuated upon 'developmental' aspects of stabilization. In a nutshell, UN mission are often sounded like from peacekeeping to peace building. As it is witnessed that UN very recently is wading in the arena of stabilization agenda, so it is considered as newcomer for this, still it has 180,000 blue helmets and civilian personnel for peace keeping and peacemaking. It has adopted the strategy of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). Stabilization programmes are not necessarily taken in full scale scenario rather, they can be taken in a 'no war no peace' scenario. They are not meant to build a positive peace during peace building, nor are they aimed at social transformation, and reconstruction in case of development. They are carried out to create calm and conducive environment for a state to resume its functions. The aim is to reduce violence and increase trust on local security and justice. The important aspect which is necessary to mention here is that these programmes are undertaken with the consent of host government/state. UN operations are guided by a doctrine which also actuates on the above mentioned description.³⁴

UN in Generating a Sense of 'Hurting Stalemate'

When UN is stationed in Afghanistan with the consent of Afghan people then first and foremost task is to create the awareness about 'mutually hurting stalemate' because 'ripeness' is very important factor as far as intrastate conflicts are concerned. When and how a conflict is ripe is a fundamental question to answer while going towards the peace process. This can be considered as a

prerequisite of any peace process. How a conflict can be ended? Military victory by either of the belligerent caused the end of civil wars during the Cold War era. But after cold war trends got changed, negotiated settlement became the focal point of conflict resolution. And 2009 onwards it seems that trends prevailed during the Cold War are again becoming the fashion, as counter insurgency has replaced negotiated settlements. It is argued that peace which prevails after a military victory will be durable. What about the losses caused during that conflict which are double than those caused during negotiated settlement.

It is difficult to identify when conflicting parties wish to enter into a peace agreement. It is surprisingly difficult when they realize that continuing conflict is not in favor of both parties and it is mutually hurting both of them then they decided to end the conflict. So achieving “hurting stalemate” in Afghanistan is important to bring peace. Here comes the role of UN. The first step towards achievement of “hurting stalemate” is to generate the sense of mutually hurting stalemate. As far as the case of Afghanistan is concerned the process involves multi-party stakes who need to recognize the hurting stalemate. It is more likely that involvement of multi party will bring difficulties to reach to some consensus on negotiating table. The formula adopted in South African case by international community, in 1990s, where economic pressure was exerted on white government (minority) for the sake of making them enter into negotiation with African National Congress (ANC), but it seems difficult to apply it in Afghanistan case. The reason being that major part of Afghan economy is dependent upon foreign aid.

UN in All inclusive Process in Afghanistan

Who should be seated on negotiating table is another important question. Is it feasible to include all the warring parties in negotiations or only those who are interested to bring peace in Afghanistan? It all depends on the moment when they achieve the mutually hurting stalemate, once they reach that point then peace process should be as inclusive as it can be. For that matter there is need to look at the demand of all the stake holders and factions. Whatever they want, should be publicized. A national dialogue should be generated to sensitize the public about benefits of inclusive peace process.³⁵

In case of Afghanistan, an all-inclusive process is suggested, where no one can feel left out. In this regard, year 2015 witnessed some important moves from Afghan Government and Taliban. Both the parties gathered in Pakistan and talks were held in Murree on 7th July 2015, in the presence of representatives of China and US. That was the time when Taliban agreed for an agreement within the constitution of Afghanistan. The golden opportunity for peace process faded away with the break of news related to death of Mulla Omer, and the announcement for continuity of Jihad against Afghan Government and its allies by his successor Mullah Akhtar Mansoor.³⁶ In a scenario of direct violence, again the UN comes in to generate the sense of mutually hurting stalemate to establish the grounds for enduring peace in Afghanistan.

Conclusion

To conclude, to achieve the enduring peace in Afghanistan it is prerequisite to create the awareness about the *hurting stalemate*³⁷ among conflicting parties so that they can recognize the importance of Peace. While taking this position *ripeness*³⁸ is very important

factor as far as to address the intrastate conflicts and to bring them to reasonable conclusion is concerned. This can be considered as a prerequisite of any peace process. The case of Afghanistan needs soon to be under this lens because most of the elements hampering enduring peace to prevail in Afghan society lie within Afghanistan. The role of UN is very important in this regard, as after signing of BSA and withdrawal of NATO forces, there is again resurgence of direct violence in Afghanistan as it was witnessed when Taliban took over Kunduz last year.

United Nation has very important role to play, through rule of law, preventive diplomacy, peace keeping, and peace building strategies to manage stabilization projects in fragile states like Afghanistan. UN has done a lot in Afghanistan to soften the grounds for enduring Peace, e.g peace keeping operation, passing resolutions, signing of Enduring Partnership agreement, advisory role to high peace council, support for survival of National army, and efforts in countering terrorism. Afghanistan is still fertile for UN role to be played in terms of dealing with not only direct but also structural violence so that 'Enduring Peace' can be gained and maintained in Afghanistan.

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MOBILIZATION ENABLERS FOR RELIGIOUS NON-STATE ACTORS IN PAKISTAN

(Mr. Abdul Rauf Iqbal & Muhammad Ahsan)*

Abstract

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been a home to religious activism since its inception, due to its proclaimed religious ideology. Religious activism played a profound role in the state's social make-up and accordingly remained manifest in routine cultural activities. The period after the 1980s witnessed a rise in violent activities by these religious extremists. The situation became more pronounced in early 2000s, when religious extremist groups openly started undermining state authority in less developed areas of FATA and Balochistan. This was followed by an armed struggle generating a threat to the stability of the country. Accordingly this paper explores the enablers that contribute towards the mobilization capacity of religious non-state actors in Pakistan. It tests the theory that the legitimacy earned by these elements is an outcome of the environment shaped during Afghan War of 1980s in the context of two case studies: Lashkar e Taiba (LeT) and Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Key Words: *religious activism, cultural activities, extremist groups, non-state actors, LeT, TTP*

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Introduction

The Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been a home to religious activism since its inception, due to its proclaimed religious ideology. Religious activism played a profound role in the state's social shaping and accordingly remained manifest in routine cultural activities. Religious ideology was time and again used by the political setups (Chengappa 2001, Haqqani 2005 and Jaffrelot 2004) for generating mass support but it never resonated in a big way on the political landscape. Although there had been religious and ethnically based extremist demands in the early years of Pakistan's history, the interplay between the rise of religious groups, government policies, and growing poverty was unprecedented during General Zia's regime¹ (Sadia, 2004)". Religious elements remained involved in power politics as evident from Lahore riots of 1953 but never they turned devastatingly violent against the legitimate government till US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 that witnessed extreme violent activities against state and society of Pakistan by non-state actors like Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

The period after the 1980s witnessed rise in violent activities by extremists generating serious social issues like sectarianism and violent extremism. The situation became more pronounced in early 2000s, with religious extremist groups openly undermining state authority in less developed areas of FATA and Balochistan. This was followed by an armed struggle generating a threat to the stability of the country. The situation attracted sharp concerns from the West in general and United States (US) in particular. The US was particularly concerned that these religious extremist groups could be linked to terrorist threats, and for this reason it is important to understand what enables the mobilization of these groups.

