

UNDER THE SPECTRE OF INSECURITY MAKING SENSE OF THE FORMATION OF PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL NARRATIVE: A REALIST PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

Narratives are an important part of nation-building. National narratives not only inculcate a sense of self; they also address a nation's sense of security as well as insecurities. National narratives are an outcome of a nation's collective historical experience and the ideas on which it is built. States facing security challenges and situated among or in a hostile neighbourhood, use their national narrative to achieve alignment both internally and externally. Pakistan's national narrative is a testament of it. Since 1947, it has been facing threats to its national security. Pakistan's national or meta-narrative addresses all such concerns. This paper focuses on the formation of Pakistan's national narrative and the factors involved in its formation. Grounded in the Realism school of international relations theory, the paper overviews and critically analyses Pakistan's national narrative and its contributing factors. This is followed by the development of a "structural-ideational framework" to make sense of the process of the formation of Pakistan's national narrative.

Key Words: Pakistan, Narrative, IR Theory, Realism, Instrumentalism

Introduction

Over the years, several academics and scholars have criticised and debated the role of the foundational theory of Pakistan; the two nation theory and the national narrative of Pakistan linking it with societal divisions, sectarianism and fundamentalism in the country. However, what is often overlooked or is missing in this set of literature is the underpinning causal logic of this narrative. Nayyar and Hoodbhoy in their pioneering work on the subject, argued that since the 1977 martial law, the content of almost all history textbooks in Pakistan were similar. Taking this a step further, noted historian K.K. Aziz in his magnum opus "The Murder of History" identified and highlighted the historical inaccuracies in the textbooks and pointed that the content of these books is mostly subjective in describing both event and personalities. Ali Usman Qasmi, a LUMS based historian, pointed to the fact that the Indian Muslims' collective Muslim identity was established and developed in areas that were in mainland India and did not become part of Pakistan. He further argues that the demand of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India itself was based on a myth or a claim that the subcontinental group are a separate identity group.

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While the above-mentioned criticism might hold credence yet what it overlooks is what the authors of this paper call the causal logic of Pakistan's national narrative. Political Science and International Relations literature informs us that states are rational actors and that state elites take their decisions on rational calculation, preferences and choices. When one examines the criticism of Pakistan's national narrative in light of this, one realises that what is missing in this criticism is why such a narrative was formed in the first place. This is an important question as it provides a contextual background to the whole debate. This paper argues that "the formation of national narrative is necessarily a function of the state; it is influenced by state preferences. Structure shapes a state's preferences. Thus, a structural-ideational analysis should necessarily unlock the causal puzzles surrounding narrative formation."

Another missing element in this debate is almost non-existent contribution of political scientists to the national narrative of Pakistan and how and why it was formed. The absence of a political science perspective on the subject has created a huge void in literature. This paper is an attempt to narrow that gap by looking into Pakistan's threat perception and national narrative and how the social and political developments at domestic, regional and international levels affected it. The primary aim of this study is to make sense of Pakistan's national narrative by looking into the reasons and factors that contributed to its formation and giving it a religious overtone. The questions that are addressed in this paper are: does Pakistan have a national narrative? What is the national narrative of Pakistan and how and why it is formed the way it is? The paper will also attempt to identify the causal logic of this narrative and would attempt to identify the role of state elite, structure and ideas in its formulation. This aim would be achieved by testing a hypothesis that the formation of a nation's narrative is a function of its strategic culture and structural setting.

Evolution of National Narrative = Strategic culture + structural setting

The authors identify the structural setting as the geopolitical environment and the strategic compulsions faced by a state at both internal and external levels. Strategic culture is defined as "the ideational array characterised by a nation's historical experience, its aspirations and moral standards." Using a case study research design, this paper took state as a unit of analysis to test the above-stated hypothesis. To code and categorise the existing literature on the subject, content analysis technique is used whereas framework analysis technique is used to analyse the collected data. To analyse the national narrative of Pakistan based on the collected data, grounded theory approach to qualitative analysis is used.

