


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**ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE: REVISITING THE ROOT
CAUSES AND IMPACTS OF CORRUPTION AND
MISMANAGEMENT**

Saeed ur Rahman

Introduction

Governance is generally conceived of as the exercise of economic, political and administrative authority in the public and private spheres to manage a country's affair at all levels to improve the quality of life of the people. It is a process where divergent opinions and desires are satisfied through compromise and tolerance in a spirit of cooperative action for the mutual benefit of the larger whole. "It has three dimensions: one, the political regime; two, the systems and procedures for exercising authority; and three, the capacity of governments."¹

The foundations of 'good governance' rest on the principles of freedom - of thought, of speech, from persecution and from hunger; equality – non-discrimination; justice; honesty; transparency; and accountability. Philosophical areas and religious texts are sated with the definitions and examples of both good and bad governance. The concept of 'governance' is based on lessons from history which records both the downfall of nations resulting from bad governance, and also lessons of how nations have risen to great heights as a consequence of 'good Governance'.

In recent years, the concept of governance has been evolving from, considered by some, the narrow definition used by the World Bank as "the manner in which power is exercised in the

management of a country's economic and social resources"² to the broader definition adopted by the Commission on Global Governance as "the sum of the many ways in which individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs."³

There is general consensus among think tanks that the best mechanism to sustain growth in the future is to ensure effective governance. This may be realized through reforms in civil services, improving the capacity of institutions to frame coherent policies and ensure their consistent implementation over time, developing suitable measures for legal recourse, improving resource mobilization at all tiers of government and controlling unproductive public expenditures. This paper is an attempt to discuss the implications of corruption and corrupt practices as an impediment to good governance and as a cause of the failure of institutional structures and the social and economic costs of mal-governance.

ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE

Economic Management

The proper allocation of resources to ensure wide spread and equitable economic and social development of a nation is the basic responsibility of any government and this can only be achieved through good governance. Unfortunately, this has been a dream for not only the policy makers of Pakistan, but also of its people. The rising poverty and the unequal distribution of the benefits of economic growth bear indication to the ineffectiveness in social and economic development exhibited by various governments in Pakistan since its inception.

Governments in Pakistan have included, and continue to do so, all economic, social and cultural activities through a variety of agencies, government, quasi-government, and public sector corporations. They are the single largest employers. They consume disproportionate amounts of credit and generate the largest amounts of rents. However, their contribution to equitable and sustainable economic and social development is dwarfed by the quantum of resources they pre-empt and the inefficient manner in which these are allocated, which have generated inefficiencies, corruption and rents accruing only to vested interest groups.

While governments in Pakistan have been spending and consuming more, their expenditure on the development of infrastructure and social services has been declining. The bulk of investment is into high profile low yield projects, support for inefficient organizations, and inefficient subsidies to the loss of social sector expenditures. “Other significant claims on government resources are for payment of subsidies (which are inefficiently distributed and are misdirected), welfare (which also are misdirected, centrally controlled, politically motivated, have high unit costs, and often exclude the disadvantaged segments of society - women, the poor - for whom they are meant) and public enterprise losses”⁴. And last but not least “increasing democratization has claimed a good deal of public resources.... cabinets have been expanding, demand for both public services and public employment has been rising, development resources have increasingly been

sought after by politicians for personal use, and public money has more often been spent on politically motivated projects”

Expenditure Management

In Pakistani society there is lack of transparency and accountability in the process of allocation and expenditure. Consultation in matters of taxation with vested interest groups has always existed. This has, however, improved over time as the composition of the legislatures is changed in favour of the urban areas. In making the budget, however, there is little external input. Expenditure requests are not scrutinized by legislators. Budgets are framed without a consistent macroeconomic framework.

Medium to long-term expenditure plans are not prepared, neither are such frameworks established. There is, therefore, no link between the composition of expenditures and the financing of the deficit to major economic parameters, such as growth and prices. This, therefore, erodes efficient allocation and effective management of the macro-economy. “Expenditure evaluation is minimal. Policy evaluation is largely absent. Audits focus on inputs. Impact assessments are rare. Service delivery evaluations are rarer still”⁵.

Corruption

Poor governance leads to, nay encourages and breeds corruption in a number of ways, like bribery and extortion, nepotism, and fraud and embezzlement. It reduces the efficiency on which an economy depends, and by increasing the cost of investment, lowers the potential return. It also reduces the government’s resources and hence its capacity for investment.

Corruption in Pakistan is unique because it occurs up stream, it has wings which encourage flight of capital rather than wheels which encourage reinvestment and it often rewards rather than punishes as the legal processes to fight corruption are weak in themselves and the lower judiciary is amenable to letting off the accused if the ‘*price is right*’.

Corruption remains a substantial obstacle for Pakistan where it is still perceived to be widespread and systemic. Petty corruption in the form of bribery is prevalent in law enforcement, procurement and the provision of public services. The governments’ political institutions are seen as the most corrupt. Various efforts over the past years have tried to develop institutional mechanisms to address these problems. A National Anti-Corruption Strategy, which was developed in 2002, offers a comprehensive plan for tackling corruption. The executing agency, the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), is endowed with comprehensive powers to investigate and prosecute cases. However, a lack of political will, coupled with the perceived co-option of the judiciary and the arbitrariness of many anti-corruption proceedings, are major obstacles in the fight against corruption.

Anti-corruption proceedings have long been suspected of being skewed. They are mainly directed against members of the political opposition and minor civil servants while leaving the conduct of military officials and civilian ruling elites outside scrutiny. Moreover, the National Reconciliation Ordinance of October 2007 has granted blanket immunity for past corrupt actions,

shielding many public officials and members of the government from prosecution. If the current judicial system (which is considered partially in dependent) carries out action against the corrupt persons, the executive branch does not take get agree to obey the orders of the court.

The Transparency International Pakistan (TIP) launched the National Corruption Perception Survey 2010, according to which “corruption worth Rs 223 billion occurred in the country this year compared to Rs 195 billion in 2009”⁶. The report said during 2010, police and bureaucracy maintained their ranking as the two most corrupt public sector institutions, while land administration institutions ranked third in corrupt practices.

Corruption in the judiciary, education and local government sectors increased as compared to 2009, however, customs and taxation departments ranked lower in the list this year. TIP Chairman Syed Adil Gilani said, “In terms of bribery, land administration was the most corrupt sector, where average bribe paid in each incident was Rs 46, 414.”⁷ He said according to the survey, “about 70 percent of Pakistanis thought that the present government was more corrupt than the previous one”⁸. Among the four provincial governments, “Punjab government was the only one rated better than its predecessor, while the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government was rated the most corrupt of the four”⁹,

The massive corruption was carried out “while issuing tenders for development projects, with at least 40 percent of the budget of a tender ending up in misappropriations”¹⁰. “Corruption is

the root cause of all problems in the country and owing to the lack of governance in Pakistan, the credibility of the country has fell internationally. This can be observed from the fact that the Friends of Pakistan Trust Fund, being managed by the World Bank, has not issued any funds to the country in the last two years. “The government of Pakistan needs to address corruption, as the judiciary did by announcing a judicial policy with a zero tolerance for corruption and the Pakistan Army did by removing its senior officers from civilian postings.

Causes of Corruption

The following have been major causes of corruption in Pakistan:

- Abuse of power by the public office holders.
- Political leaders’ incompetence.
- Poorly paid salary structure in the public sector.
- Lack of transparency.
- Absence of adequate internal/external controls to prevent Bribery.
- Poor legislative accountability is consistently a problem and runs the risk of hindering prospects for enacting long-term Anti-corruption reforms.
- Weaknesses in the judicial system.
- Illiterate and ignorant populace with inadequate public discernment of political choices
- Power of influential people.

- Lack of serious programme of combating corruption in the country.

Recommendations

- Head of the institutions and other leaders should be selected on the basis of merit and honesty and they should also be equally held accountable like anyone else.
- Reduction of corruption from the highest levels by setting up national anti-corruption commissions and independent watchdogs.
- Set up exclusive corruption courts, end unnecessary or archaic discretionary laws, enact legislation to improve accountability, ensure transparency and punish the corrupt severely and ensure time bound action.
- Require public officials to declare their assets.
- Provide immunity to informers and pass a Right to Information Bill.
- Educating the people to play an active role in the fight against corruption at all levels, and creating awareness of ill effects of corruption, in this way we can mobilize public support in the fight against corruption.
- Provide adequate salaries.
- Mass media can be used as an effective tool to fight against corruption.

- The democratic system and freedom of speech are real mechanisms that allow to effectively struggle against corruption.

Conclusion

The state to ensure sustainable and equitable development- it must realize that while the government has a role to play in economic development this can only be achieved best through a realization that such a positive role requires not an expansion in the scale of government activity, but an increase in its effectiveness and a major reallocation of its resources. Poor governance is now recognizable. There is a failure to establish a framework of law and government behavior conduces to development, with a tendency to divert public resources for private gain. No arbitrariness in the application of rules and laws with excessively narrowly based decision making mechanisms only exacerbate the problem.