In 2001-2, Pakistan was home to fifty-eight religious-political parties and twenty-four armed religious militias (Saeed, 2002). The prominence of religious based activism in Pakistan played a key role during Russo-Afghan war of 1980s marking the culmination of Cold War and present US invasion of Afghanistan. The surge in religious activism can be the result of conflation of religion and politics during that era. Robertson and Chirico contend that contrary to the notion of separation of church and the state in West, societies such as Israel, Iran, and Pakistan – not to speak of the "secularly religious" Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and some of its allies - were "able" to conflate religion and politics (Robertson and Chirico, 1985).

Accordingly it makes sense to wonder, why has the growth of radical non-state actors gained prominence in developing countries like Pakistan? The emergence of a plethora of these non-state groups after 1990s as highlighted by Saeed (2002), engaged in armed struggle and / or social activities, not only in the country but also in the region is adding to the security and stability challenges of the country. Moreover, relationships with politico-religious parties and non-state social groups are adding to governance issues. The availability of social space to these Islamic non-state actors in Pakistan is important because of the perceived regional and global implications. These religious non-state actors are competing and existing beside other groups with both extremist and social outlooks and often rally together on religious and political issues.

Global interest in the growing capacity and influence of Islamic non-state actors in Pakistan as a force for social and political change in the country and region has revived in the wake of September 11 attacks in US, US attack on Afghanistan – 2001, and the extension

of direct or indirect assistance by a few of these groups to Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda. This concern is augmented by the contemporary rise of Islamic activism in the Arab World and the increasing influence of Pakistan based Islamic non-state actors in the nascent Central Asian Republics.

Globalization as a Factor of Radical Groups and the State

The stability-instability paradox² resulted in global rivals using proxies during the Cold War and post Cold War eras in order to spread ideologies and curtail the influence of adversaries. Group dynamics³ was supported both overtly and covertly at places of interests like Afghanistan insurgency of 1980s organized from Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Pakistan; to meet policy ends while avoiding direct confrontation, as evident from events like Vietnam War, Afghan War and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The tactic resulted in interference, interdependence and communication between diverse world players and societies and was furthered by the advance of globalization. The phenomenon of globalization, which Robertson (1985) defined as the process by which the world becomes a single place both with reference to interdependence and the growth of consciousness, led to increased social awareness, connectivity and growth in almost all spheres of life including social aspects, economics, power struggles and politics.

A Conceptual Role of Religion

Globalization initially weakened the *Westphalian* nation-states (Holton, 1998) and accordingly witnessed a nearly global upsurge of nationalism that institutionalized the nation-state as the major political form in the world and the source, bearer, or inspiration for various types of rationalized action: education, welfare, economic

developments, and so forth (Boli and Thomas 1999, Boli and Lechner 2005, and Meyer 2009). In the beginning of this century, nationalism overshadowed religious based activism (Hoffman, 1999) undermining the myth of religious identities. Formal religion was observed waning as people became increasingly modernized despite the fact that most of the world's population is related with different religions⁴. The situation aired the feeling that global resurgence of religion may not be apparent (Norris and Inglehart, 2011). However, Beyer and Beaman contend that contemporary phase of globalization is with very distinct religious overtones and globalization has nothing to do with religion (Beyer and Beaman, 2007). Despite initial prominence of nationalism linked with globalization scholars talking about the sociology of Religion like Beyer, 1989, Lechner, 1989, Robertson, 1985, 1989, and Robertson & Chirico, 1985 introduced the concept of "globalization of religion".

The Emergence of Non-State Influence

Concurrent to the surge in religious activism, the growth of international non-governmental organizations has also endorsed a surge, as the number of organizations grew from 1012 in 1954 to 1899 in 1968 (Skjelsbaek, 1971). In the last ten years, NGOs have become a force for transformation in global politics and economics because of increased prominence on political as well as social fronts⁵. Legitimacy is one of the most important assets of these organizations gained through the general perception of being an independent voice (Edwards and Fowler, 2002). Accordingly, non-state actors gained prominence as a new paradigm in global politics with traditional *Westphalian* states obligated to adapt a more accommodative and cooperative stance towards these non-state

entities. This influenced scholars to conclude that the state is not necessarily the only important actor in world politics, not the gatekeeper between 'intra-societal and extra societal flows of actions' (Keohane and Nye, 1971).

Belligerents, through funding and patronization, have used these non-state entities in a few cases for achieving their desired objectives. Patronization of these non-state actors by the international community or the power players like US and Russia attached a degree of legitimacy to their actions, in-turn enhancing their capacity and ingress in society. The same can be assessed through the work of Mansbach and Vasquez's "In Search of Theory: A New Paradigm of Global Politics" that identifies 9 out of 10 most conflict prone actors (which were non-state actors) and 18 out of 25 non-state actors which were conflict prone. Only 8 of the 26 Governments in the study were involved in any conflict at all (Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981).

In some cases nation-states also feel threatened by this, sometimes forced cooperation with non-state actors because it emphasizes the external players' role in international affairs, showing strong evidence for a link between the growing strength of such organizations and their abilities due to contemporary globalization (Murphy, 2000). The situation has recently forced numerous countries such as US, Russia and India, to ban selected non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from receiving foreign funding and / or towing a different agenda. However weak states which are under international pressures often stand handicapped in curtailing NGOs activities working against national interests (O'Connor, 2012).