Narratives: A Conceptual Overview

According to the realist school, the international system is anarchic and each state is competing with others for its security or in other words, due to the anarchic nature of the international order, states feel insecure.¹ To address this insecurity, states take every measure possible to ensure their internal as well as external security.² At the external level, joining or going into an alliance is a step that a state can take. To ensure

internal security, a state has utilised its national power (economic, military and social resources). Together these provide the state the power and energy to pursue its national interest.³ A state's population arguably is the most important resource for its national power projection. However, the population can only be effective in strengthening a state's national power when it agrees with the state's narrative. If a state's population is not supportive of a state's measures to ensure its national security, the state can never be secured. States use a national narrative based on a collective historical experience, culture and ideology to coerce the masses. This national narrative then gains the support of the population for the state.⁴

What exactly is a narrative? Where do they come from? Who formulates a narrative? One of the most commonly used definitions is provided by Mona Baker. According to Baker, a narrative is "the subscribed personal and public stories that guide individual and group behaviours."⁵ Several scholars such as Gibson and Sommers⁶ Riessman⁷ and Baker⁸ are of the view that people construct identities and develop experiences based on these narratives.⁹ For them, "narrative is an ontological condition of social life."¹⁰ As regard the question where the narratives come from, the generally stated view is that narratives evolve and are not static and do not exist in a vacuum. The fact that narratives are based on collective historical experience, these should resonate with masses. According to Gibson and Sommer, narrative can be divided into four main types¹¹ such as personal, public, conceptual and master narratives.

Individual life stories would follow under the category of personal narratives.¹² Such narratives highlight the struggles and achievements of individuals. At times these narratives are used to justify and/ or enforce their identities as well as justify certain decisions and their outcomes.¹³ Public narratives on the other hand are narratives that are associated with a larger segment of the population be it a certain organisation, clan, family or an identity group. According to narratives scholars, it is quite normal to have several competing, overlapping or mutually supporting narratives at any given time.¹⁴ Dr Hassan Askari Rizvi has made a similar point when discussing the presence of several narratives in Pakistan such as Quaid-e-Azam's Pakistan, Naya Pakistan and corruption-free Pakistan.¹⁵ These narratives would fall under the public narrative category. The third type of narrative is the Conceptual narrative. Such narratives are the "disciplinary narratives in a given field of study".¹⁶ Narratives that transcend borders, social groups and culture constitute the fourth type i.e., the master narratives. These narratives can have several contributing sub narratives contributing to this master narrative.¹⁷ Islam versus the rest, Communism versus Capitalism, North-South competition, global war against terror etc., are few examples of such narratives. National narratives of nation-states would also fall under this category.

Although Gibson and Somers have not included it in their types of narratives yet there could be another type or category of narratives: Dominant narratives. What is a dominant narrative? and how exactly does a narrative become a dominant narrative? The answer to this question lies in the mass acceptance of the narrative by a large segment of the population or the masses.¹⁸ Taking the discussion further, Somers and Gibson

addressing the question how a narrative gains masses approval have listed four major elements that must be present in a narrative for this to happen.¹⁹ These four elements are selective appropriation, relationality, causal employment and temporality.²⁰ “Selective appropriation is employed to choose and include only those events that relate to story line of the narrative.²¹ *Relationality* deals with the coherence of the events described in the narrative.²² *Causal employment* turns events into episodes by apportioning significance to specific events with an aim to justify why things happened in the narrated order.²³ *Temporality* defines the sequence and order of events in a narrative as well as temporal and spatial positioning of the narrative itself.”²⁴

From the foregone discussion, one can surmise two conclusions: first, narratives construct a certain lore and a myth.²⁵ Second, every narrative’s context and meaning are ascertained by those framing the narrative.²⁶

What is a National Narrative(s)?

In keeping with the foregone discussion, the next question that comes to mind is what is a national narrative? How is it formed? Who makes or develops a national narrative? As is mostly the case in social sciences, there is no universally accepted definition of a national narrative. Out of the many definitions that are available in the literature, three definitions stand out. National narrative, according to Yadgar “is a story that a nation collectively tells about its collective self, about its origin, its common past and its social and political behaviour that is structure of its people’s characteristics and their future direction.”²⁷ Jonathan Sacks describes a national narrative as “a collective myth that we tell to ourselves to infuse in us a shared identity, national pride, social norms and ambitions for our future role that we presume to play in the global arena.”²⁸ Laurie Brand contends that national narratives “offer a nation’s vision of its philosophy about development, state’s relationship with religion, military and society.”²⁹ A national narrative need not be objective and totally factual as its main objective is not being objective and accurate but to provide a story based on a group’s collective memory highlighting its glories, heroes and how this should be utilised in the present and in the future.³⁰