Government must ensure equity and social justice. Moreover, the state needs to provide a major stimulus to economic growth, involving an equitable fiscal policy that emphasizes progressive taxation and 'pro poor' expenditures. There is the need for revitalizing existing state institutions. Political systems need no longer to have representation based on oligarchic interests. The civil service needs to be made more efficient. Similarly, judiciary needs to be more independent as well as accessible to people.

Ultimately, none of these reforms will take place without political will. Pakistan's crisis of governance stems from systemic political, economic and social challenges embedded in the country's

colonial and feudal past. Pakistan, as a former colony, inherited systems of financial accountability, an independent civil service, and a legal framework. However, because they were 'imported' from outside, they have not always taken root. Colonial rule implied accountability to the colonial power, rather than to citizens; it thus sometimes destroyed indigenous systems of accountability. A new vision of governance built on the principles of ownership, accountability and even decency, are only too increasingly becoming imperative for its citizens. It could be argued that till recently, 'governance' had not been established as a major buzz word among policy makers. Yet, what is crucial to grasp is that the concept of effective governance has always been firmly embedded in the popular imagination. In sum, governance is a continuum; it does not automatically improve over time. Citizens need to demand good governance. Their ability to do so is only enhanced by awareness, education, and employment opportunities. The Government needs to be responsive to those demands. For change to be effective it must be embedded in the societies concerned and cannot be imposed from the outside.

End Notes

¹ World Bank 1994, UNDP 1997, OECD 1995, and Commission on Global Governance 1995

² Ibid

³ World Bank, 1994 and the Commission on Global Governance, 1995

⁴ Zafar H. Ismael, Sehar Rizvi, “Some Issues of Governance in Pakistan” May 2010.

⁵ Ibid

⁶ Amar, Guriro, “Corruption thrived in country this year: TI report” Daily times, June 02, 2010

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Syed Ali, Gilani, “ Corruption in Pakistan” TIP National Corruption Survey, Karachi Press Club

⁹ Ibid

¹⁰ Opt Cited. 6

RESURGENT RUSSIA: NATO'S ADVERSARY OR A FUTURE ALLY

Lieutenant Colonel Zahir Kazmi

Russia appears to be warming up to NATO as its efforts to create buffers to the West always come to a naught. It cannot resurge due to its economic, demographic and other geopolitical imperatives. Hence, it is advantageous in its long term interests to play a second fiddle and protect its core territory



from further disintegration and become a reluctant NATO ally.

Abstract

Russia appears to be warming up to NATO as its efforts to create buffers to the West always come to a naught. It cannot resurge due to its economic, demographic and other geopolitical imperatives. Hence, it is advantageous in its long term interests to play a second fiddle and protect its core territory from further disintegration and become a reluctant NATO ally.

Key Words: Russia – Resurgence – NATO – U.S. hegemony
– Germany – China’s economic rise – Geopolitical

Introduction

Russia lacks the capacity to underpin its historical desire to become an ultimate global power or even regain its Cold War power against America due to its geopolitical imperatives. Moscow is rather trying to figure out how to avoid further decay and loss of power. Its excessive reliance on its energy resources and nuclear deterrence can affect strategic stability. Hence, a steady Russia with a ‘credible’ deterrence is in Western interest.

Kremlin has always tried to maximise its power and create buffers towards its west in order to address its perennial geographic vulnerability. It could not maintain the peak of its Cold War power and size for long. Now Moscow strives to regain its influence in the European Heartland through energy politics and by engaging the NATO. To this end, Russia has developed warm relations with Germany. Berlin in turn needs Moscow to meet its energy requirements and to gain European leadership.

The apparent thaw in Russia’s relations with NATO, particularly with the U.S., is due to common security concerns that emerged after the Cold War. Russia-NATO commonality of interests lies in the future of Afghanistan and its neighbouring region; countering proliferation of WMD (weapons of mass destruction) and missile technology; and the threats posed by terrorist networks, organised crime and non-state actors.

Unlike rest of the world, China's remarkable economic rise and military growth do not affect Russia's geopolitical interests. The Far Eastern countries tend to lean on America to contain China. Consequently, America is cementing an arc of strategic partnerships with Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia that stretches up to and includes India. This, in turn, has brought Russia and China closer and there are no prospects of an adversarial relationship between them. Notwithstanding the potential risks of arming Beijing, Moscow is its strategic partner since 1996 and has resolved its longstanding bilateral territorial issues in 2008.


World is drifting towards multi-polarity and it is unlikely that Russia regains the zenith of its Cold War period power against NATO. Though America's power is also waning, no single state – particularly Russia – will be able to pose a serious challenge to it in the short term. Russia faces a power dilemma; it cannot avoid reasserting its power and similarly it knows that it will be difficult to achieve hegemony over Western Europe. Hence, the previously unthinkable idea of Russia becoming part of NATO seems just a matter of time. An emerging NATO-Russia strategic concept may be a precursor to such an alliance and the November 2010 NATO summit in Lisbon seized the opportunity that was created by the “reset” in U.S.-Russian relations and can be termed as a “fresh start”.

Russia & American Hegemony


Russia does not have the capacity to challenge American global hegemony. Alexis de Tocqueville and Friedrich Nietzsche predicted Soviet Union and America's rise in 19th Century¹ but could not foresee their decline. Soviet Union completely collapsed by 2000 and the American power is gradually diluting.



In post-Cold War period the former Soviet states became part of NATO, Moscow's involvement in the alliance's affairs has increased,² and the previously improbable idea of Russian inclusion in the NATO is a distant option at least.³ Likewise, Germany and France have broken their post-Cold War shackles and vie for Europe's leadership.⁴ Though America is still the biggest military and economic power it is learning to cope with a multi-polar world.⁵ There are numerous indicators in this direction. However, a comparison of the GDP and defence budgets of leading powers reveals that even an economically weak U.S. is still the largest economy and military power (See Table-I and II).⁶



Russia has resurged during Putin's hold on power as the President and the Prime Minister of Russia.⁷ Moscow now actively reasserts its power in parts of post-Soviet space and elsewhere. Its role as a major energy producer and indirect control of energy resources of the former Soviet states has given it a newfound confidence.⁸ For instance, Russia wants Ukraine to actively participate in post-Soviet integration organizations like the Eurasian Economic Community, the Customs Union and the emerging Single Economic Space. Russia is also exerting its influence on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to actively participate in integration mechanisms. Putin recently reiterated that the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan is the key project in the Eurasian Economic Community.⁹



In order to play an assertive role in shaping the international system, Moscow uses Europe's energy dependency as a lever¹⁰ and takes advantage of lack of commitment within the European members of NATO.¹¹ However, this effort to reassert its power also raises a bleak prospect of a future desire by Europeans to grab its energy resources.¹² Russian energy politics has also prompted the Europeans to diversify their energy resources and to seek alternative sources of energy.¹³ U.K. has recently shown interest in building nuclear reactors,¹⁴ some Europeans are negotiating with Qatar etc. for LNG¹⁵ and the new pipelines from Central Asia may by-pass Russia.¹⁶



During Lisbon Summit, NATO did not change its stance towards Russia and called on Moscow to reverse its recognition of the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions of Georgia as independent states.¹⁷ NATO members also discussed ways to meet security challenges beyond Euro-Atlantic theatre.¹⁸

Though Russia jostles for increasing influence in Europe and elsewhere, it lags behind U.S. politically, militarily and economically. Such a prediction may not withstand the test of time, but the existing evidence points in that direction. Russia's inflation soars above 12% (Table-III) and it has the lowest economic growth rate at a dismal -7.5% (Table-IV).

Kremlin can assert military power with its largest nuclear arsenal of 13,000 weapons¹⁹ (Table-V), land forces (Table-VI), numerical superiority in tanks and artillery (Table-VII), a sizeable nuclear submarines force (Table-VIII) and a big air force (Table-

IX),²⁰ yet it find it hard to resurge and effectively challenge American hegemony due to its geopolitical constraints.

Russia is geographically destined not to expand beyond its present day borders and its past attempts bore no fruit. The Federation is a strategically vulnerable state that despite its size, finds itself surrounded by enemies and other powers.²¹ Though Russian winter and tundra have always come to its rescue, its land and sea borders are difficult to defend effectively, leaving the country vulnerable to invasion.²² The country's core region consists of only the Moscow-St. Petersburg strip and the surrounding European Russian areas bordered by Ural Mountains. Protecting this strip of land is Russia's primary focus because it is disconnected from Russia's wealth of resources that lie beyond the Urals. In order to fully protect itself from other powers, Russia tries to surround itself with a buffer zone. Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact bloc were a manifestation of this need, thus forcing Russia to either




conquer or influence countries around European Russia, the

Caucasus and non-European Russia.²³ Russia's permanent geographic vulnerability is exacerbated by other dynamics – like demography – and thus it has expanded and contracted in the past along with fluctuation in these factors.