Religious Activism in Pakistan

Religious activism can be traced back to the very struggle of Pakistan, as dominant political party then All India Muslim League (AIML) projected Two-nation Theory for achieving a separate nation-state. Islam was used as mobilizing and solidifying force to achieve the goal of a separate nation-state by identifying Hindus and Muslims as two different entities. Although the religious elite opposed the idea of Pakistan, the religious appeal for the creation of Pakistan is commonly believed to be the most important factor behind the creation of a separate Muslim state (Rehman, 2006). Islamic ideology sprang directly from the struggle waged by the AIML in British era for creation of Pakistan (Jaffrelot, 2004). The AIML's 1945-46 election campaign was based almost entirely on Islamic rhetoric (Haqqani, 2005). For them Islam became a handy philosophy to garner support from the Muslim masses (Kapil, 2008).

Another school of thought contends that a combination of political, social and economic issues in the 19th century led to the demand for a Muslim state to be carved out from British India⁶. The genesis of Muslim separatism can be traced to the need for social purity, the lack of job opportunities for Muslim youth, a comparatively weak entrepreneurial Muslim class, and the separate electorates for Muslims and Hindus (Chengappa, 2001). However, in both cases mobilization appears to be an outcome of the use of religion as an effective tool for social control and to acquire support for regaining lost political power which had long eroded as a consequence of British imperialism (Kapil, 2008). This religious based cultural identity led Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah to build a strong nation based on the principal of one nation, one culture, one language. All his successors as heads of State of

Pakistan took their inspiration in the same way from Islam. The preamble to the first Constitution of 1956 stipulated that citizens should organize their lives both as individuals and collectively in accordance with the demands and the principles of Islam. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto laid the foundation of general Islamization policy in 1973 Constitution that declared Pakistan as an Islamic State (Jaffrelot, 2004).

Prominent Islamic organizations like Jamiat Ulema Hind never sided with the AIML in the struggle for Pakistan (Haqqani, 2005) and were unable to gain prominence on political front. The performance of religious political parties in elections also remained poor and they failed to form a national government throughout the history of Pakistan. Petito's argument that religion is culture but it is not the whole of culture (Petito & Hatzopoulos, 2003), appears good in case of Pakistani society that despite deeply embedded religious values in its culture did not repose enough confidence in politico-religious parties that can earn them dominance on political front. However, failure of mainstream political parties in revitalizing politics, economics and society and hopes of establishing Islamic order and a system of justice and equality contributed towards attracting some people to the religious forces (Rehman, 2006).

Religion gained prominence in the politics of Pakistan after 1971 (Haqqani, 2005). Its role in politics and militant manifestation increased several times after the anti-Soviet Afghan War (Chengappa, 2001). The military rule of General Zia-Ul-Haq and his policies under compelling domestic, regional and international circumstances left an indelible mark on the civil society of Pakistan. 'Civil society' is conceptualized as a space occupied by social institutions and groups between the state, markets, and individual

households (McIlwaine 1998). Many domestic and international factors favored the religious segment of civil society without a doubt, which weakened the secular forces of civil society to a great extent (Rehman, 2006). The religious segment of civil society aimed for gaining political power, and the state for either getting legitimacy or forwarding the security agenda. The two collaborated with each other especially during Afghan War of 1980s, at the expense of secular segment of civil society (Rehman, 2006).

Like the pervasiveness of religion in politics and culture, the role of religious NGOs also started gaining prominence after independence of Pakistan. The religious organizations like Jamiyat Ulema Islam that did not favor the idea of a separate country shifted their headquarters to Pakistan after independence and started activities by voluntarily serving in relief camps for refugees. They increased social work, started gathering skins of sacrificial animals and opened many hospitals and clinics to facilitate population (Jamaat i Islami, 2013). The organization also criticized the Pakistani Government in 1948 since it had resumed support of the insurgents in Kashmir by dispatching armed tribesmen from FATA and Kohistan region. “The Government had found a way to support such a move by calling the conflict a Jihad (Kapil, 2008)”.

Despite religious calls for armed struggle in the 1948 Kashmir War, and the 1965 Indo-Pak War, religious NGOs never gained prominence or sizeable social strength. Their agenda mainly revolved around improving the social outlook as per religious teaching through social work. Their social works extended them legitimacy in less governed areas. Social welfare projects and activities by religious organizations greatly contributed to the process of social development. Such initiatives are mainly in areas

related to health, education, and humanitarian relief. In cases of natural disasters, such as floods and earthquakes, religious organizations are always in the forefront of relief activities. Many people volunteer on such occasions out of religious motivation (Rehman, 2006)”.

The Pak-US sponsorship of Afghan jihad in 1980s facilitated the hijacking of state ideology by the religious groups. During this time, Western and national media also portrayed these elements as heroes furthering their perceived sacred image. The problem intensified during the period under President Zia-Ul-Haq’s Islamisation policies⁷. Failure of successive regimes in the fulfilment of stated developmental agendas led to a crisis of legitimacy, resulting in promoting Islam in the affairs of the state (Rehman, 2006). Religious groups further developed during 1990s, when a historically unprecedented growth in poverty occurred combined with an undermining of democratic institutions (Chengappa, 2001).

Lashkar - e – Taiba (LeT); A Morphing Non-State Group

After understanding the very nature of religious groups and their existent categories especially in Pakistan, now LeT will be analyzed. It is a multifaceted non-state actor that could be termed as ‘Hawkish fundamentalist group’ till being declared as a terrorist group. It started thriving in Pakistan’s ‘social capital’ – norms of behavior and the social and functional relations between individuals and groups, which might facilitate the actions of the social actors (Coleman 1988) and constitute a building block for a civil society.

LeT meaning ‘army of the pure’ was the armed wing of Markaz-Dawa-ul-Irshad (MDI)⁸ formed slightly after the establishment of its parent organization, in the late 1980s in Afghanistan (News, 2006). The founder of MDI was Hafiz Saeed, a professor at an

engineering university in the Punjab. LeT's militant activities began in the provinces of Kanton and Paktika in eastern Afghanistan in 1987–1988 and focused primarily on engaging Soviet forces. It is widely believed that CIA and ISI used the MDI during Soviet Invasion (Clarke, 2005). Abdullah Yusuf Azzam (Coordinator of Afghan Jihad) is considered to be the co-founder of the Hamas (Ḥarakat al-Muqāwamah al-ʾIslāmiyyah – Palestine) and the LeT (Riedel, 2011). Accordingly, both organizations reflect similarities to his version of Islamic ideology and nationalistic approaches. Comprising majority Pakistani mujahedeen and leadership, LeT was able to exploit social sentiments shaped for facilitating Afghan insurgency and established its headquarters at Muridke, Punjab.