Narrative and Elites

Narratives play an important role in how a state functions in the existing international political order. Therefore, national narratives are reflective of the collective belief and thinking of the elites on matters of national importance. Before proceeding any further, it is pertinent to clarify the term “national elite.” As per Wright Mills, national elite are “the complex set of small but leading groups that have decision of national importance.”³¹ Several factors such as the armed forces, opinion leaders, political leadership etc can be considered part of what Mill has referred to as small but leading groups.³² The intelligentsia are also an integral part of this as it is they who provide intellectual inputs to this. Although the elite play the most significant role in formulating narratives, yet such narratives must be acceptable to the masses and resonate with them. An effective narrative links the history especially how certain events are portrayed in a

nation's collective memory with contemporary events. Elites play a significant role in linking the two. Narratives are framed as such so the masses can accept and relate to the issues as a collective or shared problem.

By doing so, they provide the elite the legitimacy to act. This is perhaps why narratives are selective and provide information from a certain perspective. There are several ways using which such narratives can be communicated to the people or the masses. The prime amongst these several methods/ ways is a state's education system. According to E. H. Carr, "the state which provides the education necessarily determines its content. No state will allow its future citizens to imbibe in its schools teaching subversive of the principles on which it is based."³³ Morgenthau in his magnum opus *Politics among Nations* argued that state formulate narratives to provide a justification and support of its existence as well as a justification of its preferred course of action.³⁴ As such narratives are not available as a single document, although some times, there could be such a document available, mostly, the researchers have to glean this narrative through a critical examination of constitution, related parliamentary resolutions, educational curriculum and the text books. Therefore, in this paper all these sources will be analysed to make sense of the national narrative of Pakistan.

Pakistan: A State in Search of Security

Pakistan emerged on the world map in 1947. It was a period of global uncertainty. Second world war ended two years' prior with Germany's defeat in Europe and American use of a nuclear bomb against Japan that sped up its surrender. USA and USSR emerged as victorious out of the 2nd world war who were now posturing against each other and the cold war was in its initial phase. The British due to heavy economic losses during the war were compelled to move out of its colonies despite opposition from some notable British politicians such as Churchill. The British decided to withdraw from the jewel of its empire's erstwhile crown: the Indian subcontinent. The shameful flight as Stanley Wolpert described it borrowing Churchill's reaction to British's hasty withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent, resulted in creating instability and emergence of conflicts in it. Pakistan being a new and smaller state that the leadership of India was not willing to accept justifiably felt insecure. More so, because New Delhi blocked its share of the allocated assets from the British India. Emerging cold war, insecure and hostile neighbourhood coupled with internal discord and disharmony further complicated the nation-building project in Pakistan. If this was not enough, a debate about the character of the newly formed state started between the clergy and the moderates. In this section, the authors will briefly overview the domestic, regional and international developments and events that had an effect in Pakistan and its threat perception in its early years.

Cold War

Although USA played a role in convincing England to decolonise the Indian subcontinent, it is often argued that its primary interest was securing the sea lanes (SLOCs) of the Indian Ocean and countering the Soviet expansion,³⁵ USSR was keen to expand its Socialist ideology in the region. Even prior to the independence of the

subcontinent, communist elements were active in the region although could not develop a strong following. Soon after the partition of the Indian subcontinent, a conference was held in Calcutta in April 1948 in which the communist representatives from USSR, Pakistan and India as well as from some eastern countries were present. In this moot, it was decided to intensify the communist struggle in these countries to prepare the grounds for socialist revolutions including armed struggle.³⁶ A close scrutiny of the communist activity in these countries reveals that the Communist elements were most active in this time frame in these countries. This resulted in an ideological tussle in these states. Pakistan, a newly created state could not ignore it as it added another layer of instability into it. East Pakistan was particularly affected from this tussle.