Russia's demographic makeup works as a drag shoot to its progress and resurgence. Russia's unreliable population census holds that about 80% of 140 million are actually ethnic Russians.²⁴ For territorial expansion, Russia forcibly absorbed deeply resentful non-Russian minorities.²⁵ Hence, in trying to create buffers against its geographic vulnerability, Russia has ended up creating a chronic security problem in the form of new populations hostile to Moscow's rule.²⁶ A dismal population growth rate is another impedimen

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


rate has sharply declined by almost 50 percent—and Russia is projected to lose a substantial 40 million people in next fifty years.²⁷ In a sharp contrast, the birth rate of non-ethnic Russians like Muslim Chechens and Dagestanis' has steadily risen since 1990s.²⁸ HIV, tuberculosis, alcoholism among males and heroin abuse among

ethnic Russians, especially of child bearing age, is also negatively affecting their population rate.²⁹

By taking advantage of Russia's unfavourable situation, America has gradually tightened the noose around it by helping in NATO's expansion. America infiltrated into Russia's domain by placing its military bases in Central Asia to support its forces in Afghanistan in 2001.³⁰ Thereafter, Washington successfully placed its military installations in Central and Eastern European states in 2002 and promised a BMD shield against Russia and then Iran.³¹ The most aggressive move came in 2004, once U.S. steered the former Soviet Baltic States into NATO.³² This pushed Russia's buffer to the West within 100 miles from St. Petersburg.³³ America also supports Georgia and


Ukraine's pro-Western revolutions and their NATO membership.³⁴



Thus, while U.S. continues to bolster its ties with Russia, it does not shy away from disputed issues.³⁵


NATO's expansion threatens Russia's fundamental interests.³⁶ If Georgia or Ukraine joins NATO, Russia's ability to defend its core region will be undermined. Moscow's cooperation with NATO and U.S. will be on the condition that latter does not expand to Ukraine or Georgia. Moscow considers arms control of

central importance because it cannot compete with Washington in another conventional and nuclear arms race (see Tables I to IV above).



Kremlin relies on treaties like START to lock the Pentagon into a bilateral strategic balance. For Russia, START is about long term survival and nuclear balance has a central role in ensuring Russian sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The West, on its part, wants Russia to have a credible conventional and nuclear deterrence in order to achieve strategic stability. That is why the Obama administration is proactively



pursuing U.S. Senate for the ratification of START.³⁷ The NATO leaders also back Obama Administration on the START treaty because it affects European security also.³⁸ Another contentious issue about European security is the proposed BMD shield. Russia has also shown eagerness to join the planned missile defence.³⁹ The BMD shield for Europe is more about political bargaining than

actual defence.⁴⁰ The American installations in Europe would have little effect on Russian ICBMs directed at the U.S.⁴¹

A resurgent Russia's strategy is based on three prongs. First, recover influence and effective control in the former Soviet states; then try to create a second tier of buffers beyond its Cold War boundaries without seriously antagonising the U.S. and Western Europe; and finally, continue to prevent coalitions to build against its interests. As Russia can no longer assert its influence in Europe and elsewhere through military force, it will exploit the weaknesses of its former states in Caucasus, Central Asia and Europe to challenge U.S. dominance.⁴² Analysis of Russian geopolitical imperatives leads to the conclusion that its attempts to resurge are basically a defensive move.

Sino-Russian Competition

Sino-Russian relations are good and there is no likelihood of a competition because both have commonality in their geopolitical interests. However, a rising China has prompted America and far-eastern countries to form a strategic partnership against it. America is cementing an arc of strategic partnerships with Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia that stretches up to and includes India. These developments allowed both countries to shed the prospects of adversarial relationship and instead enter a strategic partnership in 1996 and resolve bilateral territorial disputes in 2008.⁴³

Beijing triangulates between Moscow and Washington in order to play each one off against the other⁴⁴ and even attempts to gradually convert Latin America into "China's backyard".

Cooperation between China and Latin America has diversified and expanded in the last six years on the basis of an increasingly close economic and trade relationship that is developing into a strategic partnership. An alliance between China, Latin America, Russia and Iran will be alarming for America.⁴⁵

Russia is a major arms exporter to China. Its exports totalled almost \$16 billion between 1996 and 2000.⁴⁶ China actively pursues licensing and technological transfer from Russia.⁴⁷ Sino-Russian arms deals in the past were a product of Russia's bid to increase its military influence but there are potential risks involved.⁴⁸ China literally dictates the financial terms to Russia and the limited income is lost to the corrupt Russian bureaucracy.⁴⁹ This is a luxury that the flagging Russian economy can ill-afford over a protracted period.

The prospect of a Chinese military threat to Russia is a Western idea that considers a potentially destabilising situation can occur if Russia continues to bilaterally reduce its strategic arms with the U.S.; indirectly letting China's arsenal grows steadily. Though China has announced a self-imposed limit of almost 300 nuclear weapons⁵⁰ for maintaining deterrence, few observers assume that Beijing's stockpile will outnumber Moscow's between 2010 and 2015.⁵¹

Though China is the most populous country in the world, and second only to America's economic power, it will take a long time and sustained economic growth rate to challenge the U.S. hegemony. To continue to rise, Beijing will also have to address its domestic social and political problems. China is less likely to pose a

serious challenge to the U.S. for three reasons: its physical isolation and barriers of impassable terrain prohibit expansion, unlike America it is not a major naval power and it is an unstable country with prosperous coastal regions and an impoverished interior.⁵²

Russian Alliance with NATO

Only someone with a crystal ball may be able to predict the strategic scenario in the 2030s within the context of Russian and NATO relationship. In geopolitics, the geographical imperatives of a state are permanent and dictate its political fortunes too. The primacy of American power is a derivative of its relative geographical advantage,⁵³ Lithuania's destiny as a state constantly striving to maintain its territorial integrity is geographically preordained⁵⁴ and Russia's chequered history of attempts to resurge are ephemeral likewise. Hence, from geopolitical perspective, Russia may never be able to regain its Cold War period influence.

Though America's power is waning, no single state – particularly Russia – will be able to pose a serious challenge to U.S. hegemony in a short term. There is a growing realisation in the Kremlin that Russia risks further disintegration⁵⁵ if it surges on the basis of energy resource politics and nuclear deterrent only. Hence, Russia may attempt to diversify its economy and address its demographic challenges. It will continue to engage NATO, play a second fiddle to the U.S. and show willingness to become a member stopping, short of entering the alliance.

Russia, China, Europe and the U.S. are economically interdependent, so while they appear to compete strategically their

own survival and destinies are intertwined and will largely depend on each other's stability. For instance, there was a speculation that China is considering buying European outstanding debt.⁵⁶ Notwithstanding, the permanent competition, the WMD proliferation threat, countering terrorism and efforts to diminish the role of non-state actors are few reasons for increased cooperation between the three great powers.

War is a constant of history⁵⁷ and while the powers will fight for maximising their gains, the nature of war itself will become more non-traditional and asymmetric. This trend has already set in last one decade. Hence, it can be reasonably argued that the strategic stability between Russia, U.S., Europe and China will continue to grow in next two decades. An emerging NATO-Russia strategic concept may be a precursor to such future cooperation. The November 20th NATO summit in Lisbon seized the opportunity created by the "reset" in U.S.-Russian relations and now there appears to be a "fresh start".⁵⁸

That said, Russia is likely to grow wealthier by manipulating its energy resources but it will remain geographically insecure. Therefore, Russia will use its wealth to create a military force appropriate to protect its interests and manipulate its neighbours through energy politics to deter them to unite against it.

Conclusion

Russia cannot underpin its desire to challenge the U.S. hegemony due to its economic, demographic and geopolitical capacity. Moscow will play a difficult balancing act to regain its

influence in Europe through energy politics and by engaging NATO. The apparent thaw in Russia's relations with NATO, particularly with the U.S., is due to common security concerns that emerged after the Cold War. American attempts to contain China have thus brought Russia and China closer. Russia's resurgence is ephemeral and may not even attain its Cold War period power. Thus it may ultimately compromise and think of becoming part of NATO in mid-term.

End Notes

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integrity and to work toward energy security. START is one area of U.S.-Russia progress.

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NARCO-INDUSTRY IN AFGHANISTAN: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

Mehvish Nigar Qureshi

Introduction

US exit strategy and the efforts to dilute military means with state-building initiatives in Afghanistan faces the biggest hurdle in the form of “Drug Dollars”.¹ The term drug dollars refers to the narco-industry in Afghanistan, which plays a pivot role in funding the insurgency and provides a cost effective livelihood/ source of earning to the people in Afghanistan. Opium poppy was traditionally cultivated in some parts of Afghanistan as far back as the eighteenth century. It is not a new phenomenon to Afghanistan but narco-economy witnessed a rapid growth since 1990’s as production shifted from South-East Asia (mainly Myanmar) to Afghanistan. Now Afghanistan’s opium industry supplies more than 90 percent of the world’s heroin and generates an estimated \$ 3 billion a year in profits.²


The opium economy is now deeply entrenched in Afghanistan and its reach extends far beyond its borders. Narco-industry has not only witnessed vertical growth in terms of getting access to diverse markets but also horizontal growth as now it leaves no one untouched - including the law enforcement agencies tasked with curbing the drug trade, political elite, war lords, and poor farmers. The problems associated with drug use have worsened steadily over the past two decades in Afghanistan. The three decades

of civil unrest and foreign invasions soured the situation. In this period, opium economy emerged as the most reliable means of earning. Today, opium is the country's biggest export and one in seven Afghans is reportedly involved in some aspect of the trade.³ Criminal revenues thus continue to comprise a significant component of the national economy.