After the withdrawal of Russian forces, the organization should have logically lost its legitimacy for existence. However, in order to remain relevant, it shifted weight to the accessible rolling insurgency of Indian-held Kashmir, on the plea to support 70% Muslims of Kashmir struggling for their rights since 1947 in line with UN resolution 47 of 1948. This shift was again made possible due to the prevalent sympathy in Pakistan for the Jihadi elements of the Afghan War. The shaped environment was not a result of domestic efforts alone; international interests also greatly contributed towards it. The ideology of Islam was propagated both internally and externally through media hype, economic and logistic support and using education as a tool to radicalize the society and generate sympathies for the jihadist elements.⁹

It was not an outcome of a single factor like religious ideology, structure, culture or external resources rather it was a well thought out mix of all enabling shaped environment. A considerable part of the youth remained overwhelmingly involved in Afghan War and

accordingly later started viewing every territorial conflict from a religious lens due to the environment generated by both internal and external interest.

After the termination of Afghan War of the 1980s, a sizeable segment of society - over sensitized by media and state's political campaign on the state sponsored atrocities in Indian-held Kashmir and ongoing insurgency - unintentionally facilitated the shift of weight of LeT from Afghanistan to Kashmir. The organization was able to procure a substantial amount of weapons and ammunition and recruit heavily owing to rampant availability of experienced mujahedeen of Afghan War as evident from RAND Corporation survey reflecting that many of the mujahedeen who served in Afghanistan also served in Kashmir (Fair C. C., 2008).

The enabling environment in this case resulted in the initial establishment of LeT, shifting from the conflict zone of Afghanistan to Indian-held Kashmir, regional or global motives and sustenance of the organization, but the question arises regarding how and why the organization was able to sustain its existence over a span of more than three decades. How was it able to mobilize a sizeable support for its agendas?

Until its ban in 2002, LeT enjoyed considerable public support and may be some support from government machinery. Its bold media campaign projected its image while it boldly accepted responsibility for most of the armed attacks against Indian military targets and denied killing of civilians, maintaining that such a tactic was against the organization's religious beliefs (BBC UK, 2012) and part of Indian propaganda campaign. This also contributed towards justness of its cause as the local media also projected a similar image of the organization and international media hardly criticized

the activities of the organization prior to 9/11. The organization was consequently able to generate mass support base both in Pakistan and Indian held Kashmir.

The survey conducted by RAND Corporation highlights that LeTs activists are actually better educated than the average Pakistani with the bulk hailing from KPK and Punjab (Fair C. C., 2008). The provinces of KPK and Punjab also bore the brunt of enabling environment of Russo-Afghan War by contributing maximum support. LeT's exact size is unknown, but the group probably had several thousand members because of mass support it could generate from Pakistan, Indian Muslim community, Afghanistan and growing support in rest of the world. Lately there have been unconfirmed reports of its international recruitment like the case of US citizen David Headley (drug addict and smuggler) affiliated with Mumbai terror plot, the Falls Church, a Virginia based Jihad network and UK terror cells. Unconfirmed reports also highlight presence of the group in Bangladesh. Padukone's report reflected that the group enjoyed massive support in the 180 million people population of Pakistan (Padukone, 2011).

The foregoing analysis indicates that the morphing and sustainability of LeT and JUD is due to the shaped environment. The religion is used as ideological framework to justify the "channeling of emoticons," such as false glorification, denial of self-worth, deprivation, as well as the desire for revenge. Religion in this case does not engender these emotions; it is only twisted to justify them.

Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP); A Violent Non-state Group

TTP represents the fourth type, the violent fundamentalist group. The culture and social setup of FATA (stronghold of TTP) is to some degree different from main social structures of Pakistan. The population of immediately adjoining areas of Pakistan harbours same ethnic views as these tribal militants - as orthodox, uneducated and antidevelopment as they are. Besides, the FATA region was used as main launching pad for mujahedeen against USSR forces during 1980s.

The well-preserved and unadulterated heritage which passed on from generation to generation still thrives in the self-governing and primitive tribal society. The code, 'Pukhtunwali', which guides them, has several attached unwritten laws and traditions but its main maxims are those of mediation or protection (*Nanawati*), retaliation (*Badal*), and hospitality (*Mailmastia*). *Nanawati*, the law of asylum, denotes that asylum must be given to all fugitives and even to bitter enemies if they come as supplicants. *Mailmastia* calls for hospitality and protection to every guest. The *badal* imposes the responsibility of wiping out insult with insult, like 'an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth'. The important element of Pathan code of honor is cause of the orthodox culture of feuds and vendettas, which sometimes last for generations (Azam, 2006). Traditionally the *Maliks* enjoyed the position of power with unchallenged representation of respective tribes through Jirga (group of local notables). The jirga enjoys legal legitimacy awarded by the Government of Pakistan, but its real strength came from its engrained social legitimacy. A FATA tribesman must abide by a jirga ruling or risk expulsion from the community (Ayaz, 2010).

Historically these tribes have aligned with numerous powers and were never completely subjugated. The Ghaznavids, with the

likely support of these tribes, defeated Jaipal in Kurram Valley (Haq, 2005). Subuktigin's son Mahmud annexed Peshawar in 1001 and thus founded a Muslim state in the region which now forms northern Pakistan. Mahmud of Ghazni (998-1030) and Ahmad Shah Durrani (1747-1773), the founder of Afghanistan, may have used Wazir and Mahsud tribes as mercenaries in their conquest of parts of the Subcontinent (Haq, 2005).

The absence of the writ of Federal Government in the area and prevalent orthodox culture turned FATA into a safe haven for outlaws from all over the region who thronged exploiting the local tradition of *Nanawati*. The same culture resulted in initial move of warlord families that got engaged in insurgency against Russians in 1980s. This was followed by huge influx of Afghan refugees with increased social ties (Quddus, 1990). Generally till 1980s, FATA enjoyed an orthodox religious outlook, but culture prevailed over religion when contended (Azam, 2006).