End of Colonialism

The shameful flight of the British from the Indian subcontinent was a sorry affair. Although it is a matter of record that the British left almost all of their colonies rife with political uncertainties yet, the mess they created due to their hasty flight from the Indian subcontinent resulted in further intensification of existing discord as well as creating several new conflicts, brunt of which is still felt in both India and Pakistan. Prime amongst these was the issue of the state of Jammu and Kashmir with long term consequences. The fact that Mountbatten kept the partition plan secret and revealed it after declaration of independence of India and Pakistan and the tempering that was done in the plan itself resulted in mass exodus, violence and ethnic cleansing in India and Pakistan. More than a million people lost their lives and two million were displaced.³⁷ This number does not account for the people went missing during this period.³⁸

As per the census of 1951 data, 72,26,600 residents of Pakistan (settled in different parts of the country) were migrants.³⁹ Adding to this was the hostile behaviour of the Indian leadership and Nehru's decision to block the supply of Pakistan's financial and national share. Soon after partition, Kashmir emerged as a major bone of contention between the two countries. A local uprising against the Dogra raj, Maharaja of Kashmir's indecisiveness and then plea to the Indian government for help, all contributed to further complicating the situation. The first war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir coupled with the above mentioned added to Pakistan's threat perception. Kashmir became a major factor in this perception.

Internal Dissonance

From the very outset, Pakistan suffered from internal dissonance or disharmony. Apart from ideational and ethnic differences, the people in Pakistan held diverse views on the future outlook of Pakistan. Bengali, Pashtun and Sindhi nationalists coupled with the progressive and moderate Muslims versus orthodox Muslims debate about the future outlook of Pakistan was a serious issue. All these further complicated the delicate task of national building in Pakistan.

Amongst the early challenges that Pakistan faced was the arrival and settling of the migrants. How the indigenous population would react to the influx and how would it

effect the population trends etc? would the Muslim identity be the factor that would be key in the settlement or would local and social concerns dictate the local response were among the many concerns. The settlement of the migrants in Sindh especially in Karachi raised concerns among the Sindhi nationalist politicians. Once it was declared that Karachi will be the capital of Pakistan, the concern among Sindhi politicians increased that this might adversely affect Sindh's economy as Karachi was the economic and financial nerve centre of Sindh. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah assured them that this would not affect their economic and financial interests.⁴⁰ In the East Pakistan, a Decca University Professor Abul Kashem founded an organisation "Tamadun Majilish" in September 1947. Another organisation Gonotantric Jubo League (Democratic Youth League) held a conference aimed at protecting Bengali culture and language. DYL comprised of students and political workers of secular bent. It was established a month prior to the independence of Pakistan in July 1947. Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah during his official visit to East Pakistan in March 1948 declared that only Urdu will be the official language of Pakistan. This was against the wishes of the people of East Pakistan. The elite of the country, however viewed any demand contrary to this as a conspiracy against the state by anti-state elements that included communists, Hindu politicians in East Pakistan as well as disgruntled Muslim Leaguers.⁴¹ This was not surprising as the national elite since November 1947 held the position that the language controversy in the country was instigated the communist elements. Therefore, it was surprising that during his speech to a public gathering in Decca on 21 March 1948 pointed that the communists were conspiring against the state of Pakistan and were working to undo partition.⁴²

Pashtun Nationalism and Afghanistan's Territorial Claims

After the 1946 elections, Dr Khan sahib made the provincial government in the erstwhile NWFP with the support of the Indian National Congress. When partition of the subcontinent was announced in June 1947, NWFP was given an option to decide its fate through a referendum. The sitting provincial government lobbied against joining of Pakistan. However, it failed as the majority voted in favour of joining Pakistan.⁴³ On this, according to several historians, Bacha Khan, the leading Pashtun nationalist leader on the advice of Gandhi,⁴⁴ started a campaign for a separate homeland for the Pashtuns.⁴⁵ Kabul also laid its claim on the Pashtun territory and claimed that with the withdrawal of the British, the agreement with the British including the Durand line agreement would lapse and the territory from Durand line up till the Indus river and Attock should become part of Afghanistan.⁴⁶ Pakistan suspected that Kabul is doing all this on the behest of India whose leadership want to undo Pakistan.⁴⁷

To counter the increasing Pashtunistan campaign and fail the propaganda spearheaded by Kabul, Pakistani leadership emphasised the Islamic character of the state. The ideological debate within the state also addressed this question. An editorial in the leading progressive newspaper in the country, Pakistan Times indirectly supported the state's version when it challenged Bacha Khan and Congress arguing that ethnic and linguistic nationalism has no place in Islam.⁴⁸