The first significant increases in cultivation levels were reported in the 1980s.⁴ This gradual shift further solidified towards the end of the Soviet period (1987) and during the "warlord period" when opium became a surrogate currency to fund various factions at war with one another. There was no let up during the Taliban period as cultivation continued to expand, reaching 91,000 ha in 1999, which was then the highest level of cultivation ever recorded in the country.⁵ Case-studies of Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in Central Asia and the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) in Colombia demonstrate that insurgencies always have an interest in and capability of using drug money for fuelling their cause.⁶ In case of Afghanistan also, the relation between the narcotics industry and the insurgency in southern Afghanistan has augmented gradually, due to the role played by tribalism in both drug trafficking and insurgent networks. According to UNODC Report, the strongest overlap between the insurgency, tribal networks and the drug trade is found in the southern and eastern parts of the country. The links between anti-government elements in Afghanistan and its drug economy have been well-noted. Christopher M. Blanchard traces the links among insurgents, militia,

corrupt officials, government, opium economy and security conditions in Afghanistan.⁷ (See Fig-I)

Figure-I: Insurgency, Government, Opium Economy and Government in Afghanistan



It has become difficult to distinguish clearly between terrorist movements, insurgencies and organized crime (linked to the drug trade or otherwise), since their tactics and funding sources are increasingly similar.⁸ It can now be said that all actors involved in destabilizing Afghanistan are directly or indirectly linked to the drug economy. Insurgents' access to the opium economy translates into increased military capabilities and prolongs conflict. Opiates also

fuel insecurity across Afghanistan as groups fight for control of routes and territory. Finally, the drug trade, in addition to domestic political instability, indirectly contributes to political unrest in neighboring countries i.e. Pakistan, Central Asia and the Chinese province of Xinjiang (bordering Central Asia and Afghanistan).⁹ This paper aims to examine the dynamics of narco-economy in Afghanistan and explores how opiates trade flourished as a major component of Afghanistan's economy since the mid- 1990s. It explores how insecurity is correlated with the opiate economy and why it is difficult to disentangle cause and effect and to distinguish insurgents from drug traffickers is a challenge.

Dynamics of Narco-Industry

Dynamics of narco-industry can be studied as follows:

- Poppy Cultivation Patterns in Afghanistan
- Province-wise Details of Cultivation
- Trafficking and Transportation
- The Illicit Opium Trade Chain in Afghanistan
- Opium Eradication Campaign in Afghanistan

Poppy Cultivation Patterns in Afghanistan

Opium poppy cultivation has been a staple of Afghanistan's economy for over two decades as the figures show due to its environment friendly cultivation patterns as compared to other crops. In recent years, opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has been concentrated in the south-west of the country where government control is weakest. Regions of highest instability are

also the regions of highest cultivation.¹⁰ Today, 1.6 million Afghan people participate in the production of opium.¹¹

In areas such as Hilmand, where cultivation is concentrated, 80 per cent of population is involved in poppy cultivation. In 2002, total opium poppy cultivation covered 74,000 ha, and production reached 3,400 tons. In 2009, opium poppy cultivation increased by 66 per cent (123,000 ha) and production by 129 per cent (6,900 tons) compared to 2002.¹² The southern province of Hilmand accounted for 44 per cent of Afghanistan's opium production. Kandahar province and Nangarhar produced 9 per cent each. Overall, 99 per cent of Afghanistan's opium economy is based on production in southern and western provinces. Opium production in the rest of Afghanistan is negligible.

Table-I: Share of Opium Production by Province in Afghanistan¹³

Province	Share of Opium Production (%)
Hilmand	44%
Nangarhar	9%
Kandahar	9%
Badakshan	6%
Uruzgan	6%
Farah	5%
Other	21%

The pattern in Afghanistan in recent years has been concentration of the area under opium poppy cultivation. As such, reductions in cultivation in the northern, eastern and central regions

are offset and even supplanted by a parallel expansion in opium production in the south. Cultivation mirrors the shifting of routes in response to interdiction and law enforcement presence.

Moreover, details about processing laboratories are revealed by combined ISAF/NATO and Afghan forces counter narcotics operations conducted in 7 provinces (namely Badakhshan, Farah, Hilmand, Hirat, Kandahar, Nangarhar, and Uruzgan), mainly focusing on Hilmand and Nangarhar (especially the district of Achin). They destroyed a total of 27 labs, 17 of them in Hilmand and 8 in Nangarhar, corroborating the assumption that a large proportion of the morphine/heroin manufacturing is taking place within Afghanistan. Twelve laboratories were seized in Sangin district of Hilmand alone, suggesting that this district is crucial for drug traffickers.¹⁴ The location of laboratories in the most insecure areas of Afghanistan further substantiates the link between insurgency and opiates trade.

Trafficking and Transportation

Transnational organized crime groups, with kin on both sides of the same border, as well as Diasporas farther up the trafficking route, are also major players and beneficiaries of the illicit opiate trade. The opiate market (like all illicit drug markets) is controlled by well-established trafficking organizations of various sizes at international level in cooperation with corrupt officials at domestic levels. In some regions, the trade is facilitated by insurgent groups also. Ongoing war conditions have made drug trafficking a legal action and placed it almost in the centre of the Afghan economy.

Every year, the equivalent of some 3,500 tons of opium flow from Afghanistan to the rest of the world, via its immediate neighbors: 40 per cent through the Islamic Republic of Iran, 30 per cent through Pakistan, and the rest through Central Asia (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) which further goes to European markets. Perhaps due to improved security along traditional trafficking routes, some African countries are increasingly used as transit points for Afghan heroin trafficking, especially to Europe and North America. At the source, in Afghanistan, corruption buys protection against eradication, facilitates illicit shipments, and guarantees impunity for drug traffickers. The drug trafficking routes are shown in the figure below.

It has been a normal practice among Afghan poppy growing farmers to pay 10 per cent of their total income, or US\$ 600 million, to the Taliban, warlords, Mullahs or Government officials as tax in return to protection provided by them for trafficking of narcotics.¹⁵ Taliban-led insurgents also get other benefits from drug traffickers, like weapons and financial contributions, in return for the provision of security.


Regional Heroin Flows and Trafficking Routes from Afghanistan



The Illicit Opium Trade Chain in Afghanistan

The opium trade chain in Afghanistan has a number of actors, including farmers, landowners, laborers, corrupt officials, militia, criminal syndicates, traffickers, insurgent groups and Taliban. (See Fig-II) There are no rigidly defined market roles in drug industry. However, chain can be defined as opium is purchased individually **from poppy growing farmers by local traders** who have close connections with poppy cultivators in villages. Because of their close ties to the local communities, they are approachable by these farmers. Throughout most of Afghanistan, traders work as *Kamishankars*, that is, the people who collect opium (usually small volumes) from farmers to supply to the area/district dealers for a fixed commission. There are 2-4 farm-gate traders depending on the level of cultivation for each opium poppy growing village. Next in the chain are **area or district dealers** who act as liaison or intermediaries between **provincial drug traders** and farm-gate traders by controlling the farm-gate trading networks in the villages. Depending on the level of cultivation in the area or district, there are 1-2 traders who collect the opium from farm-gate traders and make cash advances and purchase opium at the farm-gate price.

Fig-II: The Illicit Opium Trade Chain in Afghanistan¹⁶



These district traders perform the job of transferring opium to **provincial/zone traders** who dominate the trade in bulk purchases at the provincial level. Provincial/zone traders transfer the opium to **main market traders**. Each province hosts 1-2 major provincial traders. However, main market traders operate in Hilmand (Sangin and Musa Qala districts), Kandahar (Kandahar and Andarab districts), Nangarhar (Shinwar district), Hirat (Shindad district) and Badakshan (Faizabad district), which are main poppy cultivation regions. These traders then maintain strong links with **international trading networks** who organize processing and trafficking to neighboring countries where some have tribal and family ties as well.

Opium Eradication Campaign in Afghanistan

A region is defined as “opium poppy-free” when it is estimated to have less than 100 ha of poppy cultivation. In 2009, the number of opium poppy free provinces increased to the highest level since 2002. Between 2003 and 2006, the number of cultivating provinces increased before declining in 2006. In 2006, UNODC presented a report which outlined a strategy to gradually increase the number of poppy-free provinces in Afghanistan and reduce cultivation in opium producing provinces. That same year, the main stakeholders (the USA and the United Kingdom) on counter-narcotics in Afghanistan jointly with the Afghan Government announced the Good Performers Initiative (GPI) under the Counter Narcotics Trust Fund (CNTF) in Afghanistan.¹⁷

The objective of the GPI is to support provinces which achieve sustained progress towards opium poppy elimination or remain poppy-free by providing financial support for their priority development projects. In 2006 each of the six poppy-free provinces were awarded US\$ 1,000,000 and eight provinces were awarded US\$ 500,000 for having less than 1,000 hectares of opium poppy cultivation. Seven more poppy-free provinces were announced in August 2007 bringing the total number of poppy-free provinces to 13. This figure reached 18 in 2008. In 2009, 20 provinces were declared opium poppy-free. Following a chronological order from 2002 and 2009, Afghan provinces can be categorized into five groups on the basis of their opium poppy cultivation status:¹⁸

- **Consistently Poppy-free Provinces:** Ghazni, Logar, Paktika and Panjshir. All four provinces maintained a poppy-free status between 2002 and 2009.
- **Reclaimed Provinces:** Bamyan, Khost, Kunduz, Nuristan, Paktya, Parwan, Saripul and Wardak. These eight provinces regained their original opium poppy-free status in 2008 (and continued to be poppy free in 2009) after five years of continuous cultivation between 2003 and 2007.
- **Gained Provinces:** Baghlan, Balkh, Faryab, Ghor, Jawzjan, Kapisa, Takhar and Samangan. These provinces were cultivating opium poppy in 2002 and between 2007 and 2009 had all become poppy-free.