The 1980s and 1990s saw an abrupt shift in core cultural and religious norms and values in FATA as the area due to its geography, terrain and mercenary approach was selected and developed as launching pad of foreign fighters that participated in Afghan War against Russians. The direct involvement of the Government of Pakistan beside elaborate assistance from USA and Saudi Arabia expanded the combative outlook of the area and as already discussed linked the Afghan insurgency of 1980s with religion. This was the first time that religion was used at such a mass scale to legitimize an insurgency (Quddus, 1990).

Through the development of a systematic network of *madrassahs*, FM radios, pamphleteering, mosque loudspeakers and posters, the previously ineffective local religious leadership replaced

traditional *Maliks* and redefined cultural norms of FATA (Hussain K. , 2011). The local cultural norms including those related to conflict-resolution (jirga), entertainment and community activities (sports, music and dance), public meetings (hujrah and mosque) and interpersonal interaction (etiquette) were redefined in the light of the jihadist ideology and replaced by Arab cultural norms of antiquity (Hussain K. , 2011). Till mid-1990s, the intangible cultural norms had been successfully redefined with more people being attracted to the local *mullahs* than to the tradition-bearers (maliks) of FATA (Hussain K. , 2011).

The foundation of Pakistani Taliban was laid once Afghan Taliban were receiving religious education in Pakistani *madaris*. The combined source of religious education cemented ethnic, cultural and religious bonds between the two. Both were wedded to traditions of *Pakhtunwali*, Sunni Muslim sect and Jirga system, due to which they together fought Soviets in 80s and laid down their lives (Azam, 2006). Affinity between them was therefore natural. Due to the US invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, the Pakistani Taliban and tribesmen, due to their historical linkages and traditions, got mobilized to assist Afghan Taliban in resisting US and NATO forces (Hussain Z. , 2008).

TTP emerged as the largest terrorist organization involved in violent terrorism with a religious label against the state of Pakistan. It was formed on December 13, 2007 as an umbrella organization to unify militant groups fighting against Pakistan Army in FATA. Since its inception, it has dominated violent terrorist activities in Pakistan and enjoyed varying levels of social support.

This case clearly reflects that TTP initially thrived in the shaped environment generated due to poor governance, past national and

international influences, role of education, social linkages with 'Afghan Taliban' and cultural alterations made by government by siding traditional power broker 'maliks' with 'mullahs' during Afghan war. The prevalence of basic grievance of governance and lack of support to TTP at present reflects that social grievances are not the major cause of proliferation of religious activism in terrorist turmoil in the FATA region. The initial rise of TTP was an outcome of environment shaped due to kinetic actions by the government of Pakistan against the public perception and residue of past experiences of war against USSR but same failed to generate long term social support for the organization.

Conclusion

Religious activism in Pakistan can be traced back to the political struggle that led to the creation of the country in 1947. Religious ideology was used during different political eras for political gains by generating mass support including 1948 Kashmir struggle. Despite being a major contributor towards creation of Pakistan, political patronage and culturally being a religion-dominated country, the religious ideology has never contributed towards prominence of politico-religious parties in the country. This very phenomenon reflects that the masses never extended legitimacy to religious elements in Pakistan's early history.

Prominent conflation of politics and religion can be witnessed after 1971 war when religion was used as a force to bind nation under the religious ideology. The phenomenon was dangerously altered during the Afghan war of 1980s when instead of garnering nationalism the scope of religious ideology was extended to regional conflict. Religious non-state groups were patronized by both domestic political elite as well as foreign powers namely US and

Saudi Arabia for generating mass mobilization against Soviet invasion of Afghanistan not only from the region but from all over the Muslim world. Conducive environment was created for boom of religious elements in less developed areas of FATA, KPK, Balochistan and South Punjab of Pakistan. Public opinion was moulded in favour of these elements throughout the Muslim world including Pakistan that facilitated their increased ingress in the social setup especially in less developed areas.

After Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan these elements thrived on social periphery of Pakistan and turmoil in Afghanistan. US invasion of 2001 on Afghanistan facilitated few of these elements to turn violent and declare the legitimate government as apostate besides labelling once friendly and supportive US as infidel. Despite initial surge violent religious elements briskly lost initially gained public support and are presently fighting a battle of survival. They are likely to subside with withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. Other religious non-state groups that morphed as social organizations shall continue to thrive till there is improved governance and political stability in the country. They are likely to remain pervasive due to their social services agenda and deeply held religious values in the culture. However, these elements are likely to remain nonviolent and peaceful for accomplishment of their goal of ultimate reformation of society as per religious dictates and shall continue to enjoy substantial mobilization capacity for building political pressures, as and when required. Denying any chance to peaceful fundamentalist groups to turn violent appears need of the time and shall facilitate the Pakistan government for gradually normalizing the security situation in the country.

End Notes

¹ General Zia UlHaq remained in power from 1978 to 1988, after ousting the government of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He remained President of Pakistan for 11 years during the Russo-Afghan War of 1980s. His era witnessed close cooperation between US and Pakistan.

² Michael Krepon, in his article "The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South Asia" highlights that "the US and the USSR managed to avoid nuclear and conventional warfare during the Cold War, while jockeying for advantage in a myriad of ways, including proxy wars and a succession of crises that became surrogates for direct conflict. International relations and deterrence theorists aptly described this tense standoff in which much blood and treasure was expended—but without direct conflict—as the stability-instability paradox (<http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/ESCCONTROLCHAPTER1.pdf>).

³The phrase "Group Dynamics" was coined by Kurt Lewin and describes a social unit of two or more individuals who have in common a set of beliefs and values, follow the same norms and works for an establish-able common aim. The members of the group share a set of common purpose, tasks or goals. The flow of, envisaged coherent activities lead the group towards establishment of set goals (The Group Dynamics Research Center at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology).

⁴ According to a recent study of Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, over 80 percent of the respondents worldwide identified with a particular religion (Pew, 2012).

⁵The increased role can also be understood from US assertion of funneling financial aid through non-governmental organizations without information of recipient less developed countries like Pakistan as evident from Kerry-Lugar aid package and USAID assistance to African NGOs. They appear to be independent of local governments control as evident from a news published in print media of Pakistan 'The Dawn – Pakistan' of December 12, 2012, highlighting the concerns raised by Public Account Committee about the funds released to United States Agency for International Development(USAID) through Kerry-Lugar Bill that are being utilized without government knowhow and government was advised to scrutinize the NGOs activities.