Ideological Debates among the Intelligentsia

During its formative phase, Pakistan went through an intense ideological debate about the outlook of the state. Clergies led by Maulana Syed Abu ala Maududi were advocating a theocracy whereas the progressives and moderates led by Mian Iftikaruddin, Faiz Ahmed Faiz and other stalwarts were advocating a secular and modernist outlook. Muslim League campaigned for a separate state focusing on Muslim identity now found it quite difficult to counter the pressure from the clergies. The political leadership of the state was also divided: while Molvi Tameezuddin Khan and Moulana Shabbir Ahmed Usmani were leading the conservatives, the progressives were led by Ghulam Muhammad. While Liaquat Ali Khan, I.H. Qureshi and Fazalur Rehman towed centralist line. In media, the former were represented by daily Dawn and the latter by daily Nawa-e-Waqat. Within the Muslim League, a few Muslim league leaders such as Mian Mumtaz Daultana, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan and Nawab Iftikhar Mamdot were using the religious groups to advance their political interest. Ulemas were constantly pressurizing for the adoption of an Islamic system of governance in the country.⁴⁹

Majlis-e-Ahrar started a public campaign for preparing and adopting an Islamic constitution in May and June 1948. The leadership of the Majlis argued that Islam can keep the nation united and adaptation of an Islamic system of governance can rid the state of dissonance and bedlam.⁵⁰

While all this was going on, a few enthusiasts took it upon themselves to enforce sharia laws. For instance, Nawabzada Fatehullah Khan, who was DC Jhang issued an order on 19 July 1948 according to which all government employees were to offer the jumma prayers at the Kachehri mosque and those who miss these prayers would be fined Rs. 1. The Jumma prayers will be led by the DC himself.⁵¹ The Chief Minister of East Pakistan, Mr. Noorul Amin banned liquor on 1 April 1949.⁵² Ministry of Education launched compulsory religious education in all government schools.⁵³ Next year in October 1949, Islamic studies was included in compulsory subjects for matriculation classes by the Punjab University.⁵⁴ An all Pakistan Political Science conference was held in Lahore in March 1950. During his presidential lecture for the conference, Moulvi Tameezud Din emphasised that Islam is a complete code of life and politics is an integral part of it.⁵⁵ As part of the conference, a committee was formed to draft a constitution for Pakistan. The committee was headed by Moulana Hasanat Syed Muhammad Ahmed. On 25 September the committee published the proposed preamble and principles of the constitution with Sharia as the supreme law for the country.⁵⁶

National Narrative, Strategic Culture and Global Alignment

Due to the several security concerns that Pakistan faced since its independence in 1947, securing the state became the primary concern of the state and its leadership. As it was militarily weak as well as in economic and industrial infrastructure, it started a quest for a balancer against the Indian threat.⁵⁷ The first decade of its history witnessed this quest. The search ended when Pakistan's relations with China were established on firm footings. In its quest for security, it reached out to the Muslim world and USA. A

number of historians are of the view that the fact that Pakistan inherited British India's threat perception further complicated the situation.⁵⁸ In an interview soon after independence, Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah focusing on the emerging cold war between USA-USSR hinting at the possible role of Pakistan stated that in keeping with the fact that USSR is not far away from it, Washington needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needed USA.⁵⁹ However, at that time, Washington was trying to befriend Nehru as Washington's first choice was India and not Pakistan. It was Nehru's refusal and USSR's invitation to Pakistani prime minister for an official visit that forced Washington to change its mind and reach out to Pakistan.⁶⁰ As Muslim identity was a key factor in the creation of Pakistan, it was logical for the leadership of Pakistan to reach out to the Muslim world and forge a strong alliance with Muslim countries. Moulana Shabbir Ahmed Usamni was the head of the All Pakistan Arabic Society. The aim of this society was to promote Arabic language in Pakistan as well as work towards the unity of the Muslim ummah.⁶¹ On 22 November 1947, another organisation with the name of "Islamic World Association of Pakistan" was established.⁶² "Jamaat Akhuwat-e-Islamia," that had the patronage of then Interior Minister Khawaja Shahab-ud-Din organised a world Muslim Conference in Karachi in February 1949.⁶³

The elite also emphasised on Islamic way of life. A number of leading members of intelligentsia such as the education minister Fazalur Rehman, Dr Ishtiaq Hussain Qureshi, minister of state, VC Punjab university Dr Umer Hayat Malik and VC Sindh University Professor Abu Bakar Haleem who were instrumental in defining the national character of Pakistan emphasised this point albeit through progressive perspective. Under them, the education as the key element in nation building and creating patriotism was identified and emphasised.⁶⁴ In an "All Pakistan Educational Conference" held in Karachi from 27 November to 1 December 1947 covenanted to promote and project the two-nation theory. Another important pledge of the conference participants was to promote Urdu as the only national language of Pakistan.⁶⁵ Thus giving birth to the Bengali-Urdu language controversy.