- **Progressive Provinces:** In four provinces (Badakshan, Kunar, Laghman and Nangarhar), the total opium poppy cultivated area was 30,000 ha in 2002 but by 2009 it had decreased to 1,100 ha, showing a positive progress towards eradication.
- **Relapsed Provinces:** In 10 provinces (Hilmand, Hirat, Kabul, Kandahar, Badghis, Kundi, Farah, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul), opium poppy cultivation has shown a marked increase in 2009 compared to 2002.

As mentioned earlier in cultivation patterns, eradication campaign also suggests that it is not sweeping out poppy fields from the country rather concentration of poppy cultivation in areas where insurgency has strong roots and less government control.

Facilitators to Narco-industry

There is a combination of factors which act as facilitators to make narco-industry a feasible source of earning in the country. These facilitators provide motivation to indulge in narco-trade and can be listed as:

- Lack of Effective Governance
- Poverty
- Vibrant Consumption Markets, High Demand vs. Supply Phenomenon
- Cost Effectiveness: Value of the Opiate Trade
- Lack of Alternative livelihood Strategies

Lack of Effective Governance

Narco-industry directly affects the power structure of the producer countries, contributes to the overall growth of the underground economy, and weakens the power of the state to govern and execute.¹⁹ Narco-industry in Afghanistan has successfully penetrated into power structures of government and is thriving on the weaknesses/loopholes in state's policies to tackle this problem. U.S. officials and many observers believe that the introduction of a democratic system of government to Afghanistan has been accompanied by the election and appointment of narcotics-associated individuals to positions of public office.²⁰ Narco-trafficking not only envelops the state but also adds measurably to existing corrupt practices.²¹ These factors facilitate narco-trade to operate smoothly inside the country and beyond.

Poverty

Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world. All its socio-economic indicators are near the bottom of global rankings. In Afghanistan, despite six years of reconstruction and development assistance totaling billions of dollars, unemployment rates remain very high; a large proportion of the population still does not have access to basic services. Although Afghanistan's gross domestic production (GDP) has increased sharply since 2002, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world. In 2008, the national GDP was 180 per cent higher than in 2002. Despite this substantial improvement, 53 per cent of the total population in Afghanistan still lives below the poverty line.²²

Afghanistan has historically suffered from underdevelopment which became chronic and finally led to economic regression as various internecine conflicts ravaged the country.

Economic hardship facilitated the Afghan drug trade to thrive in Afghanistan and ultimately the broader region. Poverty and economic stagnation combined with weak governance and rule of law, motivates ordinary citizens to indulge in narco-industry and serves as a justification for them as they get access to basic facilities of life through the money earned. Further, it also drives them to take the risks associated with the production, processing and transportation of drugs. Moreover, this combination of factors is also aiding insurgent recruitment. Although poverty is not the only factor, but at the root level, it is one of the major facilitator to convince local farmers to switch from licit crop cultivation to poppy cultivation due to great disparities in income of poppy-cultivating and non-poppy cultivating farmers. (See Table-II) The number of people engaged in the opium trade has increased since Taliban times, due in part to increases in prices and production levels of opium poppy. In Hilmand province alone, the estimated number of traders (all levels) varies between 600 and 6,000, meaning that hundreds of families derive financial benefit from the opium trade.²³ In southern Afghanistan, 40 per cent of household income is derived from opium poppy cultivation.

Region	Average annual income of opium poppy growing farmers in \$	Average annual income of non-opium poppy growing farmers in \$
Central	2,357	2,674
Eastern	1,817	1,753
North-eastern	1,970	2,290
Northern	2,270	1,862
Southern	6,194	3,382
Western	2,895	2,273
Overall	5,055	2,370

Table-II: Income of Opium Poppy Growing and non-growing Farmers²⁴

Vibrant Consumption Markets, High Demand vs. Supply Phenomenon

The main opiate consumer markets are: Europe (about 19 per cent of global consumption, with a market value of US\$ 20 billion), the Russian Federation (15 per cent), the Islamic Republic of Iran (15 per cent), China (12 per cent), India (7 per cent), Pakistan (6 per cent), Africa (6 per cent) and the Americas (6 per cent).²⁵ After the decrease in opium production in Myanmar, the demand of Afghan opiates increased in the markets across the world as there was no proportional decrease in heroin consumption. Consequently, Afghan heroin not only filled the gap in the demand but also became an integral part of international drug trade. In addition to main destinations in European markets, routes of transportation pass from

countries which offer vibrant markets to narco-trade also. As a result, seizures are very less.

The world only intercepts one fifth of the global opiate flows every year, with very mixed performances at the country level. The Islamic Republic of Iran has the highest seizures rate, at 20 per cent. Next are China (18 per cent) and Pakistan (17 per cent). In the two main source countries, Afghanistan and Myanmar, seizures represent only 2 per cent each of the world total. An equally insignificant 2 per cent is seized in South- Eastern Europe, the last segment of the Balkan route to Europe. Along the Northern route (Central Asia - Russia), the interception rate is also low (4-5 per cent).²⁶ Africa is an emerging destination for Afghan heroin. One of the indicators is the rise in the number of heroin users, which increased by an estimated 54 per cent between 2004 and 2008. As a result, efforts to combat the opium trade in Afghanistan face the challenge of ending a highly-profitable enterprise fueled by international demand that has become deeply interwoven with the economic, political, and social fabric of a war-torn country.²⁷

Cost Effectiveness: Value of the Opiate Trade

The total value of the opiate market is estimated at US\$ 65 billion, or 20 per cent of the US\$ 320 billion global illicit drug trade.²⁸ Estimating the value is difficult because of the substantial price increases that occur as goods move along trafficking routes, as well as the number of times a shipment may change hands. One kilogram of pure brown heroin at the Afghanistan/ Pakistan border costs US\$ 3,200, while in Europe; the same heroin fetches US\$

150,000-170,000 per kilogram, a markup of 30-50 times the original price. According to UNODC Report 2009, one kilogram of high quality heroin at the Iran/Afghanistan or Iran/Pakistan border is around US\$ 5,000/kg. When the same heroin reaches the Iran/Turkey border its price per kilogram increases to approximately US\$ 8,000, a 60 per cent increase. This swift rise in prices at every border serves as one of the main drivers to attract people into narco-industry

An estimated 11.3 million heroin users pay around US\$ 56 billion to drug dealers per year. The size of the opium market is estimated at around US\$ 7 billion. Consequently, the combined total heroin/opium market is worth upwards of US\$ 60-65 billion per year. This amount is higher than the GDP of 120 countries in the world.²⁹ The estimated \$700 million farm-gate value (equal to volume multiplied by the price of non-dried opium paid to farmers) of the 2007-2008 opium harvest is equivalent in value to approximately 7% of the country's licit GDP. The export value may exceed \$3.4 billion, equivalent to approximately 33% of the country's licit GDP.³⁰ Moreover, many licit and emerging industries are also being financed or supported by profits from narcotics trafficking.

Lack of Alternative livelihood Strategies

Agriculture is an important income source and many Afghans in rural areas do not have diversified livelihood strategies to generate household income. Moreover, due to harsh weather conditions, it is difficult for farmers to harvest food crops. In these

circumstances, opium cultivation becomes the most appropriate choice which is not affected by harsh weather conditions and ensures high profits. Only three persons can harvest one jerib (0.20 ha) of opium poppy-cultivated land in 21 days.³¹

It has been witnessed in 2009, when the gross income for opium growing farmers per hectare decreased by 24% to US\$ 3,562 whereas per hectare income of wheat was at a relatively high level, and wheat prices reached record levels worldwide.³² This led to a shrinking of discrepancy between (illicit) gross income from opium and (licit) income from wheat considerably, driven by decreasing farm-gate prices for opium and, more recently, by higher wheat prices. But no coping strategies were designed to promote licit crop cultivation particularly wheat in this period. As a result, with every slight increase in opium prices, the balance shifted towards poppy cultivation again. Moreover, in case of Eastern Afghanistan's farmers mainly Nangarharis also, who has left opium cultivation in 2005, the lack of alternative livelihood made them revert back to opium poppy cultivation in 2006.