⁶Chief Minister of Punjab Mumataz Daultana made a comprehensive statement on the case for Pakistan in 1965 which is cited in Sheila McDonough, "Pakistan: Islam in Politics" n. 3, p. 11

⁷ General Zia UlHaq's era witnessed close cooperation with US government. His famous reply to CBS News.com "Charlie did it", is reflective of close coordination between Pakistan and US governments. CBS News documentary "Charlie did it" reflects the extent of US assistance to Afghan Mujahedeen. During his regime Pakistan was declared as front line ally in fight against communism. His era is infamous for his projection

of religious elements in political landscape of Pakistan including his assembled Majlis e Shora.

⁸ MDI was formed with the collaboration of ISI and CIA (Operation Cyclone) during Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1980s to gather mujahedeen on the religious war cry.

⁹ University of Nebraska Omaha received USAID contract to provide educational training programs and facilities to Afghan Refugees residing in Pakistan. The Center continued the educational programs until the mid 1990s, receiving more than \$60 million from USAID. The Center, with USAID funding, established offices in Pakistan to train and educate Afghan refugees, who had formed seven mujahedeen resistance groups. The Center's educational work helped the resistance against the Soviet occupation.

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TRANSITION FROM UNIPOLAR TO A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY

(Ms. Sidra Khan & Ms. Qurat-ul-Ain)*

Abstract

Since the Cold War ended the world has become unipolar and the United States is delighting in a hegemonic position. As the 21st century progresses the framework of international system is again moving from unipolar to a multipolar structure. Colossal economic accomplishments of a few nations like China, Brazil and India have prompted the most preservationist advocates of this civil argument of a change from unipolarity to multipolarity. As indicated by numerous researchers it appears that we are living in the realm of transition. Extension of G8 to G22, the discourse of expansion in United Nation Security Council, perceived decrease in United States influence, BRIC nations rise and the ascent of new powers all point in one course. Worth noticing is the realist Kenneth Waltz who declared at the end the Cold War that United States would not have the capacity to appreciate the products of unipolarity for long. Underestimating this it appears glaringly evident that theories explaining transition are significant for the time period we live in. This Paper is an attempt to discuss the foreign policy of Pakistan in this changing scenario.

Key Words: *unipolar, accomplishment, preservationism, insecurity, circumstances*

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Introduction

In the order of the day, a powerful state is the one which exceeds expectations in size of populace, geography, region in which situated, financial capacity, resource endowment, political dependability and military capacity. These qualities are referred to as power capacities which guarantee a great power because of its financial, military, social and political impact on worldwide scale. The extent of great power in international framework can be decided by power abilities and thus polarities of the worldwide framework are likewise controlled by power capacities of states.

In the future multipolar world, it may be assumed that global system is not going to rest with a couple of significant nations but rather with numerous nations with varying capabilities. Every state having its particular noticeable qualities will have decisive say in the limited arena of affairs pertaining to its region. Other than the US, Japan China, EU and India are capable of economic potency owing to their technical advancements, growing economy and wide base of population. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, countries from the African Union and Brazil would have impact because of their considerable energy assets. Russia would have both preferences. A few nations would have some regional significance because of their geostrategic location like Pakistan, Central Asia, Ukraine and Turkey as these nations are situated on the energy routes through which energy resources will be on the course to some parts of the world. Other than the worldwide associations like UNO, World Bank, IMF territorial associations like SAARC, EU, SCO, ASEAN, AU and NGO's including environmental, social and humanitarian would be on the rundown of power focuses.

Unipolarism in Decline

Numerous IR neorealists consider unipolarity as a wellspring of potential insecurity and risk which in the end leads different actors to attempt to offset the dominating force (hegemon) utilizing either hard or soft power. A few researchers restrict themselves to only the precise hierarchy of the unipolar world guaranteeing peace and strength.¹ The majority of them concur that in the long haul the dispersion of force and the increasing expenses will cause decay to the unipolarity which as a result will undermine the authority of the sole power of present times, i.e. the US, and in order to counterbalance, other forces will upgrade their abilities to rise.

US unipolarity could last thirty or forty years if USA had not shattered its economy in recent years,² through some protracted wars. The U.S. is encountering a monetary emergency of historic size which could truly undermine its domination and in the long run could compel it to focus its endeavors on its internal issues as opposed to world politics. As a result of the monetary emergency the U.S. will decrease its universal engagement, and this will create a sort of new vacuum of force that will be refilled and engaged by other potent forces.

On regional premise, numerous states are surely prepared to supplant the U.S., others might aspire to the role of great power in the future. In succeeding decades China can financially and militarily overwhelm the U.S. India is among the ten quickest developing economies of the world since 1980 and it is anticipated that in the next decade its development rate would rise to the level of three major powers.³

The inescapable and enduring financial ascent of India will furthermore be augmented by consistent development of its

populace. Expansions of populace and developing economy will likewise bolster and cultivate the ascent of Brazil, a nation which sooner rather than later will assume crucial part in the Latin American district. Additionally new circumstance could shape the eventual fate of power distribution and add to the rise of new great nations. Global warming for instance could permit a local player, like Russia to exploit the Siberian soil and gain new power abilities which may be used to challenge the U.S. hegemony in the area.

Challenges in the Transition Period

In the second decade of the 21st century world is encountering a critical phase of massive transition. On account of the realignment of the international order, this time of move is of specific significance because it tuned from a phase of quantitative development into a key one of subjective change.⁴ In the present time of transition, nations are attempting to modify their actions towards domestic change and about changes in legislative issues regarding local economy. There is a significant discord in interweaving of clashes within and without which is profoundly muddled, thus bringing about violent internal disputes. For example, in China, the remarkable broadening of social welfare in addition to the expanding transparency brought by a very well informed society is hosting extraordinary multi-pronged rivalry and a significant effect of general feeling on the government's choice making.⁵ Such a period is brimming with vulnerability, flightiness and hardly conceivable outcomes. The opposition between the nations comes down to their internal capacities for getting control of those patterns which preserve their inner and outer strengths. These strengths guarantee their interior coordination and fast reactions.

Another real pattern related to the multi polarization of global monetary and political conditions is the eastward movement of the

world's economic and political gravity, shifting of focus from the two sides of the Atlantic to the Asia Pacific. In the 21st century it is a notable change which might likely turn into a foreword to another recorded cycle in social, monetary and political spheres of global patterns. The most vital passage for the world is Asia-Pacific and the ascent of Asia all in all has more notably essential than that of China alone.