On 25 February 1949, an in-camera meeting of Muslim League's parliamentary committee was held. Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan chaired the meeting. During the meeting the issue of "Objective Resolution" was discussed.⁶⁶ As the views on the future constitution were divided between the secular and orthodox elements within the Muslim League, Prime minister Liaquat Ali Khan established a sub-committee to bridge this divide and reach to a consensus. However, the sub-committee failed to develop a consensus due to stark differences between the two groups. The prime minister decided to publish the draft resolution in the print media on 1 March 1949.⁶⁷ The kerfuffle continued when the resolution was presented in the assembly on 7 March 1949. Despite opposition from the progressive and minority members, the resolution was passed by the constituent assembly. The resolution described the image as well as orientation of the state of Pakistan as Islamic, acknowledged the supremacy of the Islamic laws and adopted the principle of Divine sovereignty. The government in East Pakistan in 1950, altered the school syllabus of history and geography.⁶⁸ This could be termed as first such change in a series of changes of the syllabus to project a certain image and description of a personality

and historical event. Around the same time, serious consideration was given by the East Pakistan assembly to establish a Bait-ul-Maal under the offices of East Bengal Accountant General.⁶⁹ Federal minister Fazlur Rahman was appointed the president of the Pakistan Historical Society that was established in 1951 with an aim of revisiting the Muslim history of the subcontinent with particular focus on the works of Hindu and British historians.⁷⁰ In 1952, the Society constituted a board of historians to research and write a detailed historical account of the Muslim period with particular focus on the freedom movement.⁷¹ While the team of the historians appointed by the society to prepare such a history, in 1955 the Pakistan History Board⁷² published "A Short History of Hind-Pakistan."⁷³ It is argued that this was an obvious extension of F.A Karim's work⁷⁴ as well as of the history narration earlier notified by the government of East Pakistan.⁷⁵

In early 1950s, the state supported history writing in order to develop nationalism on the commonality of religion.⁷⁶ This decision was primarily taken to counter the insecurity emanating from the structure wherein perpetual threats existed from across the borders as well as from within the borders. The state felt to address two immediate challenges: one, nation-building; second, the need for establishing and solidifying the Muslims identity of the people of Pakistan so that Pakistan and the Pakistani could be distinguished from that of the Hindus identity. This was aimed at countering the propaganda against state's *raison d'être*.

In national political arena, the ideological tussle between the Ulema's demand for an Islamic constitution and nationalist politicians' demand for internal autonomy and a secular constitution gained momentum. In the midst of this tussle, the Ulemas demonstrated their ability to mobilise the masses during the 1953 anti-Ahmedi 'Khatam-e-Nabuwat' movement. At the time when constitution bill was tabled, majority of Muslims favored Islamic system of governance.

While all this was happening, Pakistan's first ever constitution was adopted by Choudhry Muhammad Ali's Government.⁷⁷ The constitution declared the official name of Pakistan as the "Islamic Republic of Pakistan" endorsing Islamic character of the country. The constitution also obligated the president to be a Muslim, the creation of an 'Islamic Ideology Council' and an 'Islamic Research Institute.'

Consolidation and Propagation of National Narrative

Following the 1958 martial law, the new government set up an education commission under the secretary for Education S. M. Sharif.⁷⁸ The commission submitted its report on 26 August 1959. The report raised alarm about the attempts at creating provincialism and regionalism in Pakistan. The report emphasised the need to use and apply religious teachings and education to further strengthen as well as preservation of the ideology of Pakistan. Through this, the report argued a sense of nationhood and unity would be established.⁷⁹ The report recommended making Islamic studies as a subject compulsory for primary and secondary level education.⁸⁰ The "Textbook Advisory Board" revised its policy in early 1960s. Up till 1962, the policy was to select books from published

by different publishers.⁸¹ Now with the establishment of “West-Pakistan Textbook Board” it was decided that the board itself would develop the curriculum.⁸²