In addition, a considerable number of rural wage laborers are engaged in and benefit from harvesting opium in the absence of alternative livelihood. It is very unfortunate that a large number of itinerant laborers also move to southern Afghanistan during the poppy harvest season to work as wage laborers (lancing and/or harvesting). Although the typical wage is US\$ 5/day, due to labor shortages, daily wage rates were sometimes increased up to US\$ 15/day. It is because of these factors that the figure of opium poppy

growing farmers rose from 42 per cent to 58 per after 2001 and further higher during 2004 and 2005.³³

Recommendations

Narco-trade is deeply entrenched in Afghanistan economy, government and society. Alastair J. McKechnie states that in order to rebuild Afghan economy, there is a need to shift from illegal, low-productivity informal economy to a legal high-productivity formal economy. Most striking feature of the Afghan economy is the prevalence of informal activities in almost all the sectors.³⁴ In such a grave situation, narco-industry can be curtailed in a step by step manner. Following recommendations have been made in this regard:

- There is a need to promote and facilitate licit crop cultivation. In this regard, management of water resources is important to ensure water supplies for crops in dry-season. Moreover, large irrigation projects need to be materialized.
- The current reduction in opium prices is partly a response to market changes. But this opportunity can be best exploited to increase the size of the legal economy in order to isolate the opium economy.
- There is a need to open new areas of agriculture and animal husbandry and government should provide subsidies to revert inclination toward illicit crop cultivation. The developed countries should open their markets to Afghan cotton and textiles.

- The world over, development is the most powerful means to contain the twin threats of drugs and insurgency. In Afghanistan, many farmers grow opium because they depend on loans provided by traders as a down payment for the subsequent drug harvest. Historically this has trapped farmers in debt bondage. Micro-credits can free farmers from their drug masters. Infrastructures, storage facilities and access to markets can help them market their (licit) crops.
- Eradication should only be pursued in areas where people have alternative livelihoods; otherwise problem of poverty may intensify. Progress in Afghanistan should not be measured only by the rising number of opium free provinces as it is due to concentration of poppy fields in southern provinces. Counter-narcotics must be a growing part of national efforts to improve living standards and governance and, therefore, should be a higher priority in international assistance programmes.
- The process of eradication should follow a bottom up as well as a top down approach to reach tangible results. In the past the focus was on eradication, rather than interdiction. It didn't work. Over the past two years, only 10,000 hectares of opium were eradicated: less than 4% of the amount planted, with

an enormous human and economic cost.³⁵ There is a need to disrupt the drug trade by dismantling high value assets. More is needed, for example going after the handful of drug kingpins who control the bulk of the trade. Security Council Resolution 1735 of December 2007 called for them to be listed, their travels banned, their assets seized. So far no names have been submitted to the Council.³⁶ Major traffickers should be reported to the Security Council and brought to justice.

- There is a need to adopt a regional approach to resolve the menace. In southern Afghanistan, for years insurgents and drug traffickers alike have taken advantage of the strategic depth in Pakistan to regroup and strike again, moving opium, equipment, arms and foot soldiers back and forth, in reaction to law enforcement pressure. At present, under combined NATO/Afghan pressure the business is being pushed south and east. Afghan narcotics are smuggled through neighboring countries, and there are no significant seizures. Yearly, as much as half of Afghanistan's opium is exported through Iran, which is threatening border security and spreading addiction. There is a need for regional cooperation to share counter-narcotics intelligence and run joint operations.

Conclusion

The opiate economy is a central rather than marginal phenomenon in Afghanistan. It is an important source of finance for networks of corrupt government officials and for many insurgent groups. After three decades of successful execution, now narco-industry coupled with some anti-government elements in Afghanistan are turning into *narco-cartels* as it happened in Columbia. “In Colombia, for example, drug trafficking (by FARC and ELN) started as a means to a political end – a way of funding an ideologically motivated *guerrilla* movement. Yet, the world over, drug money eventually trumps ideology, and becomes as addictive as the dope itself.”³⁷

A study of dynamics of opium industry shows that Afghanistan has approached this point where some insurgents are now opportunistically moving up the value chain: not just taxing supply, but getting involved in producing, processing, stocking and exporting drugs. Security conditions in Afghanistan also served as a substrate for growth of narco-industry in Afghanistan. Narco-industry in Afghanistan flourished because of two main factors i.e. unstable security environment and insurgency, and lack of alternative livelihood to get rid of poverty. Interestingly, with the passage of time, insurgency and lack of alternative livelihoods have become so dependent on narco-industry that it became the most powerful /influential cartel controlling the state affairs in Afghanistan. Reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts in

Afghanistan can be successful only after cutting the roots of narco-industry from Afghan society and Government.

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FLOOD MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN – A CASE STUDY OF FLOOD 2010

Abdul Rauf Iqbal

Introduction

Pakistan continues to suffer from natural hazards that threaten to affect the lives and livelihood of its citizens. Due to its unique geo-climatic conditions, Pakistan is one of the most disaster prone countries in the world and undergoes natural disasters including floods, earthquakes, landslides, cyclones, and drought. According to a study, over 40% of landmass of Pakistan is vulnerable to earthquakes, 6% to cyclone, 60% to floods and 25% of the Barani land under cultivation is vulnerable to drought.¹

Pakistan is one of the countries with the highest annual average number of people physically exposed to floods, which occur normally due to storm systems that originate from Bay of Bengal during the monsoon from July to September. The storms originating from Bay of Bengal passing over lower Central India and Rajputana, enter Pakistan and continue towards North into Kashmir. The mountain ranges in the extreme north of Pakistan provide a perennial source of inflow into the rivers. Floods particularly hit Punjab and Sindh while hill torrents tend to affect the hilly areas of Khyber Pakhtunkha, Balochistan and the Gilgit Baltistan. Sind, Kabul and Swat are three hazard prone rivers, and due to climatic and ecological condition, Pakistan constantly receives flooding every year. However, when floods exceed normal flooding level,

they take dangerous turns. Floods have caused extensive deaths and huge losses to the national economy.

According to official sources, floods in Pakistan during the decade 1991 to 2001 caused an estimated damage of over Pak Rs 78,000 million to property.² But 2010 flood have broken all past records. Latest Government estimates put the number of people directly affected by the floods at 20 million, and the number continues to rise.³ Assessments to establish the degree to which affected populations are in need of immediate humanitarian assistance continue. The official death toll has risen to 1,603, with 2,366 people reported as injured.⁴ Over 1,237,360 houses are now reported to have been either damaged or destroyed.⁵ In the above backdrop, this paper aims at highlighting the history of disaster management in Pakistan, an analytical view of disaster response of flood 2010 and finally the suggested response.

Disaster Management in Pakistan – A History

In 1950, Pakistan witnessed first but severe flood disaster that claimed 2910 lives and affected more than 10,000 villages.⁶ Since then, floods, drought, cyclones, earthquakes and landslides have been striking with regular intervals but none of the successive governments could ever devise a comprehensive strategy for disaster management.

The need for a flood control programme in the then East Pakistan (Bangladesh) was realized only in the late 60s that subsequently led to the incorporation of the programme in the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1970-75) but efforts in this direction

remained insignificant. Three years later, the Emergency Relief Cell prepared a draft National Disaster Plan in 1974, which intended to deal with various components of disaster management. The Plan was to establish procedures, organizational set-up, fix primary responsibilities and support functions of implementing agencies and standard procedures for the monitoring of disaster operations. However, it has never been finalized and implemented.

At the federal level, the Emergency Relief Cell (ERC) in the Cabinet Division serves as the focal point during emergencies. At the provincial level, the ERC coordinates with provincial relief departments and relief commissioners who are responsible for effective distribution of relief items in respective provinces. The Cell is also responsible for dealing with institutional donors and receives grants, donations and funds for distribution through the Prime Minister's Disaster Relief Fund.

National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)

October 2005 earthquake highlighted the potential of natural disasters in Pakistan that could threaten human life and infrastructure on large scale, as well as pose an impediment to sustained economic growth and social development. The earthquake of 2005 caused direct economic losses of USD 5.2 billion which amounted to 20% of national budget.⁷ Similarly, 14 major floods since 1947 have caused direct damages to the tune of USD 6 billion approximately, apart from huge indirect economic losses.⁸ A reactive emergency response approach was the predominant way of dealing with disasters in Pakistan till end 2006.

Realizing the importance of disaster risk reduction for sustainable social, economic and environmental development, the Government of Pakistan felt the need for establishing appropriate policy, legal and institutional arrangements, and for initiating strategies and programmes to minimize risks and vulnerabilities. To fulfil this need and in pursuance of Resolutions passed by the Provincial Assemblies under Section 144 of the Constitution, the National Disaster Management Ordinance was promulgated in December 2006, wherein a comprehensive system of disaster management, envisaging legal and institutional arrangements at the Federal, Provincial and local levels have been envisaged. As required under the Ordinance, the National Disaster Management Commission (NDMC) has been established under the Chairmanship of the Prime Minister, as the apex policy making body at the federal level in the field of the disaster management.

As required under the Ordinance, National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) was notified on 18th of January, 2007 as the executive arm of the NDMC. It acts as the lead Agency at the federal level to coordinate and implement whole spectrum of disaster management activities. Being an intricate and time sensitive affair, disaster management is required to be done as a One Window Operation through the NDMA to ensure better coordination and optimum utilization of resources, as envisaged under the Ordinance.