The stability and general condition of regional security is a typical wish for all states to keep. Security concerns are generally raised and the role of participation and cooperation which are positive symptoms are ascending. Under such multifaceted situation of progress with an increase in pressure, transitional period tactic has remarkably influenced regional stability in particular and global security in general; security and peace are essential prerequisites for guaranteeing maintainable monetary advancement in the world. Setting up an overall and successful regional security structure is a brilliant alternative in spite of the fact that it is unachievable in short term.

Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a Multipolar World

The rise of certain nations beyond the west is crucial to how the international system is being reshaped in the first quarter of the 21st century. The rise of these states is tendering some uneven characters in the international framework and at a time of globalization which has mirrored the great impact of traditional strong states and commercial actors.⁶ The scenario of a multipolar world with an agreeable face is based on their interests emerging out of evolving systemic relationship among states. While they may differ on particular issues, but this picture shows the need by both old and

new powers to cooperate under emergency conditions, exceptionally different from pictures of rising force in the past. Customarily the image of rising forces has not been a multilateral one, Prussia under Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm executed as a classic realist force blending parity of force with unilateral activities.⁷ The objective was to realize national interests and resources through securing territory.

The power of this emerging challenge was intensified by a psychological feeling of the developing states of being untouchables in the multilateral framework. The main change was in the manner – solidarity was formed and unification of stances was achieved, augmenting the sage utilization of power of numbers. Endeavors to arrange around these distinctions met with some unexpected reality and rehashed disappointment. Classic case of this difficulty was the Cencun gathering of the mid 1980s which was an innovative endeavor to break out of the North-South standoff enlivened by the Brandt Commission report under the initiative of Mexico, Canada and Austria.⁸

In institutional terms key multilateral forums are opening up in a more equitable fashion. As highlighted by the main response of the G20 to the financial crisis of the previous decade, there is some considerable recognition at the heart of the system that the G8 or any other small exclusive clubs is not a legitimate or effective means of problem solving. Moreover, as Daniel Flemes points out, the nature of innovation within rising powers has been induced through sophisticated occasions of negotiation and by the establishment of new intergovernmental foreign policy networks.⁹

In comparison, India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) engage in a common approach to influence global security issues on the basis of the IBSA dialogue forum's Defence Working Group¹⁰. IBSA's present

security agenda signals that the alliance's best prospects of having some meaningful impact on global security affairs are related to cooperative intuitional strategies, particularly within UN system. From the perspective of the regional dimensions there is a very clear divide between strong tendency of Brazil and South Africa to act as regional stabilizers and brokers, and on the other hand India's Hobbesian perspective keeps it inevitably committed to sub-regional hegemony and regional deterrence, thus making it very difficult for IBSA to derive a common perspective from their regional experiences.

In spite of this, some opportunities for security cooperation associated with their respective regional context exist, namely those associated with the armaments industry and maritime security. Two facets have special relevance from a realist perspective. Alexandr Burilkov and Torsten Geise examine maritime strategies of the rising powers through empirical evidence from the cases of Russia and China. Secondly, Mahanian concepts on the importance of the command of the sea persistently argues that naval power is an effective tool of statecraft in peace and war. Russian and Chinese strategies are formed through the interplay of threat perception, domestic factors and strategic culture.¹¹

The trend is not following a precise linear transition from a US-centered equilibrium to a multipolar one underwritten by a set of alternative actors. While the global system will be shaped by what this more diverse cluster of core countries want and do on the basis of their varying political cultures and competing ideas of domestic and global order. So it will be modified by how others respond to these emerging states and who they decide to interact with in order to attain their own goals and objectives in specific policy domains.

The United States and Changing World Order

The current US administration has tried to turn the overreach policies of USA in world affairs which were hallmark of the Bush years. However, the two major political parties are in complete agreement that US must continue pre-eminence in international affairs. This means that US will not cede to China a role in global politics that may give it an opportunity to emerge as an economic super power. Though the Obama administration has been criticized for too soft a stance in world affairs, the change in its approach is one of nuance in strategy and tactics, not of objectives. It appears that there is reduced appetite for direct intervention by USA in any of the trouble spots of the world. Within the political leadership in US, there is strong bipartisan consensus that the country must remain a global leader/ world dominant power. This belief in its pre-eminence also comes with the moral underpinnings that US must lead the world to freedom and democracy. Its third expression is the determination to contain China.

The US is deeply concerned about China's global emergence and will do all to prevent it taking on a major role. Most members of the Republican Party and the 'right of center' Democrats criticize the present US administration for being too soft in this regard. The present administration is equally wary and unwilling to allow China its due role in world affairs. It, however, does not wish to present an outright image of wanting to contain China. The US position on China is unlikely to change with a new administration in Oval Office after US presidential elections of 2016. China has responded to this circumscribing of its role through many out-reaching measures. Launching of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is one. The US tried to resist its launch, but was unable to do so. Most US allies,

including UK and Australia, have signed up for the AIIB.¹² This is evidence perhaps of a perceived decline in US power and that this is no longer a unipolar world. Yet there is no country to replace US's military prowess.

The extent to which the US pursues containment of China is worrying. The 'coalition of democracy' or the 'pivot to Asia' are examples of US designs. On its part, China too departed from usual cautious approach and its declared policy of 'peaceful rise' to an unambiguous position on the South China Sea. For now though, it does not seem that the situation would come to a head-on collision anytime soon. Yet this contest could bring to fore a serious and dangerous situation. US will not directly engage on the ground with its troops. There is much resistance at home for another war. (Ukraine is an example where, apparently unwittingly, it has been dragged into a replay of the cold war). This does not mean that the US is ineffectual. What we have is a *hegemon* with reduced power and an unwillingness to give up its leadership role. On the other hand, there is no other country with the ability to replace it though they often attempt to challenge its authority. China's occasional departure from caution and US unwillingness to yield creates a situation that is fraught with danger.¹³

Implications for Pakistan's Foreign Policy

The concept of foreign policy dates back to the perception of state's mutual interaction since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648). States since then are required to interact mutually for peace. This notion of state system persists even until today, though with the democratic assertion that state's sovereignty denotes people's sovereignty exercised by the government in the pursuance of national interests. Hence foreign policy-making became imperative

because of super power's strategic self-interests and the emergence of new sovereign states after the WWII. States started nurturing relations with each other on the bases of their national interests. With gradual passage of time, this has become a dominant concept with various views.