The 1971 war resulted in the dismemberment of the country. The fall of Decca and East Pakistan becoming Bangladesh gave birth to another wave of propaganda against the state of Pakistan and its ideological foundations. Indira Gandhi, the then Indian prime minister boasted, “we have taken the revenge of a thousand years,” adding “we have drowned the two-nation theory in the Bay of Bengal.”⁸³ International media also started questioning the *raison d’etre* of the state of Pakistan, the future of the rest of Pakistan (then west Pakistan, now the state of Pakistan) and raised questions about the veracity as well as applicability of the two-nation theory.⁸⁴

After the separation of East Pakistan, Bhutto took over the helm of affairs and start to reorient and realign the foreign policy of Pakistan. Under him, Pakistan inched towards non-alignment, and reached out to the West Asian region.⁸⁵ Bhutto projected himself as the leader of the third world and the Muslim world. Pakistan provided significant support to both Syria and Egypt during the 1973 Arab-Israel war.⁸⁶ The landmark event during Bhutto’s regime was the second OIC summit that was held in Lahore in 1974. It not only boosted Pakistan’s confidence as a state, it also brought it on the centre stage of the Muslim world. This policy of focusing on the Middle East and West Asia soon paid its dividends. Pakistan received significant support from the Middle Eastern countries. Between 1973 to 1976, Pakistan received US\$ 993 million as credits and loans from Saudi Arabia, Libya, UAE and Iran.⁸⁷ During this period the state of Pakistan faced security challenges from its western border i.e., Afghanistan. In July 1973, Daud overthrew Zahir Shah’s government and took over Kabul. Soon after, Kabul started to actively support the separatist elements in movements in the Baloch and the Pashtun areas of Pakistan.⁸⁸ The Cold War dynamics were also at play. In response, Pakistan supported the anti-Daud groups in Afghanistan led by people like Burhan-ud-Din Rabbani and Gulbadin Hikmatyar, both of these would become mainstream mujahedeen leaders after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.⁸⁹

On domestic front, Bhutto faced stiff opposition from NAP and the JUI as these two parties who had nothing in common except their dislike of Bhutto and the Pakistan People’s Party formed provincial governments in Balochistan and the erstwhile NWFP, now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.⁹⁰ JUI’s government in NWFP was quick to ban on alcohol and gambling in the province, moved to declare Friday as the weekly holiday and ordered the hotel industry to remained closed during the days in the holy month of Ramzan.⁹¹ This was not surprising as Mufti Mehmood led JUI was a religious political party with a commitment to enforce Islamic sharia in the country. So it was logical that they moved ahead with these measures. The religious groups in Pakistan were particularly critical of Bhutto’s political views and openly declared him a danger to Pakistan. Bhutto who fought the election on slogans such as Islamic socialism.⁹² After assuming power, Bhutto took several steps to reinforce Pakistan’s Muslim identity and introduced several steps within the country to dispel the campaign led by the religious political parties against him and his politics. In the constitution of Pakistan of 1973, Pakistan’s official name was declared to

be the Islamic republic of Pakistan and Islam was declared as the official religion of Pakistan. It also pledged that no law in the country will be enacted that this against the spirit and teachings of Islam.⁹³ Moreover, the Council of Islamic Ideology and the Federal Shari'at Courts were given constitutional cover.⁹⁴ In 1972, the government also issued an education policy. In this policy, Islamic Studies was made a compulsory subject up to secondary level. Arabic Language was also included as a compulsory subject in the middle school. Other than Islamic Studies, the percentage of Islamic content was increased in other subjects.⁹⁵ In 1976, committee was established at the national level in which experts were assigned the task to review the existing text books published by the provincial text book boards and ensure that these books have nothing against or contradictory to the ideology of Pakistan and identify any content that might favour regional and/ or ethnic biases. To further augment this, Pakistan studies and movement was introduced as a compulsory paper at different levels.⁹⁶ The government also promulgated a "Federal Supervision of Curricula, Textbooks and Maintenance of Standards of Education Act 1976."⁹⁷

General Zia-ul-Haq after taking over the power further intensified the Islamisation drive in Pakistan. So much so that most of the observers credit him to be the architect of the Islamisation of Pakistan. From the outset, General Zia made it known that he intends to revise the education policy and base it on the Islamic principles: The highest priority would be given to the revision of the curricula with a view to re-organizing the entire content around Islamic thought and giving education an ideological orientation so that Islamic ideology permeates the thinking of the younger generation and helps them with the necessary conviction and ability to refashion society according to Islamic tenets.⁹⁸