Flood Management Strategy

Since floods are almost a routine annual feature in the monsoon season in the areas lying along the rivers and their basins,

the government has a two-pronged flood management strategy: structural and non-structural measures.⁹

Structural measures include constructions of embankments, spurs, dikes dispersion, delay action dams, bypass structures and channelization of flood waters. While the non-structural measures aim at improving flood forecasting system through effective data collection and dissemination system, real time rain fall and river flow data collection, weather radar prediction, modern system of transmission of flood forecasts and improved early flood warning system including based on effective flood forecasts, early flood warning is issued, reliable interaction between all related flood control and relief agencies and timely warning and evacuation arrangements by provincial relief departments and district administrations.

Floods in Pakistan

Hazards, by definition, occur only where and when natural extremes and social systems interact, and that is the case in Pakistan.¹⁰ The human impact of natural disasters in Pakistan can be judged by the World Disasters Report which states that 6,037 people were killed and 8,989,631 affected from 1993 to 2002.¹¹ Floods in Pakistan are caused by heavy concentrated monsoon rains which are sometimes augmented by snowmelt flows. Monsoon depressions originate in the Bay of Bengal (India) and often result in heavy downpour. Additional contribution is made by weather systems from Arabian Sea Seasonal Low), and Mediterranean Sea (Westerly Wave) producing destructive floods in one or more of the main

rivers of the Indus System. While flash floods occur due to cloud bursts and hill torrent flows etc. Temporary natural dams as a result of landslide or glacier movement also sometimes cause floods. Following table represents the flood history of Pakistan¹²:-

Historical Flood Damages in Pakistan

Year	Value of Property Damaged (Rs in million)	Human Lives Lost	Villages affected
1950	11,282.00	2,190	10,000
1956	7,356.00	160	11,609
1957	6,958.00	83	4,498
1973	118,684.00	474 9	719
1976	80,504.00	425	18,390
1978	51,489.00	393	9,199
1988	25,630.00	508	1,000
1992	69,580.00	1,008	13,208
1995	8,698.00	591	6,852
2001	450.00	219	50
2003	5,175.00	484	4,376
2004	15.00	85	47
2005	Not reported	59	1,931
2006	Not reported	523	2,477
2007	Not reported	586	6,498
Total:	385,785.00	7,806	99,854

Flood 2010

The 2010 Pakistan floods began in July 2010 following heavy monsoon rains in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh, Punjab and Balochistan regions of Pakistan. Present estimates indicate that over 2,000 people have died and over a million homes have been destroyed since the flooding began. The UN estimates that more than 21 million people are injured or homeless as a result of the flooding, exceeding the combined total of individuals affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Kashmir earthquake and the 2010 Haiti earthquake.¹³ At one point, approximately one-fifth of Pakistan's total land area was underwater due to the flooding.¹⁴ The story does not end here but the coming days are more critical as millions of people in Punjab and Sindh have lost their homes and are facing hunger and illness unless they get vital help.¹⁵ Beyond the human suffering and loss of lives, the floods have inflicted tremendous damage to property and infrastructure, including roads, railway lines, communication links and energy supply lines. Power plants and some gas fields have had to be closed down, leaving millions without power.

Disaster Response of Floods 2010

Due to frequent occurrence of disasters induced by natural hazards, NDMA has failed to develop system across the country to handle disaster at national level.¹⁶ Earthquake 2005 was fast onset disaster, all damages are natural and one can not criticize government or any authority because in fast onset disaster damage to life and property can not be minimized by any mean. But floods

2010 was slow onset disaster in which damage to life and property can be attributed to NDMA and the government of Pakistan. Because in slow onset disaster damages can be minimized if a country has disaster management system in place (like early warning system, hazard assessment, risk calculation etc). Further, political differences amongst federal and provincial governments and breaching of channels by the landlords added insult to the injury by making the floods, a complex disaster. At the time, when poor management policy of NDMA and the government left the entire country under water, civil society came upfront to manage the aftereffects of flood. They, along with their international counterparts, assisted by UN and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), help the flood-affected people by providing them food, medicine and shelter. Thus, the second and third wave of looses was timely managed by the civil society which clearly speaks that the government's management component is missing.

Shortcoming in Management

Flood damages to immovable property can not be minimized by any mean but one can minimize the risk of a potential hazard in pre-flood period through proper system and technology. Unfortunately, successive governments of Pakistan are responsible for irrecoverable damage to the 'food basket' of Indus Basin. Because this damage can be minimized if the government of Pakistan has built dams which are best instrument of flood control. Swat and Kabul Rivers generate flood because their water is unchecked or free in flow. Technically speaking, both rivers must

have dams for control over its water and flow but due to poor planning of the government and its concerned institutions, floods have devastated Pakistan. Also, NDMA is responsible for damages to life and immovable property. Because flood is slow onset disaster not a fast onset disaster, which give enough time to the authorities for preparation and mitigation. If NDMA has effective 'national disaster management strategy' in place which includes countrywide early warning system, emergency management plan, hydro meteorological hazards assessment, structural / non-structural measures, environmental impact assessment, environmental degradation assessment and forecast, damages can be minimized. But due to lack of technical management and planning, the whole country was exposed to floods which resulted in damages to life and property of people.

Suggested Response

According to Patrick McCully, Executive Director of International Rivers, there are vital global lessons to learn from the ongoing flood catastrophe in Pakistan. The main lesson is that mismanagement of river systems for the benefit of short-term gain, such as along the Indus, has major long-term costs.¹⁷ Some other valuable lessons include:-

- The pre-flood planning seems to be absent. There is an immediate need to build water reservoirs which would hold the excessive water. This would help Pakistan in two ways; frequency and level of floods

can be controlled and water can be utilized for agriculture and hydro power.

- NDMA has emerged as merely a policy organ which lacks the administrative capability. There is a need for capacity building of it.
- Political differences and lack of coordination between federation and provinces have added insult to injury in flood situation. A coordinated approach was absent and it has been felt that political parties are exploiting the floods card for their personal gains. Synchronized federal approach for disaster management is the need of hour.
- Breaching of water channels by the landlords have changed the course of flood causing numerous losses to life and property. Judicial inquiry against the *breachers* must be carried out to control the human factor of the disaster.
- The rise in the planet temperature has reached a tipping point and people are now in a scary new era of extreme weather. Therefore, every effort should be made to cut greenhouse gas pollution.
- Stop weather disasters to become catastrophes. It means increasing the resilience of infrastructure, economies and communities. Greater resilience in Pakistan would include better emergency warning and evacuation systems, better flood protection for

key infrastructure and plans to help communities recover once the waters recede.

Conclusion

Devastating floods 2010 have caused a huge loss to the people and economy of Pakistan and it has also posed serious questions on the mismanagement and governance issues of the country. Since floods have become almost annual phenomena, there is an immediate need to relook the flood management strategy of Pakistan.

It is also evident from the study that huge flaws in disaster response system of Pakistan have aggravated the situation and resultantly country suffered a historical damage both in term of lives and property. In this backdrop, a serious heed must be paid to enhance the administrative capability of NDMA and empower it for managing the future disasters at the war footing. It is to be remembered that only quality of the response can reduce the consequences of any disaster.

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NATO MISSION IN AFGHANISTAN: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Afshan Sajid

Introduction

The terrorist attack of September 11 on US caused North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to invoke its mutual defense clause – article 5 - first time in its history that “an armed attack on any ally shall be considered an attack against all of them”.¹ Initially, the US did not prefer to let NATO to lead the Afghanistan mission. Though, several NATO countries contributed their troops to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan. ISAF is not a UN force but UN Security Council’s Resolution no. 1386, 1413, 1444 and 1510 are very important regarding the justification of ISAF force in Afghanistan.²

ISAF’s main objectives were to assist newly established Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) and to maintain peace and security in Kabul and its surroundings and to provide them a secure environment to operate. Its most important operation in Afghanistan was Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) on October 12, 2001 in eastern and southern parts of the country which caused the fall of Taliban regime. NATO took command of the ISAF in August 11, 2003.

NATO’s mission in Afghanistan was its first “out of area” mission. After the September 11 terrorist attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, Allies were prone to create a “new” NATO

which would be able to go beyond the European boundaries to achieve its new objectives, e.g., eliminate the evil of terrorism and stop proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).

NATO's main goals in Afghanistan were to combat the threat of terrorism and reconstruction of the country. This landmark operation showed NATO's ability and will to address the security issue in Afghanistan. As it was NATO's first mission out of Euro-Atlantic orbit, this was also a test case of alliances' will to address new security challenges, bring law and order, encourage good governance, bring to a halt on poppy cultivation and corruption, and reconstruct the war ravaged country. The objective of this paper is to analysis NATO's mission in Afghanistan, its different stages, and the challenges and constraints which they are facing in the country.

NATO Mission in Afghanistan

In October 2003, the UN Security Council authorized the expansion of NATO beyond Kabul. NATO mission in Afghanistan was divided in four stages.³ Stage one, 2003 to 2004, NATO moved into northern part of Afghanistan, predominated by French and German forces. At this stage NATO forces started assuming authority for the ISAF mission. Stage two, began in May 2005, NATO started to expand its mission and moved into western Afghanistan where Italian and Spanish forces were the hub of NATO. These areas were relatively stable areas of Afghanistan.