In contemporary environment, isolation has been replaced with regional interdependence due to the process of globalization, technological advancement and economic and trade relations. States therefore, have to maintain interaction for mutual gain and benefit. Foreign policy is supposed to be aligned entirely with the state interests. For that to happen, a state must have the capacity to formulate policies and have the fundamental orientation towards valid policymaking. This orientation comes from effective institutions and a leadership that cares for the welfare of the people. Deeper processes are at issue here. Policymaking depends on the views and values of the society and the leadership. It depends also, on whether policies that have a modern perspective find resonance in the norms of the people.

Pakistan is a developing state, but has a strong society (in a pre-modern way with beliefs and values bound by traditions), a society which lacks in social discipline. Policies that are good for the state are unfortunately not implemented because the people and the leadership resist these. This coincides with Gunnar Myrdal's hypothesis that (parts of) developing countries' societies have education, but do not have the discipline or ability to implement state policies¹⁴. Civil servants, largely, are trained in modern methods and ideas of state policy. But it is hard to translate these potentials. Societies that are unable to make the transition from a pre-modern to modern thinking encounter a whole range of

difficulties. Policies and practices of more modern societies do not find acceptance among them. Europe too passed through such a transition. A period of religious dominance was followed by the renaissance, the reformation, and the age of enlightenment.

In essence, Islam is more in tune with the needs of modernity. This is evident from Islam's political history. In early Islam, dialogue took place between the school of tradition and the school of reason. Such dialectic was not just tolerated, rather it was encouraged. Once Islamic leaders closed the door to independent discussion, the space for reason circumscribed. Soon, innovation became a sin. Fear of reason and innovation heightened after two traumas challenged Islam's youthful success. The Mongol invasion was Islam's first setback and a jolt into the 'realpolitik' of conquest and contest for power. Other great powers had faced similar challenges before Islam did. Colonization was the second setback. It reminded the Islamic region that it had fallen behind in the race to modernity. Threatened by colonialism, Islam questioned all that was associated with it. This included scientific knowledge, Western institution, and military power. The reaction that followed still exists in many countries. It is especially visible in Pakistan.

Pakistan's political leadership is a product of this society, and of necessity, must stay in touch with it. It is sensitive to their views. This social and economic structure is rooted in time. There is a small elite, mostly found among civil servants that accepts and promotes modern concepts. These ideas have very little acceptance among the wider middle classes. Several identities compete, which weakens the state and its ability to protect its interests. We can take a stock of Pakistan's relations with its neighbours. While talking about relations with India, for example, Pakistan's stance and

position on Kashmir is mainly emotional in nature. Pakistan could gain a more effective position had it highlighted instances of human rights abuses by Indian forces in Indian held Kashmir. Kashmir has turned into a human rights tragedy. Human rights violation is of great concern in Pakistan and world over. Our Foreign Office remained stuck with making it a case for right of self-determination, which unfortunately has met with sense of repetition and resignation. To have an effective state and to find respect and acceptance in the world requires a change in mindset. The modern mind must prevail over limits placed by tradition; Pakistan has not yet rationalized and harmonized the idea of being a Muslim, a Pakistani, and modern at the same time.¹⁵

Options for Pakistan:

- **The Afghan conflict:** Afghan conflict has harmed Pakistan greatly. It is important to understand the extent of the damage and that it continues to do so. Pakistan must nurture and sustain over a long period this nascent improvement in relations with Afghanistan and its new government. It could do so, by facilitating trade movement through both Karachi port and the Torkhum border. We must view this moment as an opportunity to place the relationship in a new direction. It is important to stay on course in a determined way.
- **Pakistan and India:** Pakistan must refrain from its usual impulsive and predictable response towards India. It must have a logical answer to India's frenzied and forceful activity in the region of Kashmir and LOC and should be responded to with aggressive statements via Pakistani government.

Pakistan's response must align with Pakistan's long-term interests.

- **Pakistan and China:** Recent developments in economic cooperation, sets relations with China in the right direction. Balancing the current close political and military links, Pakistan must view China as a source of capital and as an economic partner. To benefit fully, Pakistan must develop internal capacity to work as China's capable and worthy economic partner
- **Pakistan and US:** Pakistan must build a cumulative and positive relationship with US. It is important to develop convergence of views on some international issues. Pakistan must improve its broad base relations with both countries and not side too much with one or the other. Its own regional and economic interests must dominate. Pakistan faces an environmental challenge, debilitating water scarcity, and social harmony deficit. We are one of the few countries in the world that cannot even administer preventive polio drops to our children. These challenges require a reorientation of the state system. Pakistan has a weak economy and a society that is behind times. As with other areas, our diplomatic space is circumscribed by a lack of development and the quality of governance.¹⁶

Finding and Conclusion

It is very difficult to understand the role of emerging states, which are influencing the range and change of the international system. The broad outlines of what is taking place about this phenomenon are becoming more apparent, as change is taking place under stressful internal dynamic conditions and not from

external elements. There is a group of candidates which can be termed as rising powers and this process of change has dramatic bursts but is of longer duration than might have been expected. A core segment of these changes is taking place under conditions of evolving institutionalization. But the gulf in the perceptions on the concepts of cooperation and tension is quite wide.

In the changing world order the most important are surely national interest and values, and these at times can lead to highly complex and irritated bargaining positions which should be dealt with by increased coordination at states level. Jointed communities and the old values are dissolving. The western camp suffers from the renationalization of Europe as well as from the political polarization of the USA. Rising countries are not less divided due to different ideas of world system, thus will continuously compete and interact at the same time with each other. It is likely that the management of global interdependence will work through assembling different groupings for different purposes on a contemporary basis, an approach for which major powers may already have delivered the design.

It is unclear what will be the situation in this emerging process. Having included the surrounded institutional option there are signs that the emerging states are becoming more suspicious of involvement in the new concert diplomacy because of the compulsions placed on them

The rise of new player has resulted in a fundamentally contested direction of the world system and the meaning of the essential concepts must be renegotiated. We have to see what new approaches rising countries will bring to the table in the course of

normative struggle under the conditions of the new establishing system.

End Notes

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