In 1981, through a notification⁹⁹ the government declared 'Pakistan Studies' a compulsory subject for all secondary, higher secondary and degree classes. Furthermore, the University Grants Commission directed the textbook authors to present the syllabi to the students that "induces pride for the nation's past, enthusiasm for the present and unshakeable faith in the stability and longevity of Pakistan."¹⁰⁰ UGC instructed: -

- To demonstrate that the basis of Pakistan is not to be founded in racial, linguistic, or geographical factors, but, rather, in the shared experience of a common religion.
- To get students to know and appreciate the Ideology of Pakistan, and to popularise it with slogans.
- To guide students towards the ultimate goal of Pakistan - the creation of a completely Islamised State.¹⁰¹

Reflections and Appraisal

Pakistan emerged on the map in what can be termed borrowing Charles Dicken's famous lines from his novel *The Tale of Two Cities* can be termed as the best of as well as worst of times. It was best of times because colonialism was ending and colonised people

across the globe were winning their freedom. It was worst of time because the world was entering into one of the most dangerous and uncertain era of global rivalry in which several smaller states were compelled to join one side or the other which had serious implication for these states. Pakistan was one such state. Its geography and unjust partition plan positioned it in a geopolitical order that perpetuated continued insecurity to the nascent state. The people had won the freedom based on an ideological narrative that had historical underpinnings. This imbued in them a desire for a traditional Muslim social order.

India and Afghanistan added another layer to its security and threat perception. Internally, Pakistan faced number of issues. For instance, local sub-nationalistic sentiments, that were earlier less conspicuous due to a much greater idea of Muslim nationalism, started to emerge particularly Bengali, Pashtun and Sindhi nationalisms. Added to all this was the migrant influx. These all contributed to developing a specific strategic culture wherein the state was in a constant security dilemma and so perceived each and every divergent view as emanating from anti-state sources.

It was this perception of insecurity emanating from the structural setting that was responsible for the state to embark upon internal and external alignment. Pakistan needed alignment with USA to obtain economic, technological and military aid. The other alignment the state sought was with the Muslim world. Again, strategic compulsions as well as ideological affinity dictated this alignment.

The insecurity that perpetuated through early years of its inception also necessitated nation building. This insecurity persisted throughout the period preceding authoring of historical accounts that later translated into collective national myth. Ideational stream at that point was passing through Islamic euphoria due to recently won freedom and drive for Muslim unity. Threatening intent demonstrations from Afghanistan and India in the years preceding crystallisation of common historical accounts greatly influenced the perception of insecurity.

The sense of insecurity from immediate neighbours mitigated as the state aligned with USA. This was demonstrated by reduction in anti-Pakistan propaganda and force mobilisations by India and Afghanistan. On domestic front, recede of secessionist movements coupled with economic improvement marked stability during early years of Ayub regime. As soon as the sense of insecurity mitigated, the state tended to a rather secular orientation. During this period, state elite made endeavours to project 'secular' ideals. This change in state behaviour was due to favouring structural shift. Capabilities of hostile state actors existed but intent demonstrations were trimmed down. The state was passing through a phase of assured security. Thus, state behaviour concerning narrative formation and propagation was evidently a function of structural setting and accompanied perceptions about security. As the compulsions eased, so was the state's response.

This all changed in the decade of 1971. Events leading up to and post 1971 fall of Dacca had far reaching effects on state elite's psyche. India had doggedly demonstrated its intent and laid its victory claims challenging the *raison d'être* of the state. Afghanistan under Daud had returned to its policy of hostility. Fourth phase of Baloch insurgency had followed secession of East Pakistan. The elite had started revision of ideological grounds for nation-building. Thus, the insecurity [of ruling elite] acted as a push factor for reformation of state's meta narrative. Resultantly, Bhutto introduced evermore Islamism into the constitutional development. General Zia had staged coup d'état following a strong public fervour for enforcement of 'Nizam-e-Mustafa'. General Zia therefore embarked upon a phenomenal Islamisation program.

To conclude, it is the confluence of intentions and capabilities that decides the course of politics. Structural compulsions are the major drivers of state behaviour whether it concerns state's role in international system or domestic politics. These structural compulsions cannot be understood unless we take into account different components of this structure and the ideational array prevailing at that particular juncture of history. This research finds that narrative formation and its propagation in post-colonial states are heavily influenced by the structural setting shaped by structural compulsions, strategic culture characterised by ideational array and elite preferences shaped by the earlier two.

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