Stage three, began in July 2006, ISAF moved into southern Afghanistan where US, Canadian, Dutch, and British forces were leading. These areas of Afghanistan were most violated region of the

country. Stage four, begin in October 2006, ISAF forces expanded its area of responsibility and took over the command of the whole country. Stage three was considered to be stabilizing those parts of the country. Alliance forces are currently in stage four and five⁴ which involve transition of Afghan forces and redeployment of NATO forces.

NATO mission in Afghanistan was not only its first mission out of European boundaries but it happened to be its first largest area of operational deployment. Currently, it is facing serious problems in Afghanistan both politically and militarily. To accomplish its mission in Afghanistan, it has to address some core issues i.e. effective communication between its members and Afghan civilian, security problems and law and order situation in country, number of its troops and their capabilities, funding and enlargement issues. Apart from these problems, there are also other serious issues like reconstruction, rehabilitation, illiteracy, health problems, drug trafficking, corruption, and poor governance.

Problems and Prospects

In 2006 when NATO forces took command of the whole country including eastern and southern provinces of Afghanistan, there was a common perception that the war torn country should be safe and secure but that did not happen. Though, Alliance has approximately 140, 000 troops in Afghanistan at present operating under NATO and the US command⁵, but coalition forces are not able to tackle the insurgency which is increasing day by day since 2003. Not only coalition force but some 70, 000 Afghan forces and

the similar number of Afghan police have also failed in the security mission undertaken by coalition forces.⁶

From the beginning of NATO mission in Afghanistan, political leaders and local commanders have had to deal with several significant issues which have influenced NATO's reconstruction and peace keeping mission. In the initial two stages of NATO mission, focused issues were:⁷

- Use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to stabilize and rebuild the country;
- Overcoming caveats placed by individual allies on the use of their forces;
- Managing the counter-narcotics effort.

In stages three and four of the ISAF mission, the debate developed around third and fourth Stage, Alliance focused their mission on:⁸

- A refined mission statement;
- A new organizational structure; securing more troops; and the treatment of prisoners.

Not all of these issues have been successfully addressed. At present, main problems or challenges for NATO in Afghanistan are: number of troops and their capabilities; relative failure of security-sector reforms; leadership and governance problem in post-Taliban Afghanistan; counter narcotic strategy; terrorist tactics like suicide bombing, drug trafficking which is a major source of financing insurgency; Taliban resurgence in Pakistan's tribal and frontier region and its links with Afghan insurgency. All these challenges or

constraints are hampering allies' mission. Threats have to be addressed by NATO and have covered strains in US-Pakistan relations in fighting War against Terrorism.⁹

Number of Troops

Coalition forces are unable to hold on to the area cleared of militants particularly in the South and East because of the insufficient number of troops. This factor has greatly damaged the security in Afghanistan. Although, troops level has risen but the number of troops still remains a crucial factor behind the alliance failure to stabilize the country's situation.¹⁰

National Cavities

It is reported that almost half the forces in NATO have some form of caveats. Some governments' troops lack the appropriate equipment to work with other forces. Some nations have not allowed their troops to be deployed in other parts of Afghanistan. Others prohibit their troops from participating in combat operations unless in self-defense. Though, NATO commanders have willingly accepted troops from various countries but they have had to shape the conduct of the mission to fit the capabilities of and caveats on those troops.¹¹

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

PRTs are civilian-military organizations created in 2002. These units have been designed to extend the central government's authority in other parts of Afghanistan. These teams are designed to meet three basic objectives¹²; improve security, extend the reach of

the Afghan government, and facilitate reconstruction in key provinces.

These PRTs are lacking establishment model and many of them are dominated by military forces rather than civilian expertise. There is a general observation about the PRTs that they operate without an overarching concept of operations, do not provide a common range of services, do not have a unified chain of command, and often do not coordinate with each other or exchange information on best practices.¹³

Counter Narcotic Strategy

Afghanistan provides approximately 93 per cent of the world's supply of opium, which is the main source of funding for the Taliban insurgency.¹⁴ Many illicit organizations have been financed and supported by profits from poppy production and trafficking.¹⁵ Thus, a reduction in opium production remains critical factor for coalition forces. Moreover, most of the drugs from Afghanistan find their way into Europe. Despite the fact that opium cultivation fell by 19 percent in 2008,¹⁶ significant differences exist in the Allies' approach to counter narcotics in Afghanistan. These differences are undermining the Alliances' counter insurgency efforts.

Security Sector Reforms

In Afghanistan, the security reforms and reconstruction projects undertaken by the Alliance have not achieved desired outcomes. Its broad efforts to reconstruct and reform country's security sector have produced minimal results. Consequently, NATO has to share more burden of providing security as well as

development and reconstruction reforms which produce sound results. Under the UN-mandated 2001 Bonn Peace Agreement, the US and Germany have respectively helped in creation of Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) each of which has 70,000 personnel.¹⁷

Despite the large number of ANA and ANP, security and reconstruction cannot be achieved. The reason behind the failure of an effective ANA and ANP is both are under armed, inefficient, oppressive and corrupt. Major combat operations are going on in eastern and southern Afghanistan where the US or NATO forces are combating with militant insurgency and the ANA is only playing a secondary role. Reconstruction and security sector reforms including the creation of ANA and ANP and countering narcotics are long term solutions to Taliban-led militancy in Afghanistan. Thus, NATO's failure in realizing these broad goals directly impinges upon its mission in Afghanistan.¹⁸

Leadership Crisis

The crucial issue faced by NATO forces at domestic level which is creating problems for them is the leadership crisis and governance constraints. There is no doubt that Afghanistan has taken very essential steps to build its political structure. Under the supervision of UN, the political domain started evolving in Afghanistan which has helped to create a transitional administration under the leadership of Hamid Karzai. This process also gave the first constitution to Afghanistan which provided the grounds for parliamentary and presidential election in Afghanistan and its

existing executive, legislative and judicial bodies came into being. Despite all these developments, the performance of judiciary, parliament and presidential bodies is not satisfactory. The Karzai administration has failed to extend its power beyond Kabul, especially in eastern and southern Afghanistan where insurgency is on peak. The Karzai administration is not representative government of all ethnic groups of Afghanistan, especially Pashtun, which is the major ethnic group in Afghanistan and the lack of the Pashtun representation in Karzai regime has fueled the insurgency.¹⁹

Confronting Terrorist Tactics

Another important issue for coalition forces is how to combat terrorist tactics such as suicide bombing increasingly used by militants in recent years. As a result, international forces are losing their soldiers with rapidly growing numbers. These suicide bombings emerge as an essential threat in term of tactics rather than strategic threat for the Alliance and Afghan government. The rugged mountainous terrain of Afghanistan facilitates the insurgent's terrorist tactics. To tackle these tactics coalition forces use air power which confirms alliance's victory. However, these aerial bombing resulted in collateral damage and creates ill feelings among the Afghans towards coalition forces.²⁰

Analysis

NATO's performance in Afghanistan mission has not met the expectation of the international community. Alliance scorecard of this mission has rather mixed result.²¹ The Alliance's key objective behind this mission was to reconstruct the war torn

country and provide peace and stability to Afghan citizens but this goal become difficult to achieve because of Taliban resurgence, lack of resources especially shortage of ground forces which resulted in reliance on air-power, differences in allied viewpoint and policies, unable to draw successful strategies to stabilize the country.

On the positive side of the picture, under the command of allies, Afghanistan has witnessed first parliamentary and presidential elections in the country. Besides, development in infrastructure, women representation in Loya Jirga, formulation of Afghan Constitution, educational and social reforms and the prevention of any sectarian conflict are positive step.²² These are significant gains for the Alliance under unfavorable circumstances.

Recommendations

Afghanistan has been facing turmoil since decades because of foreign invaders and been almost in state of civil war. To bring the change in the country and to achieve its goals, Allies should boost troop commitments for Afghanistan, reduce the number and restrictive nature of national caveats on ISAF units, increase pressure on NATO members that are spending less than in this mission defense and undertake another round of enlargement. Hence, to normalize and recover the country's security and stability requires determination, political will and innovation and cooperation from international as well as regional players. Furthermore, allies must avoid or limit the civilian casualties, ANP and ANP assume the responsibility of providing security to its citizens, more emphasize on economic development are the solutions to win this

mission. Moreover, to solve the Afghan security issue, the Alliance need time, patience, consistency and uniformity in policies and the will to win the “hearts and minds” of the Afghans. This can happen when the Alliance adopts the posture of a stabilizing force rather than fighting forces.

Conclusion

NATO’s major concern has been security of North Atlantic areas. However, NATO challenges have been changed. NATO mission in Afghanistan was a test of Alliance capabilities to prove it as a peacekeeping organization ready to handle security issues in contemporary world. It’s an opportunity for allied forces to observe its capability and assess its shortcomings. Afghanistan mission was not only Alliance’s first mission out of its orbit but this is also the ever largest military deployment by the Alliance. Afghanistan proved to be a continuing military and political test for Allies. Therefore, to accomplish its mission, allies needs to develop strategy for economic and political development of the country. Afghanistan’s recovery from decades’ mayhem requires strength, patience, international cooperation and political innovation. To bring law and order in the country, trained and well equipped army and police is necessary. International community must assist and train ANA and ANP in dealing with threats and provide peace and security to its citizens.

End Notes

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